Human blacklisting: the global apartheid of the EU’s external border regime

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Abstract. Over the last few years, the global face of the EU has been changing. The EU is spinning a global border web with regard to the battle against irregular migration. At the borders of the EU, a powerful and security-obsessed distinction between travellers is increasingly being constructed between the travellers who ‘belong to’ the EU and those who do not, based on the fate of birth. To this end, the EU has composed a so-called ‘white and black’ Schengen list, recently relabelled a ‘positive and negative’ list, which is used as a criterion for visa applications. What is striking is that on the negative list a significantly high number of Muslim and developing states are listed. Hence, there is an implicit, strong inclination to use this list not only as a tool to guarantee security in physical terms or in terms of ‘Western’ identity protection but also as a means of keeping the world’s poorest out. Such global apartheid geopolitics—loaded with rhetoric of selective access, burden, and masses—provokes the dehumanisation and illegalisation of the travel of those who were born in what the EU has defined as the ‘wrong country’, the wastable and deportable lives from countries on the negative list. Such unauthorised travelling is increasingly dangerous as the high death toll suggests. It has led to a new and yet all too familiar geopolitical landscape in Europe, a scene many of us hope to never see again in postwar Europe, a landscape of barbed wire surveillance and camps. And hence, the EU—which started out as a means to produce a zone of peace and comfort ruled by law and order—has now in its self-proclaimed war on illegal migrants created a border industry that coconstructs more, not less, ‘illegality’, xenophobia, and fear: the EU as a global border machine.

Opening

And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?
Those people were some kind of solution.

Konstantinos Petrou Kavafis (1904)

In 1992, in her beautiful essay on boundaries published in this journal, Dagmar Reichert posed the following intriguing question: The limit, the frontier, the boundary, time-series of boundaries, or ditches, the void, or différence, they are all modifications of the line, the form of topological thinking. Can we escape this thinking in terms of spatial metaphors (Reichert, 1992)? The spirit of openness and opening borders that Reichert was after has perhaps been grounded to some extent in the topological thinking inherent in the cross-border mobility policies of one of the significant global borderlands, a unity of countries that increasingly sees itself as a soft empire—the European Union. Yet, at the same time, the internal opening of the borders has led to the rise of new fears and new walls in its external peripheries as manifest of its increasingly di-visionary view of countries. For a decade or so now, and especially after 9/11, the Zeitgeist of global freedom and opening borders—that special moment in Europe after 1989 in which a change in the wall-inspired logic that dominated Europe for so many decades was truly believed in—has become a ghost that haunts EU external border politics today. The desire to control and reclaim space, power, and national identity has found new populist political adherents and partisans. As a result, rather than focusing on maximal inclusion, cross-border mobility, and harmonious integration into the rapidly grown container of the EU that has dominated the debate in the EU
over the past decades, the emphasis has now shifted towards a constitutive ‘management’
of exclusion of the ‘Other’ inhabitants of the world. Some speak of the three global
wars that have become dominant—the war on drugs; the war on terror; and, increasing-
ly dubiously intertwined with the latter, the war on ‘illegal’ migration (see also Inda,
2006). For some this renewed focus on (preemptive and often military) protection and
territorial identity is an illustration that the world is not borderless. Rather, it consists
of global borderlands (Duffield, 2001; Rumford, 2007; 2008) or ‘planetary frontier
lands’ (Bauman, 2002a; 2002b) in which power, identity, and sovereignty are being
disconnected from territorial nation-state politics yet are not becoming institutional-
ised in a new global territorial order. Hence, what we see is a constant border-work
trying to separate the wanted from the unwanted, the barbarians from the civilised,
and the global rich from the global poor in the territorial society. In so doing the EU
increasingly is not only defining itself via its internal affairs, its ordering practices, but
also by the production of new border rules and legislation towards its incoming
migrants. The migration of the undocumented paradoxically, therefore, also induces
and evokes a stronger political community and new bordering legislation of the EU,
thereby reinforcing that which the migrants wish to escape or cross, fierce borders (see
also Zapata-Barrero, 2009). Obviously, these practices of geopolitical and biopolitical
control—this carving up of territorial containers and purified ‘dreamlands’ of identity—have a counterpart, the other face of the Janus border: the generation of (a
dreamland of) escape into far-reaching openness and freedom, into a world of global
cosmopolitan development and global distributive justice (see also Rumford, 2007;
2008). But it seems that this latter development is currently much less on the political
agenda now. In so doing, the ontological multidimensionality, which is intrinsic to any
border, is increasingly being deprived and deprived to make place for only the
tightening and filtering dimension of a border. The border—which is more a necessary
and unfixable continuum between openness and closure than it is a line—is being
reinterpreted into a super position of lines of security and protection, often coincided
by an inward-looking reproduction and canonisation of its self-constructed history and
culture (see also Balibar, 2004a; 2004b). The global course towards stronger protection-
ist and identity politics has gained considerable momentum again in today’s global
geopolitics (see also Bigo and Guild, 2005). The desire to open the border, to seize the
spirit of the fall of that Úr-border and the Berlin Wall and to escape topological
thinking seems rather far removed from us.

So somewhat less than two decennia after Reichert’s intriguing article, the quest
that her imaginary questions embrace is still most inspiring—that is, the quest for the
justification for and the way we draw borders in society and space. In this paper I will
take up the quest to understand in more depth and detail how the EU is currently
bordering itself by focusing on the current topological practices we endorse, manifest,
and legitimise in the drawing of borders for people. More particularly, I will focus on
the often tacit or implicit justification and modus operandi of our border regimes that
should prevent, select, and prioritise the movement of certain people across borders
in the world of today. In order to complement existing efforts that seek to understand
the desires and fears expressed in the current moral choreography of the (future)
external borders from a conceptual point of view, this article scrutinises the visions
and long-term EU strategies with regard to the external border regime vis-à-vis the
so-called ‘unwanted’ migrants. To gain insight into these power geopolitics of the EU
expressed through its external border regime, I direct my attention to the border
ideology, the ‘borderology’, the EU is developing. Next, I critically scrutinise the
everyday institutional practices recently enforced at the external border proper. In
particular, I will navigate my way through a new, explicitly moral landscape that has
been built at the external borders of the EU that consists of waiting zones, camps, new fences, and new biometric methods of patrol. Hence, an EUscape with increasingly defensive external borders is being erected. Building on the theoretical insights that have been gained, uttered, and brought forward already on various elements of the external border of the EU, this article could be read as a theoretically inspired conceptual protest, a counternarrative against what I see as an off beam and increasingly mechanic external border choreography of the EU.

B/ordering and othering
The act of bordering is critical to understanding the building or transformation of a specific sociospatial entity. To quote geographer Anssi Paasi: “through the institutionalisation process and the struggles inherent in it, the territorial units in question ‘receive’ their boundaries and their symbols which distinguish them from other regions” (1996, page 33). The EU’s external border regime and immigration policy towards the outer borders touch the heart of the EU as a macroborderland. When desiring to understand the importance of borders for a given entity, in this case the EU, it is not enough to study the line, the limit, the border itself; there is a need to also study the transformation process, the genealogy of that line: the bordering (see e.g van Houtum et al, 2002; 2005). A border should first and foremost be understood as a process, as a verb. Analytically, three different dimensions can be seen to play a role in this process of border production acting in close cooperation and simultaneously, yet in different nuances and degrees for different contexts—bordering, ordering, and othering (van Houtum et al, 2002). Together these dimensions of the border process can be seen as a generic lens through which the building or transformation of a specific sociospatial entity can be analysed. Obviously, one has to bear in mind that any schematic description of the multidimensional border-production processes can offer nothing more than an abstracted frame of mind that needs to be enriched and mutated for the specific historical and geographical context and contingency of a certain border production. What is more, the internalisation of and subjection to a certain border regime, through which the border regime gains and/or sustains its power, will be different over time, space, and people.

The first dimension of the border-production process, bordering, implies the continuous (search for the) legitimisation and justification of the location and demarcation of a border, which is seen as a manifestation of one’s own claimed, distinct, and exclusive territory/identity/sovereignty. In doing so, the spatial containerisation and unification of the people, and hence implicitly the silencing of the internal differences, are reproduced (see also Sibley, 1995). This is not a once-and-for-all event. Critical for border production is that all possible social and spatial dynamics that might occur are given meaning and a vision by looking through the eyes of the self-defined territory/identity/sovereignty.

In this production of meaning and vision the second dimension, ordering, is crucially important (cf Schmitt’s Ortung und Ordnung, 1950). The process of making and remaking a sociospatial order, the ordering, implies that in its beginning the sociospatial container is emptied and purified from its past despotic codes and occupants and, to use the words of Deleuze and Guattari (2004), despotically recoded with the codes and people of the now owner. If not militarily, this is done symbolically through the production of belonging and nostalgia through the selective invention and narration of communality and tradition via common rituals, memories, and history. In doing so, the self-constructed sociospatial code and order is normalised, it becomes the norm against which exceptions and aberrations are defined. The process of normalisation involves such mechanisms as internalisation, subjection, and the taming of
resistance through the use of, for example, language politics, education politics, and labour politics, which are all territorially defined and demarcated as the norm (see eg Foucault, 1975). Moreover, what further characterises this process of ordering is the statistical biopolitical registration and territorial surveillance of the population in terms of the birth, skills, ethnicity, age, health, fertility, productivity, and death of every body into the machinery of the Order (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004; Foucault, 2007; Salter, 2006).

The third dimension of border production that I distinguish here is the making of borders via the making of others, othering. This implies the production of categorical difference between ours and theirs, here and there, and natives versus nonnatives, so important for the realist topological thinking still. It involves the now so often critically engaged and, in academic circles, so often deconstructed dichotomous and antagonising production of socioeconomic and sociocultural competition, for which thinkers like Jacques Derrida and Edward Said have become dominant and well-known sources of academic inspiration. The discrimination between what is imagined to be ours in terms of identity/territory/sovereignty, as many insightful academic studies on this have shown us, is often done through the use of geopolitics (the politicisation and discrimination of spatial differences) and chronopolitics (the politicisation and consequent discrimination of time differences), expressed by terms like development, underdevelopment, lagging behind, speed, race, modernity, postmodernity, and a-modernity. What is also critical in this process of othering, and of much significance to the understanding of the modes of border control of a certain sociospatial container, is the regime of access—the dominant beliefs or ideology by which a sociospatial order manifests itself in a certain configuration of the biopolitical, geopolitical, and chronopolitical regime of access at hand. The configuration of this regime in turn shapes how access to the order is sustained and hence how, through which border tactics, the Other is stratified, immobilised, and dislocated at borderlines that are no longer, as has been argued by many scholars now, necessarily found at the territorial end or beginning of nation-states but can be found increasingly everywhere, such as in airports, public spaces, and traffic roads: the omnipresence of a diffused border (see Parker et al, 2009).

B/ordering and othering the EU
How then can the EU’s current border regime be understood keeping the above generic approach on b/ordering and othering in mind? If we look at the entity of the EU then through this border lens, what is most significant perhaps is the rapid change of the bordering, ordering, and othering developments. After the opening of the internal borders of the EU, the political and policy attention shifted more and more, and swiftly so, to the protection of the external borders of the EU. Because of the new and heavy emphasis on the external borders, many argue that the EU is also changing how it is or should be perceived and understood. In this context, early commentators optimistically pointed to the many faces the external border of the EU had in terms of its distinct and noncongruent geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional, and cultural spaces (Friis and Murphy, 1999; Hudson, 2000; Smith, 1996). To wit, some have argued that the external borders of the EU are to be understood as ‘fuzzy’ (Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000; Zielonka, 2001) and that the EU as a bordered entity will resemble a ‘maze’ or ‘sieve’ (Brown, 2002; Christiansen and Jørgensen, 2000). Yet, over the last few years, and especially with various authors within the constructionist and postcolonial wings of the research front, the discourse has become dominant that the EU is increasingly constructing colonial-like lines or frontiers, boundaries of a self-perceived superior imperial power, often then seen as the soft imperial sister of the US.
At the frontiers of the EU then—which are often defined as Europe and not the EU—these authors typically claim that the EU sees for itself a civilisational mission, often typified as *othering*, to Europeanise or at least downscale the ‘radicalisation’ of perceived inferiors or Others (the ‘Barbarians’) in both the East and the South (Anderson and Armstrong, 2007; Boedeltje et al, 2007; Tunander, 1997; Walters, 2002; 2004; Zielonka, 2001). For some, this latter neocolonial, empire style is most visible in one of the most striking extraterritorial development plans of the EU of the recent years—that is, the development of a New Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument destined to implement the Commission’s European Neighbourhood Policy as laid down in the Wider Europe Communication and the Strategy document on this European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The goal of the ENP is, according to the EU, to share the advantages of the 2004 enlargement of the EU by fostering stability, security, and prosperity among all parties. The Neighbourhood Policy is said to be developed to prevent new lines of division between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer new possibilities to engage in the diverse activities of the EU by means of enlarged political, security, economical, and cultural cooperation (see also Emerson, 2004). The EU Commission sees the border ‘management’ as one of the core goals of the ENP:

“Border management is likely to be a priority in most Action Plans as it is only by working together that the EU and its neighbours can manage common borders more efficiently in order to facilitate legitimate movements. The Action Plans should thus include measures to improve the efficiency of border management, such as support for the creation and training corps of professional non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure. The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security” (European Commission, 2004, page 16f; see also Apap and Tchorbadjiyska, 2004).

For some, in contrast to nation-states and ideological blocs, adjoining empires are imagined to have blurred and underenergised borders at the frontiers in the periphery where their power ‘fades out’ (Waever, 1997; Zielonka, 2001). These peripheral ‘grey’, intermediate, or transit zones between empires such as Russia and the United States then would rub against each other and would be the new potential zones of global conflict. The recent conflict in Georgia is often mentioned as a case in point. Convincing as this may be, at the same time such euphemisms of fading grey zones, transition zones, and neighbourhood policies fail to capture the rather fierce and increasingly militaristic inclusionary–exclusionary logic of the current external border regime of the EU that is also increasingly apparent. More than a crossing border policy, the ENP clearly is a border policy—since when one defines their neighbours, one defines one’s own borders. It is a hegemonic *buffer zone geopolitics*, the installation of a *cordon sanitaire*. For, although the neighbourhood policies may be a clear sign of politics of good intentions, they are also an unambiguous form of excluding some countries from the arbitrary and self-made category ‘Europe’ and from membership of the EU. So, to the world the EU shows a Janus-face, one face of development aid and humanitarian assistance and another of a security-obsessed economic and cultural comfort zone. And both faces are related, especially in the ENP, for the aid to the neighbours is quid pro quo. The EU is transparent in its aims; it promises neighbours to develop and become more democratic and economically strong (measured by the EU with ‘European standards’) in order to help protect the EU from what is often defined as spill-over threats from imagined unstable neighbouring countries, by which largely irregular immigration and terrorism is meant. EU values are ‘exported’ in exchange for monetary assistance and the promise of the vague terminology of a ‘stake’ in the internal market. Increasingly, the imagined buffer states of the EU are also being
asked or ordered, again in exchange for development aid, to tighten their border control for the sake of the EU. In addition, the EU is subsiding antimigration campaigns in the neighbouring countries. In other words, apart from the erection of a tighter border control at the external borders of the EU itself, the control is, as will be shown below, outsourced to its neighbours in what the EU calls a ‘new global approach to border management’ and ‘global approach to migration’. So the EU is not merely defending its borders; it is expanding its perimeter. This inclusionary–exclusionary mechanism—and thereby attack on the dignity of others beyond self-defined borders, so significant for the ontology of any bordering and othering process—has explicitly, via immigration and security control, and also implicitly, via neighbourhood policies, become an essential feature within the rebordering process of the EU. Most clearly perhaps, this can be testified by the increasingly machine-like bordering of certain categories of migrants—to which I now turn.

The border machine
Apart from the interesting and rich debates on how the imperial external border of Europe should best be understood, there is a still marginal but growing academic debate on the degree of moral (in)justice of the increasingly fierce external border regime that coincides with the development of extraterritorial European civilisational politics. Over the recent years, the EU has been deploying a rapidly increasing active global engagement with regard to the battle against irregular migration, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the fulfilment of international law as well as the effort to prevent conflicts. The geopolitical objectives range from fighting transnational crime and terrorism to nourishing local cultural ties across the external border. Gradually, the EU’s external border regime is transforming into a digital and selective border machine (see also Walters, 2002; 2006). It seems that the neoliberal logic of maximum efficiency is also transferred to the logic and rationale of the border control, which is illustratively termed border management (see van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2009). This border machine produces new products of border control all the time. Yet, this machine does not run by itself. Let me explain this further.

The global migrant black list
At the front door of the EU a rather powerful and security-obsessed distinction between travellers is increasingly being constructed between the travellers who ‘belong to’ the EU and those who do not. Illustrating this is the EU’s common risk-analysis model, which was set up in order to achieve a common and integrated risk analysis on immigration issues. It is the word ‘risk’ that is politically related to immigration which is perhaps the most crucial and worrying aspect in understanding the recent development of the EU’s external border regime. With risk, the EU largely means practices that are defined as ‘illegal’ (see also Samers, 2004). For its border management, as the EU calls it, and to mitigate the ‘risks’, the DG Justice and Home Affairs has released a whole range of proposals in the last few years addressing the development of a common policy on irregular immigration, human trafficking, and the security of external borders.

What is perhaps most illustrative in the makeup of this external difference-producing border regime in the world of today is that the EU has composed a so-called ‘white’ Schengen list and a ‘black’ Schengen list (European Council, Common List, Annex 1, Council Regulation 539/2001; European Council Regulation No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Regulation No 539/2001). This list includes citizens from countries that require a visa (that is, an individual permission for entrance during a given period of time and for certain purposes) (see also Salter, 2006). As such, in contrast to a
passport, a visa is not issued by the sovereignty of destination, in this case the EU. For the EU a visa is, therefore, a way to grant (or deny) admission before leaving a country and a way to control when someone enters and leaves the EU. The ‘white’ list represents the countries whose citizens do not need to apply for a visa for a visit or transit in Schengen countries. This list contains 60 countries of the world. The rest, the ‘black’ list, consists of 135 states out of a total of 195 states in today’s world whose inhabitants require a visa for entrance into EU-space. Figure 1 gives a cartographic overview of the listing of visa-obliged countries by the EU.

Of all possible geographical visions on the world, the EU thus inscribes an unambiguous di-visionary borderline on the planet. It has made a di-visions into black and white list countries, into countries whose inhabitants are in principle unwelcome (the black list) and whose inhabitants are welcome (the white list). It is a

\[\text{Figure 1. [In colour online, see http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/d1909] EU’s di-visionary borderline by EU (Schengen) visa access (source: European Council Regulation No 851/2005 of 2 June 2005 amending Regulation No 539/2001. Map from http://www.upload.wikimedia.org/wiki/Bing/6/61/EU_visa_lists.png).}\]

(1) Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burkin Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoro Islands, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic), Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican (Republic), East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Fiji, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Northern Marianas, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian National Authority, Papua-New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, The Gambia, The Philippines, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
form of chronopolitics as it slows down, illegalises, or immobilises the mobility of a significant part of the world population and prioritises and mobilises the travelling speed of a select human segment. One suspects that the criteria used for a state to be put on the visa list relate to the perceived possibility of irregular residence after entering EU space, the perceived influence on public security, and the international relations existing between the EU and the third country in question (Guild, 2001; Guild et al, 2009). Yet, strikingly, no information can be found in the otherwise rather transparent communication channels of the EU on why and how this list was made, despite its obvious far-reaching consequences. Nor is it clear what criteria are being used to move from the black to the white list. Recently, the EU changed the wording of this di-visionary view of the world, from black/white list to positive/negative list. The wording may be less racial, but this does not alter the intentions and the discriminatory effects of this apartheid geopolitics (see also Hansen, 2004). With this list, the EU has created a dichotomous border of in–out, a digital 1–0. In so doing, the biopolitical border that is constructed selects and prioritises people and social relations in the world. The EU thus, in terms of access, unjustly discriminates against people by their country of origin. To base a territorial politics in this time and age on one’s place of birth is not only archaic, as we increasingly live in a transnational world, but also immoral, as it regulates and thereby destines the lives of humans on the mere fate of where they were born. Such nativist geopolitics has perhaps most powerfully and influentially been criticised by Joseph Carens in his well-cited 1987 article in which he convincingly argued against a politics based on the lottery of birth.

It is clear that in the discriminative biopolitical and geopolitical border regime of the EU there is no outside; the globe is the playing field of the EU’s border regime. The EU border decides what and especially who is to be included and excluded, what the territorial grouping and the discipline of the EU will look like, and what the global border wishes to communicate. The EU regulates who is considered legal input and who is considered unwanted input—a threat to the system, hence redundant and deportable people, or in the words of Bauman (2004) “wasted lives”—to the border machine.

What is telling when analysing the negative list is that there are a significantly high number of Muslim states listed. Another important portion of countries that are listed are developing countries. Hence, there is an implicit and strong inclination to use this list not only as a tool to guarantee security in physical terms or in terms of Western identity protection but also as a means of keeping the world’s poorest out. The scapegoating is done on the valuation of the Other’s god and economy. So, again, to put it sharply, as in former colonial times, it is the EU who selects people on the basis of their imagined added value for the EU and their imagined potential (security) risk for the EU. Alongside the execution of this new external border policy that is implicit in this negative list, there is a growing anxiety about people coming from these countries. Some literally fear an invasion of poor and/or Muslim migrants, who en masse threaten to flood ‘our’ territory. A Dutch extreme right-wing politician, Geert Wilders, often even speaks of a “tsunami” of Muslim migrants in this respect, as if the mobility of some people could be compared to a natural disaster. The discriminatory place on this list for non-EU people is not a self-chosen option. Every society creates its own strangers, and so does the political particularity of the EU. It is the inequality of a politics of difference of which the migrants are victim. The migrants are pushed in the non-self-chosen category of the immigrant with no legal name and seen as a ‘burden’ that needs to be shared among the various states of the EU. It has reached a point that a decrease in the numbers of (undocumented) asylum seekers is now viewed as a success. The consequences of this production of the eternally desired
‘We’ and the eternally undesired ‘They’ is a vicious circle between the self-produced increase of irregular travellers, as the regular routes of the citizens of the black-list countries are foreclosed, and the increase of moral panic about precisely that, the increase of irregular migrants, which nationalistic politicians thankfully seize upon in their competition for more votes.

Invasion maps
One of the most important and striking representations of this moral panic is seen in the construction and use of maps. On many of the dominant and often used ‘official’ maps, stemming from media as well as political institutions, thick arrows, lines, and dots indicate the routes and main hubs of the trajectories of undocumented migrants. These lines and arrows represent migration flows without in any way reflecting the heterogeneity of those who move, without reflecting on the possibly active role of the ‘receiving’ countries, and without adequately reflecting possible shuttle or circular movement migrants may have already made. What defines undocumented migration processes is invisibility, as most migrants without papers obviously fear getting caught—hence their strategy is to stay invisible and intractable for the biopolitical gaze of the border control. For, in the EU border machine, the life as a migrant is controlled as in a Foucauldian panopticon. The controlling eye of the Cam-era we live in is omnipresent and internalised on the penalty of being considered an out-law, an il-legal. The watching connects to the double function of the word borderguard. They guard the border, the entrance to their domain, their law, but they also stand guard; they wait for your coming and watch your moves to check for possible threats to the sustenance of the law. This also implies that how what is undocumented, irregular, and out of sight is made visible can be a determining factor in shaping the public opinion. Many of the current maps present migration as massive, unaffected, unidirectional, and unstoppable flows towards imaginatively reactive and vulnerable states (see, for instance, figure 2, made by Frontex that aims to identify and map the routes).

Maps like this do not only represent moral panics; they also coconstruct them (van Schendel, 2005). As Denis Wood (1993) has famously argued, the map’s effectiveness lies in the selectivity with which it is produced. The fear of undocumented immigrants across the EU is generally not grounded in a thorough awareness of contemporary global migration developments. The maps suggesting invasions of people omit that a very small minority of the global population flees or migrates and that the EU is only ‘receiving’ a fraction of this total number of refugees and migrants (Walters, 2007). And the majority of migrants is staying in the geographical proximity of their regions of origin; only few have the possibility and/or will to travel over longer, intercontinental distances. What is more, the reality of undocumented migration is often more dispersed, dynamic, fluid, and more of a transitory and zig-zag nature. The often taken for granted notion of migration as one of linear movement leading to a final destination—and often illustrated by the use of straight arrows, lines, and dots—is flawed. A few inspiring, although still fragmented, attempts to alternatively represent migration into the EU have been made already, mainly by NGOs (e.g. Migmap, IndyMedia, and Migrereup). Until now, these detailed accounts of when and why migrants migrate as well as these alternative representations of migration are washed away in the highly influential mediated image of the ‘invasion’ of unwanted migrants.
Figure 2. [In colour online.] The representation of an invasion (source: Frontex, 2009).
The EU as a gated community
The geopolitical result of the fiercer b/ordering of the EU is a bifurcated policy of immigration in which a strong selection among non-EU migrants is made between those who are wanted (investors, tourists, some IT managers, nurses, cleaners, construction workers, etc) and who are unwanted (the rest), largely based on the net result of their migration for the national economy and national cultural identity. Those who wish to enter the EU and fall outside the nationally defined and continually changing category of ‘wanted migrants’ often are denied access and hence are increasingly taking irregular migration routes (see also Carrera, 2007a; 2009). In this context, Roos Pijpers and I have recently argued that by implementing such a protectionist and highly selective immigration policy, the EU has come to resemble a gated community in which the biopolitical control and management of immigration is, to a large extent, the product of fear (van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2009; van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). The community thereby defines itself to be the good life, thereby reifying figures of societal difference and danger, such as the criminal, the terrorist, the invading enemy, the migrant. Often fear manifests itself in terms of fear of losing economic welfare, cultural identity, or public security. More often, however, this fear relates to the entrance of the immigrant, the stranger, and is, as such, associated with a fear of losing comfort and a community’s self-defined identity. These perceived threats to a community’s comfort lead to the politicisation of protection, whereby the terra incognita beyond the border is justifiably neglected due to the indifference shown and the intentional blindness to the outside. Over land and sea this fear manifests itself physically in the installation of a barbed-wired gate, making it difficult to apply for entrance into the EU factory. Over time, the dissolution of the internal barbed wire in the EU and the Iron Curtain between West and East Europe has been replaced by new barbed wire and what some define as a new Golden Curtain between EU and non-EU. Regardless of whether that metaphor is appropriate or not, it does allude to the commercialisation of politics, what Slavoj Žižek has called the postpolitical society that the EU has become (Žižek, 1999).

Death at the border
To guard the newly installed barbed wire, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), which was installed a few years ago, has become increasingly important. The Agency’s mission is defined as:

“FRONTEX coordinates operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders; assists Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; carries out risk analyses; follows up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assists Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; and provides Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations. ... FRONTEX strengthens border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States’ actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders.”

Hence, the goal of FRONTEX is to strive for an overall enhanced common effectiveness and efficiency in controlling the EU’s external border; the goal is to come to a pan-European model of integrated border security. To this end, FRONTEX also works with what they call ‘RABITS’, an acronym for Rapid Border Intervention Teams. The analogy with the term rabbits is striking. Such an implicit (or explicit) animalisation and dehumanisation of border control is worrying, yet not uncommon
(see also Papadopoulos et al., 2008). The empowerment of state power through animal representations and metaphors has long been used by nation-states. Most of the nation-states would have an animal (e.g., a bear, eagle, cock, lion) as their national animalistic representation, to make their nation-state (and hence their sovereignty and border control) border animated, bodily present, and potent. But, increasingly, the animalisation of the state is extended to migrants who are to be seen as wild or untamed animals that run and need to be stopped by quick and potent borderguard predators of the state. Illustratively, often one reads or hears about the *cat and mouse* game between borderguards and irregular migrants. And along the US–Mexico border one often hears the terms *coyotes* or *polleros* (the smugglers) and *pollos* (the undocumented migrants), and along the Chinese borders the term *shetou* (snakehead) is commonly used to typify migration brokers and smugglers. Hence though not new, the EU’s use of RABITs is no less sarcastic and worrying.

As of 2004, FRONTEX has been employing various boats, helicopters, and planes coming from various EU members in the Mediterranean and along the northern and western African coast to prevent boats with migrants from entering into the territorial waters of the EU, creating a whole new EU-landscape of defence and fences (see also Carrera, 2007b). What is more, the detection phase of the border machine that has been developed has increasingly become a lethal phase. Over the years, as the securitisation and patrolling of the border control has grown, attempts to remain unseen or to escape from borderguards has led to the death of many would-be immigrants who are trying to get into the EU. Obviously, the closing of the gate has not stopped migrants from coming. It has only made it more dangerous. In the words of Bauman (2002b, page 85):

“The doors may be locked; but the problem won’t go away, however tight the locks.
Locks do nothing to tame or weaken the forces that cause displacement and make humans into refugees. The locks may help to keep the problem out of sight and out of mind, but not to force it out of existence.”

With the construction of a gated isle of wealth, and with the conscious denial of regular access to citizens from 135 countries, the EU widens the gap globally and regulates mortality of people on a global scale. It produces a segment of the world population willing to risk their lives to get into the EU. Hideously, the deaths of those who do try to cross the border without permission are implicitly seen as the ‘collateral damage’ of a combat against irregular migration (Albahari, 2006; Bauman, 2004). Illustratively, neither the number of deaths nor their names or cause of death is even counted or registered officially (see also Spijkerboer, 2007). They are made absent, unrepresented, and invisible. As a protest of this silencing the deaths of undocumented migrants who have died in their attempt to get into or stay in the EU, the counting of the number of ‘deaths at the border’ is done by alternative organisations, like United Against Racism and No Borders. Rough estimates indicate that the number of deaths is somewhere in the 13,000s now (see figure 3). Other sources, however, speak of many more deaths, especially among those who have tried to enter the EU by boat, for instance, through the Canary Islands. The question that begs our moral attention is how many deaths does this politics of fear bear?

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(2) Interestingly, in his genealogy on madness Foucault analysed the use of the *Narrenschiff* (boat for the crazy people) in medieval times. To spatially and socially except and exclude people, those who were believed to be crazy were put on a boat, as society did not know how to deal with them otherwise. Hence, the people were treated as pariahs. It could be argued that a boat containing irregular migrants is also treated and perceived by the EU as pariahs on a *Narrenschiff*. 
Figure 3. [In colour online.] The immigration death atlas in Europe (source: http://www.unitedagainstracism.org).
**Bioborder politics**

In the global borderland we live in an officially stamped passport is the state proof that you exist as a citizen. By birth, a human being is thus seen not only as an individual but a political subject subject to the polity. For those who are subject to the political order that is mostly seen as comforting, as it provides a state home, but it is equally discomforting as the political order thereby also decides who you are. For the political order in its turn, there is also discomforting uncertainty, for an officer of a state never completely knows with 100% certainty that the person in the passport is indeed the person standing in front of him/her. The more fear society has for the stranger, the more the political order wants to be certain of his/her identity. Especially in the moral panic that emerged after 9/11, the measurement and determination of one’s civic identity through iris scanning, facial recognition, bone-age checking, and fingerprints has entered more and more the actual corpus of the stranger (see also eg Broeders, 2007; Dijstelbloem and Meijer, 2009; Epstein, 2007; Muller, 2005; Salter and Zureik, 2005; van der Ploeg, 1999). Increasingly, the civic identity of the European is carried and manifested by his/her body: the body as a passport. As a result of such metrical biopolitics, border control can be exercised on multiple subjectifications within the same individual. For those who do make it into the EU-factory, be it irregularly or regularly as a refugee who is asking for asylum, they enter into the increasingly digital test-room, which increasingly is an apparatus designed for hearing, checking, biometrical scanning, photographing, fingerprinting, and evaluating every moving body. The external border increasingly should, hence, be understood as a digital firewall protecting the machine (see also Walters, 2006). This border machine scans, registers, profiles, filters, selects, and categorises people on the basis of our desires and fears (see also Amoore, 2006). Whether you will be stopped as a non-EU citizen or seen as an interesting added value for the EU is dependent on your code. This code is made by the EU and loaded in the mechanic machinery of the border, the computers of Schengen. As argued above, this border code is currently based on the black and white list by which the EU divides the world. What this means is that the EU perceives people less as individual human beings than as subjects of a political order. People are coded by their country of birth and/or country of origin before they are individuals. Such classical ground-politics has major moral consequences. The migrants from a black-list country are listed as a hit by the digital border machine and are refused entry as undesirables—thus resulting in the dangerous attempts of the people of black-list countries to remain unseen, to remain uncoded. The irregular migrants are hence made into a faceless, depoliticised subclass excepted from the territorial sovereignty, or what Agamben (1998) famously termed the “homo sacer”. Not registering the death, as argued above, further illustrates this. Such EU-depoliticisation and dehumanisation not only suppresses the humanitarian value of people outside the codes of what the EU sees as added value but also misrecognises the social entrepreneurship, the creative way of escaping their fate and future in their native country.

**Para-sites**

The above-described machine-like apparatus for decision making is constantly working to finally be able to make a binary decision: stay or go. For many the actual bureaucratic production of the final decision is taking a long time. As a result, over time, the migration to the EU for those migrants who are seen as a burden and for who a ‘decision’ has to be made, has led, as argued above, to a buffer zone geopolitics with a new landscape of asylum camps that act as—taking Michel Serres (2007) word of pests for the host body literally—*para-sites*, within the state borders yet outside in a space where EU citizenship is placed in suspension. In the words of the
scholar who is most often used these days when it comes to camps, Agamben, these
camps are dislocated localisations (Agamben, 1997). In these camps the category of
’citizen’ is not, not yet, or no longer operative for the figure of the refugee (Perera,
2002). If, usually after considerable waiting time, the outcome of the asylum procedure
is not a yes (which would mean the road to national integration of the migrant) but a
no, then the purification machinery orders the migrant to go back to the future outside
the EU. Over the years this has led to the creation of a landscape of expel apparatuses
and deportation centres as a semipermanent state of emergency, what could be called,
to use Zygmunt Bauman’s linguistic metaphor of waste, a form of social dumping via
waste sites. Although the word prison is carefully being avoided in the bureaucratic
jargon of the border machine, it is difficult to perceive the bodily registration and
locking up of migrants—who have committed no other crime than not having the
right documents—in detention centres and/or expel centres differently. These camps,
these spatial para-sites, which famously Agamben identified as “the fundamental bi-
political paradigm of the West” (1998, page 181), are for those who have to go but have
refused to do so. This is neither the time nor the place to analyse in all its absorbing
details the ontological function or sociology of the camp. Others have done that in a
compelling way already (see eg Diken and Laustsen, 2005; Fassin, 2001; Minca, 2006;
2007; Schinkel, 2009; Ticktin, 2005). The point that I wish to make is that over the
years, as a result of the tightening border regime of the EU, we have witnessed an
exponential growth in the number and size not only of asylum centres, the beginning
of the border machine, but also of detention and/or expel centres, the end of the
production chain of migrants. For people without papers the constant monitoring
and spatial control of their whereabouts have become a practice of daily life. For the
EU, then, the installation of camps is a form of concentration and containment, of
’stocking’ the people without papers in order to facilitate and manage more efficiently
the daily biopolitical control of their whereabouts. (Interestingly enough, apart from
these formal camps other more informal anti-camps are increasingly being constructed
in and at the borders of the EU in the form of migrant camps made by migrants
themselves often in the woods or other sites out of sight and in the form of temporary
No Border Camps, made by activists protesting against the border control and camps
for undocumented migrants.) For the EU the camp has become a way of managing the
legality of the labour market as well as preventing the misuse of the channel of asylum of
political refugees. More concrete, politically then a camp represents chronopolitics, the
politics of time, represented by waiting time that is used to control, manage, and slow
or even immobilise all together the travelling speed of the mobile yet unwelcome others,
as well geopolitics, the politics of space, morphologically represented in terms of walls
and gates of a constructed dis-place (see also Papadopoulos et al, 2008). Hence, time and
space are used as tools in the camp machinery to refabricate the illegalised ‘input’ into
politically acceptable codes, as legal ‘output’ for the EU, that is, as new labourers,
political refugees, or waste that can be dumped. Figure 4 provides an overview of the
various migrant camps in the EU, be it asylum ‘waiting rooms’ or detention centres.

As can be seen in figure 4, and as argued above, in the context of the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the border control as well as the erection of border camps are
increasingly being transferred to the neighbours. The commission has argued time and
again in recent years that it wants to ‘share the burden’ of border control with
respective countries. Countries of origin are being made complicit to the protection
of the system, the law of the EU. In doing so, it could be argued, the EU is increasingly
selling and morally contracting out its ‘problem’. In a way, therefore, the external
border of the EU is becoming a frontier, in the sense of the shifted EU ‘civilisation’
in space.
Figure 4. [In colour online.] The immigration camp atlas in Europe (source: http://www.migreurop.org/).
Ending

I started this paper with Reichert’s enticing provocation on our topological thinking. It seems that her plea to be wary about and to scrutinise critically the topologies of borders is now as timely as it ever was. An increasing liberalisation of border control inside the EU is being combined with an increasingly machine-like external border control. Current political forces in the EU have expressed a key interest in attracting the high potentials and some low-cost labour migrants on the one hand and controlling the ‘redundant’ and allegedly difficult to integrate ‘non-Western’ immigrants and refugees on the other hand in order to preserve social cohesion and protect national labour markets within European borders. In addition, although there is no proof whatsoever of a connection between labour-market immigration and/or undocumented migration on the one hand and terrorism on the other hand, it can be ascertained that the post-9/11 (attacks in New York and Washington, DC), post-3/11 (attacks in and around Madrid), and post-7/7 (attacks in London) anxieties over global terrorism and security issues have only further strengthened the restrictive and increasingly di-visionary global border regime of the EU. This has resulted in a policy that is so focused on a strict border regime and assimilation that the migration motives of those who want to enter the EU are merely being categorised into a globally defined border between productive/unproductive, friendly/fiendish, and good/bad, with the direct dichotomous consequence of being allowed entrance or not. The restrictive and increasingly global apartheid geopolitics combined with a neoliberal cherry-picking policy outside the EU is unjust from both the global economic welfare and a normative point of view, as it sustains and reproduces global inequality, material, and symbolic segregation and reproduces a discrimination on the lottery of birth. In addition, this newly engaged global ‘war’ against unwanted and/or irregular migration has become falsely and illegitimately intertwined with the global ‘war’ against terrorism. Such a climate in itself is not helpful, to say the least, either in destroying any possible seedbed for discriminatory practices and attitudes towards the Stranger inside the EU or in diminishing the global inequality. This b/ordering and othering machine of the EU is coconstructing more not less ‘illegality’, xenophobia, and fear. The politics of desire for comfort, identity, and security and of fear for the invading Other, as it is currently framed, is mutually constitutive and hence continuous: without the identification and targeting of ‘waste’ there is no clean(s)ing desire and vice versa. The self-declared ‘combat’ is being fought with increasingly higher fences, bigger army tools, and a growing number of detention and expel centres.

The current largely exclusionary character of the global world vision of the EU makes the borders between the EU and its (Near) Abroad(s) spatially extremely pressing and edgy. A new landscape of control has come into existence. The migrants for whom this new landscape of border politics concerns often creatively use the new frames of control such as biometrical body controls, boat patrol, and camps to their own advantage. No matter how high the wall, there is no wall high enough to block off migration. They adapt to the new rules, invent personalities, disidentify themselves by throwing away their papers or even cruelly erase their finger reliefs in order to avoid finger printing, zigzag their shadow ways into the EU, use migrant camps as a stopover on their way to the next station. In short, they constantly multiply and construct new liminal becomings (Papadopoulos et al, 2008). As a result, with the tightening of legal entry into the EU, the EU is only expanding the ‘illegal’ escape routes and entries into the EU.

The EU started as a means to an end, no more war between states through the construction of a framework of reciprocity, a union, in which states would be included as much as possible. Now the means of the Union has become the end itself. Using an
analytical framework of bordering, ordering, and othering in studying the external border production of the EU, we can ascertain that we are currently witnessing the making of a new border ideology, a new borderology in the EU. The absence of a global union, a striking global political void, has provided a constant invitation to an extraterritorial bargain-by-force by the EU (Bauman, 2002b). The EU consciously recodes, narrates, and canonises a common past; creates an exclusionary military external front; and buys the imagined security of these external borders by developing an imperial development aid that is based on ‘European values’ for its neighbouring states (see also Balibar, 2004a; 2004b). It seems that the EU has become a global borderland, indeed.

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