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Post-colonial nature conservation in Southern Africa: same emperors, new clothes?

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Abstract

This paper analyses and evaluates the bordering and othering impacts of environmental geopolitical discourse on land conservation in Southern Africa. Through a theoretical in-depth analysis of the use and contents of the term conservation, this paper examines how conservation is determined, instrumentalized and interpreted by the state, international governmental and non-governmental institutions, and specific interest groups including neo-liberal capitalists and local communities especially in the developing world context. In particular, we discuss the impact of current transboundary park-like conservation practices in Southern Africa and how these feed into the continuous attempts to colonise Southern Africa's nature.

"Native Americans were not mistaken when they accused the Whites of having forked tongues. By separating the relations of political power from the relations of scientific reasoning while continuing to shore up power with reason and reason with power, the moderns have always had two irons in the fire. They have become invincible." (Latour, 1993, p. 38)

"Since most of us live in a hierarchical society, any discourse on wildlife tends to be about social relationships. Whom can we exclude from our Garden of Eden, and how can we keep 'others' from trespassing on valuables that help sustain our life and livelihoods, if not our identities." Marks (1994, p. 120)

"...it could be argued that binary divisions are deeply etched into social space and it is a deeper understanding of boundary erection and distancing that is required if we are to provide alternatives to exclusion and conflict" (Sibley, 2001, p. 240).

Introduction

This paper grows out of interest in the use of conservation as a rhetorical concept in land-use planning endeavors. By examining conservation as a land-use technique, it seeks to explore the underpinnings of this 'tool' and its impacts on the very nature it seeks to protect and on the people who derive and lose benefits from the conservation effort. By focusing our attention on the land management aspect of conservation, we largely restrict ourselves to the spatiality of conservation. In the process of examining the spatial impacts of conservation we also explore its links to the production of expert/technical knowledge and its relation to the advancement of the power and control of modern states and customary elites in the developing world. While doing so we determine that conservation has not only land management implications but also strategic territorial connotations. The territorial connotations of conservation are especially important as they relate to the expansion of control of and access to land and resources of actors engaged in conservation through geo-political ideologies, specifically neoliberalism.

Building on the current debate on political ecology[1], we begin by arguing that conservation as a state science was produced based on utilitarian principles and ideologies of nature that assisted in bringing social order out of the chaos that was perceived in Europe and European colonies at the start of the Industrial Revolution. We then explore its land use and social ordering implications along with the concomitant imaginings of the term's meaning and overview the evolution of conservation from fields such as forestry in order to provide a ground for challenging current conservation knowledge and projects, specifically transboundary conservation in southern Africa. Through a discussion of the interaction of actors – local, national and international – in the context of transboundary conservation, we then present an empirically illustrated understanding of environmental geopolitics that relates to boundary making and territorialization inherent in state and interstate conservation practices (Sletto, 2002). We begin our empirical discussion by examining colonial conservation in southern Africa and exploring the makings of an expert knowledge through colonial imaginings of identity, landscape and wilderness. Of particular concern are the imaginings of nature and identities wrought by conservation practices and technologies from the colonial past to the post-colonial present. By focusing on the ongoing efforts in Southern Africa to create transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) between Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa, this paper will reveal the othering and (b)ordering processes inherent in conservation while explor-

ing the boundary-making/territorial aspects of conservation in the modern-day context.

The disciplinary power of colonial nature conservation

Nature conservation arguably owes its genesis to its being an offshoot of scientific forestry. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, environmentalists and legislators found in scientific forestry a ready-made model to persuade the public that the reservation of vast areas of the public domain served not only environmental but also industrial, settlement, and budgetary purposes. The scientific forestry matrix resolved the tension between romantic and preservationist notions and laissez-faire policies (cf. Barton, 2001). Others such as Scott (1998), Peluso (1992), Lee (1984) as well as Barton have traced the evolution of forestry and conservation from the German bureaucracies of the late-nineteenth century that emerged to make sense of rampant deforestation and create legible forms of natural resource management. Essentially, scientific forestry and conservation emerged as economic tools of the utilitarian movement that existed in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In order to explore the relationship between governance and knowledge production in the context of conservation and forestry, we seek to answer the questions posed by Lee (1984) that remain acute two decades later in pursuing the study of the origins and impacts of conservation. Lee determined that sustained-yield, a core function of scientific forestry, was 'developed as an instrument for ordering social and economic conditions, as well as managing the production of wood from forests' (p. 95). This determination could be examined for conservation by asking; 'First, who were the social agents responsible for the development of sustained yield [substitute: conservation/forestry] and for whom did they act? . . .The second question is related to the first, since it asks: where, when, and by what social agencies was sustained-yield developed? . . .The third question further specifies the first two by asking: what social functions were pursued by developing sustained-yield? Was it designed only to provide continuity in wood supplies for domestic and industrial consumption? Or did it have other purposes as well? . . .In short, did sustained-yield originate as a means for manipulating forests to produce multiple benefits, or was it adopted solely to regulate wood production. . .' (Lee, 1984, p. 95). What Lee is indicating is that if we examine conservation as a set or as sets of human relationships rather than an ecological science based on irrefutable axioms which conservation does not possess, we will better understand its successes, failures and most importantly its societal impacts. We would argue that Lee's questions particularly make sense if seen through the Foucauldian lens of disciplinary power and the knowledge/power nexus.

Foucault's (1991, p. 88) well-known elucidation of 'how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods, etc.' has led to an increasingly better understanding of the role of science, scientific disciplines and knowledge creation and their influence on governance. This clarification of the relationship between science and 'governmentality' has shown how knowledge creates and enhances power. His notion of the diffusion of power among the social agents constituting the production and implementation of knowledge does not diminish the power of the state; in fact it enhances the state's ability to exact compliance. For Foucault, knowledge is already a function of human interests and power relations (Hoy, 1986, p. 129). He asserts that the constant inter-play between the 'exercise of power' and the production of knowledge lead to the continual expansion of both sources of power and new disciplines of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Foucault refers to this form of power as 'disciplinary power'.

Knowledge, according to Foucault, is produced iteratively among human agents through rhetoric and discourses. Seen through this lens, expert knowledge in various disciplines of conservation and scientific forestry should then be considered as a product of environmental discourse and research influenced by the ideologies of the researchers. Similarly, Brosius (1999) argues that environmental discourses are manifestly constitutive of reality (or, rather, of a multiplicity of realities). 'In their constitutiveness they define various forms of agency, administer silences, and prescribe various forms of intervention' (Brosius, 1999, p. 278). McLain (2000) explains the strategic importance of discourse in understanding power in expanding expert knowledge as follows: 'Discourse. . .connects thoughts with practice and thus can be used strategically to influence existing fields of power. And while knowledge is not identical with power, it is so intimately linked with power that knowledge production processes, the acceptance of certain kinds of knowledge over others, and the ways in which different types of knowledge are and can be used, form an integral part of any understanding of power.' (McLain, 2000, pp. 40–41). Expert knowledge and disciplinary discourses produce 'truths' that 'supply systematic procedures' for generation, regulation and production of policies that not only empower states but also empower the producers of the knowledge (Fisher, 2000, p. 25). Hence, as Shore and Wright (1974) argue, an important aspect of state power is the effective disguise by scientific neutrality of the political technologies used to enhance state control over ever-expanding domains of social life.

The seeds of a 'truth regime' in nature conservation in the developing world were sown in the early part of the nineteenth century by a combination of romantic notions of nature inspired by the writings of early environmental philosophers such as Thoreau and Muir and operationalized by early proponents of empire forestry in the United States and in European colonies (see also Demeritt, 1998, p. 182). Conservation, in effect, was produced as a disciplinary tool for the expansion of state control through the domain of public lands and enhanced rule-making and was supported by actors and agents responsible for the production and dissemination of conservation knowledge. Conservation as a science valorized public ownership and management of land due to the visual and physical ravages of the industrial laissez-faire economies. It established 'truths' such as the need for parks and protected areas in order to sustainably manage

natural resources. Knowledge creators, such as biologists, ecologists and social scientists, have validated these truths for states, international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Ferguson, 1997). Western and/or European norms and concepts have thereby been used to understand the developing world and to order and manage developing world resources and populations. Although indigenous knowledge and authority are recognized, they are subsumed into formal state governance structures. This occurs at a high cost to the people who support the traditional leaders, leading to the marginalization of the very people to be 'developed' (Parajuli, 1991). By situating conservation in the domains of NGOs, academic/technical institutions (both international and national) and state bureaucracies, the practice of conservation has thereby marginalized non-western knowledge systems. 'Other knowledges' have been rendered suspect, discredited, excluded, and 'disqualified' (DuBois, 1991). In the words of Sibley, the truth regime has purified knowledge (Sibley, 1995). 'Hence. . .local, popular knowledge has – been assigned to categories in the hierarchization of knowledge 'beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity' (DuBois, 1991, p. 7). This marginalization has been achieved by a belief in 'high modernism' ideologies that valorize the use of western rational science, which compartmentalizes the state's functions into distinct bureaucracies (Scott, 1998). This not only expanded the state's reach but it also legitimized and validated the power-knowledge nexus between providers and implementers of expert knowledge. This compartmentalization was also intended to provide a balance between resource use, resource conservation and societal control (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, p. 67). As this paper demonstrates, conservation programs in the Third World are products of contested knowledge domains of conservation science within the state apparatus that have originated from colonial objectives of consolidating territory, resources and people. These colonial objectives have continued into the practice of state-building and neo-liberal conservation policies in post-colonial Africa largely due to the bureaucratic legacy of colonialism (Drinkwater, 1989). Many, if not most authors, such as Parajuli (1991) and Chingono (1996), have labeled post-colonial African and other Third World states as problematic institutions, largely because the concept of nation-state is European and the African state did not evolve naturally, but was enforced as a condition 'by the international order as the only legitimate agent of social change. . .' (Parajuli, 1991, p. 175). Conservation as part of the development discourse in the developing world contributes to the 'subjugation' of the Third World state by the First World and, through a discourse on 'underdevelopment' and the need to meet First World standards (Redclift, 1991). As DuBois (1991) argues: 'The discourse of underdevelopment is both tactically productive and integrated strategically: it meshes quite nicely with the superstructures of power it helps to institute. On the one hand, the First World has been able to retain, if not strengthen its presence in the Third World. On the other hand, in the name of development cooperation, the elite of the Third World have been able to justify their collusion with various elements (governments, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations) of the First World, often to their own personal benefit.' (DuBois, 1991 p. 25). The discourses of 'underdevelopment' and conservation have allowed the re-entry of former colonizers and the entry of external actors such as international institutions and NGOs interested in achieving 'development' and conservation consistent with the developed world. Offering promises of funding for the building of state capacity and economic development, external actors from the developed states have negotiated 'sovereignty bargains' with post-colonial developing states. It is these post-colonial conservation attempts that we turn to next.

Post-colonial conservation

Post-colonial states such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania, were 'taught' through interactions with non-state actors to pursue certain goals such as clean air, biodiversity conservation as these have been scientifically justified and internationally held to be 'good and appropriate' (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). Developing state actions and policies are strongly influenced by international institutions such as the World Bank, the UN and NGOs such as the IUCN. For instance, in 1992 the IUCN, the world's largest and one of the most influential conservation groups with a membership consisting of states, governmental agencies and NGOs, stated as one of its objectives that 10 percent of the world's terrestrial area needs to be protected in order to ensure the survival of the world's biodiversity (Barzetti, 1993, p. xi). This objective, although not met as yet, has enormous causal weight on state behavior towards conservation.

Similarly, NGOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have 'taught' states to prohibit trade in endangered species and create mechanisms for international sanctions against violators. Thus, agents such as NGOs and international institutions have the ability to shape state interests and practices by providing international legitimation of state policies. These non-state actors achieve this by collecting, producing and providing scientific information on which states can base their policies. By setting the scientific criteria for state policies, international institutions and NGOs broaden their reach through monitoring and funding implementation, thereby inhibiting states' autonomy in domestic rule making (Litfin, 1997). 'By providing states with the expertise and knowledge to refine policies that better enforce and monitor societal compliance to laws, states in effect increase their control over society. This compromise and exchange implies a dialectal relationship between producers of expert knowledge and states. States rely on agents such as international institutions and NGOs to provide them with the expertise to increase administrative order thereby enhancing state control and more importantly legitimizing this enhanced control (Singh, 2001, pp. 8–9).

In the 1980s the state-centric 'fortress conservation' gave way to post-colonial or 'new conservation' where local residents in Southern Africa dependent on natural resources locked within national parks were allowed to participate

in the management of the parks. The fortress conservation paradigm relied on Malthusian notions and the state was 'trusted' by the global community to be the best manager of natural resources especially in the developing world. New conservation provided an evolution of conservation knowledge by including new strands of ecological rationale and neo-liberal economic thinking that proposed to remove or at least reduce the inequities produced by fortress conservation. The knowledge/power alliance in the new conservation had far-reaching effects in social (b)ordering, especially in the developing world context. Although conservation has always included an element of 'danger discourse' through which dire predictions will come true if resources are not managed by the state and international community, it now has found a new and stronger voice that calls for spaces to be bounded and protected especially in the developing world through environmental geo-economics (Dalby, 1999; Sletto, 2002). Hulme and Murphree (1999) explain that new conservation is based on three premises. First, 'conservation should move from being a state-centric activity to being more based in society, and particularly in society at the local level. Local society is usually conceptualized as the 'community' and this has fostered ideas about community-based conservation and community conservation' (p. 278). Second, '. . .new conservation relates to the conceptualization of conservation itself. This has shifted as the idea of conservation as preservation has been challenged by the notion of sustainable development in which both conservation and development goals are achieved at the same time. . .Many factors have led to this shift. . .These include neo-liberal thinking about the role of markets; arguments from 'new ecology' that environments are inherently dynamic and not simply moving towards a 'climax' or equilibrium position. . .an acceptance of the case that much conservation thinking was 'environmental imperialism' prioritizing western conservation goals over African development needs. . .' (p. 279). And the third strand of the new conservation lies in the neo-liberal economic thinking that has dominated the late twentieth century. This strand argues that unfettered markets give individuals the greatest freedom in choosing what to produce and consume and patterns of natural resource use (including conservation) are best determined by market processes (p. 280).

Phrased differently, much more than in colonial times, the new conservation practices are invoked and pushed by a neo-liberal market agenda. That is, conservationists increasingly see conservation as a reaction to rapid industrialization and for providing easy access to pleasant and recreational areas (Redclift, 1991, p. 135). In other words, conservation in the First World was characterized by amenity planning and resolving conflicts resulting from industrialization, over-harvesting and over-farming. In contrast, at the start, as argued above, colonial conservation, in the Third World took on much more pervasive social re-ordering and resource control that was justified by racial colonial managerial policies and sciences (cf. Singh, 2001; Alexander, 2000; Hughes, 1999; Neumann, 1998; Peluso, 1993, 1992). In the contemporary situation, the economic recreational value of conservation has come much more to the fore in the developing world. The increased importance of the economic value of conservation practices is arguably an important reason for its recent expansion and its widespread acceptance by the state and its polity. Hence, in addition to the romantic notions and ecological rationale for conservation, conservation discourse has included in its core an economic justification that is based on the market and neo-liberal capitalism. 'The marketing of nature and nature protection, on the one hand, and a view of human nature and institutions as fundamentally economic, on the other hand, have permeated environmental theory, programs and popular environmental imagery. . . .Nature has become an emporium, a commercial warehouse awaiting its brokers. Conservation theory now analogizes nature to a stock market: we act to conserve nature because 'wild nature' contains potentially useful 'option values' (Zerner 2000, p. 4). By using powerful economic and cultural metaphors and [re]creating global/local linkages, conservationists through conservation knowledge have expanded their territorial responsibility to include areas that are distant from their homes. Zerner (2000, p. 3) points out that through such commodification of nature, its proponents have used well-established knowledge on global/local linkages within the discourse of globalization for global environmental protection and subsequently social ordering programs that make assumptions based on western economic systems. According to Zerner: '. . .global markets and the consumption patterns of northern elites have been programmatically linked to the welfare of remote communities in the South and improved environmental management and protection in the tropics. Over the last decade and a half, environmentalists in a variety of non-governmental and governmental organizations, multilateral financial institutions, and corporations have sought to fashion and to implement a new family of environmentalisms based on markets, commodity flows, incentives, and the idea that people are fundamentally economic creatures. This efflorescence of faith in *homo economicus* is linked to two propositions that have grounded numerous programs and policies in tropical conservation. The way to move people is through their markets. The way to save wild 'nature' is through the eye of the market.' (Zerner 2000, p. 3). Such commodification arguably consists of a commercial exploitation of the purified, unwelcome strange creatures and/or places in human society. Those creatures/places that have extreme characteristics, either being the most dangerous or being the most romantic, are subject to such commercial exploitation. The conserved world created is an 'as if' world, a simulacrum, a copy of a real world that was never real. With rhetorical connotations like 'going native', or 'visiting animals living in their natural habitat' the image of reality is created in such places. In creating this image of a place, the development of nature is historicized and displayed for society's pleasure. The wish to keep everything, to date everything, this othering and museumisation of nature should be seen an act of conscious compensation. It attempts to make up for 'progress' in human society, both in time and human development, which is unavoidable and wanted and has destroyed so much already

(Latour, 1993). The consequence is the development of the welfare society's spotlight places, that produces a temporary or semi-permanent flow of well-to-do people, that all follow the narrow, predetermined and purified alleys of excitement and adventure (see Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). It leads to the packing and clustering together of the same kind of peoples in pre-structured, standardised enclaves of tourism, in which the brochure of these places become reality themselves (*idem*). For the tourists it provides a nature that is kept at a comfortable distance, purified from daily human society and accessible at will for those who imagine being in control, the humans. In short, the distance that is induced by the commodification strategy of nature brings about a 'collaging' of nature and a further purification between the human and non-human society.

Realizing the transboundary nature of most environmental problems and the inadequacy of unilateral efforts to deal with them effectively, the geopolitical discourse on transfrontier conservation has called for a multi-lateral and transnational approach to solving environmental problems. Hence, recent nature parks that spring from the new conservation era often cross state borders, making conservation significantly different than colonial state-driven and state-bounded attempts.

Colonial Conservation in Southern Africa

We now illustrate the above-described developments in conservation thought by focusing on the development of successive conservation practices in Southern Africa. We will follow the distinction made above between colonial and postcolonial (or new) conservation practices and begin our analysis with the start of nature conservation in the colonial era. In general, one could argue that both forms of conservation practices have had important consequences for the intermediation between nature and society in Southern Africa. As described above, the colonial conservation policies forcibly relocated large numbers of indigenous populations (cf. Neumann, 1998, Peluso, 1993; Hughes, 1999; Singh, 2001). These relocations were part of the colonial state's efforts to make the African landscape 'legible' and manageable while controlling prime productive and resource areas (Scott, 1998 and Singh, 2001). By 'inventing' tribes and making sense of African belongings and identities colonial authorities could then move entire populations of indigenous Africans into communal areas while enclosing resource rich regions in the form of parks. The term local community or community implies a territorial identity irrespective of the heterogeneity present within the area these people are located. In the words of Watts:

> *Communities fabricate, and refabricate through their unique histories, the claims that they take to be naturally and self-evidently their own. In this sense, a parallel with nationalism might be in order, since they always involve forms of fantasy and invention (or imagination), and they are always shot through with power and authority – some do the inventing and imagining in the name of others who do not. . .not everyone participates equally in the construction and reproduction of communities, or benefits equally in the construction and reproduction of communities, or benefits equally from the claims made in the name of community.* Watts (2000, p. 37)

The determination of 'community'[2] is shaped by various multi-level forces, which more often than not blur the divisions between local, state and global politics. In other words, conservation enclosed not only wildlife but also indigenous populations. The western ecological rationale did not include an active role for native knowledge and practices and their impacts on biodiversity[3]. Conservation in Africa was an attempt by Europeans to create imperial and nationalistic identities beyond their homelands (Wolmer, 2001 Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; Harries, 1997). As Wolmer (2001, p. 12) points out, 'The imagined landscape of Africa was in large part a by-product of the making of modern European self-consciousness. As Luig and von Oppen point out, 'like other non-European parts of the world, [Africa] served as an important screen for European identities in formation, in a context of imperial quest for domination and control.'

> *Imperial nationalists, almost by definition, have been intent to annex the home-lands of others in their identity-myths. They have projected on these lands and their inhabitants pictorial codes expressing both an affinity with the colonizing country and an estrangement from it. It is often the very 'otherness' of these lands which has made them appear so compelling, especially as a testing ground for imperial energy and imagination.* Daniels (1993, p. 5 as quoted in Wolmer, 2001, pp. 12–13)

By capturing the African lands they further enslaved the black Africans through an imagining of the African society through the creation of 'tribes' (Ranger, 1993) and national parks (Carruthers, 1989; Neumann, 1998; Ranger, 1999).

> *African national parks were particularly symbolically important for the construction of racial and national identity for European settlers and legitimating conquest. In Southern Africa views of landscape were partially vernacularised and a significant element in whites' assertion of colonial identities distinct from those of Europe. Some writers have argued that a European visual aesthetic was brought to bear on African space in order to physically and symbolically appropriate it – to exert cognitive as well as physical mastery over the natural environment.* Wolmer (2001, p. 13).

Although this process of crafting a national identity through national parks/conservation was not unique to Africa, the colonists used these areas to facilitate a 'process of the systematic domination of Africans by whites. National parks constitute yet another strand in the consolidation of white interests over black, and in the struggle between black and white over land and labour' (Carruthers, 1989, p. 189). These European imaginings were legitimized through colonial bureaucracy, science and the evolving expert knowledge in conservation.

Colonial conservation was characterized by coercive state policies that altered African settlement and land use patterns (Neumann, 2000, p. 117). However, as Singh (2001)

and Neumann (2000) point out, states did not act alone. By creating fixed, bounded labels such as 'tribes' and 'traditional leaders', the colonists gave the indigenous population a means to resist (as well as collaborate) by establishing the notion of tribe and chief as an institution. Singh's (2001) study, demonstrated that the traditional leaders reinforced the boundedness of their categories by following the rules of the colonial state while demonstrating the importance of indigenous knowledge in managing local resources. This is not to say that these labels (tribes and chiefs) did not exist before the colonists arrived. However, the historical antecedents of these labels, contrary to current usage, were much more fluid and less bounded. By recognizing them through categorization, expert knowledge in conservation automatically establishes a framework for resistance and collaboration through these labels. By firmly establishing categories such as 'customary or traditional authority' the traditional leaders were able to work within the colonial and post-colonial systems to maintain their legitimacy (Singh, 2001, p. 39).

However, several authors have exposed the 'invention' of African tribes by the colonists (Ranger, 1983; Illife, 1979; Vail, 1989) or 'imaginings' (Ranger, 1993) which was accomplished and validated through the scientific collection of social data to create a sense of order out of the perceived African chaos (Cohn, 1996). This European 'imagining' was super-imposed on a complex African society that benefited both the colonists and the ruling African lineages. These tribes, once labeled and defined, were then compartmentalized into communal containers where customary law could be practiced and encouraged by the colonial authorities. An important reason for establishing these reserves and defining bounded tribal communities was to limit the mobility of the African to within the domain of customary or traditional society. This assisted the colonial authorities in creating effective means of control and domination by 'decentralizing despotism' (Mamdani, 1997). A unique aspect of colonial rule in Africa was that traditional laws were extended to not only personal matters but to land as well (Mamdani, 1997, pp. 50–51). By extending traditional laws to land, land in native reserves became *de jure* communal possession, which marginalized the individual African in favor of maintaining the larger traditional society.

To summarise, colonial state involvement either in the form of technical development or administrative control did not create monopolies of power for any single group (state or traditional leaders) in Southern Africa but, instead, created opportunities for gaining patrons or clients by both the state and traditional leaders. Colonial state interventions set the stage for post-colonial attempts of state-building as both Zimbabwe and Mozambique inherited colonial bureaucracies with established sets of operating procedures.

Post-colonial conservation in Southern Africa

By expanding the single-nation danger discourse to a larger global one, the so-called new conservationists have effectively expanded their influence beyond the nation to the multi-nation level. These discourses have stimulated a number of global conventions to address climate change, air pollution, migratory species, desertification, etc. By fanning fears of continuing biodiversity loss, new conservationists have raised alarm bells especially along international borders where fences and other man-made obstacles hinder the movement of wildlife and their subsequent survival. By combining the danger discourse with sustainable development, 'community' participation and neo-liberal market interventions as described above, the transboundary/transfrontier conservation discourse has appealed to states and border communities/tribes.

This is especially so in southern Africa where with the assistance of the World Bank, US Agency for International Development, Ford Foundation, Peace Parks Foundation and the GTZ, several large transfrontier or transboundary conservation areas have been proposed and are in the process of being established. Within the discourse of new conservation, transboundary conservation, although not a new concept in conservation, has of late gained heightened attention especially in southern Africa. Labeled as the 'new frontier' of conservation by a number of southern African conservationists, transboundary conservation areas (TBCAs) promise the following (Singh, 2000):

(i) to rejoin natural/ecological areas that have been divided by political boundaries as well as restore a number of ecological processes and functions including the nomadic and migratory patterns of terrestrial wildlife;

(ii) to rejoin areas where communities such as in Africa have been divided by political borders imposed by colonial powers to preserve and maintain indigenous traditions, cultures and knowledge as well allow for transboundary community-based natural resource management,

(iii) to provide states means for economic growth through eco-tourism (after oil, tourism ranks as the second highest revenue generator in the world (World Bank, 1996)), and joint resource management or development, and;

(iv) to provide means of establishing a symbolic as well as a functional base for political cooperation.

As the above suggest, TBCAs through ecological, economic and normative rationales has produced a multinational arena for gaining access to cross-border areas for states, environmental groups and international institutions. These TBCAs have enhanced the control of states and subsequently their sovereignty through the discourse and funding opportunities provided by transboundary conservation. Based on the success of European and North American TBCAs, conservation groups such as the IUCN and World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) have promoted TBCAs for not only the above four reasons but to also enhance institutional capacity and peace (cf. Thorsell, 1990; McNeely, 1993; Weed, 1994; Westing, 1998). TBCAs have drawn the attention of private investors as well and provide a unique multi-nation forum that amalgamates a number of environmental ideologies. The TBCA concept '. . .draws on both traditional preservationists notions of wildlife management, and on ecocentric environmental philosophies with their emphasis on biodiversity and their criticism of environmentally inappropriate political boundaries' (Duffy, 1997, p. 442).

Figure 1. Potential and Existing Transboundary Conservation Areas (adapted from Griffin, et al, 1999, p. 1)

The concept of TBCAs in southern Africa dates back to the beginning of the century to efforts by the white colonists to manufacture and transform the African landscape into a series of national parks that would provide commercial and ecological benefits. Wolmer (2001, p. 172) summarizes the history of the Limpopo TFCA that encompasses parts of Mozambique, South Africa (Kruger National Park) and Zimbabwe: 'As well as attempts to manufacture wilderness in particular enclaves of the low veld – the national parks, game ranches and conservancies – the entire region has increasingly been represented and marketed as a 'wildlife landscape.' When in 1933 the Minister of Commerce and Transport envisaged a proposed game reserve in Rhodesia's south-east as a continuation of the South African Kruger Park, and a further contiguous 'sanctuary' on the Mozambican side of the border he was drawing on General Smuts' typically grandiose notion of 'a great fauna and tourist road through Africa'. In recent years the idea of a regional 'wildlife landscape' has re-emerged in the form of what has been termed a 'Peace Park' or Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA). Although there has been conceptual continuity since the colonial period there has been an escalation (in terms of scale and numbers of actors involved) of the political and economic dynamics.' Private conservation-cum-entrepreneurial groups such as the Peace Parks Foundation exemplify the continued interest in the economic and ecological potential of developing TFCAs. The Peace Parks Foundation founded by Anton Rupert, a wealthy South African businessman (and head of Rothmans International Tobacco and board member of other large multinational corporations), ostensibly aims to 'facilitate the establishment of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), supporting sustainable economic development, the conservation of biodiversity, and regional peace and stability' (*www.peaceparks.org* – accessed Nov. 26, 2002). The TFCA Open Africa has a similar mission statement and agenda: 'An alliance of individuals, corporations and institutions committed to optimising job creation, tourism and conservation in Africa' (*www.openafrica.org* – accessed Nov. 26, 2002). Both groups are closely linked with same individuals serving both groups. What is remarkable about these groups besides their wealth and influence in the conservation and corporate worlds is their utopian, modernistic visionary 'imaginings' of Africa. Both envision a series of transboundary parks that 'would link Cape Town to Cairo' and portrayed graphically on a 1997 map entitled 'The Dream' (Figure 2).

In addition to these transboundary landscape visions, both groups, especially Open Africa, espouse 'Afrikatourism'. Afrikatourism, according to these groups is inherently different as it provides a visitor to experience Africa in its natural beauty – where segregated whites and blacks live out a colonial fantasy. Open Africa's website invites visitors to share their imaginings reproduced in their invitation here below:

> *'Redefine 'parks' to include not only the wildlife but also the traditions, culture, arts, archaeological sites, and folklore of Africa. Imagine these linked from Cape Town to Cairo - and serving as the cornerstones of an African paradigm and model of living that harmonizes with nature. Then pencil in some of the following*:
> • *accommodation and new forms of craft and other industries along these links and on the borders of these parks, with informal markets employing hundreds of thousands of people*
> • *agriculture based on farming with wildlife*
> • *music, clothing, art, and theatrical exports with nature as the theme*
> • *education with an emphasis on environmental management*
> • *new forms of architecture based on the old.*
> *See Africa against the background of a worsening environmental crisis almost everywhere else on the globe. Anticipate the human interest in nature 30 years from now to be far greater than can be imagined today, and the yearning for wilderness areas to have intensified vastly by then. Regard Africa as the world's garden, the globe's lung, as the place from which humanity derives a new ethos and ethic of environmental inspiration. The picture you have conjured is of a new Africa, of a new tomorrow.'* (Open Africa Website: *www.openafrica.org* - accessed Nov. 26, 2002).

Thus through an effective message that combines the post-colonial commodification of nature along with danger discourse and the colonial vision of 'tribal' Africa, these groups along with other international NGOs and institutions such as the World Bank and USAID have re-created the colonial vision of Africa. Behind this re-creation is a strong neo-



Figure 2. Map of 'The Dream' (adapted from Open Africa, pers. comm.). The map shows current and potential connecting parks/TBCAs in dark gray.

liberal agenda that promotes not only free trade and markets but also democratic advancement. For instance USAID Regional Center for Southern Africa lists as one of its goals: 'to support regional initiatives to promote an integrated market, strengthen democratic principles, and manage the regions resources sustainably' (USAID-RCSA, 1998, see also Wolmer 2001, Hughes 2002). Through their persistent imagery and funding, these aforementioned actors have been able to 're-colonize' southern Africa while giving the states more control over populations and resources, which is eerily similar to the tactics of the early colonists.

Some of the 'tribal' Africans also share these 'imaginings'. They welcome the enclosure as it offers a means for enhancing, maintaining and creating identities and sense of belonging (Singh, 2001; Zerner, 2000; Goebbel, 1998, Baviskar, 1996; Cooper and Packard, 1997, Alexander, 1993). Through these colonial visions of Africa, the post-colonial remnants of pre-colonial African society have carved a niche through new conservation with its normative narrative of an African vision by the west and for the west. Baviskar (1996) noticed similar understandings of the indigenous resistance to the Narmada dam in India that ultimately privileges the indigenous resistance through a [false] discourse of 'noble savage' or romanticizing the indigenous. Additionally, through this process, formerly marginalized communities along the periphery of African states such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique have been given the means to enhance and maintain their identities with assistance from international institutions and western donors while [re]claiming access to resources. For example, the Makuleke have recently claimed

a large part of the South African Kruger National Park and its resources along the borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique as part of their homeland. Moreover, the proposed Limpopo TBCA has given credibility to the Makuleke's claim by promoting a discourse on community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Steenkamp, nd). Through the sub-discourse of new conservation in CBNRM, states, non-state and indigenous elites are able to bargain control, access and the rigidity of the boundedness of identities and spaces to maintain their territorial claims.

Transfrontier/transboundary conservation has been able to create a neo-liberal economic space for white capital while privileging the tribal elite and enclosing the rural black African (see Hughes, 2002). This racial separation which may be seemingly equitable in a sense, privileges *only* the elites – state, traditional, private investment, NGOs – while ignoring an important segment of the population – the younger, disenfranchised youth and women or the peasantry. As Hughes (2002, p. 25) points out, 'Even as children play at their feet, planners envision stable rural populations contained behind electric fences. But the fence, like the children, recedes from view. To return to space, the Great Limpopo construes the village scale not as a limitation, but as an opportunity for smallholders. Through intensive, community-based projects, peasants can cultivate their garden within their boundaries. In doing so, they free up land for extensive bioregions and travel routes: tourists expand as peasants involute. Again, however, the anti-politics machine of Great Limpopo portrays this inequality as parity: in the Great Limpopo each party does according to it's liking *within its scale*. Absolute space – a scale for all people – does not exist. As double standards, the village dream and the African dream are inverses of one another. Whereas the African dream denies boundaries and affirms growth, the village dream denies growth and affirms boundaries. Big, vibrant (white) bioregions nestle against small, static (black) villages.'

Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a theoretical deconstruction of conservation in the present context through a historization of conservation thought and practices to better understand its main constitutive and intersecting rationalities – economic, ecological, moral and normative. Conservation, over the last century has undergone professionalization and institutionalization among the various social actors such as the state, academic institutions and international organizations. Through the deconstruction of the visionary rhetoric of conservation we critically challenged its assumptions and the assumptions of its constitutive elements or rationalities by presenting several arguments. The argument made by Hulme and Murphree (1999, p. 283) is insightful in this respect: 'Fortress conservation's model – 'the state is best' – has proved invalid. But, whether the new conservation's model – 'local society is best plus market is best' – is any more valid is doubtful. Colonial conservation through its European imaginings of pristine nature and distrust of the technical and aesthetic sensibilities of the native black Africans allowed for the creation of a vast system of African national parks and disenfranchisement of indigenous populations. Conservation and natural resource management were flip sides of the same coin and produced similar effects of (b)ordering and othering of the 'black African'. Through a moral and economic visionary discourse masked in technical and scientific terminology, colonial conservation furthered not only the othering of Africans from their lands and resources but also created opportunities for territorial claim-making by the post-colonial state and international actors. In other words, the neo-liberal market ideology combined with romantic 'dreams' of bioregionalism and touristic nature parks has allowed international actors and western states to re-colonize southern Africa through new conservation. In addition, the discourse on transboundary conservation will further re-map the configurations of power, identities and movement of capital and people while further re-configuring post-colonial geopolitical and geo-economic territorial claims. To conclude, new conservation with its neoliberal economic underpinnings and its sub-discourses of transboundary conservation and community-based natural resource management has firmly established the territorial claims of First World actors in the developing world.

Notes

[1]Political ecology addresses the question of power at multiple levels and offers a structure that allows the interactions between multiple actors at multiple scales to be examined (see Stonich, 1999; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Peet and Watts, 1996; Escobar, 1995, 1988; Blaikie, 1995). Political ecology is an inter-disciplinary approach that 'targets issues of power in developing an understanding of human action in the context of environmental change. . .drawing partly on ideas from actor-oriented sociology, including that of 'actor strategies' i.e., . . .the way social groups use their available power resources, or their knowledge and capability, to resolve their particular problems' (Few, 2002, p. 29).

[2]In light of this blurring and lack of an apolitical term for local rural and indigenous residents, we avoid the term community and refer to pre-colonial forms of authority, such as chiefs and headmen, as customary or traditional authority(ies). We use the term 'tribes' to refer to the subjects of the traditional leaders and most importantly our usage of the term was based on conversations with traditional leaders who often referred to their 'communities' as tribes. This allows us to distinguish tribes from the other groups residing in the rural areas of Africa as well as effectively contextualize the struggles over controlling the rural landscape between state and tribal elites.

[3]Marks (1994) in an essay on the development of managerial ecology in Zambia examined the role of Sir Julian Huxley, a leading ecologist and major mover of conservation in Africa, and in the following passage captured the conservation paradigm of the colonial era: 'The ecological problem is fundamentally one of balancing resources against human needs, both in the short and in the long term. It must be

related to a proper evaluation of human needs, and it must be based on resource conservation and resources use, including optimum land use and conservation of habitat.' Ecology was 'the science of interrelations.' For Huxley and others like him the balance in those relationships was oriented toward the past, was against indigenous thoughts and acts, and was equivalent to the new synthesis of Northern ideas about how nature worked. . .Basic to Huxley's model was an 'original ecosystem,' which 'has suffered vast damages at the hands of man.' There were two main variables, habitat and wildlife, with reciprocal dependencies. . .To avoid disaster, 'we must learn to control the process' – to 'plan the future of the habitat.' Wildlife was 'no longer merely a local matter.' 'What is needed,' he maintained, 'is a bold official conservation policy based on scientific research, backed by world opinion and furnished with adequate finance.' Marks (1994, pp. 113–14)

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