B/ORDERING SPACE
In recent years, borders have taken on an immense significance. Throughout the world they have shifted, been constructed and dismantled, and become physical barriers between socio-political ideologies. They may separate societies with very different cultures, histories, national identities or economic power, or divide people of the same ethnic or cultural identity.

As manifestations of some of the world's key political, economic, societal and cultural issues, borders and border regions have received much academic attention over the past decade. This valuable series publishes high quality research monographs and edited comparative volumes that deal with all aspects of border regions, both empirically and theoretically. It will appeal to scholars interested in border regions and geopolitical issues across the whole range of social sciences.
B/ordering Space

Edited by
HENK VAN HOUTUM, OLIVIER KRAMSCH
and WOLFGANG ZIERHOFER

ASHGATE
Contents

List of Contributors vii
Acknowledgements ix

Prologue
B/ordering Space 1
Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kransch and Wolfgang Zierhofer

PART I: B/l) E MNG PRACTICES A'BORDERLESS' WORLD

1 The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries
   Mapping the Backgrounds, Contexts and Contents 17
   Anssi Paasi

2 Borders Unbound
   Globalization, Regionalism, and the Postmetropolitan Transition 33
   Edward W. Soja

3 Regions and Everyday Regionalizations
   From a Space-centred Towards an Action-centred Human Geography 47
   Benno Werlen

4 Shaky orders?
   Transnational Migrants as Strategic Actors 61
   David Ley

PART II: STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTIONS: CLAIMING AND FIXING PLACES

5 Regionalization in Europe
   Stories, Institutions and Boundaries 77
   Arnoud Lagendyk

6 On Paradigms and Doctrines
   The 'Euroregio of Salzburg' as a Bordered Space 93
   Peter Weichhart
7 Borderline Communities
   Canadian Single Industry Towns, Staples, and Harold Innis
   Trevor Barnes
   Canadian Single Industry Towns, Staples, and Harold Innis
   Trevor Barnes

8 Splintering Palestine
   Derek Gregory

PART III: SITUATING AND EXTENDING SPACES OF ORIENTATION

9 Scientists Without Borders
   Or Moments of Insight, Spaces of Recognition: Situated Practice,
   Science, and the Navigation of Urban Everyday Life
   Allan Pred

10 Debordering Subjectivity
   Huib Ernst

11 Friedrich Ratzel's Spatial Turn
   Identities of Disciplinary Space and its Borders Between the Anthropo-
   and Political Geography of Germany and the United States
   Wolfgang Natter

PART IV: RE-IMAGINING BOUNDED ROUTES AND DISCOURSES

12 The Poetry of Boundaries
   Reflections from the Portuguese-Spanish Borderlands
   James D. Sidaway

13 Bor(der)ing Stories
   Spaces of Absence along the Dutch-German Border
   Anke Struver

14 'R®stigraben'
   A Discourse on National Identity in Switzerland
   Wolfgang Zierhofer

15 On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari
   Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones III

Index
List of Contributors

Trevor Barnes is Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Huib Ernste is Professor and Head of the Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

Derek Gregory is Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Henk van Houtum is Associate Professor and Research Director in the Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

John Paul Jones III is Professor and Head of the Department of Geography and Regional Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA.

Olivier Kramsch is Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

Arnoud Lagendijk is Assistant Professor in the Department of Spatial Planning, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

David Ley is Professor in the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

Wolfgang Natter is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA.

Anssi Paasi is Professor and Head of the Department of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland.

Allan Pred is Professor in the Department of Geography, University of California at Berkeley, USA.

James D. Sidaway is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

Edward W. Soja is Professor in the Department of Urban Planning, School of Public Policy and Social Research, University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), USA.

Anke Striiver is a PhD student in the Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Peter Weichhart is Professor in the Department of Geography and Regional Science at the University of Vienna, Austria.

Benno Werlen is Professor in the Geographical Institute, Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena, Germany.

Keith Woodward is a PhD student in the Department of Geography and Regional Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA.

Wolfgang Zierhofer is Senior Research Fellow in the Programm Mensch Gesellschaft Umwelt at the University of Basel, Switzerland.
Acknowledgements

This book is the result of an intensive dialogue between the editors and scholars who in the period 1999-2002 visited the Department of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, Netherlands. Our colleagues arrived under the auspices of the department’s Alexander von Humboldt lecture series, founded by Huib Ernst in 1999 as a means to strengthen the linkages between Nijmegen geography and the broader Anglo-American and German geographical communities. In this manner, and through a combined effort of many persons located both within the department as well as in the wider Nijmegen School of Management, many inspiring speakers came to lecture and reside with us in Nijmegen. We would like to extend our gratitude to all those who contributed to making these visits a success. In addition to these scholars, we would like to thank all those who participated in the lively and inspiring discussions taking place within the framework of the lecture series, as well as in subsequent seminars and meetings. In editing this volume, we are particularly indebted to Freerk Boedeltje for taking on the challenging task of preparing the book for camera-ready submission. Last but not least, we would like to say a heartfelt ‘bedankt’ to our international cast of authors, whose patience and generosity demonstrated, time and again, that borders of all kinds can still be crossed with grace and virtuosity.
Prologue

B/ordering ace

Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer


'The earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces virtually do not exist. Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imagining.' (Edward Said, 1993, p.7)

'...en-route to other selves & other geographies (I speak in tongues), standing on the map of my political desires, I toast to a borderless future... ’ (Guillermo Gomez-Pena, 1996)

What are the bordering practices that inform our purportedly unbounded and global society and how should we interpret these practices in the light of a critically engaged geography? With this question we invited fellow geographers to contribute to the book that you now hold in your hands. Why the subject of borders? Are we not living in a brand new world, in global cybertimes for which such arbitrary lines in the sand no longer carry meaning or produce much impact? Are we not living in a mass consumer-based society, in which the production of knowledge, images, representations and simulacra are of greater significance than the hard edges of geopolitical boundaries? Our solid, rational, control-based and production-oriented society has indeed partially melted into the air. But this does not mean that we live in a borderless world, the result of a qualitatively new age or revolutionary time in which geography no longer matters (Ohmae, 1990; O’Brien, 1992; Castells 1996). Such imposing rhetorical claims are not of much help in analysing and contextualizing patterns of everyday practices - whether concretely performed or only imagined. At best, we live in evolutionary, albeit not necessarily progressive, times. Not everything, therefore, has become liquid, fluid and de-territorialized. Empowering practices themselves - both materially and mentally - have not lost their territorial ordering and bordering functions. On the contrary, notwithstanding the growth of global flows, the number of ordered and bordered (id)entities has not diminished. The multiple layers of possible identification have increased, not been replaced by globality. Local id/entities have become informed by globalizing economic, political, cultural and technological developments, but the various spatial b/orderings involved in identity-construction have certainly not become fully universalizable, either in their form or content.
Within a more assertively geo-political frame, globalization and related developments such as transnationalism and immigration are increasingly perceived as dangerous streams that risk flooding the protective and protected lands of domestic sovereignty. In this context, the desire to control and reclaim space has recently found new political adherents and partisans. Reflecting the latter, the dikes of control and containment of local id/entities have rather been re-strengthened and re-built over the past years. Perhaps it is in this context that the re-b/ordering of space should be apprehended as a reply, a counter-force to the liquidizing forces of postmodernity and recent waves of globalization (Bauman, 2000). This neo-conservative or super-modern b/ordering practice is novel in that, by reworking the territorial foundations of national sovereignty, it consciously and unrepentantly runs counter to the logic of progressive cosmopolitanism, transnationalism and postmodern liquid truth (Buck-Morss, 2003). Such a border regime strategically employs Outsiders to reclaim territorially binding powers. Re-b/ordering is ‘open for business’, yet it unfolds in a space not necessarily defined by liberal market principles. The post-9/11 world apparently seems to be marked to a large extent by fear, often propelling the nexus towards further containment and suppression. In sum, borders have not left the scene of human territoriality. On the contrary, in many cases they have become more socially manifest and performatively asserted.

There is more at stake in this than a straightforward solidification of established socio-spatialities, however. B/ordering practices have also changed their character and effectiveness. In this process, new kinds of actors appear, and their inventive performances reveal tactics, strategies and rationales that burst asunder previously fixed and taken-for-granted boundaries. On a geopolitical plane, for instance, to conceive of the world primarily in terms of the rationally organized hierarchies of the sharply bounded territorial containers associated with classical modernity is no longer adequate, if it ever was. Such interpretations have traditionally dominated the discipline of geography and its cognate fields, and still inform these disciplines to a considerable degree. An improved conceptual apparatus is needed, one that would shift the analysis and understanding of socio-spatiality away from the static world of container-borders to the complex and varied patterns of both implicit and explicit bordering and ordering practices.

Doors and Windows, Shade and Light

The material and physical dimensionality of borders, what Henri Lefebvre might have described as the espace perçu (1991) of borders, has traditionally received the most attention in wider academic discussions. The media, too, not infrequently hone in on their visible manifestations. Heavily armed border guards and high brick walls admittedly have an effect on people. More generally, the modern individual is usually trained to pay attention to what is visible to the eye or the camera, from the perspective of screening, surveillance, and monitoring. A barbed-wired fence, a wall, a door, a gate, a river, a line in the sand or on a map are striking and well-known configurations of borders as visual objects. Yet, there is always more than the map or the eye can tell us. Crucial to an understanding of borders is not so much their material morphology, but the various forms of interpretation and representation that they embody. As Latour (1993) has argued, a
key can transform a door into a border for some but a pass-through for others, in
the same way that a wall may signify protection for some while for others it
constitutes a political offence or merely an irritating graffiti board (Ley and
Cybriwsky, 1974). A border, therefore, should not be viewed as through a door or
window, as objects per se limited to their physical delimitation (Soja, 1996). Such
a restricted (and restricting) representation may indeed lead to the claim that as a
result of the current dismantling of borders, currently most fashionable in the EU,
the world is indeed becoming ‘liquid’ or ‘borderless’. On the contrary, border
objects are not relevant in themselves, as are the objectification processes of
bounded spaces informing people’s everyday spatial practices. This power of
borders, that which exceeds their constraining material form, is derived from their
specific interpretation and a resultant (often violent) practice. Most importantly, a
territorial b/order is a normative idea, a belief in the existence and continuity of a
territorially binding and differentiated power that only becomes concrete,
objectified and real in our own everyday social practices. The border of a province
or a nation-state is first and foremost a legal fact, one that is reproduced, literally
kept alive by a large ensemble of connected practices, ranging from printed bodies
of law and maps to corporeal inscriptions and the surveillance of boundaries on the
landscape. The b/order is an active verb.

Interpreted along these lines, a border is not so much an object or a material
artefact as a belief, an imagination that creates and shapes a world, a social reality.
Much like a window offers a view onto the world, the material inscription of
borders constitutes a strong act of the imagination on the world. Producing a safe
interior, borders create a membrane or buffer zone separating an inside from an
outside, while linking both in a particular way, projecting the imagination of a
larger, encompassing reality on the ground (Paasi, 1996). B/ordering, as the
strategic fabrication and control of a bounded sphere of connectivity, constitutes a
reality of (affective) orientation, power and ease, thereby expressing desire for
protective distance from the outside world (van Houtum, 2002). In so doing,
borders select and prioritize social relations. Like mapping, b/ordering creates and
represents an exclusive knowledge. It decides what is to be included and excluded,
how the lie of the land, the group, the discipline or the self will look like, and
what the border wishes to communicate (Dodge and Kitchin, 2001; van Houtum
and van Naerssen, 2002).

Yet, as borders are crucially dependent from our reproductive imagination, there
is no fixed or unitary route that borders take. Borders can be imagined as lines of
difference and protection as well as representations of the crossing, the de-fencing,
the merging, the additional, the expectation (van Houtum and van der Velde,
2004). Given the apparently contradictory spatialities of borders, reflected in their
capacity to articulate both transcendent closure and immanent openness, we may
assert that bordered spatialities are inherently partial, selective, and opportunistic,
both in their representation as in the interests that they serve. It is precisely in the
unfamiliarity of this in-between and beyond-space that we are challenged to
unbound our thinking and practices. A tension thus lies at the heart of performative
border spacings, which reveal on the one hand practices of control, the production
of inside and outside distinctions, the ongoing carving up of domains of
knowledge and purified ‘dreamlands’ of id/entity (van Houtum, 2002); and on the
other an escape into radical openness, into teeming border-crossing inventiveness
A re-ontologization of ‘the border’ is called for, one that is attuned to the ongoing socio-spatial reproduction of borders in the world today while remaining open to their qualitative transformation as the site for a politics that cannot simply be read off the logics of state-centric spatialities (Brenner et al, 2003). This is the Janus-face of borders, capturing both their conserving and expansive potential.

Spatial Turn - B/ordering Turn?

The 1990s were marked by an assertive ‘spatial turn’ in the human and social sciences, one which applied a far-reaching critique to basic categories of space, time and the social constituted under the era of modernity (Soja, 1989; Massey, 1994; Gregory, 1994). Without naming it as such, at the same time geography underwent a ‘social-discursive’ turn by adopting various social theoretic, particularly (post)structuralist and feminist approaches. Foundational to both sets of literatures was the insight that space is socially produced; rather than a mere physical container for the play of social forces and temporal relations, space is conceived at once as both the medium and presupposition for sociality and historicity (Gregory and Urry, 1985). In this context we would aver that the tension-laden qualities of borders sketched in the previous section are a specification of the inherent spatiality of social life. Moreover, to thus claim that borders are socio-spatially produced clarifies the role and positioning of borders within wider academic debates. For just as at the start of the previous decade Smith and Katz (1993) gestured with bemused concern at the promiscuous deployment of spatial concepts throughout the social and human sciences - ‘space’ having sprung the boundaries of its proprietary discipline, geography, to thrive in departments of art history, comparative literature, and gay/gender studies - we cannot but be similarly intrigued by the widespread recourse to ‘borders’ as a productive metaphor within the vanguard spheres of social theoretical inquiry in the academy today. For instance, for some years now the ‘border’ has been mobilized as a strategy among those wishing to destabilize bounded categories of class, race and gender in the service of a new cultural and spatial politics attuned to multiplicity and ‘difference’ (Anzaldua, 1987; Hicks, 1991; Giroux, 1992; Keith and Pile, 1993; Dworkin and Roman, 1993; Schedler, 2002). Rather than view the resulting imbrication of cultural studies and traditional border research as a further dilution of disciplinary focus or flight from an appropriately ‘grounded’ political praxis, however, we believe the field of border studies should strongly embrace the possibilities offered by the crossing of disciplinary boundaries, seeing in the creative ‘mediations’ between the material and metaphorical narration of borders an opportunity to expand the imaginative scope of what has until now constituted a rather empirically-oriented domain (see Woodward and Jones, this volume). Concurrently, by staging an encounter between critical social theoretic approaches in geography and ‘actually existing borders’, we believe a more experientially engaged form of geographical theorizing may be sustained which does not always need to seek legitimacy by falling back reflexively upon claims to spurious material ‘authenticity’.

Such a transformation in disciplinary perspective on borders has not been induced exclusively by intra-academic developments. Theoretical reflections on
borders are linked to key developments of world society, particularly as they relate
to debates surrounding the post-Cold War world order, globalization and the end of
the nation-state, cyberspace and associated time-space compressions. European
Union integration policies aimed at the promotion and funding of cross-border
regions have been vital in setting the context for contemporary research on borders
in Europe since the early 1990s. It is not by accident that European cross-border
planning initiatives have occurred in tandem with the emergence of a European-
wide network of research institutes devoted to the study of political borders and
transboundary regions, themselves often located outside metropoles in less central
cities often situated on or near nation-state borders. For the editors of this volume,
one means of keeping this intellectual space of border knowledge open to the flow
of new insights and voices has been to invite not only distinguished colleagues in
political border studies but leading human geographers who do not necessarily
place the theme of bordering at the heart of their respective research agendas. It is
precisely this view, from a well-informed but distant position, with the intention
to bridge divergent research fields, that we as editors were keen to nurture. And so
it is with this perspective that we asked each contributor to inflect current work-in-
progress through the metaphor of bordering space.

Structure of the Book

Part I: B/ordering Practices in a Borderless’ World

The opening essays grouped in Part I argue forcefully that, rather than constitute
barriers or obstacles to globalization, boundary-making practices should be
conceived as inescapable features of the globalization process. Such an assertion,
while offering another useful way to ground current globalization discourses,
opens up new perspectives for theorizing politics spatially from the border. Anssi
Paasi thus argues against the metaphorical claim of a borderless world while
making a plea for a more nuanced and less universalizing view of boundaries.
Drawing primarily on social and political constructivist frameworks, he argues that
boundaries should not be taken for granted, nor should they be grasped in terms of
a universal essence, function or trajectory. Rather, boundaries must be understood
as important constitutive elements of the practices and narratives by which social
groups and their identities are constructed and governed. In this context, he
underlines the importance of critically scrutinizing boundary-drawing practices,
while following the inherently contested meanings of boundaries as ideological
forms, symbols and markers of identity.

In the following contribution, Edward Soja engages with some of the dramatic
changes in the way urban space has been re-bordered over the past thirty years.
Drawing on the insight that all bordering practices are expressions of the social
production of space, he sketches out some of the main features of the globalization
process itself and traces its varied effects on territoriality. Soja argues that if the
physical demarcations of international boundaries have not altered due to economic
globalization, they have certainly become more permeable to economic and cultural
flows, and are being newly questioned in terms of their functions. He proceeds to
discuss this new configuration of boundaries by examining the gradual bordering
of the modern metropolis, shifting attention to the myriad ways in which bordering practices inform the politics of today's postmetropolis. More than ever before, Soja argues, the expansive reach of the city now stretches outward onto a global scale. The contemporary post-metropole thus envelops its inhabitants in more bordered layers than any other form of human habitat in human history. Prodding social constructivist accounts of bordering space into the sphere of what might constitute a normatively spatialized politics, he contends that it is precisely within the multiplicities of contemporary post-metropolitan space produced in this novel world-historical conjuncture - from Los Angeles to Amsterdam to Mumbai - that we must seek out and encourage new models of cross-border urban and regionally-based democracy and justice.

Benno Werlen reminds us that the traditional core of the geographical discipline has concerned itself with the study of physical spaces. The last decades of the 20th century, however, have been characterized by a turn towards action-, agency-, practice- and discourse-centred perspectives in the analysis of space. Notwithstanding their ambitions, Werlen believes a large number of contemporary geographical approaches do not take the epistemological and methodological implications of this shift sufficiently into account. Contrary to persisting conceptions of space as merely a `thing' in the sense of structured areas or territorial containers, Werlen offers a notion of space as a frame of reference which in turn constitutes the physical world for actors while informing their activities. As a consequence, he urges human geography not to analyse regions and actions in space, but the making of frames of reference articulated within everyday regionalizations, by which actors relate themselves to the world and order it. Although this is not sketched out in any detail, Werlen implies that bordering practices must be grasped analytically as well as in terms of such everyday spatializations.

While following an independent line of argumentation, the following chapter nevertheless provides an excellent illustration of those bounded `everyday regionalizations' Werlen has in mind. In his intervention David Ley trains his lens on Asian `business migrants' whom the Canadian state perceives as successful entrepreneurs contributing to the nation's economic dynamic and prosperity. While Canadian immigration policies actively construct the Asian business migrant according to the ideals of Homo Economicus, Ley reconstructs a typology of migrant behaviour that deviates from the rationalities implied by standard neo-classical `push-pull' models. In his view the borders business migrants must overcome are not best represented by their cartographic location, but are more accurately captured in terms of the imagination and activities of officials, politicians, migrants, family members and other actors. Adopting this perspective, Ley not only illuminates the complex fabric of illusions and despair enveloping many migrant households, but also demonstrates how the Canadian state, by selectively `selling' passports to economically successful subjects, subverts an inclusive notion of national identification in favour of a strategic, even opportunistic attitude towards citizenship. This reality, a far cry from any borderless world, is one of the more perverse faces borders take on in the age of globality.
This part engages in a more sustained fashion with one side of the Janus-face of borders, namely the specific bordering and ordering practices and associated power relations flowing from the strategic claiming of space, place and territory. Once the unique purview of political geography, this theme is highlighted by Arnoud Lagendijk as of increasing concern to economic geographers preoccupied with the selective socio-political re-scaling of economic activity at the sub-national scale. Much like borders themselves, cities and regions are increasingly defined through ‘strategic construction, claiming and bordering’. In analysing this process he observes that while on the one hand the usage of territorial principles is ever-present, its underlying logic often remains elusive. Within the European Union, for instance, the scope of problems purportedly amenable to regional solutions is impressive, covering, amongst others, themes of innovation, competitiveness, sustainability, transport and culture. Although the concepts of ‘region’ and ‘regionalization’ have come to underpin large-scale processes of administrative and political reform at sub-national, national and supra-national levels, the precise delimitation and justification of their borders remain highly fuzzy and open to wide interpretation. By exploring the discourses of ‘competitiveness’, ‘governance’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘identity’ in the context of EU regional policy, Lagendijk reveals the process by which vague narratives are translated into procedures, documents, institutional structures and spatial fixes. In his view, sufficient ambiguity remains in the spatial demarcation of the ‘regional’ so as to give players leeway in the pursuit of their own (often neoliberal) agendas. He concludes that’s is in the balance between the assumed coherence and interpretative flexibility of regionalization discourses, in combination with the wide range of issues addressed, that the success of regional development agendas has to be contextualized. Here, and not so paradoxically, the borders appropriately constituting the economic would seem to be kept intentionally ‘fuzzy’ the better to maintain hegemonic decision-making at higher spatial scales.

Echoing Lagendijk’s contribution, Peter Weichhart points to a mismatch between heightened transnational economic linkages and the strictly bordered politico-administrative regionalization of Greater Salzburg. As is typical for a bordered metropolitan area, the economic agglomeration of Salzburg (Austria) and its ‘hinterland’ extends far into Bavaria (Germany). But until now the political and administrative bodies of affected cities, towns, Lander and nation-states have not been able or willing to develop a coherent transnational planning doctrine capable of managing the increasingly cross-border dimension of planning problems across the region. Weichhart reports on the experience of his participation on an interdisciplinary research team charged with overcoming the resulting institutional paralysis through the development of a new planning doctrine. In so doing, the team attempted to re-present the Greater Salzburg region and elaborate the key features of a proposed new planning doctrine on the basis of a plurality of geographical approaches. These in turn were oriented towards the development of new functional boundaries acknowledging the transfrontier nature of the metropolis, the inclusion and participation of a wide array of protagonists, the establishment of regulations via civil law contract, and the founding of a transnational democratic umbrella organization infused with strategic planning.
powers. In concluding, Weichhart asserts that the reason many of the goals of the research team have yet to be achieved speaks to the ongoing power of the imagined community of the bounded nation-state to frustrate the best laid transboundary plans.

Within the field of economic geography regional development issues are often addressed solely in terms of the dynamics of successful *milieux*. Drawing on Harold Innis, a Canadian economic historian, *Trevor Barnes* overturns that perspective by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of economically peripheral areas may also obtain a wider analytical purchase on the sub-discipline. Discussing the history of the forestry sector in British Columbia, Barnes examines Canadian single industry towns rooted in staple production, highlighting their extreme exposure to market changes, technological shifts and resource depletion. He suggests regions founded on the production of staples may thus be accurately considered as 'borderline communities' in a double sense. First, the production and distribution of staples express unique spatialities and temporalities that connect one place to another. Secondly, the confluence of these different geographies and histories makes single industry communities acutely sensitive to change. They are truly liminal communities, dependent on remote strategic, investment and production decisions while remaining exposed to the danger of declining profitability and subsequent erasure. Resonating with Lagendijk's account of regionalization, the evidence would seem to suggest that regional economic borders are drawn around single industry communities largely in the service of capital-centred spatial fixes operating at national and supra-national levels. The bordered 'fixing' of spaces and places is thus intimately bound up with their subsequently 'melting into the air'.

The chapter rounding out this section of the volume pushes the `strategic construction, claiming and fixing of places' to its conceptual and ethical limits. *Derek Gregory* offers a poignant and morally charged view of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. In so doing, he reconstructs the manner by which, step by step, and through a continuous radicalization of Israeli strategies of partition, appropriation and surveillance, the lifeworld of Palestinians has been transformed into what Giorgio Agamben has termed the 'space of exception'. Here, through the 'hideous' enactment of a power topology of borders and entry passes, walls and bulldozed security perimeters, the Israeli army has thrust the lands and lives of Palestinians ever more violently into a 'zone of indistinction' located beyond the pale of 'civilized' community. Israel's offensive operations are thus designed to turn the entire Palestinian people not only into enemies but into aliens. In so placing them figuratively and physically outside the modern, Palestinians are constituted as 'homines sacri'. Under Roman law, the *homo sacer* was a subject whose death had no sacrificial value but whose killing did not constitute a crime. Today's Palestinian *homines sacri* inhabit a bordered zone of abandonment within which sovereign power suspends its own law as a condition of its own survival.

**Part III: Situating and Extending Spaces of Orientation**

The third part recasts the effectivity of socio-spatial bordering practices in terms of their potential for enabling another side of borders: openness, porosity, travelling and fecund hybridity. This, we suggest, is the counter-intuitive, mostly invisible
Prologue

(yet no less real) ´face´ of borders today, demanding equal scrutiny on the part of researchers to that of the more visibly repressive and exclusionary aspects of bordered space in the contemporary world. Allan Pred offers a historically nuanced entree into this important dimension of bordered spatiality by examining the subterranean currents linking scientific activity and the ´mundane´ daily lives of city-dwelling scientists in 19th-century Paris. Reminding us of the intrinsic situatedness of practice, knowledge and power - the fact that because of our corporeality, our material embodiment, there is always a thereness, a somewhereness, a here-and-nowness to practice - he insists upon the porosity and mutual entanglement between the conduct of science and that of urban everyday life. For Pred, it is precisely in those ´moments of insight´ produced through the lightning-like constellation of science and the urban everyday that an ´unbounded´ space opens up for both, leading in turn to the production of newness.

Drawing a conceptual bridge between action-theoretical and post-structuralist approaches in human geography, Huib Ernste gestures towards precisely such an ´out-of-bounds´ scientific praxis, both at the level of research object and methodology. Ernste contextualizes the need for an analytical synthesis in human geography by defining the latter as the science that traditionally investigates the relationship between human activities (or being) and the environment. At a more general level this involves the relationship between society and space. Ernste posits that within contemporary human geographical debates one may distinguish different social theoretic schools, ranging from modern behaviouralist approaches via late-modern action-theory to post-structuralist theories of practice. These approaches differ in the way they conceptualize both sides of the man-environment relation. As a consequence they distinguish themselves in the way they achieve only a partial understanding of the spatiality of human activities, plumbing selective elements of the *conditio humana* by way of ideal typical model of the human self. In search of a more holistic conceptual framework, Ernste proceeds to analyse the models of man used in each of these approaches. These models in turn describe the ways subjects are meant to be differentiated from their environment and how the ´border relation´ between subject and environment is to be managed and analysed. Based on the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner, he argues for a less one-sided and more ´debordered´ conceptualization of human being, thereby also implying a more hybrid mode of understanding the spatiality of human activity.

Closing the circle on a section devoted to the theme of ´unbounded science´ and its ´de-bordered´ practitioners, Wolfgang Natter excavates a prescient ´spatial turn´ in the 19th-century writings of Friedrich Ratzel. For Natter the open-ended and ´possibilist´ aspects of Ratzel's oeuvre have been systematically suppressed in subsequent treatments of his work, which have tended to cast its orientation as environmentally deterministic. Through a close reading of key texts, notably Ratzel's *Anthropo-geography* and *Political Geography*, Natter presents his work as a border phenomenon in its own right, particularly in its attempt to meld the social, natural and human sciences into a dynamic theory of space that would reinsert the human subject back into the systematic pursuit of a general geography. Influenced by his transnational movement throughout the Mediterranean and the Americas, Ratzel elaborates a dynamic conceptualization of the ´border´ as a natural corollary to his trans-disciplinary excursions, one that, rather than demarcate a firm
dividing line, consists of the unique space of a border-edge (Grenzsaum), itself an expression of ‘movement between transitions’ of language, ethnicity, culture, religion and race. The ‘essence’ of the border, thus posed, is that it is always ready to be transformed, and it, in turn, reacts back upon those centres that in myriad ways are constituted by it. In reflecting on Ratzel’s intellectual legacy, Natter is keen to point out a visible ambivalence in his writing between a recognition, on the one hand, of the violently dislocating effects of space wrought by 19th-century globalization, and on the other his efforts nonetheless to provide some sort of ground for a territorially defined state.

Part IV: Re-Imagining Bounded Routes and Discourses

Such Ratzelian ‘ambivalence’, we would aver, has not lost any of its urgency in our day. The essays grouped in this last part are attentive to the ironies and paradoxes at the heart of various cartographic as well as discursive re-imaginings of European and North American space. Borderless visions of an ‘ever closer Europe’, for instance, come face to face with enduring refusals, imperial memories, semi-conscious opacities and varied socio-linguistic exceptionalisms. James Sidaway reminds that, although within the European Union we have come to hear much about the project of a Europe without frontiers, borders endure and are incorporated as key features of contemporary European integration discourses. Guiding the reader on a self-styled ‘detour’ through the southern Luso-Iberian borderlands, Sidaway reveals the border as a semiotic system, a mythical-magical performance, a set of images and imaginations. Thus conceived, he argues that a specific visualization (or ‘perspective’) on borders lies at the heart of the European project, one that acknowledges borders only as a precondition of their gradual erasure. As demonstrated through a case study of an EU-funded cross-border bridge-building programme, Sidaway reveals how such an imaginary in turn leads to contradictions and paradoxes, as the bridge - whose intended goal is to catalyse cross-border economic networks and encourage the formation of a pan-European identity - threatens to destroy ways of livelihood founded on informal cross-border commerce while ironically stimulating a local transboundary oppositional politics. It is only when the very idea of transcending boundaries has been cast aside, Sidaway would seem to suggest, that the overcoming of state borders in Europe will become (re)conceivable. For the foreseeable future, the imaginative charge and meaning of borders are inscribed within the logic of another project, another set of discourses and powers emanating from Lisbon, Madrid and Brussels. It is (t)here, in such inscriptions and actions that Europe is remade, the old marks of its borders rearranged into hegemonic networks of meaning.

Anke Striiver focuses on images, narratives and popular culture as a way of engaging with people’s lives along the Dutch-German border. Towards this end, she concentrates on Michel de Certeau’s notion of ‘everyday practice’, training particular attention on the interplay between popular representations and everyday practices. Striiver thereby attempts to ‘transfer’ de Certeau’s conceptual framework the better to examine the observable lack of cross-border movement on the part of the inhabitants of the Dutch-German border area. A first section highlights the demographic fact that people who inhabit the Dutch/German zone cross the border extremely infrequently. Theoretical reflection on de Certeau’s notion of ‘the every-
day' and 'everyday practice' is then sustained in order to frame the latter in terms of 'routines of non-border-crossings'. The idea of 'popular culture' is subsequently introduced, pointing to the relevance of stories and images for the study of (nationalized) everyday life. This is further illustrated by empirical examples dealing with the consumption and interpretation of popular representations of Dutch-German relations, which in closing are linked back to the 'spaces of absence' at the Dutch-German border. As in Sidaway's Luso-Iberian border wanderings, these counter-intuitive spaces are actively 'produced' against the backdrop of breathlessly 'willed' European inter-connectivity.

Introducing the geo-culinary metaphor of the 'Rostigraben' (roasted potato gap) Wolfgang Zierhofer draws attention to a contemporary clash of political opinions and attitudes splitting the French- and German-speaking populations of Switzerland. He sets the stage for the current conflict highlighting that Switzerland constructed its national identity as a 'nation of will' and linguistic pluralism in response to the aggressive and homogenizing nationalisms of its neighbors in the latter decades of the 19th-century. In this context, speaking of the 'RSstigraben' - and thus metaphorically referring to a linguistic as well as a purportedly mental cleavage - allows the Swiss to manage their heterogeneous national identity while discursively circumnavigating constantly the threatening cliffs of regionalist secession. Beginning with a historical account of the country's linguistic landscape within the Swiss federal state, Zierhofer subsequently discusses the Rostigraben within the context of broader European integration imperatives. He then problematizes the current language impasse of which the Rostigraben is emblematic as a matter of political ethics. Since mobile human beings are the bearers of language(s), the political or legal fixation of language-territories and language borders is ultimately untenable. Zierhofer recalls that linguistic territories are neither sharply delimited, homogeneous nor necessarily stable. Rather, he clarifies that both spoken and native languages reveal themselves in Switzerland as a dynamic and multi-layered feature of Swiss culture, particularly once it is taken into account that many individuals use several languages and dialects in different contexts, such as at home, school, public life and the workplace. What can be mapped or statistically captured is at best selective - and at worst a thoughtless and reductionist representation of communicative practices. Under such circumstances, recourse to an appealing gastronomic border metaphor fails to address tensions lying at the heart of Switzerland's unresolved identity project.

Obviously, political borders should not seek to ground their political efficacy solely by way of metaphorical inference. Indeed, as Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones III argue, drawing on the 'post-structural historical-libidinal materialism' of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, analysis of borders must overcome the trap of either falling into an exclusively ideational or material cleavage, an unhelpful epistemological dualism that continues to suffuse much of geography. In order to break out of this 'congealed' ideational/material binary, the authors affirm Deleuze and Guattari's explicit rejection of the former term, as it suggests a transcendent whole that 'drops' onto a field of segmented parts and gathers them into a singular, coherent identity. In place of a dichotomous reading of the social, the authors deploy three spatial concepts critical to Deleuze and Guattari's theory of bordering: becoming, as 'lines of flight' out of and away from all constructed totalizations; territorialization and de-territorialization, the latter
involving the passing of limits, while changing the nature and increasing multiplicities in the service of an 'immanent heterogenesis'; and smooth vs. striated space, whereby the erasure of national borders by capital is met by strategies which demand 'leaving the plan(e) of capital altogether' through novel territorial re-appropriations. The notion of 'border' emerging from these Deleuzeian reveries is quite other than that of a stable, permanently situated object, and departs just as markedly from ideational constructions of border-as-metaphor. For Woodward and Jones, the movement of a border that marks such a 'horizon of multiplicity' is exemplified in the activities of La Resistencia, a pro-immigrant's rights movement along the Southwest U.S.-Mexico border. Through the use of their slogan 'Somos Todos Ilega1es' (We are All Illegals), La Resistencia deterriorializes State attempts at rigidly managing space, identity and access to cross-border flows. This task is Sisyphean and never-ending, however: while the smooth spaces produced by cross-border activism are key sites for bordered 'becoraings', they are also continually re-captured by capital and transformed into spaces of surplus value.

Re-Imagining the Janus-face of Borders

This book dispels the notion that the essence of borders is to be found in their taken-for-granted map-ability, their on-the-ground common-sensical visibility, their easy and complacent partitioning of the world. Intrinsic to the social production of space, from the body to the globe, borders are more complex, confounding and interesting. Notably, borders can trap as well as liberate socio-spatial identities. Thus, by virtue of their evasion of easy categorization and handling, their inherent ambiguity - poised between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion, fear and desire - borders have become important sites for contemporary geographical and political theorizing across the spectrum of the social sciences. It is here, through an infinity of bordered practices, that the political sphere is pried open and 'up for grabs'. It is in the dynamic and fragile balance between the utopian and dystopian drawing of spatial boundaries that the make-up of a territory can be grasped. The woolly Janus-face of borders may stare off into space in two directions at once, but it will be up to us to widen their gaze to the myriad lines of sight waiting to be exposed.

Nijmegen and Basel

References

PART I

B/ORDERING PRACTICES
A 'BORDERLESS' WORLD
Chapter 1

The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

Mapping the Backgrounds, Contexts and Contents

Anssi Paasi

Introduction

Although regional transformation seems to be a perpetually accelerating phenomenon, we have for a long time been used to living with certain large-scale socio-spatial facts in our modern world, prominent among which has been the existence of states and their boundaries, a certainty that has been canonized in international law and in the actions of the United Nations. This fact has dominated international relations, even though it is well-known that most currently existing states are not nation-states, in the sense that several ethno-national groups co-exist within them, either peacefully or in conflict. Some of these groups may be struggling fiercely for autonomy or a state of their own.

Most of the existing political boundaries were originally created by the European nation-states, so that De Vorsey and Biger (1995, see also Burghardt, 1996) are ready to argue that it is difficult to identify any international boundary that has not directly involved a European state at some stage of its evolution. Similarly, it was the peoples from the continent of Europe that imposed a model of the space of states and a specific state-centred structure of political economy on the rest of the planet, beginning in the 17th century - a model that involved boundaries and frontiers (Shapiro, 1999). Boundaries have been a key category in political geography and political science since the 19th century, but it was above all the collapse of the East-West divide at the beginning of the 1990s that gave rise to a new interest in political boundaries.

The 1990s and the first years of the new millennium have witnessed a dramatic increase in boundary studies all over the world, but particularly in Europe. The themes have varied from problems associated with the existing state boundaries to the roles of symbolic borders in the construction of contested social identities. Particularly important topics of research have been the diverging forms of cross-border interaction, emerging new regionalizations and region-building projects. Not only have the roles of concrete state boundaries been evaluated but also the
symbolic and metaphorical roles of all kinds of social, political, cultural and historical borders (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999; Donnan and Wilson, 1999; van der Velde and van Houtum, 2000). The sociologists Lamont and Molnar (2002) have noted in their review of the boundary literature how the idea of boundaries has been associated with research into such divergent topics as cognition, social and collective identity, commensuration, census categories, cultural capital, cultural membership, racial and ethnic group positioning, hegemonic masculinity, professional jurisdictions, scientific controversies, group rights, immigration or contentious politics, and this list is by no means exhaustive.

Geographers have also expanded their traditional ideas of political boundaries as frozen lines and have begun to map the roles and functions of boundaries as institutions, symbols and discourses that are ‘spread’ everywhere in society, so that they are not confined to the border areas themselves (Paasi, 1996). Attention has been paid to boundary-drawing practices, whether conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, or social and aesthetic (O'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). These practices are always part of broader social action and have typically been based on the processes of ‘Othering’, i.e. the construction of symbolic/cultural boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘the Other’. Spatializations of identity, nation and danger, for instance, are examples of boundary-drawing practices which are always contested and reflect power relations (Campbell, 1992; Tickner, 1995). These practices, in which national (spatial) socialization and education play a crucial role, manifest themselves in such areas as foreign policy, media discourses and popular culture (Paasi, 2003a).

Another topical example of boundary-producing practices concerns geopolitically challenging spatializations based on supra-national forms of culture, especially those referred to as ‘civilizations’, as suggested by Huntington (1993) in his much debated - and criticized - treatise (O'Tuathail, 1996; Nierop, 2001).

As far as the changing roles of political boundaries, and state boundaries in particular, are concerned, Anderson (1996) reminds us that current (political, A.P.) boundaries are not merely lines on maps, forming unproblematic backgrounds and limits to political life, but crucial elements in achieving an understanding of political life. He notes how any examination of the justifications for boundaries will normally raise dramatic questions on such themes as citizenship, identity, political loyalty, exclusion, inclusion and the ends of the state. These questions are increasingly important in the present world, characterized as it is by the flows of economic assets, information, refugees and immigrants. Inspired by these seemingly border-eroding processes, some authors have claimed that boundaries, and even states, will vanish or at least lose their role in the contemporary world. However, the simultaneous strengthening of old ideologies such as (ethno-)regionalism and nationalism seems to make a mockery of the most utopian visions of the borderless world.

The future role of boundaries is not, of course, an either-or question, and we certainly will not be able to write boundaries off in our academic discussions. What is needed is a deeper scrutiny of the social practices and discourses in which boundaries are produced and reproduced. I will argue in this paper that state power and the ideas of sovereignty, citizenship and identity still provide the social, political and cultural framework for ‘reading’ the contextual but simultaneously re-
The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

scaling meanings of boundaries and the power relations that are involved in the very constitution of them. The constantly advancing process of constructing the European Union, for instance, is transforming the existing geopolitical ideas on political boundaries and will inevitably fuse the spatial scales in this specific context, but this does not detract from the fact that the state still remains important (Paasi, 2001).

New approaches to border research suggest that political boundaries - as well as territories and their inherent symbolisms and institutions - are social constructs and processes rather than stable entities. A historical perspective is therefore inevitable in any account on the meanings of political boundaries. This paper will therefore begin with a brief analysis of the history of state territoriality, before reflecting on different boundary drawing practices and the meanings of boundaries as ideologies, forms of symbolism and markers of identity. A critical analysis will then be made of the contrasting boundary narratives that are currently emerging in the globalizing world. This will be followed by some methodological suggestions for future border research.

Boundaries, Meaning and the Space of States

Political boundaries are part of the historically contingent processes of territory building. Political geographers remind us that boundaries are key elements in the maintenance of territoriality, the principle through which people and resources are controlled and governed by the establishment of specific territories (Sack, 1986; Paasi, 2003b). Territories and their boundaries are in a perpetual state of transformation, and the attention currently being paid to boundaries is only the latest example of a long interest in the social production of space and territoriality. The links between boundaries, power and the state are of particular significance in this process. Maps of state boundaries are hence also maps of meanings - and vice versa. To provide a historical context for the current debates, I will discuss briefly the emergence of the space of states and political boundaries.

The answer to the question of when meaningful territorial boundaries emerged in the past is a contested one. Anderson (1996), for instance, depicts how the Roman Empire developed important notions of territoriality, and how the Middle Ages produced the `universalist' doctrines that offered an alternative project to the hardened frontiers of the states which developed in Europe from the 15th century onwards (note: Anderson systematically uses the word `frontier' rather than boundary). He further argues that the development of the frontiers of France prefigured those of the other European nation-states. These frontiers were finally challenged in the post-World War II international system. Anderson (1996, p. 12) argues that these landmarks in the history of frontiers point to an evolution in terms of the stability of boundaries and the complexity of their functions. On the other hand, Isaac (1990) presents a more sceptical view of the `spatial logic' of past societies and argues that the rulers of the ancient empires (such as Rome) were not interested in defining the frontiers of their territories in terms of fixed boundaries and that those in power were more interested in controlling people and cities than territory as such. In any case, the modern state system that has emerged gradually
since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) helped to establish the dominance of a horizontal, geostrategic view of the space of states.

The dominant geopolitical maps have always been imposed on the world by power, and have not emerged as an evolutionary historical inevitability (Shapiro, 1997). The conventional wisdom of political geography suggests that it was only at the turn of the last century that exclusive boundary lines were generally established instead of the former more or less loose frontiers (Taylor and Flint 2000). This is a crude generalization, of course, since boundaries still vary from relatively open zones to strictly defined lines. Also, the space comprising our territorial states is in a perpetual condition of flux, so that where the number of states was about 55 at the beginning of the 20th century and some 80 around 1960, their current number is about 200. This is much less than the existing 400-600 'nations', many of which are seeking states of their own. Particularly significant has been the post-World War II period, during which almost 120 new states have emerged on the world map as a result of processes of decolonization (95 states), federal disintegration (20) and secessionism (2) (Christopher, 1999). Only a few conflicts between states have taken place each year since the mid-1990s, whereas the number of internal conflicts has been 26-28 per year (Paasi, 2003a). Although forecasting is a complicated matter, Christopher (1999) suggests that the current potential for placing new states on the world political map is perhaps of the order of 10-20 units.

The present 194 states are divided by more than 300 land boundaries, each of which has a unique history. These histories are used in the construction of - usually contested - national identity narratives on both sides of the boundary. The construction of the social and political meanings of borders occurs particularly through spatial socialization and the territorialization of meaning, which take place in numerous ways within education, politics, administration and governance (Paasi, 1996). It is through these practices and discourses that people become identified with bounded spaces and their (historical) symbolism. Boundaries and their locations are often crucial elements in representations and narratives regarding the past successes and defeats of states and nations, on account of the fact that during the 19th and 20th centuries boundaries and territories became political symbols over which 'nations went to war and for which citizens fought and died' (Sahlins, 1989). Narratives of the past are typically highly selective and are constructed from the perspective of the existing states and projected to the past in a presentist manner. Dominant ideologies also tend to transform the narratives regarding the past as part of their own representations of the present and the future. Hence boundaries are an important part of the spatial practice and discourse by which social groupings and distinctions between them are created and maintained, in which the exercise of territoriality becomes possible. Boundaries are therefore also part of the practice and narratives by which social groups and their identities are constituted and the members of these groups are governed. Since identity formation and social boundaries seem to belong together, boundaries are often understood as exclusive constituents of identity that are taken for granted. States are in a crucial position in the production and reproduction of expressions of territoriality and various forms of inclusion/exclusion, and social and cultural boundaries are usually important in this. Yuval-Davis (1997) provides one explanation by remarking how 'borders and boundaries, identities and difference
The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

construct and determine to a large extent the space of agency, the mode of participation in which we act as citizens in the multilayered polities to which we belong’.

Academic scholars have been in a key position in the production of the border-centred outlook on the world and in shaping the practices and discourses through which the current system of territories is perpetually represented, reproduced and transformed. Authors writing on the nation and state typically construct narratives that depict how the ideas of sovereignty and the system of states have emerged gradually in relation to the changing physical-material, economic and technological circumstances, how the ideologies of nationalism and the ideas of the nation as a manifestation of this ideology gradually emerged and spread to replace absolutist rule, and how the rise of the modern world system of (‘nation’) states finally transformed the network of more or less diffuse, permeable frontiers into a grid of exclusive territorial boundaries (Paasi, 2003a). These elements are effectively represented and circulated in school atlases and other media, which concomitantly become instruments of popular geopolitics.

Agnew (1998) has labelled the acceptance of the state and the nation as categories that are taken for granted as ‘methodological nationalism’, which manifests itself in numerous ways. Most bodies of comparative data on human societies are gathered from statistics created by nation-states and are interpreted at the state level, often using maps depicting boundaries, which effectively reify the existence of bounded territorial spaces (Anderson, 1991; Murphy, 1996; Paasi, 1996). And this phenomenon is not limited only to statistics or maps. The historian Hobsbawm (1996, p. 255), for instance, writes that what justifies the existence of one nation in contrast to others is the past, and historians are the people who produce this. Similarly political and regional geographers, anthropologists and scholars of international relations have been involved in the production of ‘cartographies of power’ - representational practices aimed at inscribing exclusive territorial entities with a content, history, meaning and trajectory (Krishna, 1994). Political theorists continually reproduce definitions of the state which are based on an idea of a clearly demarcated territory in which the state exercises power, and this vision is canonized in international relations theory, whether realist, neo-realist or idealist. The state’s ‘essential’ territoriality has been taken for granted as part of the ‘territorial trap’, a way of thinking that assumes that:

• The sovereignty, security and political life of the modern state requires clearly bounded territorial spaces;
• there is a fundamental distinction between domestic and foreign affairs;
• the territorial state acts as the geographical ‘container’ of modern society, i.e. the boundaries of the state are the boundaries of political and social processes (Agnew, 1998).

Hence the world is understood as consisting of exclusive, bounded territories that have identities of their own. International law, for its part, has institutionalized this understanding as part of the operation of a state system, by identifying the state as a territorial organization and accepting that violation of its boundaries is inseparable from the idea of aggression against the state itself. The idea of
territorial sovereignty and the inviolability of political boundaries therefore owes much to modern (political) nationalism, and the existence of a national territory is a crucial element of every national ideology and identity (Sahlins, 1989; Anderson, 1996).

The activities of individual researchers often illustrate how knowledge in the social sciences is internally linked with the mechanisms of power. The objects of research in the human/social sciences are partly shaped by these mechanisms of power, which are legitimated by the ‘results’, theories and visions of the social sciences (Kusch, 1991). Our identity and action as individual subjects (and researchers) is hence part of the power relations in and through which we live and act. It is probably true that academic scholars have been exploited in most states for the production of geopolitical images. The paradox is that while many grand names of social theory, such as Weber or Durkheim (and to some extent also Marx), are celebrated because of their lasting (although different) generalizing theories of social relations and organizations, academic scholars often ignore their own personal, more or less explicit national ethnocentrism and stereotyping, evolutionism, often exclusive ways of thinking, commitment to the ideas of state and implicitly territorial understanding of modern society (Beck, 1997), or, as in the case of Weber, a strong nationalist attitude (and at times Darwinian terminology) towards his own German ‘more highly developed human type’, which prevailed for the whole of his life. In the disaster of 1914 he wrote that ‘whatever the outcome, this war is great and wonderful’ (Guibernau, 1996). One major task for the critical geographer is therefore to deconstruct and make visible the ideological, implicitly accepted assumptions of our spatial categories.

**Boundaries as Ideology and Symbolism**

Boundaries are both symbolic and institutional expressions (and media) of territoriality, which is an important but often implicit element in most social institutions. Nationalism, for its part, is the specific territorial ideology that aims to create and maintain territoriality and state borders. Ideologies are of course closely associated with other territorial boundaries as well, as is illustrated by regionalism (Paasi, 2002b). Kellner (1995) suggests that ideologies include theories, ideas, texts and representations that legitimate the privileges of the power holding elites, privileges based not only on economic power but also on gender and ‘race’. This means that ideologies are sedimented in complicated ways into the diverging institutional practices and discourses that constitute ‘nations’ (and also sub-national regions). Brubaker (1996) is on the same track when arguing that we should not think about the nation as a substance but rather as an institutionalized form. This view helps to understand why nationalism as a specific territorial ideology is normally so exclusive.

Kellner (1995) reminds us that because ideologies include rhetorical structures that aim at persuading and convincing people, they must basically be attractive and include a promise of emancipation and of something better. This simply means that ideologies do not operate behind the backs of human beings. It may be argued that many national institutions operate in the field of symbolic economy, to employ the expression of Bourdieu (1998) which - by contrast with the rational material
The social meanings of boundaries have also been objects of deeper sociological scrutiny, expanding the perspective from political state boundaries to the boundaries of human life (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). The sociologist Georg Simmel, for instance, reflecting on the meanings of boundaries for human life, emphasized their role in giving direction and location to existence and as preconditions for their own transcendence. Without boundaries, social and cultural activity would have no form. Simmel was rather vague in his vision, however, and took boundaries as a self-evident part of human life without attempting any explanation of where they come from (Tester, 1993).

Nevertheless, Simmel helps us to realize that boundaries are also social symbols and institutions, and hence instruments in the creation of meaning and interpretations of the world. Cultural researchers have for a long time reiterated the importance of symbolism in the social construction of boundaries in individual and community life. Many authors point to the links between boundaries and identity, and hence the cultural meanings of the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or the ‘Other’ (Bauman, 1990; Conversi, 1995). Although authors such as Elias (1994) suggest that the division between the established and an outsider is a universal theme and that members of groups which possess more power than other interdependent ones think of themselves as better than others in human terms, we should not assign any essentialist roles to boundaries (cf. the articles in Albert et al., 2001). Anthropologists, for instance, have been largely content to assume the existence and integrity of collective boundaries and, rather than questioning whose boundaries they are, have been mainly interested in the ways they are marked (Cohen, 1994). Cohen also asks what the individual is ‘conscious of when he or she invokes a boundary as a means or source of social identity. These are crucial questions, and also force geographers to reflect critically on their conceptual views regarding boundaries. An important part of boundary studies should therefore be the theorizing of boundaries. A brief look at current narratives on the nature of political boundaries clearly displays this.
Notes on Contemporary Narratives on Political Boundaries

Geographers and other scholars interested in political boundaries have found themselves in a paradoxical situation in the 1990s. On the one hand it is increasingly common to see comments suggesting how borders and nation-states are losing their traditional meanings or even vanishing, while on the other hand, the perpetually increasing academic interest in boundaries suggests that they exist very firmly on the research agenda. The former perspective starts out from arguments that the current world of de-territorialization is increasingly being characterized by all kinds of flows that cross borders, in a way making them less important than before. Although there are differences between the various types of boundaries that are, or are not crossed, there are also huge differences between the `flows' that cross them. Some represent what may be labeled as `fast geography' (such as telecommunications), while others are matters of `slow geography' (such as the transport of goods or flows of migrants and refugees). Most elements in the `borderless world' discourse seem to belong to the following, partly overlapping contexts (Paasi, 2002a): 1) current socio-economic conditions, particularly the `flow' rhetoric emerging in the spheres of economics and finance, 2) discussions of globalization (economics, culture) and the emergence of meso-scale regional economies, 3) debates on the `postmodern condition' and the socially constructed and contested nature of identities, societal knowledge and `truths', 4) the rise of new information and communication technologies and cyberspace, and 5) `ecopolitics' and environmental problems such as acid rain and pollution.

While many of these topics have proved attractive for social scientists and cultural researchers, their arguments have not always been clearly articulated. Belief in the power of `information highways', cyberspace and the internet for crossing boundaries often omits the fact that only a couple of percent of the world's population uses internet links and that this sphere is overwhelmingly dominated by the wealthy western states. These facts do not prevent the gurus of the information society from arguing that `Today... people everywhere are more and more able to get information they want directly from all corners of the world. They can see for themselves what the tastes and preferences are in other countries, the styles of clothing now in fashion, the sports, the life-styles' (Ohmae, 1990). On the other hand, increasingly critical tones towards the relativism represented by the advocates of postmodernism are emerging (Philo and Miller, 2001).

The most challenging arguments for current boundary studies come from some analysts of the globalization thesis who discuss the changing meanings and, in the extreme case, the disappearance (or withering away), of the nation-state, sovereignty and boundaries. Perhaps the most extreme view has been put forward by Ohmae (1995), who argues that `...in terms of real flows of economic activity, nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today's borderless world'. There are many possible contexts for these debates, and most authors typically locate the emergence of the dynamics of globalization in one institutional context, whether it is economics, technology, international politics, ecology or culture/the cultural industry (Beck, 1997). The idea of economic and cultural `globalization' has achieved particular importance, whatever this means for different authors. In this context, boundaries are increasingly understood as symbols of a `past', `fixed' world or the `space of
The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

places', which will be increasingly replaced by a 'dynamic' world and a 'space of flows'. These pairs of words, popularized by Castells (1989), have become extremely important metaphors of spatial transformation during the last decade. The paradox is that whereas many writers now rely on the 'space of flows', these two spaces were in fact simultaneous for Castells: it is the space of places that renders possible the identities of resistance against the tendencies associated with the space of flows. Identities, for their part, are certainly not based only on economics, since culture, history, politics and other processes that are important for national socialization do not inevitably lose their significance even if economic practices change (Paasi, 2003a).

One contextual problem in recent debates has been the fact that the 'disappearance of boundaries and the state' thesis has been a view posited mainly by scholars in the developed Western world. In these circles the end of Cold War bipolarity has been replaced by keywords such as speed, simultaneity, interconnectedness and decentralization, typically understood as key elements for explaining the nature of the structural change, the location of domination, the conditions of control and the realms of strife. Not all authors have interpreted the world in this way, however, as those from the South, for instance, saw the collapse of bipolarity as a moment of regression and a step towards marginalization, recolonization and global apartheid (Nabudere, 1994; Dalby, 1999). Border scholars in continental Europe have also faced a very different world, but one where boundaries are still a part of the territorial order, for even though the European Union is increasingly striving towards more open internal markets, it effectively maintains control over its external boundaries (Paasi, 2001).

Although some scholars have been ready to conclude that the globalization tendencies will lead to the erosion of nation-states and their boundaries, others argue that both will continue to exist, perhaps even gaining in strength in some cases (Anderson, 1995). Contemporary 'society' has never been merely national, but deeply transnational - involving relations that freely cross national boundaries (Mann, 1996). Mann's key argument is that transnational units are not a recent phenomenon: they have always undercut the sovereignty of all states. Similarly, geopolitical relations between states (and alliances) effectively restrict the sovereignty of those that have actively created binding agreements. Territorial states are therefore not vanishing but operating in a new, global context in which new, re-scaled forms of governance, and perhaps democracy, will gradually emerge (Held et al., 1999).

Much of the globalization discourse has to be understood as rhetorical and metaphoric (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 2002), and closer scrutiny reveals that the 'boundaries' mentioned in the more extreme globalization discourses do not refer to any particular boundaries (which are always contextual) but serve as general metaphors for economic liberalism (Paasi, 2003a). This is clear in Ohmae's ideology, for instance, where 'the borderless world' is the global marketplace, 'a competitive map' of real flows of financial and industrial activities (Ohmae, 1995). On the other hand, the idea of 'flows' in relation to political boundaries often remains abstract too, since rigorous empirical analyses of cross-border 'flows' and networks do not normally seem to theorize boundaries, but take them for granted (Sassen, 2002).
A major challenge for the existing state-centred views on boundaries is the changing link between state and nation. While it may well be noted that the nation is alive and well and that the state, too, is still significant in the contemporary world, the nation-state is in trouble. It is less and less the case in the world of flows and transforming loyalties that a territory constitutes a people in a sense that the land and its people are linked in an exclusive relationship (Appadurai, 1996). Both the strengthening sub-state and the existence of supra-state nations and nationalisms and of ‘supranational social spaces’ (Beck, 1997) challenge the traditional ‘one state, one nation’ assumption. Geographers and others have commented on the need for ‘anti-essentialism’ in interpreting identities, and the need to reflect carefully on our assumptions regarding the boundaries of bounded spaces and to identify the hybrid character of identity (Pratt, 1999; Rose, 1995; Massey, 1995). In the same spirit, the idea of ‘borderlands’ has become popular in debates on identities that do not fit neatly into the master narratives of ethnicity, race and nation (Isin and Wood, 1999). This idea is most popular in the literature on the Mexican-US border (Andreas, 2000; Herzog, 2000), but it has also become important in research on cross-border regions in Europe (Dürrschmidt, 2002; Space & Polity, 2002).

As far as the disappearance of the state is concerned, the continually increasing number of states and boundaries in the actual world suggests quite the opposite tendency. Blake (2000), in fact, argues that there has probably never been a time when so many borderland regions worldwide have become such difficult or dangerous places to live in, and the current world still harbours some 50 unresolved boundary disputes. This ‘stress’ on borderlands may be partly based on the effects of globalization and the opening (and closing) of borders with regard to flows of capital/finance, goods, ideas and people, which have cast doubt on the concepts of sovereignty, identity and governance. It may also be based on historically contingent meanings emerging from the political relations between neighbours. Blake suggests that a ‘stress-free’ borderland requires at least the following: 1) political goodwill, 2) the settling of territorial questions, 3) straightforward transboundary interaction within the law, 4) a sense of security provided by the border, 5) rational resource exploitation, and 6) coordination of local administration. This simply means that a context-dependent and sensitive approach to boundaries is needed instead of crude generalizations. It also means that many scholars during the early 1990s perhaps underestimated the importance of boundaries when the idea of exclusive spaces and fixed concepts of identity were challenged by the collapse of the ideological divide between East and West, the accelerating processes of globalization, the belief in the ‘world of flows’, annihilation of space, re-scaling of governance and the emergence of cosmopolitan and supra/post-national thinking. The roles of boundaries have again been reflected in the aftermath of 11th September, when the traditional ‘fronts’ between states seemed to turn into asymmetric networks (Anderson, 2002). It was not long before the state, strategic alliances (military, economic) between states and nationalistically toned assumptions of natural links between the state, the nation and its territory seemed to emerge again at the centre of international relations. These processes have been most visible in the conflicts between Pakistan and India and between Israel and Palestine, and most recently in the conflict between the US and Iraq.
Some Challenges for Boundary Studies

Previous analysis shows that boundaries are very ambivalent objects of research but due to this fact also provide a very interesting field for researchers. It also displays that very different views exist regarding the contemporary and future roles of nation-states and the boundaries between them. These views imply that (state) boundaries have versatile functions and meanings in social action. They are instruments of state policy, territorial control, markers of identity, as well as discourses manifesting themselves in legislation, diplomacy and academic scholarly languages (Anderson, 1996). Boundaries should not therefore be taken for granted, as if they were elements with one essence, function and trajectory. Neither should boundaries be understood as having some universal, independent causal power. Instead they are social and political constructs that are established by human beings for human - and clearly at times for very non-human - purposes and whose establishment is a manifestation of power relations and social division of labour. As far as academic research is concerned, the contested interpretations are fitting illustrations of the fact that social science is constructed rhetorically and can be understood as a set of meanings created in response to problems that emerge in different historical and political contexts (cf. Brown, 1987). Following from complicated societal relations of power and governance, space is typically divided into binary oppositions such as inside and outside at all spatial scales. Sibley (1995) has aptly pointed out that the defence of social space usually has its counterpart in the 'defence of regions of knowledge'. He argues that what constitutes knowledge - i.e. the ideas which gain currency through books and periodicals - is conditioned by certain power relations which determine the boundaries of knowledge. One part of the production of knowledge is the exclusion of dangerous or threatening ideas and authors. The discourses on the disappearance of boundaries and state are illustrative of a certain contextual unbalance in the emerging new rhetoric. It is contextual in a sense, since these ideas have been created typically by Anglo-Saxon scholars, obviously following from the one-sided optimism based on the fall of East/West geopolitical order, but these ideas have been presented as if these processes would be universal, occurring everywhere in the world (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Wilson and Donnan, 1998). The ideas of the disappearance of states and boundaries, put forward by authors like Ohmae (1995) are indeed fitting examples of cultural imperialism discussed by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999), a phenomenon that universalizes particularisms and imposes them in apparently de-historicized form upon the whole planet. Current planetary doxa, resulting from the false and uncontrolled universalization of the folk concepts and preoccupations of American society and academy, includes, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant, such key terms as multiculturalism, globalization, identity, etc. It is important to realize that the ideas of boundaries, such as their supposed 'disappearance', are themselves products of diverging, contested discourses. These ideas may be impregnated by rhetoric and reflect diverging strategies of academic power in their promise to depict real world processes. The major challenge is to develop critical approaches to understand the changing - contextual - meanings of boundaries in the current globalizing world (Paasi, 2003a).
Boundaries are means and media for organizing social space where the questions of power, knowledge, agency and social structures become crucial. Much of the boundary language in geography, for instance, reflects traditional modernist views on boundaries and provides fixed essentialist categories for research (Paasi, 2003a). One major task is, therefore, to reflect perpetually the links between boundaries and other ‘geographical’ categories, such as region, place and territory, since boundary-making is one part of the institutionalization of these units in social practice and discourse. Boundaries are studied today by scholars coming from several fields, often so that they do not recognize each other’s work (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). It is obvious that increasing cross-disciplinary (or even post-disciplinary) cooperation in research will open new theoretical and concrete horizons. This also means that boundaries need to be reflected in relation to categories developed outside of geography.

Border scholars often study their own research objects and even published collections tend to include separate case studies. In the world of the re-scaling state, economy and governance, comparative research is increasingly important. Since boundaries are historically and spatially contingent, contextual approaches are inevitable in research. Important research topics are the implications of the existing boundary narratives on the ideas of citizenship, identities, political/territorial loyalty, the territorialization of memory and the power relations that these narratives imply. Accordingly, new sensitive methods have to be developed by boundary scholars that could reveal the social meanings of boundaries as well as their functions and meanings in local daily life. An increasingly important question is how socio-spatial inclusions and exclusions are constructed and reproduced. This will require a combination of traditional disciplinary approaches, such as quantitative, qualitative, textual and ethnographic methods and the use of various kinds of research materials provided by (in-depth) interviews, participant observation, media texts, literature, school books, etc. This will help to study the meanings of boundaries in identity formation at various spatial scales and to reflect the relations between state boundaries and other social/symbolic boundaries. This will also render possible the evaluation of the meanings of boundaries in the structuration of the various spheres of social life (e.g. cultural representations on ‘nation’ and ethnicity, foreign and immigration policy), and, as part of this, the power relations that are involved in this structuration.

References

The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries

Chapter 2

Borders Unbound

Globalization, Regionalism, and the Postmetropolitan Transition

Edward W. Soja

Spatial B/orderings: An Ontological Introduction

We live enmeshed in thick webs of borders and boundaries. Most are out of sight and conscious awareness, yet they all impinge in some way on our lives as integral parts of our real and imagined geographies and biographies. Some carry with them the hard and invasive powers of the state, others the manipulative magic of market forces, still others the softer limits of identity and community, desire and imagination. Borders and boundaries are life's linear regulators, framing our thoughts and practices into territories of action that range in scale and scope from the intimate personal spaces surrounding our bodies through numerous regional worlds that enclose us in nested stages extending from the local to the global.

Your computer's thesaurus extends these definitive meanings still further. For border alone, leaving out decorative terms such as tassel and frill, there is abut, adjoin, approach, approximate, barrier, bound, boundary, bounds, brim, brink, brow, circle, circumference, circumscribe, coast, confines, connect, edge, enclose, encompass, envelop, extremity, fence, flank, fringe, frontier, girth, limit, line, lip, margin, meet, near, neighbor, outline, perimeter, periphery, rim, ring, shore, side, skirt, strip, surround, top, touch, trim, verge, and verge on. Boundary adds a few more terms (demarcation, extent, marches, and restriction), but enclose opens new ground, with beset, cage, comprise, confine, contain, cover, embrace, encase, encircle, immure, impound, imprison, incarcerate, include, insert, isolate, jail, lock, lock up, pale, picket, restrict, sequester.

Notice the paradoxical binaries and attracted opposites that compose the bordering process: circumscribe/connect, isolate/encompass, separate/meet, confine/approach, limit/touch. Borders by definition lead to creating and taking sides, producing and occupying opposing spaces, and to many associated dichotomizations: inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, we/they. But they also simultaneously invite transgression, a movement beyond the defined limits and enclosures of our lives to open new places and spaces, to search for reconciling alternatives, creative syntheses, resolving hybridities. Border crossings defy the limits of inclusion/exclusion, creating a distinctive space of its own, a borderlands
culture that resists enclosure and confinement. Foucault leads us into these spaces of transgression.

‘Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of its passage... it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses’ (Foucault, 1977, pp. 33-4).

Making practical and theoretical sense of these boundless meanings requires a broader ontological setting, one that positions the bordering process as a dynamic component of the social production of space, the making of history, the constitution of society. Seen this way, as active parts of the contextualizing of human life, borders and bordering develop in an ontological choreography that is always simultaneously and interactively spatial, historical, and social (Soja, 1996). Their impact is not naively given, nor does it stem from an extra-social environment. All borders and boundaries are socially produced and reproduced, and thus are always susceptible to being modified, transformed, erased, recreated, re-imagined, transgressed.

This ontological positioning connects the regulatory power of borders and boundaries to what is perhaps the most fundamental principle of the spatiality of human life, an existential framing that is at once obvious yet rarely recognized or examined explicitly as axiomatic and omnipresent. Ontologically speaking, every human action, the entirety of human existence, is materially situated in a multi-scalar nesting of nodal regions. Our bodies in themselves are the centers or nodes of mobile regions of personal space, and our lived experiences take place, literally and figuratively, in a more sedentary nesting of increasingly larger nodal regions contextualized in scale from the local to the global. At each of these levels of life, borders and boundaries demarcate the dynamic interplay of space-knowledge-power and the more subtle performances of human subjectivity and sociality. They define, confine, surround, envelop, mark, divide, connect, approach, encompass, enclose...

Following these explicitly spatial lines, boundaries and borders can be seen as arising intrinsically from the constant and often conflict-filled social production of the nodes, regions, scales, and territories that shape, and are shaped by, all human geographies/societies/histories. Nodality, or the focusing of human activities and networks of social relations in places, centers, agglomerations, is fundamental to all social life, the basis for all habitat construction. In turn, access to the situational advantages of nodality becomes a source of social power, giving rise to regional patterns of uneven development expressed in center-periphery relations that repeat themselves at multiple spatial scales. The internal and external borders of these nested and networked nodal regions are, for the most part, fluid and configured by movements and flows into functional or activity spaces. Territorialization, the fourth framing dimension of spatial ontology, adds to the spatiality of social life a more formal materialization and demarcation, imbuing borders and boundaries with significant regulatory power.

Territorial behavior in human societies, or social territoriality, revolves directly around the deliberate bounding of spaces, the bordering of our lifeworlds for purposes of safety, defense, control, identity, intimacy, community, separation, connection, regulation, and many other needs and wants, all of which can be summarized under the general notion of spatial governance. Social territoriality
thus becomes the actual and intentional practice of imposing and maintaining purposeful boundaries, demarcating and enclosing social life, circumscribing human subjectivity. It produces the specifically political organization of space (Soja, 1971).

My aim in this essay is to move from this ontological choreography into a much more concrete discussion of some of the changes that have been taking place over the past thirty years in how space is bordered and bounded at several different scales. I start with a look at the globalization process and its effects on the territoriality of the nation-state. I follow this with a brief discussion of the border effects of what some term the New Regionalism. Finally, I examine the reconfiguration of the modern metropolis and the restructuring of urban and metropolitan boundaries and borderings associated with what I have called the postmetropolitan transition (Soja, 2000). The intent of these rather brief explorations is not a thorough summary or analysis of changing conditions but rather an attempt to open new ways of thinking about and studying borders and boundaries in their contemporary setting.

Globalization and its Dis-containments

However one approaches the study of boundaries, there can be little doubt that our border-full world has been changing at an unusually rapid pace over the past thirty years, perhaps as much as in any other comparable thirty-year period. Many once rigidly defined lines of demarcation and containment have become more nebulous and permeable, less confining. At the same time, new barriers, defensive walls and fences, impenetrable enclosures have been raised where there were formerly little or no territorial restraints. Although the concept is so often muddled and misrepresented, there is an important connection between these changes and the globalization of capital, labor, and culture.

Globalization in its manifold forms has carried with it a loosening up of older territorial boundaries of political power and cultural identity, and stimulated the emergence of new and different forms of bounding political economies and cultures at every geographical scale. Among the most useful and interesting ways to describe this loosening up and selective reconfiguration is through the terms deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Broadly defined, this pairing refers to a reorganization - a debordering and rebordering - of territorial power, autonomy, and identity at multiple scales of government, from the global governance system to the local state. This territorial restructuring does not necessarily involve an actual realignment of formal government boundaries, but even when established boundaries remain intact and unchallenged, there have been sufficient changes in their meaning and intended - as well as unexpected - effects to create a substantially different political organization of space.

Let us look first at the global scale itself, and the grid-work of international boundaries that patterns the earth's surface into its most formidable mosaic of political power, the nation-state system. Just how many miles there are of international borders is almost impossible to measure precisely. In addition to the boundaries that separate states from one another there are also those that extend into the sea, and even up in the air and underground, setting additional limits to
territorial state authority. There has been very little evidence to suggest that these formalized international boundaries have been significantly redrawn. Many new states have emerged over the past thirty years, adding significantly to the membership of the major institution of global governance, the United Nations, but nearly all have been formed out of older territorial units. The pre-existing boundary lines separating autonomous state governments have remained remarkably stable.

What has changed most in recent years (although certainly not everywhere) has been the containing effect of international boundaries, their degree of permeability to the flow of people, goods, money, ideas, and information. There are many explanations for this reduction in the barrier effects of international boundaries, including the expansion of new information and communications technologies, and the related rise of worldwide webs or networks that facilitate border jumping and transnational linkages for all kinds of flows. Receiving the most attention, however, has been the ever-widening globalization of capital, labor, and culture and the associated reconfiguration of national capitalisms through the formation of a more territorially footloose and flexible New Economy.

The globalization of capital has taken three main forms. The globalization of commercial or mercantile capital that was initiated more than four hundred years ago has, over the past thirty years, intensified international trade flows and increased the importance of imports and exports in almost every national economy. It has also stimulated the formation of many new supra-national trading blocs such as NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in South America, and APEC in Asia, and greatly empowered global trade and tariff regulating organizations such as the WTO. Cities with large airports and seaports have benefited significantly from these expanding transnational trade flows.

A similar intensification in the global flows of finance and investment capital has more than matched the late 19th century globalization associated with the age of national imperialism and colony-building. Combined with increasing trade flows, the increasing globalization of finance capital has refocused economic power in a reorganized hierarchy of nodal centers or what are now called global cities or global city regions. At the peak of this hierarchy of centrality are the three great citadels of global financial power, the most commanding capitals of capital, New York, London, and Tokyo.

What most distinguishes the contemporary era, however, has not been the continued globalization of commercial or financial capital but the onset of a globalization of industrial capital and the spread of advanced forms of urban industrialization. Formerly confined to the advanced national economies of what has been defined as the First World, advanced forms of industrial capitalist development have spread more widely than ever before, although certainly not to all the countries of the old Third World. This limited diffusion is best exemplified in the expansion of the NICs, newly industrialized countries that range from the `Asian Tigers', which led the way, to the most recent rise of the `Celtic Tiger' of Ireland. But such newly industrialized spaces have also appeared at more local and regional scales, such as in the so-called Third Italy (in the borderlands between the developed North and the still underdeveloped South) and the prototypical Silicon Valley and Orange County in once peripheral suburbia.

This increasing globalization of commercial, finance, and industrial capital has led some pundits to proclaim the coming of a `borderless world' and the `end of
Although these claims are clearly exaggerated, there seems to be little doubt that the system of international borders and the bounded sovereignties of national economies are no longer what they used to be just thirty years ago. The web of official governmental boundaries may not have changed much, but there have been major shifts in what has been called the International Division of Labor and in the global patterning of geographically uneven development. The longstanding divisions between First, Second, and Third Worlds, developed core and underdeveloped periphery, North-South, have become much less distinct and stable, while regulation of the global economy increasingly bypasses the nation-state to concentrate more than ever before in the rapidly expanding system of global city regions (Scott, 2001).

These reconfigurations of the global mosaic of political power are not just shaped by the movements of capital. Transnational flows of labor have also increased significantly over the past thirty years, leading some to speak of global diasporas as millions of migrants from nearly every country in the world move increasingly longer distances in search of work and improvements in their quality of life. These huge migration flows have concentrated primarily in global city regions, the largest of which today contain the majority of the world's population. These directed global flows of labor have been crucial to sustained economic growth. They have also stirred conflicts between domestic and immigrant populations, and stimulated reactionary xenophobias, as almost every definition of we versus they and the borders of social inclusion and exclusion become increasingly unsettled.

The unsettling effects of the globalization of capital and labor have been magnified and made more complex by the associated globalization of culture. There are many sides to this cultural globalization. Some see in it little more than a rampant homogenization cum Americanization, a new imperial age spreading capitalism around the world like molasses on a plate, disregarding all boundary impediments. Others emphasize increasing diversity, heterogeneity, multiculturalism, differentiation, and the potential for new forms of resistance to this homogenizing cultural imperialism. Still others see cultural globalization as a direct threat to national, racial, and religious identities, giving rise to resurgent fundamentalisms if not fascisms that call for the re-entrenchment of national territorial boundaries against all newcomers and all forms of cultural mixing and border crossing. The more accepting see globalization as a source of creative advantage and economic opportunity, offering a multitude of flexible choices and the promise of innovative fusions and hybridities.

Whatever side(s) one takes, it can be argued that attitudes toward globalization are significantly influencing all contemporary political and ideological debates about borders and bordering. If international boundaries are not changing in their physical demarcation, they have certainly become more porous to economic and cultural flows, and are being questioned in terms of their functions in new and different ways. There seems little doubt that global economic integration has been increasing, but this world of intensified economic flows remains constrained by more static political boundaries, older forms of political territorialization and regulation that were constructed, for the most part, to meet very different demands.

This imbalance between economic and political change has led many to argue that there is emerging a growing crisis of governance at the global scale and with
respect to the relations between nation-states. Recent events have vividly demonstrated the weaknesses of the existing global governance system to deal effectively with the negative effects and by-products of globalization, from social polarization and deepening poverty to global warming and international terrorism. Similar challenges to the creation of effective democratic governance in the face of rapid economic, social, and cultural change are also arising with the so-called crisis of the nation-state, and extend internally to the intra-national, regional, metropolitan, and local scales of governance as well.

**Regions Rebounding**

Global economic integration and the restructuring of nation-states have contributed to a resurgence of regionalism at both supra-national and sub-national scales. This has added new challenges and opportunities to national and local governance systems. Although this reinvigorated regionalism can be seen all over the world, it has become most clearly manifested in Western Europe and the development of the European Union. The EU itself is an emergent form of supra-national regionalism, the first attempt to create a territorial union of established industrialized nation-states. And with its development, almost as a strategic counterfoil to national power, it has stimulated the growth of sub-national regionalisms, giving rise to what some now call a Europe of the Regions.

With the slow filtering of territorial power and identity upward to a near continental scale, and the simultaneous percolation downward through processes of regional devolution and decentralization, the actual functions and effects of national boundaries are being transformed. To give just a small example, so many barriers have been lifted along the international borders of Europe that thousands of border crossing facilities are now empty, awaiting thoughtful re-use. More significantly, new forms of transborder regionalism are beginning to emerge, provoking and being provoked by intensified border crossings and the development of specific EU policies, such as the INTERREG and Euroregion (Euregios) programmes.

Regionalism as a form of advocacy has become central to EU policy and to the changing political organization of space. The European Regional Development Fund has become a sort of supra-national World Bank for the regions of Europe and national as well as regional planning are increasingly being shaped by the adaptation of what is now officially termed the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), a concept that would have been almost unimaginable ten years ago (Faludi and Waterhout, 2002; Herrschel and Newman, 2002). National devolution and decentralization policies, as well as the assertive pressures of revived regionalism, have created new kinds of semi-independent state-regions in such areas as Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque country. Without any need to secede, the regions of Europe are accumulating significant autonomous force and are increasingly engaging in a new web of inter-regional and inter-urban networking in as well as outside of Europe.

The restructuring of border functions has focused particular attention on transborder regions, and not just in the European Union. These borderlines where two nationalities meet have traditionally functioned to separate cultures, to maintain and regulate their apartness. In many parts of the world today, however,
the border serves to draw people together, to intensify border crossings and interactivity, even to create distinctive border cultures and transnational regionalisms. Nowhere perhaps is the development of a distinctive borderlands culture more advanced than along the 1500-mile boundary that separates/connects the United States and Mexico.

No political boundary anywhere on earth marks as great a divide in levels of economic development, and none has attracted such a dense array of specialized border activities. High-tech barricades, sophisticated surveillance processes, and hundreds of government patrols make this perhaps the most watched international border, but at the same time it may also be the site of the greatest number of border crossings, peaking each day in at least a dozen twinned cities ranging from the small nominal hybrids of Calexico and Mexicali to what is almost surely the largest border metropolis in the world, San Diego-Tijuana.

Here and elsewhere, the borderlands are also spawning new hybridities that are much more than simple combinations or mixtures of two ways of life. These emerging transborder cultures feed off the loosening grip of international boundaries and generate a sense of radical openness and engagement, a new sense of borderlands culture, power, and identity. In *Borderlands/La Frontera*, Gloria Anzaldúa speaks of these extended transborder cultures.

> 'The psychological borderlands, the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands are not particular to the Southwest. In fact, the Borderlands are physically present wherever two or more cultures edge each other, where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, middle and upper classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy... It's not a comfortable territory to live in, this place of contradictions... However, there have been compensations for this mestiza [a woman of mixed Indian and European heritage]... Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact one's shifting and multiple identity and integrity, is... never comfortable, not with society's clamor to uphold the old, to rejoin the flock, to go with the herd. No, not comfortable but home' (1987, unpaged preface).

For Anzaldúa, the borderlands combine and move beyond both metaphorical and material spaces to become a space of radical openness and admixture, a place for creating new projects. In ‘The Border Is... (A Manifesto)’, the performance artist Guillermo Gomez-Pena provocatively extends the meanings and scope of border culture still further in space and time.

> 'BORDER CULTURE IS a polysemantic term... [it] means boycott, complot, ilegalidad, clandestinidad, transgresion... hybrid art forms for new-contents-ingestion... to be fluid in English, Spanish, Spanglish, and Inglenol... transcultural friendship and collaboration among races, sexes, and generations... creative appropriation, expropriation, and subversion of dominant cultural forms... a new cartography: a brand new map to host a new project; the democratization of the East; the Third-Worldization of the North and the First-Worldization of the South... a multiplicity of voices away from the center, different geo-cultural relations among more culturally akin regions: Tepito-San Diejuaana, San Pancho-Nuyorrico, Miami-Quebec, San Antonio-Berlin, your home town and mine, digamos, a new internationalism eccentric... to develop new models to interpret the world-in-crisis, the only world we know... to push
the borders of countries and languages or, better said, to find new languages to express the fluctuating borders... the border is the juncture, not the edge, and monoculturalism has been expelled to the margins... it also means glasnost, not government censorship... to analyze critically all that lies on the current table of debates... to question and transgress border culture... but it also means to look at the past and the future at the same time...' (Gomez-Peña, 1993, pp. 43-4).

Metropolis Unbound

Over the past thirty years, the modern metropolis (along with Fordist national economies, the Keynesian welfare state, and perhaps also the very nature of modernity itself) has been experiencing a crisis-generated restructuring that has been as intense as in any other similar period in the history of the industrial capitalist city. I describe this period of transformation that followed the urban uprisings of the 1960s and the deep worldwide recession of the early 1970s, as the postmetropolitan transition (Soja, 2000). Associated with the transition from the modern metropolis to what I call the postmetropolis has been a major reconfiguration of the boundaries and borders that define and confine urban life. Let us look further into this deconstruction and reconstitution of the modern metropolis and its bordered spaces.

So much has been changing in cities and metropolitan regions that it is difficult to know where to start the discussion, and this in itself reflects the nature of the postmetropolitan transition. More than at any other time in history, it is difficult to know where cities begin and end, what is urban (or even suburban) and what is not. Borders and boundaries that once seemed fixed and firm now appear, to use the time-worn phrase, to be melting into air.

These melting boundaries of the postmetropolis start at the outer limits of the urban region. More than ever before, the reach of the city now stretches outward to a global scale. With this expanding scope, the metropolitan hinterland can no longer be defined simply by proximate boundaries of daily commutes or media use or residential identities, since for any given city the hinterland is to a significant degree the world. Residents of Amsterdam, for example, can now be in instantaneous contact with Lima, London, or Los Angeles. Every local activity or event, whether associated with production or consumption or exchange or leisure time choices is in some sense not just local but global as well. The city is no longer the product only of its immediate regional culture, but increasingly reflects all the cultures of the world. In what may be the most far-reaching example of the metropolis unbound, the 'city limits' have exploded in scale.

Looked at in a different way, at the same time the globalized city-region reaches out to the world, the world also reaches into its internal enclosures. Cultures and people from every place on earth have been packing into global-city regions, creating the most culturally heterogeneous urban worlds and cityspaces that have ever existed. In more than just a metaphorical sense, the postmetropolis seems to be turning inside out and outside in simultaneously, making the city appear everywhere as everywhere appears in the city. In this double inversion, every place on earth is becoming increasingly urbanized at the same time as every urban
center becomes increasingly globalized, expanding the meaning and scope of the term glocalization, one of many new additions to the postmetropolitan vocabulary.

Moreover, this double inversion can not only be seen at a global scale, it is also occurring within the borders of the global city region, leading to an intra-metropolitan version of the metropolis unbound. To begin with, the global city region is itself being turned inside out and outside in at the same time. At the broadest level, this intra-metropolitan inversion is being expressed in a peculiar convergence in scale and meaning between the urban and the regional. The city and the metropolitan region have always been separate and distinct, but they are increasingly melding together in the postmetropolis, creating a new hybridizing of city/region that resembles the formation of the suburb from the intermixture of city and countryside and also reflects the dialectic of the global and the local implied in the term glocalization.

The convergence of city and region is generating what can be called a regional urbanization process that is eroding the once fairly fixed and clear borders and boundaries between city and suburb, the urban and the non-urban or rural, the urban core and the urban periphery or fringe, the very duality of urbanism and suburbanism as distinct ways of life. Polycentric networks of urban nodes expand the size and scope of regional urbanization, giving rise to the regional city or, more aptly, what we have been calling the global city region, a term specifically devised to recognize the regionality of metropolitan urbanism that such terms and concepts as world city and global city failed to do (Scott, 2001). As noted earlier, the majority of the world's population now resides in the largest 350 global city regions, several of which have reached population sizes far beyond what most urbanists thought possible. The Pearl River Delta and the Shanghai urban region in China and the great conurbation of southern Honshu in Japan are each estimated to have more than 50 million inhabitants and are still growing.

Regional urbanization is also characterized by another set of topsy-turvy processes, the almost oxymoronic urbanization of suburbia and an associated and equally paradoxical peripheralization of the urban core. With the growth of Outer Cities and Edge Cities, the primary staging points of regional urbanization, great swatches of formerly suburban areas are developing into cities in themselves, with dense concentrations of jobs, offices, immigrant and minority populations, crime, museums, and nearly every other feature traditionally associated with urban life. At the same time as some suburbs urbanize, some inner cities are becoming less dense (less urban?) with the outmigration of domestic populations. Much more characteristic of the postmetropolitan urban core, however, has been an increasing density arising primarily from huge inflows of foreign migrants, mostly from peripheral countries.

The urbanization of suburbia and the peripheralization of the core, as well as other aspects of regional urbanization, are still far from being fully developed anywhere, but indicative evidence of these trends can be seen in almost every global city region in the world. This sharing of global urban trends has reduced (but not eliminated) the differences between what we used to call First World and Third World urbanization processes. Singapore and Sao Paulo as much as Los Angeles and London can be seen as exemplary cases of the postmetropolitan transition, remembering that, as is true with all social processes, these general trends take on very particular local forms and effects.
At the very least then, both the urban and the suburban are no longer what they used to be thirty years ago, and in some cases, where the postmetropolitan transition is particularly advanced, it becomes almost impossible to apply traditional categories and definitions, or to perceive and demarcate the boundaries of the urban and the suburban. Here we have another and very telling example of the modern metropolis unbound, released significantly from its former meshwork of enclosures, distinctions, separations, and confinements; but also bordered again in new and different ways. To capture these paradoxical processes and forms, I have coined the term exopolis, with its double meaning of happening outside (exo-) the city as well as ex-city, that is, the city that is no longer what it used to be.

No place illustrates the processes of regional urbanization and exopolis formation better than the global city region of Los Angeles. Now containing (depending on how its boundaries are defined) between 10 and 17 million inhabitants, Los Angeles is predicted to pass New York City over the next decade as the largest city region in all the North Atlantic countries (again depending on boundary definitions). But the Los Angeles of today is extraordinarily different from what it was thirty years ago. In the late 1960s, the region was probably the most exemplary low density modern metropolis in the US, described by many as 60 suburbs in search of a city. In a truly stunning reversal, Los Angeles passed New York City in 1990 to become the densest urbanized area in the U.S. (with the outer limits of the urbanized area defined as having a minimum density of 1000 per square mile). Los. Angeles (actually, its official census designation would probably have to list at least a dozen other cities with more than 150,000 inhabitants, starting with Long Beach) gained this distinction in two ways. First, there has been an enormous agglomeration of 4-5 million of the immigrant working poor in the region’s urban. core, where some census tracts now come close to the peak population densities of Manhattan. Second, there has developed around the core of Los Angeles some of the densest postsuburban Outer Cities, led by the oldest and largest of the new breed of urbanized suburbs, Orange County, an amorphous conglomeration of municipalities with over two and a half million inhabitants but rarely recognized as a metropolitan region of its own.

Los Angeles and New York City are also the top two sites for another indicative statistic. Today they are reputed to have the widest income gaps between the rich and the poor in all the advanced industrial countries, disparities that are comparable only to those in Mexico City, Karachi, and Mumbai. This brings us to another aspect of the changing intra-metropolitan geography of the postmetropolis, the recognition that the postmetropolitan transition has not only been characterized by unprecedented heterogeneity but has also been marked by increasing social and spatial polarization, fragmentation, and inequality. From their infrastructural approach, Graham and Marvin (2001) call this splintering urbanism. For similar purposes, I use the term fractal city. The fractal city has many levels of complexity. At the same time as the once clear economic and cultural geography of the modern metropolis, with its neat division between urban and suburban ways of life, is becoming increasingly shattered into many different pieces, the whole cityspace often seems to be spinning like a kaleidoscope, generating ever more complicated configurations. Once neatly stratified urban labor markets, for example, are now broken into a more irregular and heterogeneous mosaic by the development of new ethnic divisions of labor, and the multiplication of ethnic
niches and occupational patterns that are highly differentiated in terms of rates of social mobility. Complicating this re-stratification still further has been the impact of the new post-Fordist economy, with its acceleration in the growth of the super-rich and the super-poor, and its resultant squeezing upward and, even more so, downward of the once bulging and confident middle class.

The Inner Cities, and to a lesser but growing extent the Outer Cities, of many of the world's global city-regions are now packed much more densely with multi-cultural and transnational populations, creating a finer meshwork of inter-cultural boundaries. In some cases, these boundaries form hard edges of friction and conflict, in others they are bridged by more peaceful inter-community linkages, and in a few they are reconstituted through the development of creative hybridities and other forms of fusion. Like the re-patterning of nation-states in the New International Division of Labor, the intra-metropolitan mosaic of local neighborhoods and municipalities is being radically reconfigured, giving rise to new forms of cleavage and conflict as well as new kinds of coalition-building and cooperation. Here again, some once firmly defining and confining boundaries and borders become more susceptible to crossing and transgression, willing and unwilling; while others emerge as transitory barriers and still others become zones of hybridity and mixture. The unbound (post)metropolis appears more chaotic than ever, but there are discernable patterns, many of which are repeated at many different scales.

Not surprisingly, the postmetropolitan transition has been creating a highly volatile milieu, an edgy city seemingly on the verge of exploding from its multiple tensions and polarities, between rich and poor, domestic and immigrant populations, one immigrant group and another, and a host of other splinterings and cleavages. The cumulative effect of all this has been another pervasive aspect of the postmetropolitan transition, the growth of what Mike Davis (1990) called an ecology of fear and, along with it, the almost epidemic spread of security-obsessed urbanism. This fearful obsession with security is expressed in many ways: increasing gunownership, the visible presence of surveillance cameras, the proliferation of private police forces and neighborhood watches, the overcrowding of prisons, the erosion of public space, thriving businesses selling alarm systems and guard dogs, barricaded streets and razor-wired barriers to free movement, even signs which state or imply that 'trespassers will be shot'. In short, the fractal exopolis is also increasingly becoming a carceral city, a city of insular cells and walls, obsessed with maintaining the boundaries between we and they, the insider and the Other, the familiar and the stranger, the resident and the alien.

Symbolizing the ecology of fear most forcefully is the new urban archipelago of gated and armed-guarded communities, a re-walling of urban life designed primarily to protect and serve the interests of the upper fifth of the income ladder. The growing retreat of the rich to their luxurious redoubts amounts to a secession from public responsibility, an attempt to opt out from contributing anything to improve the threatening city that surrounds them. But the gated community is only the most visible sign of a much more insidious process of insular privatization and irresponsible abdication affecting all aspects of postmetropolitan life, especially in the US. In many US city-regions, the growth not just of gated communities but of other common interest developments (CIDs), condominium organizations, and residential community associations (RCAs), including many in
poorer areas, has resulted in the formation of a new kind of corporatized urban space, an insular domain of private residential government that may be global neoliberalism's greatest conquest at the local scale. These privatopias, as McKenzie (1994) called them, are in effect the residential equivalent of business property, a contractual and collective form of corporate ownership. As they multiply and begin to join in larger coalitions, these 'association-administered servitude regimes', as the lawyers call them, become an increasingly powerful political force at the local as well as regional and national scales.

Concluding Lines of Thought

As we have seen, the postmetropolis blankets its inhabitants in many more layers of borders and boundaries, enclosures and containments, than any other form of human habitat. And every inhabitant is, more than ever before, located in a baffling multitude of bounded places and spaces, stretching in uncountable and rapidly changing borderings from the body to the planet. Where then do we go from here? What can be done to make the nested nodal regions in which we live better places and spaces? How can we reduce the oppressive burden of borders while maximizing their enabling, connecting, and transcending powers?

There are no easy answers, but there may be a useful new point of departure, one that arises from the 'spatial turn' that has intensified interest in critical spatial thinking and the spatiality of social life across a broader range of disciplines than ever before, and has informed and inspired the present essay right from its ontological beginnings. This transdisciplinary spatial turn has been leading to the development of a more comprehensive and strategic spatial consciousness that imbues all aspects of the social production of human geographies, including territorialization and the bordering process, with significant social power and strategic importance.

Fundamental to this expanded spatial consciousness is the recognition of the double-sided power of borders and boundary-making as active forces in social life. This refers to their potential to be oppressive and repressive as well as liberating and enhancing, whether we are speaking of the little tactics of the habitat or the global practices of geopolitics. Few scholars have helped us understand this dynamic expression of the relations between space, knowledge, and power better than Michel Foucault. Activating this consciousness further is the awareness that our bordered and bounded lives are socially produced, and so they can be changed. This in turn creates new possibilities for social mobilization to act collectively to reconfigure our borders and boundaries, especially where they define unjust or excessively restrictive geographies.

Flowing from this cumulative awareness is the potential for a new spatial politics that springs directly from our shared experience and understanding of the spatiality of injustice and the injustices of spatiality (Dikec, 2001). Sharing a particular history of oppression and injustice often narrows the scope of social mobilization to specific groups and imposes rigid boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Sharing the effects of oppressive and unjust geographies, however, can more easily create lasting ties between different groups and communities, enhancing the possibilities for effective coalition building that cuts across the
Borders Unbound

Borders of class, race, ethnicity, culture, age, sexual identity, and other channels of political action. It is in this sense that the new spatial consciousness can become politically empowering.

To illustrate some of the possibilities of this new spatial politics, I return briefly to Los Angeles and the work of the Bus Riders Union (BRU). The BRU is a broad-based alliance of the working poor who depend on bus transport for their daily lives and livelihoods. In 1996, it won a court order against the Metropolitan Transit Authority forcing a switch of billions of dollars from the construction of a fixed rail system to the improvement of bus transport. The case built first on civil rights law, contending that rail benefited the predominantly white and wealthy versus the predominantly minority poor. To strengthen this argument, an explicitly spatial strategy was added, contending that the planned regional rail network was geographically unjust, that it favored the wealthier and multiple car-owning Outer City residents over the huge agglomeration of the working poor (and transit dependent) in the metropolitan core. Whereas similar cases involving just civil rights issues failed elsewhere in the country, the more spatialized Los Angeles case succeeded, shifting billions from a plan that would help the rich more than the poor to one that would, almost surely, benefit the poor more than the rich (Soja, 2000).

Here then is a successful example of a conscious effort to achieve greater spatial justice, regional democracy, and control over the negative local effects of globalization and the New Economy. It is a very small and localized example, but it is a starting point, perhaps one of many. In the end, one can only hope that these efforts to expand our rights to the city, to the city region, to regional and national resources, and to a more spatially just global order continue to flourish.

References


A significant number of social processes and problems involve some spatial component. Bordering processes are a specific expression of this. My argument is that, for a more adequate understanding of these and other forms and processes of ‘regionalization’ and the constitution of socio-spatial relations in general, we must not base our analysis on the spatial aspects of social conditions, but on the activities that constitute those socio-spatial relations.

In respect to most methodological approaches and perspectives in contemporary human geography, this approach implies a rigorous categorical shift from ‘space’ to ‘action’ or from what I call ‘a geography of things’ to ‘geographies of subjects’. Consequently, geographers should rather be interested in the regionalizing implications of activities, and not so much in the analysis and description of regions in the traditional sense. This shift of focus implies therefore a shift from regional analysis to what I call the analysis of everyday regionalization. Or, more generally speaking: from spatial description to subjective understanding and a social explanation of everyday geography-making. From an action-centred perspective it becomes - I suggest - more feasible to recognize than before, that establishing, transforming, or abolishing spatial demarcations, thus the ‘bordering of spaces’ in the broad sense, should be seen as a means of everyday activities, never as their aim. Thus, these bordering processes can be viewed as the outcome of the ‘world binding’ of agents.

This perspective provides a systematic methodological basis that complements the conceptualizations of ‘region’ as they were recently proposed, for instance, by Paasi (1996), Thrift (1996) and Allen, Massey and Cochrane (1998). However, this approach stands in strong contrast, first, to all attempts to conceive regions and spatial relations as entities constituted by classificatory activities of a scientific observer, as the tradition of spatial science would have it. Second, it also exists in contrast to all approaches that begin with regions, borders, spatial patterns and other spatial phenomena and work toward an analysis of social structures, rather than the other way round.

In the first section of this paper I will present the theoretical and methodological implications of the shift in perspective from ‘space’ to ‘action’.
The main point of the argument will be that ‘space’ is an element of ‘action’ and not ‘action’ an element of ‘space’, as a majority of geographical approaches - implicitly or even explicitly - still claim. In the second half of the paper I will discuss the consequences of this shift in perspective for the understanding of regionalization and bordering processes, and I will discuss the concepts of ‘everyday regionalization’ and ‘geography-making’ in a wider context.

From ‘Space’ to ‘Action’

The necessary shift from ‘space’ to ‘action’ implies both an ontological necessity and a methodological implication. Answers to questions about the ontology of research objects and the adequate methodology to analyse them are relevant to one another (Werlen, 1987, 1993a). This is true for all scientific disciplines. For geography and its (research) object of distinction - ‘space’ - it is of special importance. We must first of all clarify the status of space in the context of different social ontologies, and then ask how what is called ‘space’ can be integrated in geographical research.

In the history of geographical research, ‘space’ has been understood variously as a cause for social action, as a container of the social world or even as objectified social and cultural meaning. In all three interpretations ‘space’ is qualified as something pre-given to human action. Consequently the analysis of what is called ‘space’ could be qualified as a certain form of social or/and cultural research. Of course, under certain social conditions - or for certain social ontologies - there was a certain evidence that ‘space’ was somehow the social and that regional or spatial analysis could contribute to an understanding of the social and the cultural. But this conclusion can only be held on the basis of - in both senses - very superficial views of the socio-cultural: metaphorically, as the opposite of a deeper understanding of what is talked and written about, and in the material sense, as the view from above, and therefore from outside.

But the differing social ontologies imply as well different modes of geography-making or better: they are also expressions of very specific modes of geography-making. What is understood as ‘spatial’ and what the ‘spatial’ stands for consequently changes with alterations in what can be called the specific modus operandi of geography-making underlying the different social ontologies. This is especially the case in the change from what - in an (ideal-)typical way - can be characterized as the traditional modus operandi of geography-making under late-modern conditions of local everyday life.

The traditional mode of geography-making can be characterized as a life form, in which the agent had to get to the location of nearly all material elements. The process of industrialization enabled agents to replace the encompassing necessity of getting somewhere physically by the revolutionized means of transport and (mass) communication. This enlarged the reaches of action, but most forms of interaction were still linked to the transport of bodies and material goods. Even information (newspapers, etc.) were still linked to material support. ‘A ship arrived from London, and here is the news it brought’ (Brooker-Gross, 1985, p. 63) is the perfect description of the geographical bundling of bodies, goods and information typical for the ‘industrial geographical modus operandi. A mode of geography-
making on which the so called 'globalization process' is based, lies in the
dissolution of the encompassing restraint of social interactions and materiality.
This opens up a new potential of world-binding, bringing goods, information, etc.
to the agent with the dwindling need to get there.

Because of the strong linkage between the materiality of agents' bodies and
meaning as a key characteristic of the traditional mode of geography-making, it is
understandable that traditional geographical analysis focused so much on the study
of spaces and the causal power of space. Even if there was much empirical evidence
for this claim, however, it is nothing but the outcome of a 'fatal confusion'
(Zierhofer, 1999, p. 163), to confound constellations - predominantly of
communication - and their description as spatial categories, with the effect of an
objectified, for all actions, pre-given 'space'. This confusion is one of the
constitutive elements of traditional geographical world views, and at the same time
the legitimizing operation for regional geography: the containerization of societies
and cultures as regions.

We can understand the quantitative revolution of geographical research as a
spatial science as a response to a shift from traditional to industrialized geography-
making. It is typical that space still remains as object of research and that
'distance' is understood as the explanatory element in the attempt to explain
spaces. Because of the extension of the reach of agents' activities and their control
over distance, it seemed meaningful to focus on this change in everyday
geography-making-

But, as the latest revolution of geographical constellations and corresponding
social ontologies makes clear, all soft renovations in the space-centred view of
everyday life can never be sufficient. It becomes obvious that the link between
'meaning and matter' (Gren, 1994) is not - and never was - substantially fixed,
but rather an expression of socio-cultural practices. This is - on the level of
everyday experiences - brought to the forefront on the basis of the globalization of
local conditions, and as a consequence of the growing separation of meaning, body
and matter through the new technologies, enabling agents to bring the world to
them. Under these conditions the 'real', non-substantial ontology of space becomes
obvious. It is not very helpful to go on, as is the case with traditional geographical
research, with the outcome of geography-making processes on the basis of the
traditional *modus operandi*, and continue to claim that 'space' exists in an
independent way as some kind of a container, or at least as something
(substantially) existing previous to social practices. This was never the case. And
now there is less and less evidence for such a construction.

If we wish to have a methodologically more adequate access to everyday
demography-making, we must consequently give up the belief, thus far paradigmatic,
that 'space' has to be the central object of geographical inquiry. What geographers
used to describe as spatial problems can rather be understood as problems of certain
types of actions: problems emerging from actions which involve, simply said,
bodies and things, or more generally: corporeality, materiality, and physicality. If
we begin to look at the world from an 'action-centred perspective', and discard
space as a starting point in itself, we focus on the embodied subject, the
corporeality of the actor, in the context of specific subjective, socio-cultural and
material conditions. We adopt then a perspective that emphasizes subjective agency
as the driving source of action and hence of social change, while it also stresses
that conditions of the social and material world `shape' social actions, while the latter produce and reproduce social and physical conditions.

If we, however, accept the fact that the social world is produced and reproduced by actions, we cannot take `space' at the same time as constitutive of the social world. Rather, within such a methodological framework `space' can only signify a discursive frame of reference by which actors refer to and localize elements of their physical and social context in order to co-ordinate their activities. Because the subject is embodied, physical conditions are of course relevant for most activities. But since physical conditions are neither the only significant nor necessarily the most relevant factor, actions cannot be explained exclusively by them in a satisfactory and empirically acceptable way. That does not deny, however, that in order to explain actions and interactions physical conditions have to be taken into account systematically.

Objectified `space' - in the sense of the physical environment of human bodies - can neither determine actions nor the frame of reference of actors. Rather, `space', now understood as a frame of reference, is itself the product of actions, particularly communications. It is inadequate to start from the (implicit) premise that physical `space' or even materiality already have a meaning `in themselves' and are capable of constituting social facts. Rather, materiality becomes only meaningful through interpretations in the course of the execution of actions, thus with respect to certain intentions and under certain social and subjective conditions.

In the current debate on space(s) and spatiality, notions like `within a geographical space' (Harvey, 2000, p. 23), `shaping spaces' (Harvey, 2000, p. 200), `third-space' (Soja, 1996) or `post-modern places' (Casey, 2001, p. 684) have to be understood to some degree as sophisticated articulations of earth-space - or variations of it - in particular theoretical frameworks, for conceptions like these are claiming that `space' has some kind of independent status in regard to actions. Otherwise it could not be argued that society finds its expression in `space', and that geographical space can be understood as a footprint of past social processes, thus of `history'. This line of argument can only be sustained if `space' is understood as the `concrete' arrangement of material things, as `space in itself'. Therefore a certain form of representation of objects is taken as the represented object that can be theorized. Needless to say, this remains - despite social-theoretical efforts in the theorization of space - at least a very ambivalent conceptualization of the research object of human geography.

Christian Schmid (2003, p. 20, p. WE) demonstrates that the most characteristic feature of the current debates on `space' are their eclectic `qualities'. The main reason for this rather disturbing constellation is a quarry-like use of elements of general social theories - like Lefebvre's (1991) theory of `the production of space' - while neglecting some of their basic assumptions and principles. It is especially significant that the geographical interpretations of Lefebvre's work do not take into account the manifold embodiments of his theory in German dialectics (Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche), phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard) and the `situationalist movement'. One of the important consequences of this very rich context is that we should have a very high awareness of the historical and conceptual character of Lefebvre's `space' and dismiss any understanding of his `space' as something materialistically real.
The fact that in Lefebvre's theory 'space' does not exist independently of social praxis is not taken seriously by its geographical interpreters. The outcome can be qualified as evidence of a 'highly poetical imagination' (Schmid, 2003, p. 43), but certainly not as an accurate transposition of Lefebvre's social philosophy into a geographical research perspective. This is one of the important consequences of neglecting the basic assumption, i.e. that space does not exist outside of praxis. This is precisely the basic principle to consider: that the importance of space and spatiality for social practices can only be understood through an understanding of objects as constituted elements of social action. Therefore the above-mentioned problem of the eclectic reference to Lefebvre's work is only a surface phenomenon. The real problem is much more profound. It lies in the fact that in the current debate 'society' is seen as something theoretically conceptualized, whereas 'space' is not. It is for this reason that to achieve a deeper understanding of the significance of the spatial for the social we need a theoretical conceptualization of space based on an agency-centred analysis of 'society'.

There is no easy (spatial) way out of this dilemma. In the same way that the understanding of social realities is guided or even constituted by theoretical categories, understanding of the relevance of the 'spatial' for social actions is as well. Any search for an adequate conception of 'space' for the geographical analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of human activities cannot be answered without reference to the basic principles of the applied social theory. There is not only no practice independent of the existence of 'space', but also no theoretically independent existence of 'space'. 'Space' does not exist outside a specific theoretical framework (see also Schatzki, 2001, p. 698; Schmid, 2003, p. 21).

The problem, then, from a methodological point of view, is that these objectified 'spaces', assumed implicitly to exist, play a role within general frameworks of human geography. That is to say, space is granted an implicit explanatory function with regard to actions and social structures in general, yet without reflecting nor clarifying its specific potential in this respect. Moreover, the notion 'space' often incorporates a variety of concepts or is split up (e.g. following Lefebvre) in several mutually complementing spaces.

Nevertheless, while this conceptual variety complicates any attempt to formulate a coherent critique of contemporary geographical practices in general, it is obvious that with few exceptions (Kldter, 1986; Reichert, 1996; Weichhart, 1999; Zierhofer, 1999, 2002; Schlottmann, 2003) approaches are lacking that take space consistently as the frame of reference of actors. Any other alternative has to cope with the problem of clarifying the methodological relation between an (at least partially) reified space and spatially determined social action.

'Space' in 'Action'

At the forefront of this theoretical debate two main misunderstandings in the geographical conceptualization of space can be identified. Firstly, there has been a mix-up of the spatial representation of physical-material entities with the idea of a physical-material space. This reproduces the Cartesian mixing-up of extension and corporeality, produced by Rene Descartes in 1644: ‘For the idea of extension that we conceive any given space to have is identical with the idea of corporeal
substance’ (Descartes, 1959, p. 22). The rationale of the argument can be reconstructed in the following way: because every material substance can be characterized by its extension, and because the extension of substantiality is the same as spatial extension, it follows: space must be substantial. I will demonstrate that this conclusion is based on a problematic description of the two basic assumptions. Secondly, there has been a mingling of the significance of the spatial ordering of physical-material things as social practices with the idea of the spatial existence of socio-cultural facts per se. If one does not want to reproduce this array of (logical) confusions - with all the tragic consequences emerging from binding social phenomena to physical conditions, as is the case, for instance, with the cultural misinterpretation of territorial conflicts demonstrated by Samuel Huntington’s (1996) ‘Clash of Civilization’ - then the ontological status of ‘space’ must be clarified as well as from what space it is to be distinguished. Consequently, we need a further clarification of the status of ‘space’ for different types of meaningful social performances.

If ‘space’ were equal to extensive materiality it would have the status of an object. As a consequence, we should be able to indicate the differences between the totality of all material objects and space as an object beyond that totality. But this is impossible. Space neither exists as a material object nor as a consistent theoretical object. It is - as I suggest - rather to be understood as a formal and classificatory concept, a frame of reference for the physical components of actions and a grammalogue for problems and possibilities related to the performance of action in the physical world. ‘Space’ is a formal frame of reference because it does not refer to any specific topical aspect of material objects. It is ‘classificatory’ because it enables us to describe a certain order of material objects with respect to their specific dimensions (Werlen, 1993b, p. 245, 1995, p. 135).

The main problem in Descartes’ characterization of ‘space’ seems to lie in the fact that there is no distinction made between the characterization of material entities by ‘extension’ and their ontological classification. But ‘extension’ is part of a possible description and has no material ontological status. Consequently, the status of ‘extension’ has to be classified as conceptual, as a derivative of a certain conception of ‘space’, enabling the ordering of coexisting material things and bodies.

If we understand ‘space’ not as a thing, but as a formal and classificatory concept, it is possible to make clear why ‘space’ takes so many different significations in everyday actions. As the concept of ‘place’ can only be meaningful in interrelation with the self and its body as the ‘central mediating phenomenon between them’ (Schatzki, 2001, p. 668), so the significance of ‘space’ can only be grasped in its interrelation with human activities and its carrier, the body of the subject.

Using this conceptualization, it is possible not just to postulate space as an action preceding thing, but as a socio-cultural product, constituting an important conceptual tool for the structuration of the interrelations between ‘meaning and matter’, between the extended material world of objects and the non-material world of mind and signification. This starting point allows us to theorize space on the basis of a certain socio-theoretical framework. Based on Lefebvre’s (1974) social theoretical conceptualization of ‘space’ as ‘espace perqu’, ‘espace conqu’ and ‘espace
vecu', space is - at least to a certain degree - already linked to three different types of practice (Lefebvre 1991):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of practice</th>
<th>Type of space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spatial practice</td>
<td>Perceived space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of space</td>
<td>Conceived space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space of representation</td>
<td>Lived space</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.1 Practices and Spaces**

The different practices are theoretically embedded in Lefebvre's dialectical interpretation of the temporal and spatial 'evolution' of social reality. It is not possible to reconstruct the philosophical 'ingredients' of his social theory in this paper and to discuss them critically. For my argument it is sufficient to indicate the direction as to how conceptions of space, theoretical construction, and ontological postulates must form one line of argument with the lowest eclectic quality possible. The compatibility of the social and the spatial is necessary with regard to the ontological and the conceptual levels. Not acquiring this condition - and this is my thesis - will lead to a social analysis much more preoccupied with the artefacts of theoretical reasoning than with the artefacts produced by the social everyday practices to be researched.

In accordance with these guidelines, the theoretical construction of action-space-society relations must accept action as the only source with the capacity to constitute social reality. Space can only be accepted as a medium of action, not as its material, and only as a conceptual tool. Depending on the orientation of the actions, the conceptualization of space takes another form. The categorical dimensions of space have therefore to be compatible with the social frames of reference of action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Formal dimension</th>
<th>Classificatory dimension</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stational</td>
<td>Metric Absolute</td>
<td>Classificatory Calculation</td>
<td>Land market Location theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>Metric Body-centred</td>
<td>Classificatory-relational Normative Prescriptive</td>
<td>Territorial state Back-/front-region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>Body-centred</td>
<td>Relational Signification</td>
<td>Regional/national Identity Regional symbols</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.2 Spaces in Actions** (source: Werlen, 2000, p. 329)
I propose to distinguish three main formal and classificatory types of interpretations: a rational, a normative and a communicative interpretation (Fig. 3.2). The main reason for the different interpretations and subsequently different constitutions of 'space' lies in the fact of specific interconnections between the body and other material aspects of situations. The different constitutions of 'space' are expressions of the different interpretations of its formal and its classificatory dimensions.

**Rational Action, Space and the Economic Dimension**

For rational actions the social constitution of space is based on the metric aspect. It makes calculative orientation and ordering possible. Rationality and a geometric orientation are closely tied up and both are core expressions of what Max Weber called the de-mystification of the world. They are tied up with the formal understanding of space, which is the main precondition of the rational calculation of spatial extensions. A precise cartographic representation, as well as the emergence of a capitalistic land market, now become possible. Together with the invention of the mechanical clock (labour market), the formalized space concept is the fundamental basis for industrial capitalism.

**Norm, Space and the Political Dimension**

The interrelation of action and space in the norm-oriented context produces territorializations. The formal aspect involves a geometric appropriation of extensions in a body-centred way. The classificatory aspect refers to the relation between body, material context and normative prescription in the form of: 'Here you can do this, but there not', etc. This kind of territorialization as a prescriptive form of regionalization regulates the inclusion and exclusion of actors and utilities. On the personal level this includes the differentiation between back- and front regions in the sense of Goffman (1969) and Giddens (1984). But the most prominent combination of norm, body and space is certainly the nation-state and its territorial binding of law, jurisdiction, and a territorial organization of bureaucracy, surveillance, and a monopoly of the control of the means of violence by the police and the army. These forms of everyday social geographies are linked to the authoritative control (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Guibernau, 1996) of people through territorial means (Philo, 1989; Paasi, 1991; Sofsky, 1999) and specific types of controlling the means of violence. A very important component of the making of these everyday geographies consists of the activities of regional and nationalist movements, aiming for a new political geography, and the different forms of regional and national identities on which they are based.

**Communication, Space and the Cultural Dimension**

In communicative actions spatial orientations are also predominantly body-centred. The body is the functional link between experience (stock of knowledge) and the meaning and the operational basis of subjective action. The meaning attributed to things depends on the knowledge we have of them and the role they play in our actions. Symbolic meaning constitution is therefore the result of the interplay
between knowledge and intention. This is one of the key dimensions of everyday geography-making: the symbolic appropriation of material things. The most powerful mythological and ideological discourses are based on symbolic geographies and are reproduced very often on the basis of reification processes, as forms of the naturalization of the symbolic.

**Space, Region and Everyday Geography-making**

The basic implication of the shift in perspective from a `geography of things' to `geographies of subjects' is that the praxis of geography-making and the use of spatial concepts in these processes are of core interest. There is an overall tendency in human geography to focus more strictly on everyday practices. But most attempts do not make clear enough what the implications of that shift really are. The debate on the 'new regional geography' in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Pred, 1986; Gregory, 1989; Thrift, 1990, 1991, 1993) demonstrates this quite clearly: although within regional geography the theoretical frames for the analysis of human activities have become much more differentiated than they have been before, the theoretical emphasis and point of departure is still upon 'regions', instead of the making of regions and processes of regionalization. If this position is maintained, the subsequent analysis of regionalizations runs the risk `of being nothing but a self-fulfilling prophecy' (Schlottmann, 2003, p. 58).

The main obstacle to a satisfactory exploitation of the potential of this shift in perspective is certainly the conventionalism of the idea of pre-given spaces and regions, with a status independent from human actions and practices (Werlen, 1997, p. 121ff.; Schlottmann 2003, p. 23).

Traditionally, `regionalization' in geography is defined as a scientific praxis of spatial classification. On an everyday level, `regionalization' often signifies a process of political appropriation and/or delimitation. In either case, the constitutive idea is based on the spatial delimitation of the 'region'. The borders of political everyday regions normally consist of symbolic or material markers. But `physical markers' are, in their social aspect, nothing but material representations of the symbolic delimitation of normative standards. Material conditions are therefore not social constraints, only social norms are. Spatial aspects are consequently neither causes nor reasons for actions in and of themselves. They exist socially only in the way and to the extent that they are mobilized as a means of categorization and symbolic representation in actions.

Consequently, the central role of regionalization is, firstly, not spatial delimitation, but the selective appropriation of the world. Put in a more general context, we can understand everyday regionalization as a form and a process of `world-binding', which is the praxis of the allocative appropriation of material objects, the authoritative appropriation of subjects, and the symbolic appropriation of objects and subjects. `World-binding' as the core element of any kind of regionalization process can thus be defined as a praxis of re-embedding: to bring the `world' within reach - and above all under the domination - of actors through the use of their culturally, socially and economically uneven capacity to hold sway over spatial and temporal references. Social control over spatial references enables both the direction of the subjects' own actions or of other actors'
(possessive) practices. This implies the threefold (allocative, authoritative and symbolic) appropriation of goods, persons and objects/places over distances.

Therefore, and secondly, it is not the production of ‘spaces’ that is of central interest, but the use of spatial and temporal dimensions (frames of reference) for different types of appropriation. Thirdly, globalization can be understood as a process of appropriation, as a set of specific forms of ‘world-binding’. The globalization of life-worlds is consequently the expression of the multiple combinations of world-binding on the basis of a wide range of individual choices. These decisions are of course limited by the capacity to control material goods (nature, artefacts, etc.) or allocative resources, the capacity to control people (authoritative resources) and the capacity to control the symbolic attribution and management of meaning.

Of course, even the building processes of nation-states and the subsequent nationalization of life forms were and are forms of world-binding. The nationalization of life forms can be understood as the rationalization of traditional life forms along the core dimensions of modernization. The disembedding of traditional life forms led to a re-embedding through rational territorialization. The most significant expression of this process was manifested in the transformation of the relations of production and exchange (capitalism), the transformation of technologies of production and communication (industrialism) and the emergence of the powerful apparatus of bureaucracy (bureaucratization) for the co-ordination and control of human actions over long temporal and spatial distances.

A central aspect of the history of modernization is the process of territorialization and therefore of regionalization on the level of nation-states. Religious-mythological embeddedness is replaced by bureaucratic-institutional forms of re-embedding. The history of nation-states may be the most prominent expression of that process. In the age of late modernity these basic principles are transformed, especially on the economic and cultural level. The modern principles of territorialization and regionalization are evaporating as a consequence of the growing power of disembedding mechanisms. One of the striking implications of this trend is the globalization of life-worlds.

The growing power of disembedding mechanisms is illustrated by globally observable cultures (Featherstone, 1990; Altbrow, 1996; Beck, 1997), life styles and life forms (Schutz, 1982; Shields, 1992; Chaney, 1996), very often linked to a specific generation. The actual and potential reach of actors is stretched to a global dimension (McLuhan 1995). The most important disembedding mechanisms in this respect are money, writing and technical artefacts (Curry, 1996; Strohmayer, 1998). Furthermore, means of transportation enable a high level of mobility. Together with individual freedom of movement, this produces a mix of formerly locally fixed cultures. This multi-cultural medley, combined with global communication systems, enables the diffusion of information and storing of information not dependent on the corporeal presence of actors. Of course, face-to-face interaction still plays an important role in communication, but a very substantial part of communication is mediated.

One important implication of these changes in the ‘arts of doing’ (de Certeau, 1988) everyday geographies is certainly that there remain fewer and fewer totalizing regions in the traditional sense. The economic, political and cultural dimensions of everyday activities do not only refer to different spatial frameworks, but they are
not linked to a `common ground'. This of course also has very strong implications for the concept of bordering processes. From an action-centered perspective bordering processes are not only multi-dimensional but also highly differentiated in respect to the economical, political and symbolic power at one's disposal in processes of world-binding as the practices of everyday geography-making.

**Conclusion**

It should be obvious that according to the outlined perspective every subject is constantly regionalizing the world through his or her actions. All activities refer to some world, whether the reality of everyday action, scientific models, fictions or dreams, and establish relations to the entities populating those worlds, locating them according to specific frames or references. A modern geographical representation of the world has to take the subject into account by studying how subjects live and realize the world, particularly their world, and not just live in a world. Space is therefore an element in the processes of world-binding and not constitutive for the social world (at least not in a deterministic sense). It is rather itself constituted depending on the type of action to perform. This shift in the understanding of space is the outcome of a shift in perspective. It is the implication of a constructivist view, taking space not as a blank sheet of paper, on which social processes inscribe their traces. If a clear distinction is made between space and materiality, then the traces are material, but space is not.

One of the most important consequences of my proposal is the transformation of the task of geographical research from a space-centred project into the analysis of practices of geography-making, especially economic, political and cultural processes of world-binding. In this perspective, globalization is interpreted as a particular set of regionalizations, and no categorial difference is assumed between globalization and regionalization. Life-forms are globally regionalized, not within a pre-given space, but according to the variety of schemes of reference that establish dimension for locating entities as well as distinctions that allow the `bordering of spaces', and provide orientation to all the everyday regionalizations of subjects. Perspectives like this one may claim to avoid any kind of vulgar spatialization of cultures and social problems.

**Notes**

For a further discussion of the historical roots of the construction of the geographical research object as outcome of Friedrich Ratzel's adaptation of Ernst Haeckel's theory of evolution, leading to `Anthropogeographie' and the implications for the conceptualizations of the society-space-nexus, see Werlen and Weingarten, 2003.

Of course, the interrelation of `space of representation' and `lived space' is only a spatial interrelation, not a practice-space relation and therefore the two are not compatible.
References


"Enough to drive one mad", the organization of space in 19th-century lunatic asylum, in J. Wolch and M. Dear (eds), *The Power of Geography*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, pp. 258-290.


The mantra of globalization has moved to centre stage in the social sciences and humanities. According to the Web of Science close to 6000 articles and reviews have appeared in journals that have included globalization in their titles or abstracts, ranging through every social science discipline. Until recently the general tenor of discussion saw globalization as an inevitable and irreversible set of social and economic processes that demanded accommodation if not obedience by local actors. As a result the primary geographical scale shifted to the global level, leaving other scales of analysis secondary and marginalized. The local - whether it be the neighborhood, the region, or the nation - has become subservient to continental and global impulses. We are, it seems, in a world beyond borders (Omae, 1990; Castells, 2000).

Numerous theoretical and political implications spring from these assertions. Theoretically, this global space of flows might represent if not the end of geography, at least its diminution as a constraint to action. Virtually frictionless communication and significantly depressed transportation costs have limited the transaction costs of information, capital, people and products (Andersson and Andersson, 2000). At the same time the development of transnational forces and the creation of supra-national economic regions in Europe, the Americas and elsewhere have diminished the jurisdiction of the nation-state (Omae, 1995). But the space of flows also minimizes the play of human agency, as people, communities, organizations, even states become subject to some supra-human and seemingly irrepressible economic logic.

This manner of thinking is present in some discussions of transnational migration. Transnationalism evokes its own space of flows, of migrants and undocumented arrivals moving constantly across, through, and around national borders. The push-pull factors are conceptualized in terms of economic gradients so that migrants are usually reduced to that homunculus, rational economic man. On a now global surface, flows of migrants follow paths of economic opportunity. In this model there would seem to be little place for a theory of action, of multi-dimensional decision-makers confronting complex environments. In earlier essays we have challenged the erasure of geography (Ley and Waters, 2003) and the
reduction of the nation-state (Ley, 2003) in such formulations. In this paper I want to re-examine the decision-making of the transnational migrant as actor, and show the diverse and contradictory strategies and actions that are contemplated by international migrants as they encounter opportunities (and the absence of opportunities) in Canada. We will see, too, that while many of these actors treat national boundaries as permeable, their avoidance of the state's attempt to socialize them as citizens contained within borders does not come without cost.

**Immigration by Design**

Canada has for long practiced a proactive migration policy, producing an immediate point of engagement between the state and globalizing forces. In 1967 the policy of European preference was abandoned and replaced by three broad immigration entry streams: the humanitarian stream, where refugee acceptance is an expression of Canada's global responsibilities; a family reunification stream through sponsorship of family members; and an economic stream where eligibility is determined meritocratically through possession of human capital, including job skills, education, age, and fluency in one of the nation's two official languages. There has been a steady growth in the share of the population that arrives through the economic stream, so that it has approached 60 percent in recent years, while through the 1990s the annual immigrant cohorts as a whole have boasted educational qualifications that exceeded the national average. Even among refugees, who typically account for only ten percent of annual arrivals, there is a surprisingly high level of educational achievement, especially from selection conducted overseas, for immigration officers favor the candidates most likely to succeed in Canada from applicants in refugee camps.

In the pursuit of candidates likely to integrate into national society and make significant economic contributions, initiatives were undertaken in 1978 and again in 1986 to launch a business immigration program to recruit entrepreneurs with a proven track record, quintessential rational economic men. The 1978 regulation sought entrepreneurs who would begin a business in Canada, actively manage it, and employ at least one Canadian within two years of arrival. When this had been achieved, the terms and conditions on their landing visa would be lifted and the entrepreneur and his/her dependents could move on to qualify for citizenship. A second stream, added in 1986, sought in addition more passive investors who were prepared to place a significant sum in venture capital funds in Canada, with no requirement for active entrepreneurship. The required investment sum has risen steadily and in 1999 was raised to $400,000, locked in for a five-year period, though with this revision government guarantees for the funds were added, replacing the frequently mismanaged and sometimes fraudulent practices of private sector management at earlier dates. A third and smaller track, the self-employed stream, permits entry to a range of skilled individuals in the arts, sports and wealthy individuals who are seen as capable of developing their own livelihood in Canada on the basis of unusually bountiful human capital.

So defined, the Business Immigration Programme (BIP) proved of greatest interest to residents of small states in East Asia on the margins of the People's Republic of China. In the period from 1980 to 2001, some 330,000 immigrants
entered Canada through the three business streams, and of these 30.6 percent originated in Hong Kong, 14.4 percent in Taiwan, and 8.2 percent in South Korea. The households were well-endowed financially, and during the first half of the 1990s, a period when these data were publicly accessible, average declarations of household self-worth by business immigrants with destinations in the west coast province of British Columbia easily exceeded $1 million. The business program grew steadily in scope and reached a national peak of 32,000 landings in 1993, since when numbers fell to 14,600 in 2001. Three-quarters of these immigrants were attracted to a few major urban centers: 76,953 (23.4 percent) identified a destination in Montreal on their landing card, 77,610 (23.6 percent) selected Toronto, and 92,835 (28.2 percent) chose Vancouver. The Toronto and Vancouver figures are without doubt underestimates for it is known that significant secondary migration has occurred to these two metropolitan areas after landing.

My individual data are taken from several rounds of interviews with business immigrants in Vancouver (Ley, 1999, 2002) and Hong Kong (Ley and Kobayashi, 2002), as well as interviews in separate projects by Waters (2001, 2002). Our work is shaped in part around the sophisticated essays by Aihwa Ong (1999) on the flexible citizenship practices of recent overseas Chinese in North America as they negotiate the boundary-marking behavior of the nation-state. The story we tell may be compared with parallel developments in Australia and New Zealand, other immigrant-receiving nations that have competed with Canada for the prize of wealthy emigrants from East Asia over the past twenty years (Ho and Bedford 1998; Ip, Wu and Inglis, 1998; Burrill, 2000).

The typical business immigrant household has contained 3.6 members, with parents in their early forties, and one or two school-aged children. On their landing forms a majority of household heads declared they planned to become self-employed in Canada, exactly the type of active entrepreneurialism the BIP was set up to achieve. Most had been owners of businesses in their countries of origin and the remainder had usually been managers in larger enterprises. However, their facility in English was limited and among immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, educational achievement was bi-modal, with a number having failed to achieve high school completion. It was precisely this shortfall in human capital that channeled these applicants into the business streams, with their rigorous entrepreneurial expectations, rather than the skilled worker stream where they would not have assembled the necessary human capital points to cross the threshold for entry. Nonetheless in engaging rational economic man, the Canadian state operated from the premise that financial capital and business experience would offset any shortfall in education and language ability (Ley, 2003).

The Business Immigration Programme represented a bold move by the state to engage the neo-liberal forces of globalization by looking outside Canada's borders for holders of significant human and financial capital who could be corralled and turned into economically productive national citizens. As Harrison (1996) observed, the BIP might be seen as raising a moral question not only of offering citizenship for sale, but also of limiting it to the highest bidders. Certainly, the state was prepared to join the lingua franca of globalization, the language of commodification. Its expectation of course was that this was a contract that business immigrants would understand and sign on to. As it turned out this assumption was itself problematic, for it was based on the further assumption that
business immigrants were one-dimensional economic actors with skills that were readily portable from place to place. As the state entered the global arena, it appropriated the view of the world as an isotropic plain, sufficiently homogeneous that labor skills could be easily transferred from one province to another of the space of flows. Subsequent events have shown these assumptions to be untenable.

**Business Immigrants as Economic Actors**

This economistic reading by the state was only imperfectly the view of the business immigrants themselves. Information feedback and environmental scans by potential migrants early on, aided by social networks and immigration consultants, established the existence of systematic differences between East Asia and Canada. These differences presented both opportunities and limitations and revealed that immigrants are strategic actors with multi-dimensional objectives that may be contradictory, calling for considerable ingenuity, and not a little stress, in problem-solving.

Business migrants realized that there was little prospect of achieving significant economic success in Canada, particularly in Vancouver, with its much smaller market area than Toronto or Montreal. Yet Vancouver was their most popular destination. How is this counter-intuitive paradox to be explained among a cohort of seemingly rational actors?

Our interviews have shown that, despite their entrepreneurial histories and the state’s intent, a key issue in their decision-making was that relocation was not propelled by economic motives. A survey of 90 immigrants in Vancouver from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea who had landed through the business entrepreneur stream showed that only 12 percent identified economic motives as prompting their move to Canada (Ley, 2002). This finding is consistent with interviews we conducted with officials at the Canadian High Commission in Hong Kong, who noted that to their surprise in the early-mid 1990s there had been large numbers of candidates seeking admission to Canada through the business streams, but evoking little interest in actually opening a business in Canada. It was not economics that was driving this move, but other factors. Among the 90 respondents, quality of life in the Pacific province of British Columbia was mentioned by almost half the group, including both environmental quality and also the level of public and private services. Close behind was a desire to take advantage of what were regarded as superior educational opportunities for children compared with those in East Asia. In third place were fears of geopolitical insecurity in their home countries mentioned by more than one-fifth of the sample, and in fourth place a desire for family reunification. Economic opportunities in British Columbia only emerged as a fifth order motive. The differential assessment of the two shores of the Pacific Ocean was summarized in a common expression among Vancouver’s Chinese diaspora: ‘Hong Kong for making money, Vancouver for quality of life’. The global isotropic plain evaporated before the reality of differences institutionalized behind national borders, including official languages and the regulatory culture of doing business.

In a survey-based assessment of potential emigrants from Hong Kong in the early 1990s, Skeldon (1994) identified what he called ‘reluctant exiles’, business
people and professionals who experienced sharp dissonance as they compared apples and oranges, economic opportunities in Hong Kong versus quality of life in the broadest sense in Canada. The imminent deadline of 1997 for the repatriation of the British colony to China provided acute discomfort, particularly to middle-class citizens whose families had earlier experienced the disciplines of Communist rule. 'Most are in conflict. They may wish to exit for political reasons, but to remain in Hong Kong for economic reasons. This is the affluent middle-class story' (Salaff and Wong, 1995).

In fact economic conditions in Greater Vancouver were even worse than had been expected. Among the survey of 90 entrepreneurs, over 70 percent did not find economic conditions as they had expected them to be. As entrepreneurs, immigrants were bound by the terms and conditions of their visas to open a business with some haste, but confronted a number of unexpected barriers, including business costs, a weak market, high taxes and a culture of regulation. In contrast to the more laissez-faire business culture and income tax as low as 15 percent in their home countries, Canada offered a much more demanding economic environment. In addition the Pacific province of British Columbia was in recession during most of the latter part of the 1990s and up to the time of interview. Sixty percent of entrepreneurs encountered immediate obstacles to their business plans; adjustments occurred, in particular a scaling-down of ambitions, and a shifting of industrial sectors. Confronted by unfamiliar environmental and labor legislation, entrepreneurs were particularly unwilling to engage in manufacturing, though 20 percent had been in this sector in their home countries. There was a marked transfer into retail services, with retailing, personal services and the restaurant industry accounting for three-quarters of business take-up in Vancouver. This sector had the advantages of rapid start-up, especially if an existing business was purchased with equipment and installations already in place. Use of simple English and repetitive phrases were adequate, and for Hong Kong and Taiwanese entrepreneurs there was the asset of an existing ethnic community as consumers. Best of all, there was steady cash flow in retailing unlike the delayed payment accompanying other sectors like manufacturing, construction or the import-export trade.

But there were also significant disadvantages in the retail/restaurant sector. Many business people were operating in an unfamiliar industry, in an unfamiliar language, in an unfamiliar regulatory environment and under severe time constraints, with the clock ticking toward the two-year deadline after arrival for establishing their business. The fast start-up in retailing and the restaurant trade was a decided advantage, while an English-language deficit could be sidestepped by depending upon co-ethnic consumers. But too many entrepreneurs made this same decision, and suffered collectively for it. The ethnic enclave economy became saturated and could not accommodate the large number of corner grocery stores, Chinese restaurants, and dry cleaners. Despite long hours of work, profit margins were low, and there were abundant business failures.

An owner of a health food store told us that, unlike Taiwan, 'Here people have to steal customers from each other. We are not able to make a reasonable profit'. The business was clearing only a little more than $1000 a month, revenue was shrinking, and in desperation her spouse was trying out real estate, also a declining sector at the time. It was a common experience to have a weak business that was sold soon after terms and conditions were lifted; almost 50 percent of our sample
was in that position. Another couple opened a Cantonese-style noodle house in Chinatown, a business they had successfully operated in Hong Kong. But strategies that had worked in Hong Kong did not pay off in Vancouver, and the restaurant lost $60,000 in two years prior to sale. The couple had considered their investment ‘safe’, but...

`...it’s very different from Hong Kong. I think that was a mistake we made. We just brought our Hong Kong thinking to do business here ...It can be very depressing. It’s been so hard for me and my family. I think maybe we need to take fault for rushing into our business at the beginning, but the business we tried really burned us out. We gave a lot for it...and it failed ...My husband and I don’t know any English. We had few friends. Everything was foreign. We didn’t know what was where. My kids were still very young. The business took up all of our time. It really had a severe impact on our well-being and the life of our family.’

The woman’s distinctions between ‘here’ and ‘there’ were common among respondents, and open up a sense not just of difference but of incommensurability, in her case between the two shores of the Pacific. The state’s assumption of easy transferability of skills across a global isotropic surface was misplaced.

Among the 90 entrepreneurs we interviewed, profit levels were meagre, the fear and the experience of business failure were palpable. The mean net income from the business the year that terms and conditions were lifted (a median date of 1996, approximately two years after landing) was only $20,000, while the median net figure was zero, with many entrepreneurs unable to extract even a full salary for themselves from their long hours of work. Half these enterprises were sold, but among the remainder, only small improvement had occurred, for in the most recent business year, median net revenues remained low, at $22,500. The anticipation of a weak business performance in Canada held by immigrants before departure was fully substantiated on the ground in Vancouver.

**Strategic Actions in Canada**

Limited economic success was an unwelcome experience for entrepreneurs who had gained entry to Canada on the basis of proven business acumen in their countries of origin. A varied but finite set of strategies was employed to address these dispiriting circumstances. In these activities we see the agency of the transnational migrant, and how in one respect or another these practices compromised the objectives of the state, whose policy expectations were undermined by inadequate resources to pursue due diligence in monitoring or enforcing the terms of business immigration. It was common for the same household to employ more than one of these strategic actions, either serially or simultaneously.

1. **Successful Business Activity.** Of course some immigrants in the business classes achieve more or less successful economic integration to Canada by operating a local enterprise. On the basis of several rounds of interviewing in Vancouver it is our judgement that this group is a small minority, a view shared
Shaky Borders?

by other research (Woo, 1998). Several entrepreneurs who reported satisfactory returns stayed close to their money-making origins in East Asia, either running a trans-Pacific import-export business or an undertaking, such as herbal remedies, where prior experience jump-started their Vancouver venture. However, any successful entrepreneur, particularly one dependent on a co-ethnic market, ran the risk of quickly being joined by competitors, forcing down profits. This trend was evident when bubble tea outlets became popular in the late 1990s, and initial profitable enterprises saw their successes compromised by the entry of many new competitors. Indeed there was a clear trend among the 90 entrepreneurs in our sample that selection of a business location detached from the crowded co-ethnic market led to a higher probability of satisfactory economic performance.

2. Hunkering Down. In contrast, some households in the entrepreneur entry stream, while resident in Canada, were not active economically. Either their terms had been lifted or forgiven, and they were waiting out their stay until they had completed the three years of residence that made them eligible for citizenship, or, particularly in other immigrant streams such as the investor class, they had not yet found a business they wished to pursue. In either case they were living on savings or offshore earnings and putting in time in Canada. Especially for males, used to high levels of activity, this was a very uncomfortable status, and led to the familiar metaphor of imprisonment or ‘immigration jail’ (cf. Findlay and Li, 1997), effective detention until the award of citizenship created more opportunities, including leaving Canada. As one woman told us: ‘I tell the children father is home working in his office from his computer. But in fact he closes the door and plays computer games all day.’ The downward social status for men, under-active, and around the house, led in a number of cases to increased conflict within the family.

3. The Astronaut Household. A unique adjustment by many families to poor economic prospects is long-range commuting between a job in Taipei or Hong Kong and a family residence in Canada. Typically such an ‘astronaut’ would return every three or six months for a short period to live with family members. Waters (2002) has observed some households where astronaut status was planned before arrival in Canada, and the head of household left as little as a week after landing, but this action is also undertaken later and frequently reluctantly, after a local business has failed or has been sold, and there is need to recharge an offshore cash stream. Astronaut status can bring heavy social costs to the family, with prolonged separation often leading to relational difficulties, and in the early years contributing to heavy demands upon women who are usually the family member in charge of the children in Canada, and have to play the role of mother and father in an unfamiliar environment. Where possible it is a condition that families will abandon as soon, as circumstances permit: ‘When he leaves Vancouver ... we cry in Vancouver and he cry in Taiwan.’ Another woman expressed how she became depressed and fearful in her home with the absence of her husband: ‘We do miss him a lot. But it's been like this for so many years, we are used to this situation now...it is tough ...not an easy kind of life (in tears). If I don't have the religion I don't think I could handle my life.’
Nonetheless in many households women adjust to their new roles over time, and freed of economic necessity by trans-Pacific money transfers, they engage in personal development programs such as art and literature, sports, and language classes. But their slow acculturation to Canada is then disrupted by the return of their husband who re-establishes patriarchal family relations they have been growing away from (Waters, 2002).

A less common development sees both parents return to East Asia, leaving teenaged children behind to complete their education, usually in the loose care of a guardian. The so-called satellite kids have frequently experienced considerable difficulties (Waters, 2001): sometimes victimized by peers and criminals because of their affluence and vulnerability, sometimes becoming drop-outs and delinquents themselves, including the small number that belong to the sub-culture that races fast cars at considerable danger to themselves and others.

4. Return Migration. Some business immigrant households exited Canada altogether (Ley and Kobayashi, 2002). An extension of the astronaut option is to cut all ties once citizenship is attained, an option that must also look attractive to those who are hunkered down in ‘immigration jail’. Out of Hong Kong’s population of some seven million, it is estimated that more than 200,000 hold Canadian passports. A foreign passport was widely regarded as an insurance policy against geopolitical uncertainty in the future, and once attained has the added advantage of aiding international travel. A returnee to Hong Kong itemized the advantages of holding a Canadian passport to us: ‘Before it was insurance. Right now it’s for the convenience.’

Return to Hong Kong began in earnest in the early 1990s, but accelerated through the decade as growing numbers of immigrants had secured citizenship, as the Canadian economy was in recession, and as geopolitical developments in Hong Kong in 1997 were less worrisome than expected. Interviews with returnees in Hong Kong, however, indicated less a model of return than one of circular movement, for in true transnational fashion, many returnees anticipated a future move back to Canada. Given the expectation of greater economic rewards in Hong Kong, relocation would be delayed until sufficient income had been amassed. For a surprising number of respondents, this move is likely to occur at retirement, when Canada’s quality of life is raised to a higher priority. This was a message we heard repeatedly from returnees in Hong Kong: ‘I will consider moving back after retirement, though I still have 30 years to go. My dream is to go back to Vancouver for retirement ... [My parents] plan to be there after retirement. My dad will retire in seven years. He will live there with my mum, because there it’s more comfortable.’

5. Slowing Down. We also encountered families who had sought a refuge in Canada from the active pace of economic life in East Asia. Commonly Hong Kong and Taiwan were conceptualized by such categories as fast, active, lively, while Canada was regarded as slow, laid back. For some households, burned out from the speed and demands of business careers, a slower pace was eagerly sought, permitting the pursuit of multidimensional objectives including sports and other leisure activities, family life, and, not infrequently, religious practices and spiritual
formation associated with the rapid growth of Chinese- and Korean-Canadian churches (Ley and Waters, 2003). One male asked rhetorically:

‘What is your definition of success? Most of the men would say ‘reputation, wealth and power’. Those three things were my objects that I was looking for in Taiwan. I already achieved very good at that. [Then] when I was immersed in the study of English literature [in Canada] I found a lot of positive concepts. One day I asked my tennis friend ‘What is your definition of success?’ and he said ‘Happily playing tennis’. Everybody likes him. So my values are changing in these three years. I almost lost my health three years ago because I was looking for wealth, reputation and power very, very hard. I worked almost twelve hours every day.’

This shift to post-material values was held in particular by families in their forties with young children who had re-valued the significance of child-rearing and developing strong family relationships. Benefiting from past savings in their home countries, such families were willingly prepared to accept downward mobility to a less demanding career. As one family told us:

Mrs Yee: ‘In Hong Kong it’s the pressure you can hardly face because the whole society is so rushed, you know, and life is so busy that you can hardly slow down a little bit to enjoy life ...It’s too busy for both adults and the kids. So we want to slow down our pace a little bit so we came ...the first year we came here we just enjoy life. We didn’t bother to find job for at least one year. We’d been working for twenty years so busy.’

Mr Yee: ‘Yes, so we decided to change our lifestyle, to do some business of our own. We’d get a business and we’d provide some jobs for people. So we have a better lifestyle, and we can take care of the house and the kids. And we can go to church, worship our Lord. We were not, like, having any religion when we were in Hong Kong....’

Mrs Yee: ‘And when we were leaving Hong Kong we were in the peak of our business and profession at that time. That’s why we were too busy and we find too little time giving to the family and the kids. So when we came over to Canada and we first get away from that fast living we still maintain family life.’

There is some irony in this status passage from East Asia to Canada. The BIP was predicated on trans-Pacific transfer of ‘fast living’ and economic momentum. But business immigrants are unlike automobile components that can be exchanged unproblematically between two continents. For immigrants, a change of place facilitates a change of identity and lifestyle.

6. Retirement. Migration as a status passage may be associated with a movement away from active economic activity altogether. This development was not unusual in investor class immigrants, usually a little older than the entrepreneur class. Mr. Liang landed in Vancouver as an investor at the age of 52 and began his retirement (Ley, 1999). ‘Frankly, you can’t earn any money here. [If] you have your own money you can come. Just stay here and relax. You cannot earn good money here
because the tax here is so high. So you must have earned enough money to come.’ In Mr. Liang’s circle those over the age of fifty are retired. Those who come recently, they, we, are all retired people. But entrepreneurs like the Yees who have amassed considerable wealth in East Asia may also be drawn toward an early retirement once the lifting of terms and conditions on their frequently shaky business has taken place. Retirement takes the slowing down process a stage further. While passive investment on the stock market and in property may continue, active entrepreneurialism slows to a halt.

7. *Subverting the Regulations.* A ready response to unfamiliarity has been to fall back upon the predictable market of the ethnic enclave economy, which in the case of the Chinese diaspora amounts to some 300,000 Chinese-Canadians in the Vancouver metropolitan area. Co-ethnic ties have offered both legitimate and illegal opportunities. Knowing the high risk of failure in entrepreneurial activities, temptations emerged to take short-cuts. One of these was the re-cycling of the same business through a chain of owners. We have seen that half the owners sold their enterprise soon after terms and conditions had been lifted. The same proportion bought an existing business rather than move through the delays and frustrations of start-up. It is known that the same business is passed along in this manner through a series of owners each of whom owns and manages it for approximately two years until terms and conditions are removed. Such passing along of frail undertakings is clearly not the intent of the BIP; in addition it undercuts the BIP’s statistical data by multiple counting of economic activity related to the same business.

While subverting the intent of the BIP, such re-sales are not illegal. But a development of this behavior leads to fraudulent activity. Several respondents told us of a practice whereby ‘paper sales’ of businesses to new immigrants occurred for amounts as low as $20,000, much less than the typical investment of $125,000-$150,000. Paper ownership for immigration monitoring purposes was purchased by a new immigrant entrepreneur, but in practice the original owner continued in charge of the business. After terms and conditions were lifted the new immigrant parted company with the enterprise. Telephone calls in Cantonese to three immigration consultants by a member of the research team making enquiries for a friend soon to arrive in Canada led in each instance to a veiled offer over the phone to locate paper ownership, with details to be discussed in a face-to-face meeting. One respondent entrepreneur thought that lack of English fluency led to this ruse: ‘For people from Taiwan, language is the greatest obstacle. Many people worry so much about language that they dare not start a business themselves and they pay someone to do the business for them.’

**Border-making, Border-shaking**

The intent of the Business Immigration Programme has been to accelerate economic activity in Canada by offering the incentive of citizenship to a footloose cohort of entrepreneurs with proven commercial ability and significant liquid assets. The objective of course is economic development within Canada, in other words the containment of gains inside national borders. A short, three-year qualification for citizenship is intended to add to the attraction of establishing a
new national identity, while language and other integration programmes offered by
government-funded NGOs and voluntary agencies are aimed to ease the settlement
process. In all of this the state has a conventional view of immigration and of
citizenship. The migrant leaves behind an origin and an older identity and arrives
at a destination where a new national identity is forged. The state's task -is to
consolidate its borders, to socialize the immigrant into the advantages of
citizenship through integration processes behind national boundaries.

But this shoring up of national citizenship is compromised by many of the
immigrants we have interviewed. Their view of citizenship is strategic, their life-
world one that transcends borders through an active transnationalism. The linear
model of migration assumed by the state is more often circular in the lives of the
migrants, with constant movement of information, capital and family members
across national borders. Some migrants expect only a limited sojourn in Canada,
long enough to collect a passport. It has been noted that some Hong Kong
employers granted their valued staff leaves of absence long enough to achieve the
residency required to secure a foreign passport (Mak, 1997). Other migrants keep
an active presence on both sides of the Pacific through astronaut travel and family
fragmentation.

Nor does the planned enclosure of business immigrants behind Canadian
borders guarantee the achievement of the state's intentions. We have seen that the
active entrepreneurialism expected through the BIP, the outworking of an identity
of *homo economicus*, has been the exception rather than the rule. Immigrants have
complex subjectivities like anyone else and for some the move to Canada has been
accompanied by a status passage to a quieter and more multi-dimensional life,
more concern with family activities, personal development, and leisure, including
early retirement, displacing work from its dominant position. More direct
subversion of the BIP comes from those who hunker down without active
economic participation in Canada, awaiting citizenship, and others who find means
to shortcut the legal regulations for entrepreneurial activity. Among these groups
enclosure behind Canadian borders has the existential status for some of
imprisonment, and their inclination is to shake the neat borders that contain them,
revealing by their actions both a material and a symbolic discontent (Pred, 1995;
Pred and Watts, 1992). Even among those who are running a business as
prescribed by the state, economic returns are typically modest, leading to a
surprisingly high poverty rate among business immigrants from East Asia (Ley,
2003).

There is rationality in all of these migrant strategies, but it is not the
rationality anticipated by the state. Those immigrants who continue to derive their
primary incomes from Asia have correctly read the gradient of economic returns
and have judged that the economic regulations within Canadian borders limit their
profit-making. Those who moderate their entrepreneurialism in Canada have
correctly discerned the enhanced quality of life opportunities compared with East
Asia in a mature welfare state. Those who hunker down or subvert due process
correctly recognize the high probability of economic failure in pursuing expected
business practices. In many respects, in light of anticipated economic returns, the
irrational actor is the one who follows the promptings of the Canadian
government. The state for its part does not have adequate monitoring resources to
ensure that its directives are being followed, a power failure that allows for the shaking of its borders.

Conclusion

With their strategic movement in and out of business and indeed in and out of Canada it is not surprising that the business immigrants have proven an elusive population for a national government bent on shoring up borders by reproducing predictable national citizens. Many disappear from official records altogether; government managers estimate that 30-40 percent of the entrepreneur stream never report in as required for monitoring of their business progress, while from a comparison of different data bases it appears a quarter of the immigrants have disappeared, many no doubt returning to their countries of origin (Ley, 2003). The strategies we have discussed in this chapter also identify a highly pragmatic or strategic view of citizenship (Ong, 1999), and lead readily to a conclusion that the state has failed in its task not only to promote active entrepreneurialism, but also to socialize a cohort of resourceful immigrants into the paradigm of national citizenship within the enveloping wall of state borders.

This circumstance might readily lead to a conclusion that borders do not matter to transnational migrants in the current phase of globalization. But this would be wide of the mark, above all for the careful eye of the business migrant, who calibrates differential opportunities behind national borders with considerable finesse. Transnational mobility is predicated on the absolute significance of the difference, not sameness, between nation states. It is a Canadian passport and quality of life that attract business migrants, while it is unrewarding economic prospects and a regulated economic culture that repel them. So their movements and practices are planned, indeed sweated over, as a result of international differences contained within the borders of the nation-state. Contra the missing subjectivities of globalization theory, human intentions, carefully laid yet flexible plans, and the strategic actions that spring from them define the transnational migrant’s engagement with national borders enclosing differences that matter profoundly.

Notes

These figures, and those that follow in this paragraph, have been computed from the unpublished Landed Immigrant Data System (LIDS) collected by the federal government department, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, from landing cards completed by immigrants to Canada at the point of arrival, for the period from 1980 to 2001. Tabulations from this data base have been prepared at the University of Alberta, and released through the Metropolis Project research network.

References


Ley, D. (2002), Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Indicators of Success, Immigration Branch, Department of Community, Aboriginal and Women's Services, Province of British Columbia, Victoria, BC.


PART II

STRATEGIC CONSTRUCTIONS:
CLAIMING AND FIXING PLACES
Chapter 5

Regionalization in Europe

Stories, Institutions and Boundaries

Arnoud Lagendijk

Introduction

The use of territorial principles is, according to Keating (1997, p. 383), ever-present but often elusive. The currently rising popularity of `regions' (as subnational units) and processes of regionalization offers a good illustration of this double characterization. The core concepts of `region' and `regionalization' remain highly fuzzy concepts, open to many interpretations and usages. Moreover, the various narratives that underpin regionalization - economic, environmental, social, political - far from produce a coherent or even compatible story. Yet, despite the fuzziness and tensions, the concepts of `region' and `regionalization' have come to underpin major processes of administrative and political reform, at the levels of regions, nations and the EU. As part of these processes, the notions of `region' and `regionalization' have been translated in practices related to demarcation of territories, competencies and tasks, resulting in recognized territorial boundaries, in organizational structures with set responsibilities and resources, and in procedures and scripts of regional action. It appears that, in this translation, conceptual fuzziness and incommensurability are partly addressed. Boundaries are fixed, organizations are named and framed within an institutional context, procedures detailed in handbooks, practices consolidated in institutional routines, etc.

So how does this work? How do practices of region-building cope with the conceptual fuzziness and tensions characteristic for thinking on regions and regionalization? How do agents engaged in processes of region formation reconcile, or at least cope with, the fuzziness and ambiguities that pervade narratives of the region? More specifically, what is the political agenda behind the invocation of the various regional stories, and its translation into actions of region-building? And, as a second question, which practices are employed, which criteria used, to draw boundaries? This chapter will explore these issues by focusing on the fixation of boundaries in the context of EU regional policy. Within the context of the EU, all member states but the smallest ones have developed, or are developing, regional divisions to facilitate the implementation of EU regional policy. The most important division is that in supra-local, subnational territories at the so-called NUTS-2 level. This level is used for the allocation of development funding (`Objective 1') across the EU. Yet, regional divisions represent much more than
pure administrative instruments. Both at the national and European level, processes of regionalization are underwritten by stories about the importance of the region and its role in political, economic, social, and environmental development. This makes regionalization in Europe an interesting case for exploring the question of how agents cope with fuzzy and, in some respects, even ambiguous notions of the region and regionalization.

The analysis takes place in two parts. The first part is primarily discursive, and involves juxtaposing, manipulating and subjecting the various stories in such a way that major contradictions and tensions are eradicated. Four 'lead stories' are presented, under the headings of 'competitiveness', 'governance', 'sustainability', and 'identity'. The second part involves the practice of region formation in the context of EU regional policy. This starts with a discussion of administrative processes of region formation in the EU, followed by a final discussion on boundaries and identity.

Stories of Regional Significance: The Nexus between Competitiveness and Governance

The notion of the region and regionalization as actual territorial principles is underwritten by a series of stories that each present a pervasive 'logic' of why the region and regional structures are so significant. This includes, amongst others, narratives on innovation and competitiveness, sustainability, strategic spatial planning, integrated forms of policy implementation, and spatial identity (Keating, 1998).

Not only does the concept of the region draw from so many different themes, each of the themes contains a large variety of interpretations, storylines, and recommendations on region formation, development and policy. Blotevogel (2000) thus interprets the region as a multidimensional semantic field, with not only diffuse edges but also highly heterogeneous components. Miggelbrink (2002) speaks of an 'irritating fullness' that characterizes different meanings and contents of the term region. The region is overdetermined, and the various interpretations clash in many respects. The general objectives (competitiveness, transport, environment, etc.) often suggest different, sometimes even incompatible, regional actions, boundaries and organizational structures. Aspirations regarding local governance and identity may each produce yet other regional divisions and actions. Nevertheless, an illusion of the significance and coherence of the region is created through the way the various 'logics' frame the region as a single solution to a variety of social, political and economic problems. Although there are many stories about what a region is, and how it should be identified and institutionalized, together they produce a powerful mantra, both in science and policy-making. This culminates in a view in which the region is represented as a specific social order, which brings together spatial-technical and social-political aspects in a territory with a unique name and a notion of territorial identity (Miggelbrink, 2002).

While the region features in many stories, its rising status and impact may be attributed primarily to a combination of two prominent stories, namely that of competitiveness and governance. The emphasis on regional competitiveness stems primarily from the discourse on globalization. Whereas, allegedly, globalization
has weakened national capacities to influence economic performance, it has promoted the role of the region as a site of sustained competitiveness, by its ‘natural’ capacity to facilitate collective learning. In political terms, on the other hand, the region is presented as a level to build new structures of strategic and democratic governance, and to complement or even partially replace political responsibilities and representation at the national level (Keating, 1998). Through processes of devolution, decentralization and regionalization, regions can be endowed with resources and responsibilities to deal with issues such as economic and social development, education, environmental and spatial planning within their territories. Such a move is underwritten by three arguments:

1. Because of the more prominent position of the region in the global economic arena, regions should be able to develop a strategic capacity to improve their economic cohesiveness, specialization and identity. This is the crux of the nexus between the competitiveness story and the regional governance argument. What makes this point so interesting is that the region assumes a role that, in recent decades, has been denied to the state. Whereas the state should refrain from ‘intervening’ in the market, and from meddling with the national economic structure and specialization, regional agents are encouraged to strategically engage with local economic processes, notably through collaborative organizational forms such as ‘development coalitions’. Such coalitions are seen as especially useful for facilitating and catalysing ‘cluster’ development and improving regional economic conditions. Similarly, at a national level, the drafting of ‘development plans’ is associated with obsolete socialist ideals and practices of central planning. Yet, any self-respecting region in Europe regularly produces a regional strategic plan.

2. Regions are better able to represent group interests and identity, and can thus acquire higher levels of democratic legitimacy and institutional capacity. The issue of bottom-up democracy was raised, in particular, in Piore and Sabel’s (1984) seminal work ‘The Second Industrial Divide’, based on their observations of interaction and collective action between small firm entrepreneurs and other regional agents. Piore and Sabel envisioned the revival of a kind of ‘yeoman democracy’ at the regional level, notably in the form of industrial districts. The latter thus became portrayed as a new, promising model of production and wealth-creation. Also in development planning approaches, democratic legitimization of strategy development and regional action through participatory forms of governance is considered an essential condition (Healey, 1997).

3. It is not only bottom-up perspectives that inspire strong notions of governance. In a top-down perspective, inclusive, network-based forms of political and administrative structures at the regional level are thought to endorse policy customization and implementation (Vermeulen et al., 1997). Such forms of governance strengthen regional administrative capacity in the context of supra-regional policy development.
Interestingly, EU policies and initiatives towards regions are grafted onto all three arguments, although in different combinations. The emphasis on strategic capacity is a major issue in EU policies geared towards the region (regional policy and initiatives, rural policy, etc.). Although national authorities remain primarily responsible for policy implementation and monitoring, many of these tasks are delegated to regional agencies. In particular, regional agencies play an important role in policy customization and integration at the regional level, for instance through the development and negotiation of a regional strategic plan, the so-called Single Development Plan (SDP). As will be discussed later, certain countries that lacked adequate regional structures have responded to European demands by establishing regional administrative bodies with sufficient power and competencies to handle complex European programmes. The creation of regional Government Offices in England in the early 1990s presents the most marked example, especially because the Conservative government ruling at the time was a strong opponent of any form of regionalization or devolution.

The `competitiveness' imperative, in particular, has drawn attention to the notion of regional strategic capacity. Regions are seen as vital instruments serving the European economy in two ways. First, by fostering clustering and innovation, regions directly contribute to the competitive position of the Community. The latter point, which has been in vogue since the 1980s, has induced a gradual shift in support for less favoured regions from infrastructural to `associational' investments. Such investments are geared to networking (among businesses and regional organizations), competence building and strategy development. Second, by decreasing regional disparities, regions contribute to the construction of a level playing field supporting the single market, which is considered a major step in achieving more internal competition. Persistent regional inequalities are generally considered as an obstacle to further integration. Besides the direct effect of inducing polarization, inequalities also tend to produce political and social resistance to further integration in depressed areas (Lawton Smith et al., 2001).

Strengthening democratic representation and institutional capacity at the regional level also serves the European agenda. Regional authorities play an important role in the implementation of the European principle of subsidiarity, and participate in the `partnership' configurations responsible for the development and implementation of regional and territorial policies. Besides, regions play an advisory role in European politics and administration through their representation in the Committee of the Regions. In two directions, thus, regions help to give a face to Europe, as a stakeholder in the implementation of European policies, and as a voice in the European political arena. This neatly chimes with the emphasis on `informed governance' and `empowered localities' underwriting actual European governance approaches (Scott, 2002).

Yet, the question is to what extent the roles allocated to the region really require the development of a democratic mandate at the regional level (Martin and Pearce, 1993; Taylor, 1995). It is obvious that the interests of the EU are well served by a structure of regional governance that matches the way the EU, in a multi-level arrangement, designs and implements regional (and regionally relevant) policies. To what extent this should also entail regional government (democratically controlled) remains a complex issue. Advocates would say that democratically legitimized regional administration will also strengthen the various
roles and functions of regions in Europe. Opponents point at the fact that even with direct representation, the democratic legitimization of the regional level will often remain weak. Moreover, the establishment of a regional level of government is likely to complicate political and administrative processes and to add to the overall bureaucratic burden (Russell Barter, 2000). Instead of a full-blown regional administration, the strategic functions of the region may well be served by a central actor, like a regional development agency, with indirect democratic control by local authorities. Tindale (1996) also argues that non-elected development agencies would represent less of a threat to local authorities and would be able to work more closely with business, thus complying with Europe's emphasis on partnerships.

The question of strategic vs. democratic governance is also an issue in the more fundamental debate on regionalization and the political status of the region. On the one hand, the region is portrayed as a strategic actor operating in an increasingly competitive battlefield. Like firms, regions need to develop and use local resources and management competencies that help them to achieve competitiveness on a sustainable basis. In Weichhart's (2000, p. 551) view, the core challenge for regions is to develop a ‘quasi-gebietskörperschaftliche Struktur’ (a territorial semi-corporate structure), in which management, marketing and development activities are bundled and governed. On the other hand, and unlike firms, regional development processes are seen as a form of public policy-making that should be democratically legitimized and controlled. These two arguments are often joined in accounts of regionalization without much attention to the frictions between them.

Yet, the extent to which regions manage to act as, to use the words of Harvey (2001, p. 367) a ‘collective democratic corporation’ remains a controversial issue. Harvey’s own research, focused on urban policies, shows that ‘boosterist’ strategies are often based on a collusion between dominant policy-makers and business actors, while other societal groups are ignored. In certain cases this leads to ‘...not corruption of the ordinary sort but circumvention of the democratic processes of government and of public accountability for the use of public money’ (Harvey, 2001, p. 156). Similarly, critical planning literature points at the fact that only a few cases of planning processes, despite the rhetoric generally employed, can be characterized as genuinely inclusive and participatory (Moulaert, 2000).

In summary, pervasive economic argumentation - the competitiveness imperative - together with practical administrative needs stemming from European policy, have provided a strong case for the development of regional strategic governance and administrative capacities. Discourses on regional governance tend to make quick associations with notions of inclusion, participation and ‘grass roots’ democracy. Yet, in reality, infusing processes of strategy development and implementation with democratic principles and practices is fraught with difficulties, many of which are of a deeply political nature.

Supporting Stories of Regional Significance: Sustainability and Identity

In addition to the competitiveness-governance nexus, two themes have played an important role in raising the popularity of the region: sustainability and spatial identity. Over the last decades, the term of sustainability has managed to permeate
many policy discourses, including those on energy, transport, housing, agriculture, industrial development and spatial planning (Selman, 1996). Against this background, the region primarily plays a role as a strategic arena in which different interests and positions are connected, mediated and accommodated. A major challenge in spatial planning is to accommodate various spatial-sectoral pressures and ambitions, and to address tensions between different forms of land use. This challenge is generally conceptualized through the so-called ‘quality triangle’ which, in an integral way, brings together three issues: (1) economic development and competitiveness, (2) environmental development and sustainability and (3) social development and cohesion. To deal with the apparent incommensurabilities among these issues, new innovative concepts have been articulated and applied that inspire novel problem perceptions and solutions, new action perspectives and creative organizational configurations (Vermeulen et al., 1997), such as ‘eco-industrial clusters’, ‘mixed land-use’ and ‘integrated transport nodes’. Hence, through these conceptual innovations and discursive advances, sustainability serves as a bridging concept between the dominant economic interests on the one hand, and environmental and social concerns on the other.

A similar supporting role is played by the notion of regional identity. Recent work on spatial identity has highlighted the importance of identity construction in the process of space formation (Van Houtum, 2003; Paasi, 1991). Instead of a fixed, contextual dimension, identity is now understood as an important vehicle in the shaping of stories and images of the region, and, more specifically, in applying the ‘logics’ of regional-economic positioning and regional governance. For that purpose, the notion of regional identity has turned into a set of scripts underpinning the practices of region formation and institutionalization, of regional positioning and governance, informed by stories about the significance of the region. The result is a rather ambiguous relationship between regional identity and region formation, including the drawing of boundaries. On the one hand, processes of region formation are legitimized on the basis of ‘objectified’ notions of a community, common culture, shared values, a shared history and destiny, creating an illusion of an ‘objective’ region (Van Houtum, 2003). On the other hand, these notions are (re)constructed and (re)presented through identity scripts associated with region formation, institution building, strategy development, and regional marketing. These scripts, in turn, are legitimized not so much on the basis of the existence of particular regional characteristics and demarcations but on the generic understanding of the region as a significant place, as detailed by the various ‘logics’ of regionalization. So, paradoxically, the quest for the uniqueness of a region is not a product of the deeper understanding of that particular region, but of the abstract notion of the region as a unique place for social-economic development, and the way this notion has been scripted (Cox and Mair, 1991).

As a result, regional identity, although it strengthens the case for regionalization, does not provide a key to the demarcation of boundaries or the creation of regional divisions. As Paasi (1991) observes, the process of region formation, including the articulation of a regional identity, can actually start with arbitrary territorial units and administrative processes. Once a territorial grouping shares a political will and administrative drive to engage in region formation, identity scripts will be applied to the area concerned, yielding the symbols, stories and images shaping and promoting the region and its core agents. In Paasi’s (1991,
Territorial symbols are often abstract expressions of group solidarity embodying the actions of political, economic and cultural institutions in the continual reproductions and legitimation of the system of practices that characterize the territorial unit. This is not to say that regions are entirely 'artificial' entities concocted by groups of agents involved in spatial politics. There are many spatial features, like physical barriers, language, dialect or ethnic borders, historical affiliations, etc. that frame processes of region formation. Yet, these features do not produce natural outcomes; they are subject to processes of mobilization and representation within a wider context of spatial politics.

In conclusion, the current emphasis on the region and the political interest in regionalization is legitimated and shaped by a series of interlocking stories. These stories are wrapped around a central nexus between the story of the region as a core site of economic competitiveness and the region as a platform for strategic governance. Other logics, although manifesting their own discursive momentum, are hooked onto this nexus. They include the region as a domain for integrated and inclusive planning, as a site to promote sustainable development, as a place through which to acknowledge and foster local cultures, and as a level to improve administrative effectiveness and efficiency in policy-making. Not only do these discursive ploys serve to rhetorically overcome the incommensurability inherent among the various stories of regionalization. They also create a discursive space fitting the political agendas pursued by dominant agents such as EU policy-makers. This will be further explored in the remainder of the chapter.

Administrative Processes of Region Formation in the EU

The 'logics' of regional significance have created a momentum in regional development and policy across Europe. From a European perspective, the start of this momentum can be dated back to the 1980s with the reorganization of the Structural Funds and launching of other European initiatives geared towards the region. Besides the activities and programmes initiated by the European Commission itself, a whole 'industry' of regional development agencies and networks has developed (Lageadijk and CorWford, 2000; CEC, 1999). Through the policy channels and this industry, the logics, scripts and practices underpinning region formation have been disseminated across Europe. At present, a new wave of dissemination is rolling over Eastern Europe, in anticipation of accession to the EU.

The emerging discourses on the region have turned regionalization into a core issue on the European agenda, and, largely as a consequence of that, also on national agendas. In all cases, there has been a shift from mere functional-administrative applications to political-strategic approaches. As perceived core sites of competitiveness, governance, planning and identity, regions have become major players in the building of an integrated Europe as well as restructuring of the national administrative and political territories. EU regional policy, accordingly, has gained a prominent place in the debates on the position and role of Europe versus that of its constituent parts. In the words of Scott (2002, p.148) EU regional policy '(...) is much more than a mere technical matter - it requires a
flexible construction of political and territorial identities as these must co-exist in constant tension with national/local interpretations of Europe.

As a result of the differences in interpretations, political positions and interests, and administrative contexts and processes, the European emphasis on regionalization produces highly diverse, and often controversial, outcomes. On the one hand, as argued in the first part of this chapter, the various ‘logics’ that drive and inform the regionalization process yield a broad, but also strong, discursive anchor for political and administrative action. Indeed, it is this breadth and apparent congruity that presents a key explanation of why the regionalization agenda has become so prominent. On the other hand, due to remaining fuzziness and even ambiguities, the stories of the region leave ample room for different interpretations, forms of mobilization and courses of action. When it comes down to practical action, the European Commission does not offer a clear model of regionalism or region formation (Grabbe, 2001). In particular, there is silence about the question of what kind of democratic mandate should preferably be given to regions, as introduced above. Should region formation lead to elected regional bodies, or can regional development agencies do the job? Obviously, national, regional and local sensitivities may prevent the European Commission from raising the issue. Apart from the problems some member states presently face with respect to the position of regions, any European hint of stronger regional government could easily be interpreted as an attempt to further undermine the positions of central administrations. Yet, based on the discussion before, another, internal, reason for this silence may be suggested. On the one hand, more democratic regions may help to nurture commitment for regional policy and projects, and the position of European bodies such as the Committee of the Regions. Over the last two decades, the European Commission has tried to promote the involvement of local stakeholders and ‘grassroots’ interests in the drafting of regional strategies, project design and implementation (Bachtler and Michie, 1997). On the other hand, establishing indirectly controlled regional agencies is less costly and may be as effective (or even more) in the top-down implementation and monitoring of EU policy. For the accountants and evaluators of the European Commission, regional ‘executive’ bodies primarily focused on the running of European programmes will often be easier to liaise with than full-blown regional administrative bodies.

What is essential is that the fuzzy notion of the region and the ambiguities encompassed by the stories on the region provide a sufficiently wide and mixed discursive basis for the EU to strategically engage in region formation and regional development. In one way, the stories yield an image of the region as an autonomous agent, which, supported by increased self-recognition as well as strategic and institutional capacity, is allowed to develop its own direction and position in a Europe which is both integrated and regionalized. At another level, regions remain instrumental to European (and national) agendas. Within a European context, their role is prescribed by the overarching goals of competitiveness, cohesion and sustainable development, for which the administrative capacity for handling European programmes is most significant. Although many tensions and ambiguities remain, the discursive space and ploys offered by the stories of regional significance help to reconcile the various ‘usages’ of the region in the context of EU policy-making.
Boundaries and Identity

The tension between more functional-administrative and political-strategic interpretations of the region also bears on the second main question of this essay, namely the drawing of boundaries. Each process of regionalization involves a stage in which, based on a political and administrative procedure, a larger territory is chopped up into regional units. For simple functional applications of regionalization, such as in health, education or police, making a spatial division is a relatively straightforward task. Although certain boundaries may still be contested, regionalization basically consists of applying a set of criteria and conditions to a specific territory characterized by certain spatial patterns and distributions. When regionalization is induced by political agendas, and informed by a variety of ideas and images, things become much more complicated. The present processes of regionalization within the EU and its (future) member states find themselves in such a situation, since they are increasingly based on the discourses on regionalization introduced above. To put it briefly, there is no simple way to divide a country into regions that match the image of “sites of competitiveness, governance, planning and identity”. So how are boundaries drawn?

One answer to this question is that, in many cases, boundaries were already there. In the European context, regionalization processes hardly start from scratch, but build on earlier spatial divisions. Indeed, many processes of regionalization take the form of aggregating and reshuffling, joining existing local into new regional units (Hogwood, 1996). In general, administrative processes of boundary drawing are based on a kind of jigsaw logic: regions are aggregates of adjacent local communities; they should be of comparable size and/or weight, covering the whole territory. To play this game, authorities have applied various criteria and conditions, depending on the wider political and administrative context.

In more detail, EU-induced regionalization processes have gone through the following phases:

1. In some countries, regionalization started as a response to bottom-up manifestations of regionalism emerging from so-called “historical” regions, i.e. regions with a strong sense of self-recognition and identity. In other cases, century-old regional divisions are continued. This includes Belgium, Spain, The Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, Italy.

2. In other countries regionalization has been primarily an administrative process serving certain political goals, mainly geared to statistical processes and decentralization. For 60 years, England has been divided into eight “statistical regions”. Another good example consists of the 22 statistical regions of France, of which the regional boundaries were purposely designed in an artificial manner so as not to reflect traditional identities (Russell Barter, 2000). The German Lander consist of a combination of historical regional boundaries (such as Bavaria) and artificial creations, carefully designed to avoid power concentrations, in the post-World War II reconfiguration of Germany.
3. Similarly, the EU regional division was started primarily for statistical purposes. The regional division is the second layer in a multi-level, nested spatial division from national to local, the so-called *Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistique* (NUTS) developed by Eurostat. Although NUTS preferably uses prevailing institutional divisions and breakdowns at the national level, regional units should be of a certain size and a general nature. Mono-functional areas, or areas that do not reflect prevalent patterns of interaction (like city and hinterland) are not acceptable, although in reality the NUTS divisions are rather variable and often inconsistent (Bachtler and Michie, 1997). In some cases, such inconsistencies, especially size differences, stem from respect for historical idiosyncrasies; in other cases they have purely administrative backgrounds. What is interesting, nevertheless, is that what started as a measurement tool turned into a vital instrument for the transfer of large sums of money across Europe, and then into the basis of Europe's increasingly ambitious regional agenda.

4. The European process of regionalization, in combination with the propagation of the new discourses of the region, has impacted upon national regionalization processes, in two ways. To start with, countries have sought to (re)shape regional divisions in such a way as to optimize EU revenues. The most marked example is Ireland. Originally, Ireland accounted as one region, which has always been eligible for the highest level of support (Objective One). When its rapid economic growth pushed the national product above the maximum eligibility level, and the country stood to lose its regional support, Ireland divided itself into a `rich' and `poor' area. After years of discussion, a balance was found between the pragmatic step of optimizing European support and the demarcation of areas that approximate `general regions' acceptable for the European Commission as new `NUTS-2' regions. One newspaper comment about a business response illustrates the underlying dilemma: `IBEC, the employers' organization, is happy to support the regional division of Ireland in pursuit of maximum EU structural funding in the post 1999 era. (...) However, the proposed splitting of the country would have to be done in an inclusive process whereby the strategic investment priorities of all regions are considered in an inclusive way' (O'Mahony, 1998).

5. The second way in which Europe has influenced national processes is through stimulating a strategic interpretation of regional development. The core example here is England, which is currently in a phase of transforming its statistical regions into political regions. This process has been stirred by the success of Wales and Scotland in positioning themselves as European regions. In the last ten years, the English statistical regions already served as domains for territorial integration of various policy areas and the implementation of European regional policy (through the so-called Government Offices). In the 1990s, the ambition rose to create a layer of regional government through the establishment of Chambers and Assemblies. As far as possible, the new regions should represent group interests and identity (Hogwood, 1996). However, so far there has been very little change to the original administrative boundaries.
Both lines of European impact, i.e. the administrative need to create a regional division to benefit from EU regional policy and the response to the strategic regional agenda, currently reverberate across Eastern Europe. In many East European countries, the post-communist transformation produced a strong incentive towards decentralization, including devolution towards regions and localities aspiring to self-governance. However, for European standards, the resulting spatial divisions were too fragmented. The spatial units were considered non-viable as sites for socio-economic development and as centres for running European programmes. Hence, the administrative context forced many countries to put local jigsaw pieces together to create regions matching the NUTS-2 requirements.

The move from a more functional to a more political-strategic interpretation raises questions about identity and local commitment. As the various steps show, there is little indication that aspects of regional identity, culture and grassroots commitment have an impact on boundary demarcation. Administrative lines and functional criteria on size and morphology continue to prevail. The question is how this affects the political-strategic ambitions that accompany processes of regionalization. Some authors are critical. Discussing the possibility of transforming the English statistical regions into political regions, John and Whitehead (1997) warn that continuing to use existing administrative boundaries might turn into a disaster, due to the lack of territorial coherence. Another recent example is the formation of new Czech regions at NUTS-2 level (Blazek, 1999). Due to the European Commission’s conditions on size, 14 aggregate regions were formed that do not reflect existing regional identities. Again, there is a fear that these territories will not be able to create any form of coherent regional governance.

Yet, as the work of Paasi quoted above already indicated, the relationship between identity and boundaries is not one-way. Territorial identities are not static givens, firmly rooted in a delineated space, but constructions that are constantly (re)produced through local as well as outside agents and groups. An important set of agents that contribute to this process are those working in administration. Parkin (1999) thus warns against the idea that the administrative sector should be conceived as outside the domain of identity construction, as an agent that should merely read off historically grown, spatially embedded identities and act upon them. On the basis of recent anthropological research, he concludes: ‘The real point from the anthropological point of view, however, is that bureaucracies are just as capable of generating meanings, identities and the symbols that support and express them as any other collectivity. Anthropologists have only recently begun to catch up with this insight, much of the progress coming from the study of European bureaucracies’ (Parkin, 1999, p. 7).

Examples of these processes can be found across Europe. Since the early 1990s, administrative regions in North and Middle England have been able to gain a reasonable level of coherence through the establishment of regional networks and programmes of regional promotion (fircou, 1998). Similar processes can be observed in ‘designer regions’ across Italy and France. Like the Czech Republic, Poland has gone through a process of moving to larger regions. This process of merger and consolidation has been accompanied by a substantial devolution of
power from the centre (Russell Barter, 2000; Parkin, 1999). Yet other countries manifest reverse processes. In the Netherlands, for instance, there have been attempts to move from the historical provincial division, which is considered obsolete and dysfunctional, to either a city-regional or a larger regional perspective. So far, this has failed primarily due to local opposition and bureaucratic obstacles (Herrschel and Newman, 2001). Similarly, Germany abounds in city-regional initiatives, with mixed results.

In summary, the practices of regionalization and boundary drawing underscore the way fuzzy notions and ambiguous stories of the region leave room for, as well as sustain, a variety of processes and projects. Across Europe, administrative processes abound in the form of top-down regionalization. These processes are sustained by a selective reading and blending of the regionalization literature, a competence particularly mastered by EU bureaucrats. In specific locations, boundaries are drawn and redrawn in a bottom-up manner in line with the `designer region' approach, generally aiming at economic competitiveness and a more coherent territorial management. In all these cases, rhetorical associations between the core themes of competitiveness, governance, sustainability and identity serve to drive and shape particular processes of region formation.

Conclusion

According to Anderson (2001), our society has managed to escape partly from the cage of territoriality. At the same time, however, the search for territorial principles and spatial fixes remains, or, like in the case of the region, tends to become more prominent. The region has emerged as a core object for spatial strategies to address a range of largely non-spatial problems, that is, as a spatial fix for wider societal problems and issues. At first sight, the idea that spatial fixes would gain in prominence in times where many challenges stem from increased mobility and globalization seems counterintuitive and paradoxical. Yet, as Anderson (2001, p. 19) argues, territorial strategies remain highly useful in an `ubiquitous', integrated modern world:

‘It is a spatial strategy which actively uses territory and borders to classify and communicate; it regulates information, symbols, resources, and people by delimiting control over territorial borders (...). Its valuable strengths are that it can greatly simplify issues of control and provide easily understood symbolic markers “on the ground”, giving relationships of power a greater tangibility and appearance of permanence.’

Framing problems and solutions in the context of regional units thus helps to pin down and anchor complex social-political processes, whether they involve economic development, social or environmental issues, policy implementation or, most significantly, their interrelationships.

Within the EU, the scope of problems with alleged regional solutions is impressive, covering, amongst others, themes of innovation, competitiveness, sustainability, transport and culture. Moreover, the role endowed to the region has moved from a largely functional-administrative to a political-strategic one. Besides
Basic administrative capacities, regions should also obtain strategic and institutional capacities. This is associated with inclusive and participatory forms of planning, and the building of democratic structures of regional governance.

Yet, when studied in more detail, these various notions and stories of the region far from create a well-defined, coherent account. On the contrary, the regional discourse is replete with fuzziness, ambiguities and contradictions. That raises the question of how, in processes of region formation and policy-making, the various stories about the region are employed. This question has been explored here in the context of EU regional policy and its impact on the drawing of regional boundaries. Two lines of inquiry were followed, namely a discursive line, yielding a general impression of how various stories about the region are juxtaposed and linked rhetorically, and an institutional line, focusing on practices of region formation in the EU.

Taken together, these lines of inquiry yield a fascinating picture of how discursive developments - in the form of the articulation of various stories of regional significance - go hand in hand with institutional developments - in the form of processes of regionalization and region formation. The terms and foci of this double process are set primarily by the political interests and ambitions of the main agents involved, such as EU policy-makers, but also depend on wider societal trends, and political and institutional conditions. A core ambition is the strengthening of economic competitiveness through the creation of regionalized governance structures. Secondary aims are captured by the notions of 'sustainability', 'participation', 'policy customization/integration' and 'identity'. The discursive analysis showed how the various 'regionalist' stories along these lines are intertwined, and how, through the use of certain discursive ploys ('quality triangle', 'inclusive planning') certain key contradictions have been rhetorically abridged. Yet, there remains sufficient fuzziness and ambiguity as to give players in the field leeway for pursuing their own strategies without running the risk that inherent contradictions are exposed. It is this balance between the appearance of coherence and synchrony on the one hand, and interpretative openness and flexibility on the other, that, together with the impressively wide range of social issues addressed (economic, social, environmental, etc.) explains the strength and performance of the regional discourse, and the actions that it underpins.

Institutional analysis, finally, draws attention to the central role that bureaucratic and administrative structures and processes play in mediating and translating, as well as shaping regional discourses, including their fuzziness. While political powers may define broad frameworks and directions of action, one should not overlook the way bureaucracies develop their own logics and scripts, and how these bear on core notions like competitiveness, sustainability and identity, including their symbolic and political values. The present transformation and eastward expansion of EU regional policy may provide an interesting case for exploring this in more detail.
Acknowledgements

This chapter has benefited from the many helpful and perceptive comments of the editors, which are gratefully acknowledged. In particular, I would like to thank Olivier Kramsch for helping to shape and improve the core argument of the chapter.

References


Blazek, J. (1999), *Regional Development and Regional Policy in CEECs in the Perspective of the EU Eastern Enlargement*, Department of social geography and regional development, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague.


Chapter 6
On Paradigms and Doctrines
The `Euroregio of Salzburg' as a Bordered Space

Peter Weichhart

Regions, Borders, and Regional Planning

While in Anglo-American geography Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration gained momentum throughout the 1980s, in German geography Benno Werlen's similar, albeit competing, programme of action-theoretical social geography received much attention (Werlen, 1987). It is particularly his conception of `everyday regionalizations' (Werlen, 1995; 1997), which conceives of regions as produced and reproduced by social practice, that I will apply in the following account. In this context, the term `regionalization' means that spatial structures are established or transformed by way of functional, symbolic, signifying, and normative attributions, as well as in the course of intentional acting. `Spatial structures' refer to the relational configuration of bodies and things (the term `spatiality' as applied by Massey, 1999, for instance). In this sense, metropolitan areas comprising a core city and a surrounding suburban area may undoubtedly be regarded as `regions'. `Social practice', which creates a bond between the various places or parts of the entire region, refers to the individual activities and social interactions of its inhabitants, which embrace the utilization of the infrastructure of both the core city and the suburban area, working and living there and participating in a set of discourses bound to that area. A feeling of `regional identity' may evolve as an outcome of these discourses.

Most of these interactive, functional, and communicative structures of everyday life, including, of course, economic interactions, expand beyond the administrative boundaries of municipalities and even beyond those territorial units of higher ranking, such as administrative districts, Ländere, or nation-states. In our times of globalization, many of these socio-economic interactions are performed at transnational or even global levels. On the other hand, however, this globalized frame is complemented by intensive interactions closely linked to the regional level (Weichhart, 2001a). Apparently, these `new regionalizations' are even enforced by processes of globalization, so that we may speak of `glocalization' (Lipietz, 1993; Swyngedouw, 1997) to characterize this two-fold focus of late-modern socio-economic practice. In pre-modern times, but also under conditions of
industrialization, such interactions were mostly restricted to the narrower boundaries of municipalities and were almost exclusively embedded within the local systems of the material and social world. Nevertheless, the emergence of networks of 'dis-embedded' global interactions does not make interactions at local or regional levels less significant, a matter which is best demonstrated in areas where the spheres of regions and territories do not coincide.

Territories may be regarded as special kinds of regions. They represent politically defined spatial entities, designed as instruments of power for political and administrative authorities to regulate and define the opportunities and degrees of freedom of social practices. They are areas marked out by specific legal regulations in force and valid norms. The course of their borders, legally defined, can be exactly mapped on a land register. Any modification of their course or their normative implications would entail costly administrative and legal procedures. Regions, on the other hand, do not have established borderlines but are characterized by ‘oscillating margins’ (Lapple, 1991), which may be subject to considerable changes over the course of time depending on variations in social practice.

In former times, and even still within a Fordist economic environment, the nation-state and its subordinate administrative and political spatial entities functioned to some degree as ‘containers’, as it were, which determined the range and opportunities of most of the social practices that could be performed within their boundaries. The transition of our socio-economic system to a post-Fordist formation, the processes of globalization, and the declining competence of nation-states have all contributed to the increasing dissolution of the former congruence of regions (qua social practices) with territories (qua spatial units of political power and legal provision).

This development has resulted in a number of severe consequences, especially for the traditional system of spatial planning. In regions, which are dissected by higher-ranking territorial boundaries, interactive social practice may be subject to restrictions or distortions. This is particularly the case in metropolitan regions where socio-economic interactions are most intense. Being part of social practice, spatial planning systems aim to provide steering strategies for coordinating the socio-economic development, land-use, and the allocation of infrastructure. The approaches envisaged are based on the territorial structures. Interactive socio-economic practice, however, which is the motor for region-building, expands beyond territorial boundaries. Hence, the territorial dissection of functional regions provokes specific spatial anomalies and the dysfunctional development of the spatial planning system, which, on the whole, is a barrier to efficient development strategies and the potentials for allocation policy. The editors of this book have coined the term ‘bordered space’ to illustrate (among others) such a situation, evident in cases where the core city of a metropolitan area is located near a high-ranking territorial border.

But there is a second problem to be considered. In Austria as well as in Germany, the system of spatial planning rests on three pillars of competency: the local level, which is the competence of the municipalities (dritZiche Planung, Gemeindeplanung), the regional level (Regionalplanung), and the Landes level (Landesplanung), which also functions as a controlling authority for local planning activities. Whereas local and Landes competencies are provided with efficient
planning tools (e.g. the zoning plan), the regional planning level lacks competence in both countries and may be best described as a 'paper tiger'. Under the legal provisions in force it is most difficult to take steering and planning decisions that require inter-communal cooperation. This turns regional planning into 'lip service' lacking in any efficient social and administrative relevance. The resulting deficiencies become particularly evident where relations between core cities and surrounding suburban municipalities are involved. To summarize: The traditional system of spatial planning in Austria and Germany has been adapted neither to the challenges of glocalization nor to the fact that nowadays structures of socio-economic practice are tied to location systems at the regional level.

The Metropolitan Region of Salzburg - A Worst-Case Scenario

As regards the bordered regions described above, the area of Greater Salzburg may be regarded as a 'worst-case scenario'. It is characterized by intensive intra-regional socio-economic interactions, including a variety of everyday regionalizations. Over the last few years, as thousands of Austrians have taken up residence in one of the adjacent Bavarian municipalities, multiple commuter interactions across the border and city of Salzburg have transformed the region into a highest-ranking central place. Placing it in terms of a spatial approach, the area represents a well-developed nodal region with the city of Salzburg as its urban core. Yet the region is sliced through, as it were, by important administrative boundaries: the international one, between the autonomous nation-states of Austria and Germany, corresponding with the border between the Ldnder of Salzburg and Bavaria, and the provincial one between the Ldnder of Salzburg and Upper Austria (Figure 6.1).

Spatial planning systems designed for steering land-use and development are strictly bound to the territorial entities of the region. For most of the other socio-economic interactions, however, the international border has ceased to be a barrier since Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995. Therefore, we are faced with exactly the problems discussed above: although the whole region is increasingly growing together, there are no adequate planning tools available to be employed for steering, coordinating and regulating processes of regionalization over the entire area.

To illustrate the dilemma, one has to bear in mind that due to territorial segmentation, the nodal region, though evidently forming a functional unit, is subject to three different planning laws and three different development plans which are incompatible as regards goals and even terminology. Even more so, they are based on incommensurable planning concepts, policies, and tools. Although there do exist a few 'soft' channels of mutual information between the planning authorities on each side of the border, the absence of a general planning concept for the entire region is only too evident (Weichhart, 2000a). This clash of planning policies is even relevant for the Austrian part of the metropolitan region. Lacking a federal planning law, spatial planning is solely the competence of the individual Ldnder, which results in nine different planning laws defining the relevant goals, tools and procedures allowed and to be observed at the diverse levels of the planning process.
Largely unhampered by superordinate regional requirements and unrestricted by planning guidelines for regional coordination, current conditions allow for the assertion of communal egotisms. Suburban municipalities reap the benefits of their location and make decisions concerning the location of new businesses, above all establishing mega-sized structures of retail trade and entertainment without considering regional necessities. Over the last decade, the sales area of suburban shopping malls and specialized shopping centres has grown four to five times the total sales area of the core city's CBD. A mega-sized cinema with nearly 2,000 seats and other entertainment facilities likewise drain consumers and purchasing power from the core city. Competition among the municipalities is enormously high, and there are no signs of cooperation, not even to some extent, with regards to locational decision-making. Each municipality aims to maximize profits by establishing new businesses for its own communal budget. Together with a financially powerful developer and a smart legal adviser, a politically powerful
mayor will be able to implement even those projects that are totally adverse to the legal guidelines and objectives of the Land's planning provisions.

The current planning system is most inflexible indeed and provides rather limited potential for coping with the recent transformation of socio-economic and spatial structures. It is constrained in particular in dealing with the fundamental changes in our land-use systems brought about by globalization and the transition to post-Fordism, both of which have had a dramatic impact on metropolitan areas. Coupled with the handicap of the border, steering and harmonizing land-use decisions in the core city and surrounding suburban municipalities represent major problems which traditional planning strategies have failed to solve. As a consequence, a ‘paradigmatic shift’ in the entire planning system would seem to be overdue.

Paradigms...

The term ‘paradigmatic shift’ provides a clue to link the problem of bordered space and the example of the metropolitan region of Greater Salzburg with a rather prominent research project at the University of Salzburg which, at first glance, seems to have nothing to do with spatial planning, regional development or ordered regions. Based on preparatory work conducted in the early 1990s (Schura and Weingartner, 1998), scientists from various disciplines, among them some philosophers specializing in the philosophy of science, elaborated a concept for an interdisciplinary Special Research Programme (`Spezialforschungsbereich', SFB). The aim of the programme was to investigate the phenomenon of pluralism in scientific disciplines (Pluralism, 2001). ‘Pluralism’ refers to the long-term coexistence of competing theories and paradigms. The initial question was posed as follows: Why hasn’t scientific evolution produced a unified theory in the non-natural sciences?

‘It is often claimed that one reason for the pluralism of theories in the area of non-natural sciences is the strong dependence of these theories on different background paradigms. Due to the normative and methodological differences between these background paradigms it seems to be impossible to achieve a unified theory’ (Pluralism, 2001, p. 7).

The project was aimed specifically at investigating opportunities for coexistence and cooperation between various theories and paradigms competing in their respective fields of research. One of our most important theses was that, compared with traditional mono-paradigmatic concepts, a multi-paradigmatic approach combining the perspectives and advantages of different paradigms would ultimately produce considerable surplus value. The idea of complementarity constituted a basic metaphor, which means that, by employing two or more paradigms related to the same field of research, deeper insight should be attained and more relevant research results achieved than by sticking to a strictly mono-paradigmatic approach (Schurz, 1998; Weichhart, 2000 b).

Aiming to confirm this thesis, an empirical example was to be drawn for each partial project, which should apply the theoretical and meta-theoretical
considerations to practise and prove their social relevance. Within project section 3, geography, we intended to set up a complex spatial development perspective for the Greater Salzburg area by applying such a multi-paradigmatic approach to solve the evident problem of borders hampering the economic development of the region. The results and proposals would then be made available to the planning authorities.

In the meantime, however, the relevant policy-makers and planning authorities of the city of Salzburg and the governments of the participating *Länder* had realized that the spatial planning system was in desperate need of basic re-orientation and revision. By the late 1990s, tensions and problems of coordination between the city of Salzburg and the surrounding suburban municipalities, as well as border-related problems, had accumulated to such a degree that the whole system of spatial planning in the region was paralyzed.

In this most critical situation, city planning authorities commissioned the author to draw up a new concept to restructure the spatial planning system of the metropolitan area of Salzburg, one which would help manage all the urgent problems of steering and coordinating the socio-economic development of the region. Special consideration would be given to border-related aspects. Actually, this was exactly the assignment we had always hoped for because we were convinced that the problems concerned could be more efficiently solved by applying a novel, multi-paradigmatic approach than by traditional concepts.

Human geography, as we all know, can be described as a real battleground of coexisting and competing paradigms. In the preparatory studies for our project we identified no less than 12 different paradigms (Arnreiter and Weichhart, 1998), some of which formed `families of paradigms' (Weichhart, 2000b). Over the last few years two more paradigms-to-be have developed in German-speaking geography. To sum up, the following paradigms coexisting in contemporary human geography have been distinguished:

- landscape geography and spatial structure analysis;
- the spatial paradigm;
- the family of emancipatory paradigms (welfare geography, radical geography, Marxist and feminist geographies);
- the family of subject-centred paradigms (behavioural geography, humanistic geography, and action-theoretical geography);
- new regional geography;
- the human ecological paradigm;
- post-structuralist geography;
- the cultural paradigm.

Within German-speaking geography, a debate on paradigms and their significance for the development of the discipline began in the late 1960s. Introduced by authors such as Bartels and Hard, the term was used to describe and explain a `neo-positivistic turn' from the classical landscape concept to the so-called `spatial approach'. A meeting of German geographers in 1969 in Kiel was regarded as symbolic for a scientific revolution taking its course completely in consistency with Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms. According to the theorem of
Incommensurability, it is only one paradigm at a time which dominates the `standard scientific phase'. In the decades leading up to the present, Kuhn's model has shaped the interpretation of the history of German geography. Even recently, some prominent authors have expressed their conviction that there exists only `one single paradigm' for geography. The obviously multi-paradigmatic structure of the discipline has thereby been widely neglected and has hardly been a subject of methodological reflection. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon geographers such as R. J. Johnston (1983) or R. Peet (1998) emphasize the co-existence of diverse and competing paradigms, regard this as a significant feature of the identity of the discipline, and highlight the diverse epistemological contexts of the various paradigms and their relationship to specific philosophies of science.

In German-speaking geography, however, methodological discussion has produced a fierce clash of arguments. Prominent supporters of the action-theoretic paradigm (Werlen, 1987, 1995, 1997), for instance, have opposed the spatial paradigm and, above all, the behavioural one - and vice versa - while analyses have been reduced to pointing out the deficiencies and weaknesses of rival paradigms and praising the benefits and strengths of one's own. Only within the last few years has discussion turned towards a more objective and detailed analysis of the deep-structures of competing paradigms and their implications for geographical research and practice (Blotevogel, 2000; Weichhart, 2000b).

In contrast to mainstream discussions within German-speaking geography, our project aimed to conceive of competing paradigms not as rivals or `enemies', as it were, but rather as complementors that initiate and foster cooperation in spite of competition (Brandenburger and Nalebuf, 1996). We were convinced that prospects for successfully drawing up a new concept for the spatial planning system in the bordered region of Greater Salzburg would improve considerably by pursuing the combined and complementary application of several paradigms. Some of the paradigms mentioned above seemed most appropriate to be utilized for such a cooperative approach.

... and Doctrines

In planning theory, the term `paradigm' is employed in a rather vague sense denoting a `general way of orientation' or `Weltsicht' and lacking any specific and strictly theory-based discussion of the term or its implications. In some general references the term is used to describe a conceptual revolution (in the sense of Kuhn), mostly relating to the differences between the approaches of `planning from above' and `planning from below'. The former (more traditional) concept may be characterized as a bureaucratic, technocratic, and hierarchic top-down system, relying on 'experts' to define the objectives of the planning process. The analytical part of planning is based on the `spatial approach', the paradigm of `spatial structures' as developed in geography and regional science and - in some parts - on the classical landscape paradigm. In contrast, the paradigm of `planning from below' aims to realize a `bottom-up concept', in which the `imperts' (the local protagonists) play an important part in defining the goals of development. It is a more democratic, process-oriented and flexible approach, which is also labelled as 'planning by participation'. The first concept is primarily based on legal
regulations (‘planning by regulation’) and depends on strict ruling by authorities, allowing or forbidding specific forms of land-use. The second principle focuses on binding contracts between the diverse players in the planning process, stresses the autochthonous potential of local and regional human capital and is based on the concept of active ‘spatial development planning’.

There are only a few authors in the field of planning theory who explicitly deal with issues of ‘planning paradigms’. Some of them, above all Faludi (1989, 1999), Alexander and Faludi (1996) or Needham (1996), have coined and elaborated the concept of ‘planning doctrine’, which, in our opinion, is quite appropriate for discussing some specific features of the development of paradigms in applied technical disciplines.

‘Planning doctrine’ is defined as a conceptual scheme which is employed by a planning subject ‘... to integrate and express its ideas about the planning and development of a spatially defined area’ (Alexander and Faludi, 1996: 13). The term designates all the concepts, goals, spatial models, methods and processes which form the basis of inter-subjective consensus between the relevant players in a planning system. Above all, planning doctrine defines the planning area of and the players involved in the planning process and, as a third element, includes the planning period. ‘The existence of a planning doctrine as a "policy paradigm" has some similar effects on planning to those of a scientific paradigm on a scientific discipline. It is the scientific community's agreement on a common paradigm which makes normal puzzle-solving science possible and gives such scientific research the convergence that makes science successful’ (Alexander and Faludi, 1996).

Apart from those elements which constitute a paradigm, a planning doctrine also includes the three aspects mentioned above, which may be summarized as its ‘design-related component’ (Neustatter, 2002). Just like a paradigm, a planning doctrine consists of a theoretical core specifying principles of spatial organization and metaphors (Faludi, 1999: 331). These metaphors are very important as they function as condensed images reflecting principles of spatial organization which seem appropriate to achieve and preserve specific societal goals. They serve as a ‘frame of reference’ (Alexander and Faludi, 1996: 28) by including paradigmatic examples for application, methodological components, epistemological assumptions and value statements as well as methodological norms and - most important - programmatic components: ‘planning doctrine becomes a vehicle for developing a community's consensus on the planning area's future development and the way in which the problems involved should be handled’ (Alexander and Faludi, 1996: 16).

To deal with the specific problems of the Greater Salzburg bordered region, a mere modification or adaptation of the existing planning system seemed neither sufficient nor appropriate. It was clear that only a fundamental and radical change, implied by the development of a totally new planning doctrine, could offer the opportunity to come to terms with the current socio-economic upheaval.
The Problems of the Greater Salzburg Region from a Multi-paradigmatic Perspective

The fundamental problem of the planning system of the Salzburg Metropolitan Area is that the main players in the planning process as well as in the planning area do not correspond with actual processes of spatial development and region-building. As discussed above, the main reasons for this incongruence arise from the existence and the effects of territorial borders. The impeding effect of territorial borders in the Salzburg Metropolitan Area intersects with a growing awareness of border regions and cross-border developments elsewhere in the European Union.

To prove the necessity of a fundamental revision of the planning system, it was essential to prepare a profound analysis of the current situation. This was achieved through an in-depth investigation of the regional structure exceeding the traditional methods of regional science and by employing a multi-paradigmatic approach. As already mentioned, traditional analyses and planning procedures primarily rely on the spatial approach and the paradigm of spatial structures to identify the actual situation and dynamics of development in a specific planning area. From our point of view, such an approach does not sufficiently consider the specific problems of a core town and its surrounding area resulting from their location on national borders. Complementing traditional approaches, and based on the behavioural and action-theoretical paradigms as well as the paradigm of new regional geography, analyses were performed which are not customary in traditional planning practice.

By applying the behavioural paradigm we succeeded in demonstrating that one of the major problems of the planning system arises from the fact that the functional region of the Metropolitan Area does not coincide with the ‘region perceived’. In other words: The mental maps of the area in the heads of the population and policy-makers do not include the pattern of cross-border spatial structures. Regional identity does not embrace the entire nodal region because discourses inducing the development of space-related identities still refer only to parts of the region. When mentioned in the mass media, for instance, the term ‘central Salzburg region’ is applied exclusively to regions in the Land of Salzburg, even though the peripheries of Upper Austria situated to the north and east of Salzburg as well as adjacent Bavarian municipalities are functionally linked to the high-ranking centre of Salzburg and therefore must be included.

As a consequence; the protagonists and policy-makers of the region have not yet become aware of the functional cohesion and the mutual complementarity of location structures. The relationship between core city and surrounding suburban municipalities, above all, is highly charged by mutual accusations and jealous competition. The regional name ‘Flachgau’, which in former times referred to the entire Salzburg basin and the lake area, has been turned into a ‘battle cry’, as it were, of regional policy characterizing the suburban municipalities’ opposition to the core city. This manner of speech implies that the city of Salzburg itself, though located in the centre of the Flachgau, is not a part of the Flachgau region.

The population and political decision-makers seem unaware of the fact that the growing importance of the surrounding municipalities actually represents a ‘gift’, as it were, of the core city and that the core city’s development depends on its ‘hinterland’, its population, their purchasing power and the location potentials of suburban municipalities (including those situated beyond territorial boundaries).
Regional protagonists do not appear sensitive to the fact that they are all in the same boat, and that the thriving development of the entire nodal region depends on intra-regional cooperation.

The action-theoretical paradigm was an efficient tool to identify the relevant protagonists in the spatial development system and to apply the action-theoretical definition of ‘region’ mentioned in the introduction. Based on the paradigm of the new regional geography and some of its theoretical propositions, the metropolitan area was described as a hybrid system of economic and socio-cultural practices (Weichhart, 2000a; 2001a).

Analyses conducted provided twofold evidence. On the one hand it turned out that the entire nodal region provides a large variety of complementary locations, particularly with respect to soft location factors that are of growing importance. On both sides of the border there is a complementary supply of leisure, cultural, educational and health facilities, which substantially raise the competitive position of the entire region. The worldwide image of the city of Salzburg as a top-ranking place of cultural interest, the population’s high level of education, high environmental and living qualities and differentiated trade supply - all these assets constitute extraordinary elements for attracting movable production factors. The areas located beyond the borders provide important complementary functions because the Salzburg portion of the nodal region lacks wider joint spaces for industrial development, whereas the Bavarian and Upper Austrian parts offer sufficient possibilities for enlargement.

It has to be noted that the entire region also profits from border-specific benefits which have been induced by ongoing differences between its parts. Along both sides of the national border, a location-specific supply chain has developed in which each portion is capitalized upon by the other side. Salzburg and Upper Austrian consumers, for instance, appreciate the lower prices of music CDs, while Bavarians, on the other hand, value the choice and prices of bio-farming products. Considering items such as these, a bordered region may succeed in attaining a higher diversity of soft location factors than similar nodal regions without any high-ranking territorial borders.

On the other hand, analysis has made it plain that possible assets in competition and location can only become effective and be utilized in a sustainable way if a strategy is pursued that will successfully coordinate and optimize not only the location and land-use systems on both sides of the border but also the balance of tasks between core city and suburban municipalities. The potentially competitive assets of the entire region, based on the overall structure of immovable location factors complementing each other, can be safeguarded and undergo further development solely on the grounds of development and location policies that consider the region as a whole.

The comprehensive interpretation of our empirical findings, which could only be achieved by employing a multi-paradigmatic approach, supplied us with the arguments and grounds to propose a completely new planning doctrine for the entire metropolitan region.
Proposals for a New Planning Doctrine - The Concept of the `Euroregio Salzburg'

The planning doctrine, which forms the backbone of the region's traditional planning system, is, of course, neither formulated as such nor laid down in any legal text or `official' document of the planning authorities. It can, however, be deduced and reconstructed from the context of administrative practice and the contents of these documents. The traditional planning doctrine may be characterized by the following features:

• Spatial planning has to focus primarily on regulating policy.
• Spatial planning is exclusively a task of the competent authorities to be performed within their sovereign duties. Accordingly, spatial planning is in the competence of the Länder, municipalities and the relevant planning authorities.
• Planning regions are defined by territorial boundaries, which means that the territorial range of competencies is bound to the national and provincial borders.
• Spatial planning is restricted to measures of spatial relevance; spatial planning and economic or social planning refer to different working fields which are clearly to be held apart.
• Spatial planning shall employ only those procedures and tools which are provided for and defined by relevant laws; accomplishment of planning goals is to be ensured by appropriate legal provisions.
• Spatial planning represents administrative action; the rationality of the planning process is primarily defined by judicial argumentation.

Planning doctrine includes, above all, the definition and conception of the planning subject and the definition of the planning area. The planning doctrine for the Greater Salzburg area currently employed assumes that, according to present territorial structures, there exist three different planning subjects, which are authorized to undertake autonomous decision-making within their respective areas. Accordingly, these diverse and autonomous planning areas are to undergo independent and individual coordination and development. Within the framework of such a doctrine, a uniform, interregional planning concept must be rated as totally absurd and unrealistic. The concept of current planning doctrine complies with the laws in force and with the current self-interpretation of the planning authorities - yet it utterly ignores the needs of interregional planning.

The question arises what a planning doctrine would look like whose consequences and implications are appropriate to redress the planning deficiencies and solve the problems of a bordered region. In a joint recommendation of the Akademie für Raumforschung and Landesplanung (ARL) and the Deutsche Akademie für Stadtbau und Landesplanung (DASL; Regionale Verwaltungs- and Planungsstrukturen, 1998), representing the leading planning institutions in the German-speaking area, the basic structure of a regional planning scheme was outlined which, under post-Fordist conditions of globalization and regionalization, seemed appropriate for solving the steering problems of core cities and their surrounding areas. Implementing these recommendations in the Greater Salzburg
area would imply that the planning doctrine as framework would have to include the following minimum normative elements:

- Apart from mere planning policy, spatial planning has to pursue, above all, a course of development policy.
- Spatial planning requires cooperation of all the protagonists involved in location decision-making or those being affected by them.
- Accordingly, spatial planning is not only a matter of administrative activity to be performed by planning authorities but is to be implemented in cooperation with all social forces.
- Planning regions must be defined by functional boundaries which should relate to the range of those interactions resulting from current socio-economic practice.
- Spatial planning must focus on all segments of the regional economy and, hence, must include social, economic and environmental policies.
- Spatial planning must employ all procedures and tools that, by observing the requirements of modern marketing and management, foster the development of regional economic power and quality of life; achievement of planning goals is to be supported by employing appropriate measures, preferably by drawing up civil law contracts.
- Spatial planning involves location management; the rationality of the planning process is primarily determined by subject-related arguments.

There are various possibilities for implementing such an alternative planning doctrine (Weichhart, 2000a; 2000c; 2001b). Since, according to current legal provisions, the planning process is always organized on the basis of territorial entities (be they municipalities, Länder or states), the new organizational structure demanded can be realized only on the grounds of a cross-border association of municipalities that comprises the entire metropolitan region. Given a future spatial expansion of socio-economic relations, this association can be enlarged by new member municipalities.

To begin with, and to raise public awareness as well as to eventually create a regional identity, it will be essential to find a name for the entire metropolitan region and to establish it within public discourse. The author has suggested ‘Europaregion Salzburg’ (‘Europregio Salzburg’; Weichhart, 2000a). A crucial element for re-structuring the planning system is to be found in establishing an independent cross-border planning institution, which could be set up as an operational body of the association of municipalities of the ‘Europregio Salzburg’. This institution should then act as a planning authority competent for the coordination and development of location structures in the entire nodal region. As a kind of umbrella organization, this institution should hold minimum competencies, as follows:

- to be responsible for general strategic planning;
- to draw up a binding regional development plan;
- to coordinate all regionally relevant planning;
- to steer and control the implementation of planning;
- to control and harmonize communal planning as regards all-regional effects;
On Paradigms and Doctrines

- to safeguard regional interests against policies at European, national and communal levels;
- to ensure financial equalization between the parts of the region.

To ensure the democratic functioning of the model, a regional assembly should be established representing the strategic or ‘political’ complement of the umbrella organization, the latter working at a more operative level. The regional assembly should include the socially relevant forces of the entire region and function as a *regional parliament*. This body would have the task of enforcing the definition of guiding principles and implementation of development goals while providing for their democratic legitimacy. At its very core it should serve to establish the region as a ‘political subject’ and set actions as a body competent for regional policy (Weichhart, 2001c).

To implement these proposals it is suggested to make use of a cross-border regional cooperative structure which, existing since 1995, covers nearly the entire current nodal region: the EuRegio Salzburg - Berchtesgadener Land - Traunstein. For this purpose, however, the EuRegio would have to be further developed, in both area and organization. In addition to extending over the entire area of the nodal region - which would have to include bordering Upper Austrian municipalities - it would be of utmost importance to include all relevant social forces and associations of interests on the steering committee.

Such a construction was established for the metropolitan region of Stuttgart, Germany, a few years ago and has been working most efficiently. A powerful association of municipalities performs the tasks of regional planning, while a regional parliament makes normative decisions regarding the contents of the regional plan. With respect to the cross-border European Region of Salzburg, a steering body must be erected which, as an anti-pole, is able to cope with the egotisms of the individual municipalities and coordinate the interests of the region.

So we may proceed to a final conclusion. The basic key to solving problems in bordered regions must be seen in the political system and administrative law. The dynamics of globalization and the complementary processes of regional development and European integration resemble processes that evolve without any consideration for existing territorial structures. Bordered regions such as the Greater Salzburg area will only succeed in gaining a position in interregional competition if cross-border structures are established that assume planning and management responsibilities for the entire area of the interconnected region. Such projects, however, will only have a real chance if established as political subjects and if political power is transferred to institutions having the organization and functions of regional parliaments.

**Acknowledgement**

The presented paper was elaborated within project section 3, Geography, of the Special Research Programme F012 (“Pluralism of Theories and Paradigms within and among Sciences: Rivalry, or Exclusion, or Cooperation”) at the University of Salzburg, which was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). The author also thanks the relevant
authorities of the city of Salzburg for giving financial support to a project which aimed to apply our theoretical considerations to spatial planning practice.

Notes

1 'Non-natural' refers to all scientific disciplines with the exception of the `classical' ones of physics, chemistry, and biology, where pluralism in theories and paradigms is less obvious.

2 Unfortunately, and for reasons that cannot be discussed here, the project was not extended by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) after the first three-year programming period.

3 In English-speaking geography we may identify a further paradigm which is based on the epistemological concept of critical realism.

4 For further information on this paradigm, which has become relevant in German-speaking geography only recently, see Gelbmann and Mandl, 2002, and their analysis based on the concepts and tools of the Salzburg SFB.


References


Chapter 7

Borderline Communities
Canadian Single Industry Towns, Staples, and Harold Innis

Trevor Barnes

Introduction

Unlike other contributors to this volume, I am less concerned with international borders, than intra-national ones. In particular, I am interested in communities and regional boundaries within resource-producing economies such as the one in which I live, British Columbia (BC), Canada. Resource economies, and their peculiar geography, are not a central concern of contemporary geography, however. Both are treated as peripheral to more important activities such as manufacturing or high-order service provision, and their associated geographical cores such as Orange County, CA, or world cities such as London. The derogation of resource economies, though, apart from being geographically blinkered is theoretically myopic, closing off the possibility that theories derived from experiences of peripheral places like resource regions have wider purchase. This is the entry point for my chapter. I will argue that a theorist of the spatial resource periphery, the Canadian economic historian Harold Innis (1894-1952), provides a suggestive theory of geographical boundaries and related community life with a resonance beyond the immediate context of its formulation.

Innis's theory is contained within his staples model. That model says that Canada's economic history and geography are fundamentally shaped by the export to metropolitan powers of a series of raw or semi-processed natural resources - staples - such as fur, fish and forest products. Staple commodities not only directly leave their mark on the communities in which they are produced, the single industry resource towns that litter the Canadian landscape, but have a wider national import, demarking internal geographical boundaries, and defining the temporal rhythms and disjunctives of the nation's socio-economic life. The purpose of this paper is to use Innis's staples model to discuss the relationship among single industry communities, geographical boundaries, and interrupted socio-economic rhythms within Canada, and in particular BC.

To undertake this task I use the term 'borderline communities', which is useful for two reasons. First, it connotes the idea that communities are a bridge, or a link, as in communities on an international border connecting different national spaces.
In Innis's staples theory, as I will argue, staples goods have buried with them particular spatialities and temporalities that are realized when they are extracted and sold. Single industry towns that specialize in such staples are thus at the interface of those geographies and histories. They are borderline communities connected to the spatial and temporal relations produced by the staples on which they depend. Second, precisely because of this borderline status, single industry towns are borderline in a second sense. The confluence of these different geographies and histories makes single industry communities notoriously unstable, acutely sensitive to change. They are liminal communities, drawn faintly, and with the continual prospect of permanent erasure (and represented by the hundreds of ghost towns scattered among Canada's resource margins).

The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I discuss Innis's staples thesis and his argument about the production of space and time, and the consequences for Canada, and its borderline communities. Second, I provide a set of illustrations drawn from the recent history of British Columbia's forest industry, and the single industry towns that are at its core.

Innis, Staples, Space, and Time

Innis, Colonialism, and Staples Theory

Perhaps the most important fact about Harold Innis is that he was a colonial intellectual, constantly struggling to overthrow the yoke of European habits of mind in order to present a made-in-Canada interpretation of his country's history and development. Teaching at the University of Toronto from 1920 until his death in 1952, he constantly tried to break out of the rut of colonial thinking, and to think new thoughts relevant to his own time and place. Hence, his cryptic writing style, his neologisms, and extravagant metaphors. They all represented strategies to resist and replace 'the dominant and myopic paradigms in research set by metropolitan institutions and intellectuals' (Watson, 1977).

From the beginning, Innis was especially keen to resist and replace the colonial economic interpretation of Canada couched in terms of orthodox trade theory. That theory, known as the theory of comparative advantage, and first proposed by the English economist David Ricardo, said that Canada specialized and traded in staples because it was in such commodities that the country possessed an economic advantage. Under this theory, because Canada could produce resources like fur, fish and forests comparatively more cheaply than manufactured goods, while in Britain's case the comparative cost ratios were reversed, the greatest gains to trade would derive from Canada specializing in staples and Britain in industrial goods. For Innis, though, such reasoning was wrong-headed. Innis thought Ricardo's theory not only represented the foisting of a colonial self-justificatory intellectual scheme on its ex-colony - Canadian economists were almost unanimous in espousing it - but the particular international division of labour it prescribed maintained exactly the old asymmetric colonial relation of trade. As Innis wrote, by accepting Ricardian trade theory, 'Canadians are obliged to fit their analysis of new economic facts into an old background. The handicaps of this process are
obvious, resulting in a new form of exploitation with dangerous consequences' (Innis, 1956).

Innis's response to that exploitation was to develop staples theory, which was his made-in-Canada alternative to orthodoxy (Barnes, 1996a). In contrast to orthodox trade theory, Innis argued that there were no advantages, comparative or otherwise, to specializing in staples. Staples production resulted in only halting and incomplete development, ensnaring regions and nations in a `staples trap'. The result, to use Innis's terminology, is that staples-producing regions and nations became dependent on more powerful foreign metropoles, and consequently remained on the global economic margin.

At the basis of Innis's alternative staples model is a cyclonic metaphor. Staples-producing areas are `storm centres to the modern international economy' as he put it (quoted in Stamps, 1995). Here, cyclonics is used by him as one of those `extravagant metaphors' to break free of colonial orthodoxy. The Ricardian static, equilibrium model of comparative advantage with its connotation of mutual beneficence could hardly be more different than Innis's cyclonic model based on dynamic change, instability, and the potential for tumult and destruction!

In particular, Innis uses the meteorological metaphor to represent both the whirlwind ferocity of capitalist accumulation at resource sites, and the equally ferocious decline and destruction that follows. Because the metropoles of capitalism require a continual source of raw materials, there is an incessant search for new and profitable sources of raw materials. Blowing across the economic landscape, global-cyclonic winds touch down at a few sites - single industry towns - to create in a burst of frenetic energy the infrastructure and wherewithal of resource production. But as implied by the central metaphor, stability is always precarious and temporary, and sooner rather than later, `all that is solid melts into air'. That is, when times turn bad for staples-producing regions, they are horrid.

Because of, say, resource depletion and poor markets, or changes in technology affecting demand and the production process itself, or institutional changes around resource firms as they are taken over and rationalized, or workers who resist changes at the work place and go on strike, single industry towns begin to waver. Over time, wavering becomes lurching as towns plunge from one crisis to another, sometimes barely surviving, and sometimes not surviving at all. Concomitantly there is massive disruption of peoples' lives and livelihoods. The very worst face of resource dependency is revealed as the cyclone turns destructive: mills and mines are shut down, workers are laid off, businesses go belly up, home mortgages are foreclosed, families break up, and local governance is turned upside down (specific empirical forms and examples of this process are discussed below). Single industry towns become borderline communities in the second sense that I defined it.

Space and Time

But to understand how such borderline status occurs, it is necessary to push the inquiry back yet farther, and to examine how staples production generates the spatial and temporal relations that at different times are either so creative or so destructive to communities. Again, the contrast between Innisian cyclonics and Ricardian trade theory could not be starker. In the theory of comparative advantage,
space and time disappear. There, trading countries are portrayed as existing both on
the head of pin in a 'wonderland of no dimensions' (Isard, 1956), and in
equilibrium, which as even the Nobelpize-winning economist John Hicks (1976)
admits, 'signal[s] that time, in some respect, has been put to one side'. In contrast,
for Innis events are always in space and in time; they are magnitudes intrinsic to
the very process of staples production, and the creation of borderline communities.

Innis's most systematic discussions of space and time are found in his later
work on communications (Carey, 1967, 1975). Innis argued there that
technological media as diverse as papyrus scrolls, printed books, and the telephone
and radio, are associated with particular kinds of 'space-time biases'. That is, such
media tend to favour one or the other dimension. The telephone and radio, for
example, are biased towards space in that they are designed to break down
geographical barriers of distance.

A version of space-time bias, I would argue, is also found in Innis's earlier
work on staples. Rather than applying to media technologies, however, it adheres
to staples themselves. Innis assumes that each staple embodies a set of spatial and
temporal imperatives ('space-time biases') that are then manifest once staples
extraction and trade begin. A useful analogy, perhaps, is with Marx's idea of
commodity fetishism. For Marx a commodity is not just a material good bought
and sold, but contains within it a set of social relations that while hidden are
fundamental to its constitution. For Marx, those social relations must be
uncovered and recognized if the commodity is to be understood. The same holds
for Innis and his analysis of staples goods. Treating the staple as only a natural
resource covers up all the interesting spatial and temporal relations submerged
within it, making it what it is. Innis's project is to recoup those relations. Just as
Marx pulls away the veil of the commodity to expose its social constituents, Innis
carries out the same manoeuvre to uncover the multifarious and twisted threads of
its far-reaching geography and history.

Let me elaborate more precisely the nature of those spatial and temporal biases.
For it is here that the other meaning of borderline communities I discussed above
is apparent; that is, as a connecting point linking different kinds of geographies
and histories. Each staple brings with it its own spatial and temporal biases, and
the single industry towns that are associated with its extraction are therefore
necessarily connected to, and consequently affected by, those biases and the
particular kinds of geographies and histories they imply.

First, there is spatial bias, by which I mean the geographical relations enfolded
within particular staples, and that are both local and extra-local. By local, I mean
the geographical relations adhering within the immediate environment in which the
extraction of the staple occurs. For example, the cod fishery of Newfoundland is
associated with a set of decentralized resource sites along its west coast - the
'outport' fishing villages, while potash mining in Saskatchewan or coal mining in
British Columbia are confined to a more limited number of mining locations.
These local geographical relationships, in turn, help mark wider geographical
boundaries. Jane Brodie (1989, p. 144) makes a similar point:

'Canadian history can be represented as a series of transparencies, each
representing a different matrix of economic growth and political organization,
laid on geographical space on top of one another. Each staple leads to different
geographical configurations that [are] unstable across time. Boundaries, whether national or regional, are not "in the land" but rather tied to the pattern of staples exploitation.'

The point is that the local spatial bias of each staple defines particular regional boundaries, which in Canada are well known: fishing in the maritime provinces, mining on the Canadian Shield, agriculture in the Prairies, oil and gas in Alberta, and forestry in British Columbia. But as Brodie implies with her transparency metaphor, there are continual shifts propelled by the changing spatial biases of staples goods themselves. Regional boundaries are continually redrawn because of the instability of the staple itself, and concomitant local environmental geography. For example, the exhaustion of cod stocks off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland redraws the regional boundary of fishing, making the province's outports very different communities now that "King Cod" is no more. Or again, in British Columbia, as old growth forests are cut to stumps on the Coast, the regional boundaries of forestry are redrawn (see Hayter, 2003), with old forest towns becoming retirement centres or sites of eco-tourism rather than locations for the mill. As staples fail, that is as implicit local spatial biases are realized, traditional internal regional borders and the communities found within them unravel.

By extra-local I mean the spatial relations inherent in staples goods that bear on both the markets in which they are sold, and the organization of firms that carry out production, and which in both cases are frequently international and far-flung. Single industry towns, then, are not only dependent on a set of immediate local geographical relations around the extraction of the staple itself, but also a set of often global relations around markets and firm ownership. As these extra-local relations change, just as is the case for local relations, the consequences for single industry towns can be profound. For example, in May 2002, the United States began levying a 27 percent import duty on Canadian softwood lumber, which hitherto represented the largest market for that staple good. British Columbia's sawmilling towns, of which there are over a hundred, were devastated as this extra local market relation was severely hampered by the trade levy. Or another example, when MacMillan Bloedel, the largest BC-owned forest production corporation was taken over by Weyerhaeuser, based in Tacoma, WA, in 1999, the White Pine sawmill plant in Vancouver was shut down within a year as part of a wider scheme of corporate rationalization. Again, the change in extra-local geographical relationships, extra-local spatial biases, brought about by alterations in distant corporate ownership, produces fundamental changes at the site of staples production.

Locked within the staples commodity, then, are a set of local and extra-local relations, spatial biases that are realized through extraction and export. But those relations by their very nature are fragile, subject to change, and as they do, single industry communities which are the lynch pin at the centre of those biases take the full brunt of the consequences.

Second, by temporal bias I mean the temporal rhythms built into the production and marketing of staples goods. The general nature of that bias should be clear from Innis's central metaphor of the cyclone with its implications of speed, instability, energy, and unpredictability. For Innis, staples carry with them
the seeds of their own temporal instability and disequilibria, their time bias. In particular, volatility stems from:

- Price fluctuations, a result of the high demand elasticity for primary goods and the competitive markets in which they are sold (Barnes, 1996b).
- Physical environmental factors bound to the resource cycle that moves at variable pace from initial exploitation to exhaustion depending upon the particular staple (Clapp, 1998).
- Changing production technology, because it affects both demand for the staple, as well as its ability to be extracted.
- Frequent unused capacity, a result of large sunk costs of production associated with staples that periodically dampens profits producing cyclical disinvestments (Spry, 1981).
- Varying transportation routes and technology, because staples are typically bulky, often inaccessible, and require transportation from where they are extracted.
- Shifting institutional structures and regulations, because, as Innis made clear, given the large overhead costs usually associated with staple production, only particular kinds of institutional and regulatory arrangements are possible.

The argument is that as these factors change, that is, as temporal biases are realized, which inevitably they must be, so the rhythms of production and marketing are punctuated and disturbed, producing instability. Existing resource sites close down, and new sites open up. But the transition is not easy. As Innis, (1950) writes: `Each staple in its turn leaves its stamp, and the shift to new staples invariably produce[s] periods of crises in which adjustments in the old structure [are] painfully made and a new pattern created in relation to a new staple.' The important point is that such `painful' pulses of changes are inherent within the very structure of Canadian staples and the temporal biases that they contain.

In sum, for Innis the cyclonic nature of staples production in Canada is consequence of the time-space biases that inhere within staples goods. There are certainly periods of stability in specific places when those biases are constrained, w illustrated in the next section. But it is never permanent. Destruction and bedlam are always waiting in the wings as space and time turn nasty, making borderline communities truly borderline.

**Stormy Weather in British Columbia: Cyclones, Staples, and Single Industry Towns**

The history of British Columbia since the first sustained European settlement in the middle of the 19th century is of one economic storm after another that both creates and destroys. Vancouver, for the most part, served as a local metropole, but it too periodically caught the edges of the various economic gales that ripped through the province. BC’s single industry towns are at the centre of those storms. Because of the diversity of resources found in the province, the single industry towns have taken various forms each associated with a different staple: around
fishing, such as in Prince Rupert on BC's central coast, around mining and smelting such as in Trail in the province's southern interior, around natural oil and gas such as in Fort Nelson in north-east BC, around fruit and market gardening such as in the Mediterranean-like Southern Okanagan Valley around Osoyoos, and most spectacularly around the forest products industry, found in different forms throughout the whole province (Marchak, 1983; Hayter, 2000). The result is that on a per capita basis, BC leads the nation in the number of singleindustry towns (Bradbury, 1987; Randall and Ironside, 1996).

Specifically, the prominence of forestry-based resource communities in British Columbia represents the historical culmination of a 300-year process that first systematically began in Canada's eastern Maritime Provinces (Lower, 1938). Commercial exploitation of forestry finally arrived in British Columbia in the middle of the 19th century. That date is also the beginning of forest-based single industry towns, the principal borderline communities in the province, on which I will focus in the remainder of this section.

**Rise and Climb**

The first systematic forest-based activity in British Columbia is associated with the sawmills, and found either on the mainland around Vancouver, or on Vancouver Island at such places as Victoria, Port Alberni, and Chemainus.
While cyclonic processes were certainly at work in their formation and subsequent spasmodic development through the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century, I want to focus on the period immediately after the Second World War. For it is only then that the full storm of resource development occurs within BC's forest economy, which includes not only coastal sites but also the entire province. During this post-war period, which I will call Fordist, tremendous amounts of public and private capital reshape British Columbia's landscape of single industry towns that now run the length and breadth of the province. It also provides for an expanding and prosperous economy that lasts until about 1980, at which point the forest industry in British Columbia and affiliated communities turns borderline.

In part, the prosperity lasts so long because the resource exploitation is associated with a wider set of institutional changes that help at least temporarily to manage and control spatial and temporal biases. Up until 1945, the forest economy on the Coast is unstable, with those biases out of control, and consequently producing forest communities that are sporadic, sometimes transient, and subject to constant vicissitudes. But after this date, a coalition of large institutional interests emerges that collectively, at least for a period, restrains and controls those biases, and in the process expands resource production geographically. Those institutions are the state, private capital, and organized labour.

The local state is the most important. First, it systematically organizes the forest resources that are primarily owned (more than 90 percent) by the state itself. Upholding the principle of 'sustainable yield' (no more trees should be cut down over a five-year average than are either replanted or regenerated naturally), the province is divided into tree farm licence areas on which private companies bid for the right to harvest, and for which they pay the province a resource royalty known as 'stumpage'. In this way, the state ensures an ordered use of the forest stock, in effect controlling and managing local spatial bias. Through regulation, the resource is preserved rather than 'liquefied' as occurred earlier. Second, the state systematically organizes the infrastructure necessary for comprehensive staples development. It provides sufficient power generation for staples operations (from hydroelectric plants on dams constructed on the Peace and Columbia rivers during the 1950s and 1960s), transportation (road and railway construction), and underwrites new single industry towns themselves (embodied in the 1965 New Towns Act). Finally, it offers inducements both to capital and labour to participate in a controlled form of staple exploitation. To capital, it offers subsidized production both through the provision of physical infrastructure and low resource rents (stumpage rates). And to labour it offers various forms of welfare payments that provide a safety net for workers allowing them to stay in single industry towns even after they are laid off during one of the vicissitudes. By controlling local resource use and the means of its extraction, as well as offsetting some of the malicious effects of instability, the state is able to neutralize some of the space-time biases inherent with staple production, making borderline communities, at least for a period, less borderline.

Capital is primarily in the form of large multinational corporations, frequently foreign owned, which become a presence in BC forestry from the late 1940s. Represented by such firms as Weyerhaeuser, Scott Paper, Crown Zellerbach, and BC's own multinational corporation, MacMillan Bloedel, they invest large sums
of private capital to transform the hitherto small-scale forest operations scattered along the BC Coast into a systematic, Fordist, capital-intensive, province-wide, forest-products industry. In addition, this particular form of industrial organization is favoured and encouraged by the state through a tree farm licence scheme that gives preference to firms with long-time horizons, and proven durability, that is, the multinational corporations. The point here is that this form of industrial organization, at least in theory, is most able to deal with the space-time biases of staples. Size matters. Big, financially secure resource firms, such as those that operated in BC, are less sensitive to cyclonic forces, and with the assistance of the state, they are partly able to control the instability stemming from space-time biases, for example, from long-distance markets or from unused capacity.

Finally, the two largest unions in the forest industry represent organized labour: the International Woodworkers of America and the Canadian Paperworkers Union. They, too, support a corporate form of industrial organization, with its robustness and financial stability. In particular, the two unions make the same wage bargain with corporate capital that is forged throughout Fordism; that is, sacrificing control over work for guaranteed increasing incomes. Both sawmills and pulp and paper mills throughout the province are run along Taylorist labour principles in which desklled workers engage only in execution and not conception as they mass-produce standardized products using capital-intensive, assembly-line techniques. But the financial rewards are high. As Marshall and Tucker (1992) put it: `workers with no more than an eighth grade education and little in the way of technical skills could end up with pay checks that enabled them to have two cars, a vacation cottage as well as a principal residence and maybe a boat for fishing and water-skiiing. The system worked for everyone.' Of course, it doesn't really work for everyone. Beneficiaries are overwhelmingly male unionized workers. Women rarely work in the mills (for an exception see Egan and Klausen, 1998), and First Nations Peoples, whose forested land the Crown expropriated in the 19th century without negotiating land treaties, are mostly excluded. That said, the rewards to those male workers who have unionized jobs in single industry towns are large.

A useful example is Port Alberni, one of the oldest single industry towns in British Columbia, first settled in 1861, and which in that same year established its first sawmill. The history of the mill up to the mid 1930s is marked by discontinuities - interrupted production and changes in ownership - brought about by the realization of the space-time biases discussed above: fluctuations in markets, shortages of the resource, price volatility, over capacity, inadequate institutional forms to provide finance, and so on. After that date, though, stability emerges as two firms, McMillan Export Co. and Bloedel, Stewart and Welch take over both sawmilling and pulp and paper operations in the town. In 1951, they join to form BC's first corporate giant, MacMillan Bloedel, that over the next decade massively invests in the town. By 1960, Port Alberni is the largest, most diversified, and lowest-cost site for wood processing in the province (Hardwick, 1964). By 1975, its per capita income is the third highest in Canada for the town's population class. At least some of its population achieve the good life imagined by Marshall and Tucker, and rather than a borderline community, some commentators speak of urban maturity, and coming of age-(Lucas, 1971).

But of course it couldn't last, and not only in Port Alberni, but right across the single industry towns of the province. From around 1980, the cyclonic forces kept
in check during the Fordist period return. The space-time biases that were formerly disciplined and organized slip the net of control, creating tumult as borderline communities emerge once more. As they do so, the institutions and social relations that produced stability among BC resource towns, including in Port Alberni, give way as the cyclone of staples dependency turns first inclement, and then downright mean.

**Decline and Fall**

As Innis theorized, lying behind these destructive forces were alterations in spacetime biases. First, there were those around markets and competition. There was both a geographical shift towards Asian markets and away from American (Hayter and Edgington, 1997), and an alteration in the type of products demanded. In both cases, this required a fundamental restructuring of production technology and work methods (Hayter and Barnes, 1997). Heightened competition came from low-cost producers both in the US and Europe. As a result, there was a need to lower costs of production including for both labour (BC labour costs in forestry were the highest in North America) and management. Second, the move to a leaner, lower cost production was complemented by a move to leaner government at both federal and provincial levels, and prompted by political shifts to various forms of neo-liberalism. Given the importance of the state in regulating space-time biases under Fordism, its withdrawal resulted in a quick return to the bad old days with single industry towns especially affected (Barnes and Hayter, 1994). Finally, the control over the forest resource that Fordist institutions formerly exercised came increasingly undone as a consequence of a series of high-profile conflicts with First Nations Peoples and environmentalists. Without that control, one of the Fordist bases of staples stability was undermined. More generally, as the institutions and relations of Fordism no longer coped, neither did single industry towns.

Perhaps the most devastating changes originated with alterations in production technology and labour force requirements in response to changes, in markets and the forces of competition. There was a wholesale move to post-Fordist forms of production characterized by computerized production technology, and a concomitant decline in labour force requirements. Chemainus on Vancouver Island was the first sawmill to adopt the new technology, and to suffer its consequence (Map 7.1). The mill was shut down in 1982 for two years, and when it was re-opened production facilities and work rules were transformed, as were the number of employees who worked there. The workforce declined from 650 to 165. The town was devastated. An attempt was made to re-vivify the community’s economic fortunes by promoting arts and crafts tourism centred on a series of large outdoor murals depicting the town’s history, but the employment generated was seasonal, temporary, part-time, and paid minimum wage (Barnes and Hayter, 1992). That is, hardly the employment equivalent to the almost 500 unionized positions that were lost. Very similar stories are found elsewhere. At Youbou, the old Fordist plant was closed altogether, while at Powell River and Port Alberni job losses over the last twenty years amounted to about 60 percent of the workforce (in each case about 3,000 workers). As in Chemainus there were attempts in all three communities to
engage in forms of bottom-up entrepreneurialism, but success was limited (Hayter, 2000).

This leads to the second point, which is around the withdrawal of the state, especially the local state. That process began in BC in 1983 with the so-called 'Period of Restraint' initiated by Premier Bill Bennett who ushered in a massive round of government withdrawal, deregulation, privatization, and market-based solutions (in marked contrast to his father, W. A. C. Bennett, who as premier between 1957 and 1973 oversaw massive government intervention, regulation, and moves to public ownership). It was precisely in this new environment, one in which the state retreated and withdrew from its former responsibilities to single industry towns, that an entrepreneurial culture arose. But to use Sjoholt's (1987) term, the result has been 'unruly', meaning that the geographical consequences are highly variegated in nature, outcome, and social benefit. There is one other issue about the changing nature of the state, which is that the old implicit coalition with organized labour also collapses. In fact, organized labour within the forest products industry shrinks dramatically, losing its former power to maintain the good life within single industry towns. Not surprisingly, Port Alberni in terms of per capita income now does not even rank in the top hundred of cities in its population size category. In fact, the last twenty years has seen Port Alberni bloodied and battered with unemployment rates twice the provincial average, per capita income now below the provincial average, and a grisly history of personal bankruptcies, house repossession, and various social pathologies including alcoholism, mental illness and spousal abuse (described in detail in Barnes et al., 2001).

Finally, the third assault on BC's Fordist institutions and attendant single industry derives from both local and global sources, and affects the very resource base, the forest stock, on which staples production depends. Locally there are the increasingly vigorous claims made by First Nations Peoples. From the late 1970s, First Nations Peoples have been engaged in a series of blockades, protests, demonstrations, and legal battles to force the province to turn over forested land to them. A decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1999, the Delgamuukw decision, and the signing of a land treaty with Nisga'a in 1999, gave further impetus and justification to their claims. The global assault comes from worldwide environmental organizations protesting especially the logging of old growth forests in the province. That protest has come in various forms: from mass civil disobedience at old growth logging sites, such as Clayquot Sound, BC, in 1993 (Braun, 2002), through to pressuring lumber retail chains such as Home Depot, and newspapers and magazine owners, such as the New York Times, to boycott BC wood. Again, such tactics appear to be working. An enormous new provincial park, the Great Bear Rainforest, was established in the centre of the province, which will permit no logging; and just before the firm was taken over by Weyerhaeuser in 1999 the CEO of MacMillan Bloedel, Tom Stevens, committed the corporation to no more clear-cutting (which was upheld later by the new owners). The broader consequence of action by both First Nations and environmental protest groups is to destabilize the resource itself, making cyclonic forces ever more present, which was also the effect, as I have argued here, of moves to post-Fordism and the withdrawal of state support (Hayter, 2003).

In sum, since around 1980 space-time biases that formerly were held in check in the post-war period have been increasingly let loose: because of changes in
markets and production technology, because of the withdrawal of the state, because of conflicts over control of staple resources themselves. The result is a complex geographical re jigging in which the liminality of the province’s single industry communities is only too apparent.

Conclusion

Innis, in reflecting on the history of Canada, and its relationship with especially Britain and later the United States, said it moved from colony to nation to colony again. In reflecting on the history of British Columbia since it was established as a province in 1871, it appears to have moved from cyclones to stability to cyclonics again. The period before the Second World War was characterized by ‘stormy weather’, with single industry towns quickly emerging and equally quickly disappearing as accessible resources were depleted, money ran out, prices tanked, and markets failed. Towns during this period were borderline communities in both senses that I discussed earlier: barely surviving, and sometimes not surviving at all, and at the boundary between shifting geographies and histories. After 1945, the regulatory and disciplinary apparatus of a Fordist regime was imposed on BC’s forest economy, and the stormy weather turned calm. It was during this period that one commentator, Richard Lucas (1971), devised a progressive typology of single industry towns arguing that they have reached their final stage, ‘the mature phase’, with its connotation of stability, prosperity, and permanence. But like so many teleological schemes, Lucas’s was proven wrong almost as soon as it was enunciated. Storm clouds were brewing during the 1970s, and cyclonic forces were again unleashed in British Columbia from 1980 onwards. Single industry towns were back to borderline communities again, and have stayed that way into the new millennium. It is, as Yogi Berra said, ‘Deja vu all over again’. But can anything be done? Yogi Berra also said, ‘If there is a fork in the road, take it’. That is, if there is an opportunity to do something different, to experiment, to engage in alternatives, we should. This was also Innis’s line. His staples theory was an attempt to think differently, to escape the groove of European thought. He tried to make Canadians of all stripes conceive of themselves and their economy in a different way in order to leave behind old fixed habits of mind that ran along the rut of conventional thinking about staples. Innis provided a new vocabulary that he also thought provided social hope for those on the margin. He recognized, though, as have others more recently who are engaged in similar projects of social hope (e.g. Rorty, 1999), that using a new vocabulary, and making it work, is difficult, taking a long time to succeed if it ever does. Certainly, time has run out for some people living in BC’s borderline communities. But this does not mean abandoning Innis’s project. Rather, it only becomes ever more urgent and pressing.

Notes

1 While the meteorological metaphor is based upon a naturally occurring phenomenon, an atmospheric disturbance, Innis is not claiming that economic cyclones are somehow natural, and asocial. Just as Doreen Massey’s (1984) use of a
geological metaphor to represent the spatial division of labour is set in the social relations that mark British industrial capitalism. Innis’s metaphor of the cyclone is thoroughly integrated into the social relations of Canadian resource capitalism. The term First Nations Peoples is the standard one used in Canada to refer to aboriginal peoples.

References


Braun, B. (2002), *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture and Power on Canada’s West Coast*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.


Innis, H. A. (1950), Empire and Communications, Ryerson, Toronto.


Chapter 8
Splintering Palestine

Derek Gregory

‘Palestine has been pushed to the edge of history, the edge of hope and the edge of despair, present and unreachable, fearful and afraid, and ragged into zones A, B and C...’ (Mound Barghouti, *War Butlers and their Language*).

**Topographies of Terror**

Ever since 11 September 2001, the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon has taken advantage of President George W. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ to ratchet up the colonial dispossession of the Palestinian people (Mansour, 2002; Gregory, 2003). It has done so by seeking to establish an identity between the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington and the increasingly militarized Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation of what remains of Palestine: Gaza and the West Bank. As a result ‘terrorism’ has been made polymorphous. Without defined shape or determinate roots, its mantle can be cast over any form of resistance to sovereign power. This has allowed the Sharon regime to advance its colonial project not through appeals to Zionism alone, to the Messianic mission of ‘redeeming’ the biblical heartlands of Judea and Samaria, but also - crucially for its international constituency - as another front in a generalized ‘war on terrorism’. This has in turn sustained the neoconservative deception that political violence can somehow be ended without reference to the historico-geographical conditions that frame it. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated, racist insistence that ‘the root cause of terrorism lies not in grievance but in a disposition toward unbridled violence’ has been reaffirmed by both the Bush and Sharon administrations. It conveniently exempts their own actions from scrutiny and absolves them of anything other than a restless, roving military response (Netanyahu, 1986).

This has taken place (literally so) through what Mbembe calls a ‘necropolitics’, a generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations, and I will argue that its performances of space seek not only to rationalize but to *radicalize* Israel’s colonial aggression. These performances assault not only politically qualified life - the space within which a Palestinian state is possible - but also ‘bare life’ itself. The leitmotif that runs through my discussion is the ‘splinter’: at once noun and verb, it conveys the intrinsic violence of a colonial project that has repeatedly shattered the space of Palestine. I begin by describing the successive fractures of Palestine in the first half of the 20th century that form an ever-present horizon of meaning within
contemporary Palestinian politics. I say 'ever-present' because partition is not an event but a process whose repeated performances scar the integuments of everyday life. The first partitions of Palestine were enacted through what Massey calls a 'power-geometry' - a series of cartographic severations in Euclidean space - but as Israel has sought to push Palestine to the edge of history and, as Barghouti notes, to the edge of despair, I show that this has turned into a _power-topology_ that wrenches lands and lives into ever more violent constellations that cannot be conveyed through any conventional cartography. At the limit, these torsions constitute what Agamben calls the space of the exception: a zone of indistinction between fact and law in which 'outside and inside pass through one another' (Mbembe, 2003; Agamben, 1998).

**Exile and Excision**

The Zionist dream of uniting the diaspora in a Jewish state was an intrinsically colonial project, and like all such projects it represented Palestine as a space empty of its native Arab population. Beginning in 1878 European Jews had already started to purchase a patchwork of agricultural land in Palestine, then still part of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, and by the final years of the 19th century these holdings were seen as small stepping-stones towards the reclamation of the biblical Land of Israel. Theodor Herzl had argued that it was only through the birth of their own nation-state that Jews would emerge into the world of modernity. Until then, they would be exiled not only from their land but also from their destiny. Their __return__ - in Hebrew, _aliyah_ (ascent) - to the Land of Israel was to signify their re-entry into history. The Zionists knew very well that Arabs lived on the land; they knew, too, that they would not give it up willingly. But - in another quintessentially colonial gesture - the indigenous population was reduced to the mute _object_ of history, people who merely have things done _to_ them, and never recognized as one of its active _subjects_.

This colonial project was framed by the imperial powers. At the end of the First World War, Britain occupied Palestine and received a Mandate from the League of Nations to administer the territory. A 'Jewish national home' was to be established in Palestine, and the Mandatory authority was required to 'facilitate Jewish immigration' and encourage its 'close settlement on the land'. In 1921 Britain detached 'Transjordan' in order to establish a Hashemite state east of the River Jordan, while Jewish settlement west of the Jordan accelerated Confrontations between Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine became increasingly violent, and in 1936 the Peel Commission concluded that the conflict was irrepressible within the body of a single state. It recommended partition: the Jews were to receive 20 per cent of Mandatory Palestine. The proposal satisfied neither side and the prospect of partition dimmed still further with the approach of the Second World War. In 1947 Britain devolved the question to the fledgling United Nations, where a divided General Assembly passed Resolution 181 in favour of the partition of Palestine. The Jews, with 35 per cent of the population, were now granted 56 per cent of the territory of Mandatory Palestine, and the city of Jerusalem was to be placed under a 'special international regime'.

Almost immediately civil war broke out. On 14 May 1948 the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv, and the next day the armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq invaded. By the time the conflict ended in 1949 some 750,000 Palestinians had been displaced, more than half the Arab population. Many sought refuge in Gaza and the West Bank, while others fled to Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Wherever the refugees settled, they found no vestige of an independent Palestinian state. After an armistice had been concluded with Egypt and Jordan, establishing a series of so-called 'Green Lines', the coastal plain around Gaza was administered by Egypt, and East Jerusalem and the West Bank were administered by Jordan!

To the Palestinians this was a compound catastrophe of destruction, dispossession and dispersal: al-Nakba ('the disaster'). But to the Israelis, it was the sweet fruit of their 'War of Independence'. This new state had emerged not only flushed with victory but with far more land - other people's land - than had been granted to it by either the Peel Commission or the United Nations. It now held not 20 per cent nor 56 per cent but 78 per cent of the territory that had been Mandatory Palestine (Massad, 2000). Israel initiated a massive transfer of land ownership and sought to erase the Arab presence from the landscape in order to establish both its sovereignty and its patrimony. This took place in legal, statistical and cultural registers. The Israeli legal system 'created a geography of power that contributed to the dispossession of Arab landholders while simultaneously masking and legitimating the reallocation of that land to the Jewish population' (Kedar, 2000-1). Israel also set about a process of violent 'purification' through which the country was envisioned as a blank slate across which Jewish signatures could be written at will. To create such 'facts on the ground' required immense physical erasures - evictions, displacements, seizures and demolitions - and, marching in lockstep with them, the production of a greatly extended grid of Jewish settlement. Between 1948 and 1950 Israel destroyed over 400 Palestinian villages and built 160 Jewish settlements on land that had been confiscated from its former occupants (Falah, 1996, 2003; Yiftachel, 2002).

Occupation

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched pre-emptive strikes against Egypt and Syria, and by the end of the morning Jordan also entered the war. Six days later Israel had seized the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and displaced Jordan from the West Bank. Israel now effectively controlled 100 per cent of Palestine. Its victory was invested with religious, even messianic importance. Just as the world was supposedly made after the six days of Creation, so Israel was made whole after the 'Six Day War'.

By the end of June hundreds of Arab families had been evicted from East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel, and in September the Israeli government endorsed the first Israeli 'settlement' on the West Bank and expropriated all state-owned land there. The transfer of any part of a civilian population into territory occupied by a foreign power is expressly forbidden under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and in November 1967 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 that emphatically reminded Israel of 'the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by force', required it to withdraw from territories occupied in the recent conflict, and affirmed the right of every state 'to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force'. Israel ignored the resolution, refusing to withdraw its troops and declining to fix its boundaries.

When Likud took power from Labor in 1977, there were 16 illegal Israeli settlements in Gaza and 36 in the West Bank. The new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, fulfilled his party's election manifesto to the letter. The West Bank was renamed 'Judea' and 'Samaria', and since for Jews these districts constituted the spiritual heart of the Land of Israel, the occupied territories were redefined as 'liberated' territories. Once again, the existential imperative of Zionism was translated directly into a territorial imperative that severed the Palestinian people from their land. For it was plainly not the Palestinian people who were 'liberated' by the Israeli occupation: how could it have been? It was the land itself. Under international law a civilian population has the right to resist military occupation but, following the same Orwellian logic, all Palestinian acts of resistance to 'liberation' were now counted as acts of 'terrorism'. Begin was committed to erasing the significance of the Green Line, increasing the number of illegal settlements in the occupied territories and extending the colonial grid up into the mountains. He was determined to create 'facts on the ground' that would make it virtually impossible for any future government to disengage from these territories.

By 1981 all pretence that this was a temporary occupation had been dropped. It was now official Israeli policy to establish what Shlaim calls, 'a permanent and coercive jurisdiction over the 1.3 million Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza'. By 1990 there were 120,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem, and 76,000 Israelis in Gaza and the West Bank, where their illegal settlements had spread, as planned, from the periphery to the densely populated spine (Shlaim, 2001). Some of the settlers were motivated by religious ideology, but major financial incentives were used to attract others, many of whom elected to move to illegal settlements that had been established within commuting range of the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

It was the trauma of colonial occupation and renewed dispossession that reawakened Palestinian nationalism and shifted its centre of gravity from the exiled Palestine Liberation Organisation to the occupied territories themselves. A popular uprising broke out in Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987. Its origins lay in the everyday experience of immiseration and oppression, but it developed into a vigorous assertion of the Palestinian right to resist occupation and to national self-determination. It became known as the Intifada (which means a 'shaking off') and, as Said remarks, it was one of the great anti-colonial insurrections of the modern period (Said, 1995; Aronson, 1990). It was met with a draconian response from the Israeli military (IDF), but in the course of these struggles Jordan renounced its interest in the West Bank and the Palestinians were finally recognized as a legitimate party to international negotiations.

Compliant Cartographies

In 1991 the administration of President George H.W. Bush brokered a peace conference in Madrid, followed by further rounds in Washington, in which
Palestinian representatives from the occupied territories insisted that any discussion had to be based on the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and on UN resolutions 242 and 338. The US accepted these stipulations, but Israel rejected them outright. In order to circumvent this impasse, Israel opened a back-channel to Yasir Arafat’s exiled PLO leadership in January 1993. Many of the Palestinians who took part in these secret discussions in Oslo were unfamiliar with the facts on the ground that had been created by the occupation and crucially, as Pacheco notes, they were also markedly less familiar with ‘the political connection between the human rights violations, the Geneva Convention and Israel’s territorial expansion plans’. By then a newly elected President Clinton had reversed US policy, setting on one side both the framework of international human rights law, so that compliance with its provisions became negotiable, and the framework of UN resolutions, so that Gaza and the West Bank were made ‘disputed’ territories and Israel’s claim was rendered formally equivalent to the Palestinians’. Israel naturally had no difficulty in accepting any of this, but when the Palestinian negotiators in Oslo fell into line they conceded exactly what their counterparts in Madrid had struggled so hard to uphold (Shlaim, 2001; Said, 1995; Pacheco, 2001). The preliminary agreement promised a phased Israeli military withdrawal from the territories and the establishment of an elected Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank.

Two years later an interim agreement (‘Oslo II’) incorporated and superseded these preliminary understandings. The occupied territories were divided into three areas - ‘Area A’, ‘Area B’ and ‘Area C’ - whose alphabetical rather than geographical designations confirmed them as topological abstractions produced by a strategic-instrumental discourse of political and military power. Area A was to be under exclusive Palestinian control (but its exits and entrances remained under Israeli control); Area B was to be under dual control, with a Palestinian civil authority and Israeli security authority; and Area C was to be under exclusive Israeli control, and included all those lands and reserves that had been confiscated by the Israelis for military bases, settlements and roads. Israel’s initial concessions were minimal, and the preceding history of occupation and dispossession ensured that any lands subsequently ceded to the Palestinians would be bounded by Israel and never contiguous so that they seemed much more like a series of South African bantustans limned by a new apartheid than the basis for any viable state (Bishara, 2001). The core principles of the Oslo accords were thus unacceptable to many Palestinians; but they were nevertheless accepted by the PLO, and its leader was elected to head the Palestinian Authority. As Said put it, Arafat and his people now ruled over a kingdom of illusions, with Israel firmly in command.

Throughout the interim period of negotiations and implementations Labor and Likud administrations continued to establish illegal settlements and to expand existing ones in the occupied territories. Between 1992 and 2001 the Jewish population in East Jerusalem rose from 141,000 to 170,000. Over the same period the population in the illegal settlements in Gaza and the West Bank rose from 110,000 to 214,000. While the built-up area of the illegal settlements occupied less than two per cent of the West Bank, their boundaries were over three times the size (to allow for ‘natural growth’), and through a network of so-called ‘regional councils’ they controlled planning and environmental policy in another 35 per cent.
In total, 42 per cent of the West Bank was under the control of illegal settlements (Pacheco, 2001; B’Tselem, 2002b).

These illegal settlements were linked to one another and to Israel by a new highway network which scored the border of the West Bank and moved Israel's centre of gravity decisively eastward, while a system of 'by-pass roads' around Palestinian towns and villages reserved contiguity for Israelis alone. By these means 400,000 illegal settlers enjoyed freedom of movement throughout the occupied territories and into Israel, whereas three million Palestinians were confined to isolated enclaves. In the course of constructing this landscape of colonial modernity, tens of thousands of acres of fertile Palestinian farmland were expropriated and 7,000 Palestinian homes were demolished, leaving 50,000 people homeless in addition to the millions in the refugee camps. During the Oslo process the contraction of the Palestinian economy was accelerated; unemployment soared and living standards plunged. Far from setting in train a process of de-colonization, the accords had enabled Israel to intensify its system of predatory colonialism over Gaza and the West Bank.

Camp David and Goliath

The crisis came to a head at a series of meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat convened by Clinton at Camp David in Maryland in July 2000. Israel insisted that the issues to be resolved had their origins in 1967, in its 'Six Day War' that resulted in its occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, whereas the Palestinians argued that the roots lay in 1948, in al-Nakba and the dispossession and dispersal of the Palestinian people. The thrust of the negotiations was to accept the Israeli position and to legitimize its strategic position on three fronts. In the first place, there was no recognition of Palestinians who had been displaced in 1947-48, and Israel refused to provide any compensation for the appropriation of their property. 'The most we can do', the Palestinian delegation was told, 'is to express our sorrow for the sufferings of the refugees, the way we would for any accident or natural disaster' (Kapeliouk, 2000). Then, since the Six Day War all six US administrations had more or less consistently adhered to UN Resolution 242 and its central thesis - that peace for Israel would be guaranteed by its withdrawal from the occupied territories - but Clinton obtained a Palestinian commitment to peace with Israel while continuing to treat Gaza and the West Bank as 'disputed' territories whose final shape was to be determined through negotiations. Barak made a series of territorial proposals that finally envisaged Israel withdrawing from 88-94 per cent of the West Bank and parts of Gaza. At the same time, Israel insisted on consolidating its main blocs of illegal settlement, which would have confirmed the dismemberment of the West Bank into three almost completely non-contiguous sections connected by a narrow thread of land. This depended on what Weizman calls 'an Escher-like representation of space', a 'politics of verticality' in which Palestine was splintered into a territorial hologram of six dimensions, 'three Jewish and three Arab'. Projecting this, topological imaginary onto the ground, a baroque system of underpasses, overpasses and even a viaduct from Gaza to the West Bank would make it possible to draw a
continuous boundary between Israel and Palestine \textit{without dismantling the blocs of illegal settlements} (Weizman, 2002).

Finally, the territory that Israel insisted on retaining constituted `a matrix of control' that Israel had been laying down since 1967 and which would have left Israel in effective control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank yet relieved it of any direct responsibility for their three million inhabitants. `It's like a prison', Halper explained. If prisoners occupy (on the most generous estimate) 94 per cent of the area - cell-blocks, exercise yards, dining room, workshops - and the prison administration occupies just 6 per cent, this does not make the place any less of a prison. Israel required Palestinian airspace to be brought beneath Israeli airspace, and also demanded `subterranean sovereignty' over the mountain aquifer beneath the West Bank. The result would have been the institutionalization of a carceral archipelago (Halper, 2000; Weizman, 2002).

The Palestinians were not blind, and even Arafat finally seemed to understand that his kingdom of illusions was vanishing. In September 2000 a new \textit{Intifada} (the \textit{al-Aqsa Intifada}) broke out. When the IDF responded with astonishing violence, the \textit{al-Aqsa Intifada} turned into an armed revolt. There was a final, desperate attempt to find a peaceful solution at Taba in January 2001, on the eve of a general election in Israel, but Barak withdrew his negotiators and the meeting ended without agreement. He was resoundingly defeated by Ariel Sharon, whose Likud-led coalition preferred provocation to reconciliation, repression to concession. After the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington on 11 September 2001, the intensity of IDF attacks on Gaza and the West Bank ratcheted up, and many Palestinians claimed that Sharon was using the attacks on America as a pretext `to enter the endgame' against them.

\textbf{Performances of Space}

Sharon's `endgame' has involved three discursive strategies: locating, opposing and casting out. `Locating' mobilizes a technical register, in which Palestinians are reduced to objects in a purely visual field: co-ordinates on a grid, letters on a map. `Opposing' mobilizes a cultural register, in which the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians is reduced to a conflict between `civilization' and barbarism. `Casting out' mobilizes a political juridical register, in which Palestinians are reduced to the status of outcasts placed beyond the privileges and protections of the law so that their lives (and deaths) are rendered of no account (Gregory, in press).

Palestinians were reduced to targets through what Mansour calls a `besieging cartography' that was sustained by an intricate system of monitoring. This involved passive sensors, observation towers equipped with day/night and radar surveillance capabilities, satellite images and photographs from reconnaissance planes and electronic data banks for analysis (Mansour, 2001). As the assault on the occupied territories intensified, however, Graham showed that the conflict was transformed into `an urban war in which the distance between enemies [was] measured in metres'. Orientalist tropes were invoked to render Palestinian towns and cities as `impenetrable, unknowable spaces' whose close quarters were beyond `the three-dimensional gaze of the IDF's high-technology surveillance systems'. As surveillance at a distance became markedly less effective, therefore, so `a new
family of Unattended Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and camera-carrying balloons was deployed to permit real-time monitoring of the complex battles within the cities, and to track the movements of key Palestinian fighters and officials so that missiles could target and kill them’ (Graham, 2003). This was a strategically vital arm in the radicalization of Israel’s politics of verticality. Every floor in every house, every car, every telephone call or radio transmission, can be monitored,’ explains Eyal Weizman. ‘These eyes in the sky, completing the network of observation that is woven throughout the ground, finally iron out the folded surface and flatten the terrain.’ The opacity of supposedly alien spaces is thus rendered transparent, and their complexities reduced to a series of objects in a purely visual plane (Weizman, 2002).

However, some soldiers came to see the occupation as unsustainable on humanitarian grounds. Since February 2002 over 500 reservists have refused to serve in the occupied territories. Eight of them petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court to have their action recognized as a matter of conscience. Their submission charged the army with systematically violating the most fundamental human rights of the Palestinian people, and argued that the Israeli occupation is itself illegal. While the Court accepted that the reservists’ objections were moral ones, it nevertheless upheld the prison sentences. This decision tacitly recognized that the reservists’ refusal to fight what they call ‘the War of the Settlements’ presents a much more serious threat to the legitimacy of Israel’s politico-military strategy than conscientious objectors who refuse to serve in the IDF at all. For theirs is a selective refusal that exposes the territorial underbelly of Israel’s aggressions. As Sontag observed, ‘the soldiers are not refusing a particular order. They are refusing to enter the space where illegal orders are bound to be given’ (Mariner, 2002; Yiftah’el, 2002; Sontag, 2003).

The production of this space has turned on an opposition between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ that had been a foundational weapon of Zionism and which the White House has also deployed in its ‘war on terrorism’. Palestinians were represented as denizens of a barbarian space lying beyond the pale of civilization. When Barak described Israel as ‘a villa in the middle of the jungle’ and as ‘a vanguard of culture against barbarism’, he was not only degrading and brutalizing Palestinian culture and civil society: he was also rendering its spaces inchoate, outside the space of Reason. What Sharon sought to do was to establish these linguistic claims in acutely physical terms. Israel’s offensive operations were designed to turn the Palestinian people not only into enemies but into aliens, and in placing them outside the modern, figuratively and physically, they were constructed as what Agamben calls homines sacri. Homo sacer was a subject-position established under Roman law to identify those whose death had no sacrificial value but whose killing did not constitute a crime: they inhabited a zone of abandonment within which sovereign power suspended its own law (Agamben, 1998). The prosecution of this necropolitics required the performance of two spacings. On one side, a strategy of consolidation and containment continued to bind Israel to its illegal settlements in Gaza and the West Bank and to separate both from the remainder of the occupied territories; on the other side, a strategy of cantonization institutionalized the siege of Palestinian towns and villages.

The first objective had already been secured in Gaza during the first Intifada. ‘Surrounded by electronic fences and army posts,’ Reinhart reported, ‘completely
sealed off from the outside world, Gaza has become a huge prison' (Reinhart, 2002). In June 2002 a similar barrier network was announced for the West Bank. For most of its length this will be an electronic fence but in places it will solidify into a concrete or steel wall eight metres high. The line will be flanked by a 50-100-metre security zone, edged with concertina wire, trenches and patrol roads, and monitored by watchtowers, floodlights, electronic sensors and surveillance cameras. Much of the barrier runs east of the Green Line, so that thousands of hectares of Palestinian farmland and at least fifteen Palestinian villages will be on the Israeli side, while others will be cut off from their fields and wells, allowing Israel to extend its control over the aquifer. The barrier will also consolidate Israel's stranglehold over East Jerusalem, where it cuts off hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank. In March 2003 Sharon announced plans for a second barrier to be built around the eastern foothills along the Jordan Valley, to connect with the first and so encircle the occupied territories there as in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Minister has persistently represented the barrier as a security measure whose sole objective is to deny suicide bombers access to Israel from the West Bank. The second barrier makes a nonsense of these claims, and when the minister adds that 'this is not a border between political entities or sovereign territories', it becomes clear that the only sovereign power to be recognized is the state of Israel. What lies beyond the line is not the (future) state of Palestine but what Agamben would call the (present) space of the exception.

This is the point at which the analogy between occupied Palestine and the prison breaks down, for this carceral archipelago limns the dispersed site of the camp.

'While prison law only constitutes a particular sphere of penal law and is not outside the juridical order, the juridical constellation that guides the camp is martial law and the state of siege ...As the absolute space of the exception, the camp is topologically different from a single space of confinement' (Agamben, 1998).

On that other side of the line, Israel has set about the proliferation of zones of indistinction in which, as the reservists who refuse to serve in the occupied territories claim, 'the legal and the lawful can no longer be distinguished from the illegal and unlawful!' In his original discussion of homo sacer, Agamben suggested that the state of the exception traces a threshold through which 'outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible' (Agamben, 1998). As far as the military was concerned, there was no longer any difference between Areas A, B and C. Israel had established a series of 'security zones' throughout the West Bank, so that Palestinians were now confined and corralled, subject to endless curfew and closure, whereas the IDF had complete freedom of movement and action. As the Israeli Minister of Internal (sic) Security put it, 'They are there, but we are here and there as well' (Hammami, 2002; Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2002).

The occupied territories have been turned into twilight zones, caught in a frenzied cartography of mobile frontiers rather than fixed boundaries. These enforce a violent fragmentation and recombination of time and space, which is nothing less than a concerted attempt to disturb and derange the normal rhythms of everyday
Palestinian life. These deformations involve deliberate twistings - torsions - of both time and space.

'Temporariness is now the law of the occupation... temporary takeover of Area A, temporary withdrawal from Area A, temporary encirclement and temporary closures, temporary transit permits, temporary revocation of transit permits, temporary enforcement of an elimination policy, temporary change in the open-fire orders.... When the occupier plays with time like this, everything - everything that moves, everything that lives - becomes dependent on the arbitrariness of the occupier's decisions. The occupier is fully aware that he is always playing on borrowed time, in fact on stolen time, other people's time. This occupier is an unrestrained, almost boundless sovereign, because when everything is temporary almost anything - any crime, any form of violence - is acceptable, because the temporariness seemingly grants it a license, the license of the state of emergency' (Ophir, 2001).

This too mimics Agamben's nightmare scenario with precision: a world in which nothing is fixed, nothing is clear, and the spaces of the exception constantly move and multiply. Within these zones of indistinction the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that prohibit Israel from transferring its civilian population to the occupied territories continue to be disregarded. The same protocols that are supposed to protect Palestinians from torture, illegal detention, house demolition, deportation, and degradation, remain suspended. And still this is not enough. On June 2002 the Knesset passed the Imprisonment of Illegal Combatants Law, which allows for indefinite detention without charge or trial of anyone believed to 'take part in hostile activity against Israel, directly or indirectly. These new measures considerably widened the scope of existing provisions for administrative detention (B'Tselem, 2002a). And in another shocking show of contempt for the law, Israel continues to carry out what it calls `extra judicial killings' of Palestinian 'targets' (Amnesty International, 2001; Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, 2001). In the zones of indistinction established by Israel's sovereign power,

'The Palestinians are expected to obey military orders from the State of Israel, as if they were the laws of a Palestinian state. But the state that imposes those orders and whose army controls the territories, the land, the water resources, is not responsible for the welfare of the Palestinians living in those territories. It need not behave like a normal state....' (Hass, 2002b).

Israel suspends international law in the occupied territories while it criminalizes any act of Palestinian resistance to its illegal operations there. What can this be other than the space of the exception? It is not so much punctuated by crises as produced through them, and these ever-present assaults force a mutation in the position of those made subject to them. Abu Audah argued that long before the Oslo process, but intensified during its accommodations, Israel had sought 'to transform the Palestinian people into inhabitants'. The difference, he explained, 'is that people have national rights of sovereignty over their land, identity, independence, and freedom, while inhabitants constitute a group of people with
interests not exceeding garbage collection and earning a daily living (Abu Audah, 2002). But now even the elemental forms of bare life are under acute threat.

In the countryside, Palestinian villages and fields have been pulverized by the military: houses demolished, reservoirs destroyed, olive groves uprooted. This is a bleak reversal of the Zionist imaginary. The land that they believed they would transform from ‘wilderness’ into ‘civilization’ has been laid waste by their own bulldozers. It is as though the very earth has been turned into an enemy. Palestinian towns and cities have fared no better. They have been smashed by Israeli missiles and bombs, by tanks and armoured bulldozers. The objective is to suppress the right to the city through a campaign of coerced de-modernization.

‘There is no way to assess the full extent of the latest damage to the cities and towns - Ramallah, Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus and Jenin - while they remain under a tight siege,’ one observer noted, ‘but it is safe to say that the infrastructure of life itself and of any future Palestinian state - roads, schools, electricity pylons, water pipes, telephone lines - has been devastated’ (Schemann, 2002; Hass, 2002a; Mahar, 2002).

As Mahmoud Darwish declared, ‘the occupation does not content itself with depriving us of the primary conditions of freedom, but goes on to deprive us of the bare essentials of a dignified human life, by declaring constant war on our bodies, and our dreams, on the people and the homes and the trees, and by committing crimes of war’ (Darwish, 2002). The hideous objective of Sharon’s government, which it scarcely bothers to hide any longer, is to reduce Palestinians to the abject despair of die Muselmänner. Der Muselman - The Muslim - is a figure from the Nazi concentration camps who was reduced to mere survival and thus ‘move[d] in an absolute indistinction of fact and law, of life and juridical rule’ (Agamben, 1998, 1999). The Sharon regime would understandably not invoke this figure by name: and yet it is difficult to avoid seeing its haunted, hollowed-out shadows flickering in the darkness of the zones of indistinction that have been so deliberately, systematically and cruelly produced in the occupied territories. It is in the Palestinian refugee camps, the nomos of Israel’s colonial present, that this project finds the purest expression of its violence.

Spaces of Hope?

Successive Israeli politico-military apparatuses have attempted to efface Palestine from the map altogether, and to redistribute its splinters into a series of abstract categories located in a purely topological imaginary (Figure 8.1). These redistributions - or ‘spacings’, since they have performative force - possess such consistency and systematicity that they amount to a concerted project to fold the sacralization of the land of Israel - and particularly of ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ - into the reduction of the Palestinian people to so many homines sacri.
As the splinters of Palestine form the shattered space of the exception, punctuated by the power-topologies of a colonial necropolitics, it seems clear that ‘third spaces’ and ‘paradoxical spaces’ are not necessarily sites of emancipation (Soja, 1996). And yet, despite these enormities, Palestinians have refused to be cowed, disciplined, dehumanized; they have refused to surrender their collective memories or to silence their collective grief; they have refused to collaborate with or consent to their own erasure. As Darwish affirms, they are - somehow - still animated by hope, which is itself a form of resistance:

‘Hope in a normal life where we are neither heroes nor victims. Hope that our children will go safely to their schools. Hope that a pregnant woman will give birth to a living baby, at the hospital, and not a dead child in front of a military checkpoint; hope that our poets will see the beauty of the colour red in roses rather than in blood; hope that this land will take up its original name: the land of love and peace’ (Darwish, 2002).

Notes

These Green Lines were not recognized as international borders (so-called ‘Blue Lines’); the border with Egypt turned blue in 1979, the border with Jordan in 1994; but Green Lines continue to mark Israel’s military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. The English text did not refer to ‘all the territories’ or even ‘the territories’, which enabled successive Israeli administrations and their apologists to exploit what they choose to regard as an ambiguous space for interpretative wrangling. But see John McHugo, ‘Resolution 242: A legal reappraisal of the right-wing Israeli interpretation of the withdrawal phrase with reference to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51 (2002) pp. 851-882. Israel also claimed that Article 49 did not apply to the occupied territories, but its applicability was reaffirmed by successive UN Security Council Resolutions 338 (22 October 1973), 446 (22 March 1979), 452 (10 July 1979) and 465 (1 March 1980), and by a conference of the High Contracting Parties
to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 5 December 2001 which the US and Israel refused to attend.


This could be Agamben too, but I have taken the phrase from paragraph 6 of the petition to Israel's Supreme Court on behalf of the eight reservists, see: http://www.refusersolidarity.net/images/resources/zonsheine_Petition.pdf.


References


PART III

SITUATING AND EXTENDING
SPACES OF ORIENTATION
In sum, we propose to extend the notion of a place of knowledge beyond the walls of laboratories and other scientific workplaces to encompass the city as a complex and heterogeneous space of knowledge (Dierig et al. 2003).

That the borders between scientific activity and the ordinary daily life of city-dwelling scientists are blurred, that the spaces of scientific endeavor and those of other urban spaces are not always fully walled off from one another, is evident from the contents of a recently published volume, *Science and the City*, resulting from a conference of historians and science studies scholars. To one who is preoccupied with urban modernities, the language of 'practice' sprinkled throughout so many of the historically focused contributions is most striking - as much for the understanding about the urban production of scientific knowledge it provides, as for the ideas it insufficiently develops, the possibilities it doesn't fully open. At once provoked by this circumstance and inspired by a set of revealing studies, I intend to move beyond *Science and the City* by elaborating upon the language of 'practice', by re-viewing subject matter that is apparently taken for granted and unproblematic for many within science studies (and even human geography). By thus exploring what normally goes without saying, I will attempt to open up the possibility of rethinking the production and shaping of scientific and technical knowledge in cities. Allow me, at the outset, to be as fundamental as possible by (re)considering the situatedness of practices and knowledges in general; and then to only briefly stop in the laboratory and other places of scientific endeavor before stepping out into the streets of the 19th century European or North American city. Allow me, in thus moving about from one location to another, and ultimately raising a number of speculative questions, to blur the limits somewhat further, to help erase any borders that may remain
between the conduct of science and the conduct of urban everyday life. To further insist upon their porosity and the mutual entanglement of their respective spaces. To underscore the unbounded ways by which, in (situated) practice, scientific insight and mundane urban site may be bound up with one another.

“My body - or anything else for that matter - is a weaving: an intersection of the tattered multiplicity into which it is plunged’ (Bingham and Thrift, 2000, 290, paraphrasing Michel Serres).

Everybody has a body. No body is immaterial. Nobody can escape that fact. That being the case, all human action, every individual and collective practice, is situated. Or, because of our corpo-reality, because of our material embodiment, there is always a thereness, a somewhereness, a here-and-nowness to practice. There are absolutely no human practices - scientific or otherwise - that are not embodied, situated practices. No exceptions - past or present. Not for Le Verrier and his associates probing the universe from the Paris Observatory during the mid-19th century. Not for any of the British and French traders who collected naturalia in late-18th and early-19th century Canton. Not for any of today’s most theoretical physicists or any other practitioners of the highly abstract.

‘Knowledge, it is rightly said, does not stand outside of practical activity; it is made and sustained through situated practical activity’ (Shapin, 1994, xix).

To speak of practices as situated is not merely to speak of their ‘broader situation’, their local and wider context, or of their historical setting; but of their enactment and procedure at particular sites. It is, in a word, to speak of their site-uatedness. And of the inter-actions and inter-relations through which the site is perpetually (re)constituted. And all that consequently follows. No site of human activity may be reduced ontologically to its locational co-ordinates, to the precise space it occupies, and nothing more. No such site may be divorced from its situation, from its actual relations to its (near and distant) surroundings, from all the more or less transitory circumstances that come into nexus there. Being always situated, practices are always contingent upon what does or does not come into conjunction at their specific sites, upon the variously scaled interconnections, the variously scaled processes, the multiplicity of shifting networks, that do or do not come into nexus there. Or upon what is or is not there. But what is or is not there at any site - however areally delimited - is never solely a matter of the palpable and the measurable, the concretely apparent, the materially present. It is never solely a matter of visible macro- and micro-geographies - of the built landscape, land-use patterns and a physically extensive infrastructure; of the instruments, furniture and miscellaneous artifacts to be found in the interior spaces of a building. Nor is what comes into nexus at a site limited to the optically evident, to the movements of goods and people originating or terminating there. Situatedness is also a matter of the nexus of invisible geographies that are every bit as real as their visible counterparts - and every bit as much an intended or unintended consequence of previous situated practices.
'In a quite fundamental manner the conditions of our knowledge vary according to our placement in social and physical space' (Ophir and Shapin, 1991, p. 9).

'[W]hat we know is an important constraint on what we can think and do... [K]nowledge is historically specific. [K]nowledge is geographically specific' (Thrift, 1996, p. 96).

'Invisible geographies' is not an oxymoron. Invisible geographies are associated with meanings, discourse and knowledge, with the places in which they occur, with their spatial circulation and interconnections. For just as thought and action are always inseparably conjoined, just as knowing and doing are always becoming one another, situated practices are always fused together with specific forms of meaning, discourse or knowledge, always melted together with them. For what people do or do not know, the discourses they have or have not been exposed to, the context-flexible meanings and taken-for-granted or contested categories that have entered into their subject formation, can in no way be divorced from the situated practices in which they have participated - or have been excluded from. Meanings are always produced or encountered in situated practices. Participation in the situated practices of everyday life is one with the navigation and negotiation of meanings. And meanings can neither shift nor be contested other than by the way of situated practices. Discourse never simply floats in the ether, enjoying a state of ontological independence. Every discourse becomes by way of a set of situated practices. For every discourse has its sites of production. Its spatially articulated networks of circulation. Its sites of reception and reworking. Or its sites of contestation. Even when modern telecommunications or the internet are involved. And, of course, all knowledges are embodied situated knowledges, rather than disembodied unlocatable (universal) knowledges (Haraway, 1991). All knowledges are produced, modified, and acquired or learned at specific sites of academic, scientific, or other practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Where some networks of contact and exchange, and not others, come into conjuncture. Where some power relations, and not others, are at work.

'[T]he specificity of place also derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations' (Massey, 1993, p. 68).

Once again, 'invisible geographies' is not an oxymoron. Invisible geographies are associated with social relations, and most especially with power relations - with their on-the-ground implementation, their in-place micro-operation, their control of space, their frequent exercise at a distance, and with the spatially dispersed networks through which they operate and subjectify. At some level virtually every situated practice - scientific and otherwise - is enmeshed with power relations. For, regardless of their myriad forms, power relations are always in some measure about actual or potential behaviors, about the borders of (im)permissible action, about determining who - individually or collectively - may or may not do what, when, and where, under what conditions of control or surveillance, if any. And yet, whether enabling or constraining, power relations themselves do not spring full
blown out of nothingness. They both emerge out of and are transformed through situated practices.²

'The manufacture and manipulation of laboratory phenomena are part of a network of power relations running throughout modern societies' (Livingstone, 1995, p. 23, quoting Joseph Rouse).

If all this is so, then at sites of scientific activity, as elsewhere, the conduct of everyday practice is always inseparable from a particular conjuncture of material, discursive and relational circumstances that are without fast bounds. In the laboratory, as elsewhere, embodied practices, the world of meaning and knowledge, and power relations have always continuously emerged out of one another in more or less complex ways involving multiply scaled processes and networks. What did or did not transpire at any 19th century laboratory obviously was not simply a matter of either what instruments and equipment were present, or of the spatial layout of the locale and the degree to which it did or did not jointly facilitate solitary work, organized co-participation, and random social interaction (Hillier and Penn, 1991). What 'discoveries', 'findings' or 'advances' were or were not made at such a place was also contingent upon the singular (and ever becoming) configuration of situated knowledges associated with it; upon the 'spaces of [discursive] dispersion' with which it was linked; upon the concepts, ideas, theories, facts and practical 'know-how' that traveled to and from it; upon the literature and correspondence that arrived upon its desks; upon elsewhere-produced results that entered its bounded space only to become subject to scrutiny and possible confirmation, contradiction or elaboration; upon a multitude of informational comings and goings associated with a number of more or less integrated formal and informal networks. Not least of all, what did or did not occur was a matter of overlapping fields of power, of power relations internal and external to the facility. Power relations which determined who or who not was qualified to become engaged in the facility's operations. And what the routine modes of co(l)laboration and procedural monitoring were to be, what both the division of labor and lines of authority were to be. Power relations which contributed to some texts and bodies of thought, and not others, being considered and discussed. Or which led to some lines of inquiry and practical procedures, and not others, being pursued and regarded as appropriate or legitimate, as 'reasonable' or 'rational'. Or which resulted in the dominance of one (or more) disciplinary discourse(s) rather than others; in the prevalence of some ways of seeing and conventions of observation, some taken-for-granted modes of categorizing, naming, learning and giving meaning rather than others. Power relations resting outside - conflicts, controversies and competing interests in other realms of practice - which influenced the prioritizing of some projects or endeavors rather than others. And which were not divorced from the politics of fund procurement and allocation that yielded the physical configuration and contents of the laboratory itself.

'Much remains to be done to reinsert scientists into the cities and towns where they lived and worked' (Denise Phillips, 2003).
In (embodied) practice, the day-in, day-out conduct of science - whether occurring at a laboratory, a hospital, an observatory, a field location, or some other site - is never confined to the strict implementation of step-by-step logics, or the unceasing application of totally rational procedures (as pre-Kuhnian/pre-Feyerabendian philosophy of science would have it). Whatever the material objects, power relations and situated knowledges and discourses that come into mutual articulation at a site, those conducting research more or less frequently must accommodate inconsistencies or contradictions, wrestle with incommensurabilities, or in various ways attempt to confront inadequate categorizations, data gaps, ambiguous results, and other minor or major setbacks and difficulties. To overcome such obstacles or at least proceed further - whether by `guesswork', `intuition', `reason', random discussion, or purposeful collective `brainstorming' - requires that some new synapse(s) be made, that a moment of insight occur, that the imagination be triggered, that thoughts fall into a new constellation, that a lesser or greater act of inventive creativity take place. Such mental couplings may sometimes result from the scientist(s) involved stepping outside the bounds of convention, from the wedding of pieces of knowledge acquired at other sites of scientific practice, from the fact that embodied knowledges are mobile, from the fact that the biographical trajectory of most scientists involves prolonged sojourns at a number of sites of scientific practice, from the fact that the scientist usually embodies a number of more or less overlapping situated knowledges some of which may be well removed from her field of expertise. They instead may be contingent upon the city or metropolis; upon its morphology and infrastructure; upon the visible and invisible geographies associated with its heterogeneous mix of situated practices. Or, stepping outside the bounds of convention - however slightly - may be the consequence of stepping outside the laboratory, of stepping out into the streets, of navigating everyday life in the city and engaging in other situated practices, of the happenstance social encounters and physical experiences that thereby occur.

`Alexandre Yersin is exemplary of the emergence of this new kind of [scientific] person who can very well observe and think in the street, that is, in the city' (Mendelsohn, 2003).

The clearly demarcated laboratory (research) site is not the sole space of lightning-like re-cognition or thought reconstellation, the only location at which problems may be suddenly perceived or understood in a somewhat different light. Whether or not scientific concerns immediately retreat into the recesses of the researcher's mind once she enters the city-world beyond the laboratory, thoughts regarding them may quickly resurface in response to any number of promptings. And, because arising in a different concrete or social context, those thoughts may flow along new neural channels, may result in new imaginings, may culminate in moments of (minor or major) insight. The city beyond the research site may provide all kinds of opportunities either for scientific reflection or reconsideration, or for transfers and translations to be made from seemingly unrelated realms of situated practice. This would have been especially true of the physically compact European and North
American metropolises and industrial centers of the late 18th and 19th centuries. For everyday life in these as yet infant large cities was highly pedestrian and thereby conducive to unanticipated social encounters. For in making one's way to and from one's scientific workplace, in finding one's way to some space of sociability, in undertaking a professional or domestic errand, or in otherwise traversing a short distance by foot, there was always at least a small chance that one's path would cross that of a friend, acquaintance or colleague - and that a curious inquiry would set one's mental wheels turning, that something said would bring subsequent pondering, that a useful reference would be acquired. For even if one's purposeful walk was devoid of conversational contact, even if one remained shrouded in anonymity for the full length of one's route, the street of the pre-automotive city exposed one to a myriad of material phenomena, images and sites of practice which every now and then might bring one to a halt, capture one's attention, and in the process bring questions to mind or stimulate translations. For one might be arrested in motion by an engine or pump at work in a construction excavation, something never previously seen displayed in a shop window, smoke or steam rising skyward in an unusual pattern, the atmosphere of thick dust' that one breathed in a department store (Mendelsohn, 2003) the contorted movements of an injury- or disease-plagued body, or, or, or. Or, however hurried one might be, however much one shielded oneself from fleeting impressions - from Simmel's `swift and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli', (Simmel, 1971, p. 325) from the onslaught of Benjamin's `shocks' of modernity - one could never move so fast that one could not be slowed or stopped in one's tracks by an interest-grabbing perception. (One might even be brought to a pondering standstill by the very magnitude and diversity of sensory inputs itself, by a re-cognition of the problem of perception and attention in constantly reconstituted urban environments.) Or, on infrequent occasions the street could prove a space of re-cognition, a space of triggered rethinkings, a space of scientific or technological dawn-breaks. However modest in scope.

`Laboratories, along with the researchers, instruments, and experiments associated with these places of investigation, are not isolated from the world beyond their physical and institutional boundaries' (Dierig, 2003).

If the scientist practicing in any sizable European or North American city might not often have a moment of insight as the result of a happenstance street occurrence, he was somewhat more likely to have one as a consequence of discussions held either within some space of sociability or in conjunction with some situated cultural practice. Although 19th-century bourgeois and elite urban cultures had significant geographical variations, there were important similarities to the web of social interactions into which the scientist might be drawn, to the extra-laboratory practices in which he might participate. At dinner parties, restaurants, clubs, coffee houses, weddings, wakes, or philanthropic social functions he might find himself talking to a person whose amateur engagement with science was a source of cultural capital; to an amateur botanist, astronomer, entomologist, geologist, zoologist, or meteorologist whose posing of an innocent question demanded thought(ful) reformulation. Or he might find himself face-to-face with an avid attendee of public lectures or fashionable follower of popular science
publications burning with curiosity about his ongoing work. Or he might slip into conversation with an educated person - swept up in those national-identity-(re)constructing discourses which equated national ‘progress’ with scientific and technological advances and the ‘conquering of nature’ - who wished a fulsome report from the frontiers of knowledge. On any such occasion, or during a concert or theater intermission, or a visit to a museum or botanical garden, social-network connections might bring him into discussion with a doctor, pharmacist, engineer, architect, or science teacher; with a professional confronting science-related problems in his own everyday practice that he wished to air; with a person whose own practical knowledge might suddenly prove suggestive to him, might sooner or later give birth to a new useful synapse. At any of these sites he also might be introduced to a merchant or manufacturing entrepreneur whose business activities were one either with a specialized interest in the mineral, plant, or animal worlds, or with the ‘application’ of science to product or production technology. Such a person just might have found it in his interests to push the scientist to his limits, especially if he were a member of a local ‘Philosophical Association’. Or, if that person possessed new practice-based technical know-how he just might have found himself serving as the supplier of knowledge.

Wandering Out of Bounds - A Detour

‘According to Le Verrier, one of the main advantages of Paris was its location “at the center of scientific life and close to the instrument-makers who are always needed”. On Monday mornings, for example, he left the Observatory for the Senate located in the Luxembourg Palace, a convenient ten-minute walk along the woody allee de l’Observatoire and through the famed garden. In the afternoon, he would walk down the rue de Seine often arriving late at the Academy s6ance which he would inflame [through] his epic fights against Delaunay’ (David Aubin, 2003).

As he made his way from the Observatory to the Senate on any given Monday morning, was it not more than likely that Le Verrier would encounter someone he was familiar with? Given the array of buildings and activities in the vicinity, was it more than likely that he would chance upon a fellow scientist, politician or acquaintance? And occasionally not merely lift his hat in greeting, but stop for a chat? Is it not more than likely that every now and then the conversation involved something other than last night’s opera performance, next Saturday’s social gala, or the weather of the moment (a topic which in itself might have triggered all kinds of associations for Le Verrier)? Might not the discussion have occasionally turned to matters that directly or indirectly touched upon Le Verrier’s research or the current and future operations of the Observatory more generally? Might not somewhat differently constituted networks of knowledge circulation - differently born(s) situated knowledges - have come into conjuncture at any such site of informal fraternizing? Might not things sometimes have been said that proved enabling or suggestive, that provided news of a development or bits of information that immediately - or through subsequent association - led to thoughts regarding an ongoing or upcoming project? Might not names have sometimes been
mentioned that resulted in new contacts, in access to new data sets or the initiation of other forms of scientific exchange? Might not synapses occasionally have been made there on the spot - or in the midst of a later derived stream of thought - that yielded at least some insight, that facilitated the overcoming of at least a minor obstacle, that produced at least a small shift in focus, that encouraged at least a secondary modification in data collection or interpretation? And even when nobody was met, or when happenstance conversations were confined to polite and mundane subject matter, is it not more than likely that Le Verrier's morning navigation of his customary route sometimes resulted in the occurrence of scientifically productive mental connections? Owing to his sighting of a distinctive building and his awareness of particular people and activities therein? Or owing to his fascination with a passing cloud formation? Or owing to the quality of light that met his eyes? Or? Or, put more strongly, is it even not likely that the following of his routine morning path was seldom completely devoid of fruitful work-related synapses, seldom empty of thought relevant to his astronomical practices or the Observatory's meteorological activities? As Le Verner physically wandered down the Rue de Seine on any particular Monday afternoon, is it not quite likely that his simultaneous mental wanderings were not confined to personal problems or daydreaming fantasies? But frequently preoccupied with his next day's agenda at the Observatory? With discussions there to be undertaken? With current project bottlenecks? With projected projects? With needed instrument repairs or improvements? Or with other practical matters of astronomical significance? And is it not highly probable that, every now and then, such thoughts were interrupted in a manner that was not unproductive? That the derailment of his attention proved more than simply distracting? As a result of being exposed to some unanticipated source of association? Perhaps because the sight of a favorite cafe or restaurant, or the mention of a specific winery or entree in the text of a window-placed menu, summoned up a spontaneous memory of a drink or a meal at that site, a flash-by rehearing of conversational snippets, a recapturing of pivotal elements from a lively exchange between himself and a scientific friend or colleague? Perhaps, even more likely, because - on that street running through 'the center of scientific life' (Aubin, 2003) - thought disruption came in the form of meeting a fellow scientist? Someone with whom he could quickly progress from the mouthing of pleasantries to the formulation of a serious question that might have begun: 'I was just thinking'? Someone who instead might promptly turn to issues on his own mind, to issues that indirectly spoke to Le Verrier's concerns, to ideas that he instantly or eventually reworked, that he translated from one (un)bounded realm of practice to another, thereby enabling a project to further proceed or go off in new directions? Someone with whom matters could be pursued at length by sitting down nearby for a cup of coffee or a glass of wine? And even if Le Verrier was not preoccupied with Observatory matters while undertaking his promenade, and even if he failed to encounter anyone who might steer his thoughts back along a scientific path, is it not more than remotely possible that the street's traffic and (audio-)visual culture sporadically touched off an astronomical synapse? That a particular constellation of objects, the spinning wheels of an accelerating vehicle, the altered trajectory of a corner-turning cab, the eclipse of an attractive woman across the street by a passing omnibus, the shifting shadows jointly produced by an early-hour December sunset and newly lit street lamps, or any of a number of
other commonplace city-thoroughfare sights could elicit a flash of understanding, a one-moment bolt of insight, however small? Or that the items displayed in a shop window, the text of a poster or sign, the contents of a prominently displayed advertisement, a few animated words overheard at a street crossing, or any of a variety of other streetscape sights and sounds could suddenly remind him of something that should be done at the Observatory, could precipitate the instantaneous rethinking of a problem, could call forth associations that might not otherwise have occurred? Right on the spot? Then and there, an out-of-bounds (time-) space of re-cognition?

`Much of science... depend[s] on places of exchange and long-range networks of circulating things and people and texts’ (Dierig et al., 2003).

If social exchanges and happenstance encounters outside the scientific workplace held some small potential for yielding immediate or eventual moments of insight, that potential was presumably altered with the passage of time during the 19th century. As railroad and telegraph networks expanded, as steam-powered vessels became ever more common, as postal services consequently improved and long-distance travel became easier, as the workings of capitalism became ever more synonymous with time-space compression, and as printing technology simultaneously advanced, the volume of specialized information and knowledge circulating between cities rapidly multiplied. This not only meant that the situated knowledge of any given laboratory more rapidly shifted and accumulated via the increased arrival of texts and letters, more frequent conference attendance, and a more widespread network of nonlocal contacts or data collection. It also meant that the situated knowledge possessed by any socially encountered professional or businessman was apt to be more diversified and extensive, as the multiply scaled discourses and relations coming into nexus at their sites of practice were also synonymous with accelerated information turnover and knowledge reconstitution. Thus the probability of discussion-facilitated moments of insight, of knowledge transfers and translations, was not only enhanced between those involved in different local branches of manufacturing and commerce, but also very likely between those involved in local scientific endeavors and other realms of practice. And, as the population of any given city simultaneously burgeoned, the possible permutations of knowledge transfer and translation were further multiplied; or there was an increased likelihood of specialized knowledge moving across `borders' from one local realm of situated practice to another via overlapping social and professional networks. Of course, given the newly emerging conditions of interurban information dissemination and knowledge diffusion, once the scientist stepped outside the laboratory to a space of sociability he was even more likely to experience a moment of insight if his face-to-face exchanges involved colleagues from another institution or scientists from another field.

Attention Please - By Way of an Example A Porous Conclusion

`Contrary to Benjamin, I argue that attention and distraction cannot be thought outside of a continuum in which the two ceaselessly flow into one another, as
That major 19th-century European and North American cities were not infrequently cauldrons for knowledge transfer and translation, that the navigation of everyday life there could expose scientists and academics to spaces of re-cognition and precipitate moments of insight, is indirectly suggested by Jonathan Crary's extraordinary account of how ideas about perception and attention were transformed in the late nineteenth century alongside the emergence of new technological forms of spectacle, display, projection, attraction, and recording (Crary, 1999, p. 2). Building on his previous work on optical physiology and vision through the early 19th century, (Crary, 1990). Crary shows how perceptual experience lost its unproblematic quality and its privileged relation to the foundation of knowledge; how it became widely regarded that: 'The operation of vision itself, with all its physiological idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies was not sufficiently lawlike to function reliably without the "juridical" intervention of attention to hold together sensory data' (Crary, 1999, p. 16).

These developments are not only depicted in terms of the discourses and practices of physiology, philosophy, the nascent field of scientific psychology% and the human sciences more generally intersecting with one another; or of urban-based scientists in Germany, France, Britain, and the United States exerting influence across disciplinary as well as national borders; or of Deleuzian transversal connections between different phenomena occupying very different locations (Crary, 1999). Crary also insists that attention was a problem whose centrality was directly related to the emergence of a social, urban, psychic, and industrial field increasingly saturated with sensory input; that it achieved centrality at the moment when the dynamic logic of capital began to dramatically undermine any stable or enduring structure of perception; at a moment in which the changing configurations of capitalism continuously push[ed] attention and distraction to new limits and thresholds, with an endless sequence of new products, sources of stimulation, and streams of information' (Crary, 1999). Research, a massive accumulation of discursive statements, and new social practices converged and dissolved into one another as a growing preoccupation with the attentiveness of the perceiving body became inseparable from a network of effects (Crary, 1999). As the inevitable fragmentation of the perceptual field replaced older conceptualizations of vision, and as attention became understood as a process of exclusion whereby parts of a perceptual field were rendered unperceived, new educational and industrial workplace practices were developed in the hope of managing or fixing attention and thereby achieving greater productivity, norm-ality, and order(liness) (Crary, 1999). While in the realm of consumption, professional advertising quickly centered on capturing the attention of potential customers. How may the complexly overdetermined phenomena of the 1880s and 1890s covered by Crary be partially reinterrogated and reread? Could the scientists and philosophers who came to variously focus on questions of attention have done so other than through conducting their work at particular sites in particular cities? And thereby becoming [further] enmeshed in particular networks of knowledge exchange that paid no heed to institutional or national borders, that were not only local and disciplinary but interurban and
interdisciplinary? Was it not probable that more than a few moments of insight in the realm of attention studies and applied-research problem solving were derived from circumstances and happenstances outside the workplace - off limits? Could the vast number of translations made around the concept (and 'social problem') of attention have occurred without some share emerging from the conduct of everyday life, from impromptu social or professional contacts occurring at sites beyond the workplace - out of bounds? Given the subject matter, were there not at least a few of the involved scientists or philosophers (and inventors) whose work involved a reflective reworking of their own everyday continuum of attention and distraction, whose spaces of re-cognition were out in the streets or locations elsewhere in the city characterized by whirling discontinuities, by more or less violently clashing stimuli and a demand for rapidly switching attention? And regardless of whether or not this was the case, could any one of them actually have proceeded in the manner they did without navigating and experiencing everyday life within a particular \textit{zeitraum}, without engaging in other situated practices and interacting with people whose lives centered on other situated practices - each of which possessed its own visible and invisible geographies, its own shifting conjuncture of material, discursive and relational circumstances? As opposed to proceeding within an ethereal \textit{zeitgeist} devoid of situated practice? And if all this attention activity \textit{in part} emerged out of and contributed to the changes being wrought by 'the dynamic logic[s] of capital', was it not so that those same logics were producing increased specialization and connectivity within national and international systems of cities, thereby compounding the complexity of situated knowledges and multiplying the opportunities for new attention-research transfers and moments of insight? For grabbing attention and exercising power in new boundary-transgressing ways?

'Porosity is the inexhaustible law of life in this city' (Benjamin, 1996, p. 417).

\textit{The power of the example shown,}
\textit{The site-uatedness of scientific practice,}
\textit{the nexus of visible and invisible geographies,}
\textit{the conjuncture of material, discursive and relational circumstances,}
\textit{the moment of insight}
\textit{the space of re-cognition}
\textit{and happenstance,}
\textit{all mutually (ex)amplified.}
By way of Crary, limits further blurred, borders
\textit{between the conduct of science and the conduct of urban everyday life}
further erased.
\textit{Porous conclusion drawn.}
Or?
The astronomers and traders referred to here play upon empirical studies contained in Dierig et al. (2003). This observation demands extended elaboration, but here it must suffice to expand by way of minimalist maxims. Any control of territory or capital necessary to the exercise of power, any control over material or symbolic resources necessary to the exercise of power, can only be individually or collectively achieved through situated practices. It is only through situated practices that the repertoire of rule understandings necessary to the everyday operation of power relations can be built up - that the rule understandings necessary to any interaction between power holders and power subjects become taken for granted, become a matter of habit-us. It is only through situated practices that power relations can be either negotiated or symbolically or violently contested, and thereby modified or transformed.

In his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Pantheon, New York, 1972 [1969], Foucault repeatedly employs the term ‘spaces of dispersion’ in characterizing ‘the *sites* from which discourses of various stripes emanate’ (Livingstone, 1995, 6, my emphasis). On the movement of scientific theories and facts see Latour and Woolgar (1979).

4 On the movement of scientific theories and facts see Latour and Woolgar (1979).

5 See, for example, Shapin (1983).

6 I have previously pursued the urban-growth consequences of accelerated information and knowledge circulation at length in Pred (1996) and subsequent works.

7 Here I do not pretend to capture the full breadth and subtlety of Crary’s account, but instead merely attempt to distill those elements most salient to this commentary.

References


Chapter 10

Debordering Subjectivity

Huib Ernste

Introduction

Since the spatial turn in many neighbouring disciplines such as sociology, literary theory, political science, anthropology, economics, etc., human geography seems to have shifted closer to the core of social theoretic thinking. Current topical debates within and around human geography for a large part are concerned with positionings in relation to different social theoretic schools of thought. Especially in the context of a more `post-modern' attitude towards these debates, these positionings increasingly take place in the awareness of the political economy and power-play of inclusion and exclusion, of the disciplining effects of `positions' (in a double sense of the word) within disciplines. Strains of thought are thus all too easily sealed off against the `other'. In this chapter I will, however, try to formulate a little `resistance' from the margin, or to use another Foucauldian term: a `capillary' attempt to bring together what might seem so separate, to transgress the border between approaches which often seem so different. To make sense of the richness of these different approaches one is also forced to make rough generalizations and categorizations, neglecting many nuances and more detailed perspectives. Conscious of the danger of caricaturing and doing injustice to many of these very sophisticated and subtle approaches, I will - in the interest of the clarity of my argument - try to ideal-typically describe some general traits of three of these approaches as they can be traced in the current literature. Specifically I will deal with behaviour(al)ism, action theory (or subjectivist interpretative approaches), and post-structuralism within geography, since these represent three important currents of thought in human geography since the 1960s.

Geography traditionally focuses on the world around us, on the space we live in. Even though we nowadays characterize the object of our research as the man-environment relation, there is still a strong reluctance to reflect on the `subject' in this relationship as Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift observed in their book dedicated to `mapping the subject' (1995, p. 1). All too easily reflections on the `self' are left to other disciplines like psychology, sociology or philosophy and all too easily those who do problematize our superficial conception of human being and human acting are confronted with the demand to show first, what this has to do with `human' geography. Seemingly for many in our discipline, in the first instance the issue of the `self' seems to be `off limits' or at least `far off'. But would it not be logical to start our human geographic investigations by asking ourselves who this human being is, who is related to her environment? Also in this respect, I will attempt a border crossing, as I will focus on the specific way in which the `self is
conceptualized in the three approaches mentioned above. I believe that a thorough analysis of the man-environment relationship should not neglect the implied 'models of man'. In dealing with these models of man the main thrust of my argument is that each of these ideal-typical approaches misses the core dilemmas of human being and its spatiality and that a much more hybrid conceptualization of human being has to be the basis of human geographical research. This conceptualization is hybrid in two ways: on the one hand it is hybrid as it locates the 'subject' or the 'self' between individual corporeal being and its environment. The 'self' is a dynamic border-relation, instead of a purified substance in the face of its environment. On the other hand, this conceptualization is hybrid because it integrates all three ideal-typical conceptions mentioned above.

In transgressing these borders - the border between subject- and object-oriented geographies, the border between different conceptualizations of the 'subject' or 'self, and the border between the self and its environment - I position myself as being somehow 'in-between', searching as a nomad (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) for borders (to cross). I will not present a new closed (and sealed off position), but rather try to open up a new border crossing debate, and deliberately provoke more questions than answers. But, before I get carried away by my border crossing endeavours, first let me turn to our three key approaches and their borders: in the following section I will show that in the behaviour(al)ist model the human agent is negated in favour of a human being as a machine perfectly adapted and determined by an objectified and essentialized environment. In section three I will show how action-theoretic approaches in human geography bring back the human agent but idealize the subjective constructivist view of the environment, which enables human beings to make 'perfect sense' of the world. This was criticized from the post-structural position, with which I deal in section four. From that position the constructivist view is sustained but on the other hand the determining power and unstable character of dominant discourses, in this view, leaves only very limited room for the human subject. Finally, I will show that there is also a well founded strain of thought, by which human beings are indeed more than machines. But exactly because of the contingent power of human being one is also able to emancipate oneself from any determining power of dominant discourse without at the same time idealizing the human ability to create 'sense' in human spatial actions. But first I will typify the model of man as we meet it in 'behaviour(al)ism'.

**Behaviour(al)ism**

Behaviour(al)ism (Golledge and Timmermans, 1990; Timmermans and Golledge, 1990) was first introduced into human geography in the 1960s and 1970s as a reaction to a rather descriptive ideographic kind of human geography focused solely on the uniqueness of regional contexts for human activities, and secondly as a reaction to more analytic and nomothetic spatial analyses seeking to find general regularities in spatial patterns. Behaviourism was developed with a neo-positivist epistemology (Couclelis and Golledge, 1983) and thus assumed a clear separation between human consciousness and the spatio-physical environment. Linked with this positivist approach is the empiricist assumption that one can directly and
objectively observe and describe these physical 'facts'. The meaning of these facts is pre-given and fixed. As a consequence, only overt behaviour as well as the observable aspects of the behavioural environment are seen as objects of scientific scrutiny (Gregory, 1978). As a model of man, in essence this implies a reduction of possible behavioural explanations to a kind of environmental or spatial determinism. The causes of spatial behaviour are to be found exclusively in the form of environmental stimuli mediated by one's own senses. Internal and mental causes were neglected and only fixed regular relationships between stimuli and response were sought. Human beings were thus seen as mechanisms, as automata with fixed links between overt spatial stimuli and overt spatial responses. Instinctive animal-like behaviour, or, automatic reflexes are typical of such stimulus-response behaviour.

Even though in this approach many behavioural processes are conceptualized as decision-making processes, these were not conceived as free will decisions but rather as governed by cognitive decision-rules, irrespective of whether they concerned optimizing or satisficing, fully deterministic or probabilistic decision rules (Simon, 1957). The best-known example of this is of course the model of the homo economicus and its variations in rational choice theory. In these models, once all parameters of the rule are known, behaviour becomes totally predictable. Intentionality, as an active, deliberate and free choice does not exist in this view, even though the term appears in many behavioural models as a first outcome of a (deterministic) decision rule. Even after the cognitive turn in principle the mechanism does not change and generalizable models of man are sought. Individual perceptions are not seen as caused by active interpretative acts but rather as images, which passively occur to us. The conceptualization of differential perceptual filters or any other kind of cognitive information processing features are thus only further refinements of a still fully mechanistic, externally determined human being. As such, also the individual attributes of the 'machinery' itself are seen as (inner) 'circumstances', almost equivalent to the outer circumstances or stimuli. These and similar kinds of objectification of the human mental world hardly leave any room for subjective agency, not to mention the recognition of the subjective agency of others in the social environment. In this view the human being is totally integrated into her environment. Figure 10.1 displays a typical example of such a behaviour(al)istic model.

The epistemology and ontology of this approach also does not really change after the cognitive turn within the behavioural tradition. Only the 'bonnet' of the 'machine' called 'man' is then opened and the different mechanisms and linkages which connect inputs or stimuli with outputs or responses are partly unveiled. Differences in types of machineries, mechanisms and mental/cognitive operations are recognized, which brings back some nuances in the crude picture the behaviourists originally drew up, but in principle nothing changes. Only the original 'behavioural' model of man becomes more individualized and contextualized. Universal laws are replaced by 'local' laws. The fundamental difference between, on the one hand, individualized circumstances to which one mechanically and unwillingly responds, and on the other hand individual free will decisions of competing approaches, now becomes more subtle. This tempted several geographers to think that the humanistic and action-theoretical approaches, which assume this subjective freedom, could be successfully merged with
behaviouralistic models (see e.g. Walmsley and Lewis, 1993). However, fundamental differences still exist. Also, the much more individualized and contextualized behaviouralistic cognitive model of man is still indebted to the universalistic, causal deterministic view of human beings. The human being is still largely seen as an information-processing cybernetic machine. Once all the information is known and the mechanism identified, behaviour becomes totally predictable (and manipulatable). Deviations from expectations are often seen as due to (still) insufficient knowledge of the respective mechanisms, circumstances or predetermined information. On the level of the abstraction of the model used this might also be perfectly acceptable and will not upset the model maker.

The behaviour(al)istic view was also reinforced by the structuralist assumption of fixed, underlying structures governing human activities and behavioural situations (see e.g. Johnston, 1986, pp. 97-135). Interestingly enough, we see that although behaviour(al)ist geography initially intended to bring back man as against the dehumanized analysis of geometric patterns in spatial analysis, it finally ends up with a human being which cannot be distinguished from any other living creature or even from a machine. The human being lives totally from the centre, from its current location in space and time. It is completely assimilated, structured, and programmed through its evolutionary adaptation to the environment. Actually, if one thinks of it, there is nothing specifically human to the human beings studied in the behaviour(al)istic tradition.

From the development of this model of man, we clearly recognize the strict separation between the individual and her environment. We can perfectly know all there is about the man-environment relationship if we know the individual
Debordering Subjectivity

(irrespective of her environment) and if we know the current situation or environment (irrespective of the specific individual present in that situation). Both ‘man’ and ‘environment’ are seen as purified and pre-given substances with a clear-cut ‘meaning’ and ‘identity’. This is the picture provided of the bordered self and the well-demarcated and categorizable environment. Only under these conditions is it legitimate to construct the man-environment relationship as a causal relationship and to investigate it through the analysis of spatial regularities. This approach focuses on the analyses, the objectified spatial conditions and mechanisms of human behaviour as they show themselves in the form of spatial patterns and configurations and in our cognitive representations of them. And, as I will show further below, this is indeed one side of the coin, what Plessner (2003) calls the centric side of human being.

In the Anglo-Saxon world it was pragmatism that first formulated a programme to overcome this mechanistic kind of social Darwinism. It was the seminal work of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), in the pragmatic tradition of Pierce, James and Dewey, which reinstated man as the active subject, the core of the action-theoretical approach. Mead’s starting point actually was behaviouristic, although he finally came to the conclusion that many of the behaviourist claims about the fundamental passivity of human consciousness and the submission of subjectivity to exclusively external conditionings were invalid (Dagenais, 1972, p. 85). As such he can be seen as the link between two different traditions, making it worthwhile to devote a few more words to his contribution.

Action Theory

George Herbert Mead can be seen as one of the theoretical founding fathers of the action-theoretical approach. Mead did not just formulate the basis for another approach or paradigm but reflected effectively on the potential links and relations as well as on the differences between the behaviour(al)istic and the action-theoretic conceptualization of human subjectivity, the self and the human mind. 2

For George Herbert Mead the human self evolves out of interaction and communication. Mead explains that human communication is different from the communication occurring among animals. Animals, Mead states, may use signs in the form of cries, gestures, etc. but animal gesture is a communicative act only in that the animals respond to gestures directly in a typical stimulus-response way. It has nothing to do with mind because it does not involve meaningful gestures and their interpretations. Basically the same holds in human communication, except that an interpretation is mentally inserted between the gesture and the response to it. Now the stimulus-response chain is interrupted. As such, acts can be symbolically represented in the mind and real choices can be made between symbolically projected possible acts and outcomes. These symbolic meanings can (partly) also be shared with others and are mutually constituted and adapted in the process of real communication between subjects. Shared symbolic meanings, by means of which subjects objectify their own being and acting, imply that one must view oneself as others do. This way the person can stand outside herself for the purpose of defining the self as an object and that person can then signify to the self as to another social object. The self thus must play the part of both the signifier
and the one signified to. The self becomes the object of symbolic interaction, and
its possessor must be both objective and subjective concerning itself. By viewing
oneself from the potential standpoint of the other, one also becomes aware and can
take charge of the role one plays, in front of (generalized) others. The self-
understanding and consciousness in terms of the generalized other offers the
individual a picture of her various (social) roles and (social) positionings, or in
terms of Mead: of the various `me's'. The `me' is the interpretation the individual
makes of each of her roles in the social world. It shows that the self, and personal
identity, are firmly embedded or 'de-centred' in a network of social interactions and
socially determined meanings. However, according to Mead, the self is more than a
bundle of `me's', and also consists of the `I' as the other part of the social self, a
part which is aware of the `me' but also actively (re-)acts to the `me' and takes
charge of one's own positioning. It is the `I' which is the standpoint from which
all `me's' are interpreted and which is the agent of action with reference to these
interpretations. `It is because of the "I" that we say that we are never fully aware of
what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action' (Mead, 1934) and by
our own creativity. Phenomenological approaches such as Husserl's and Schutz's
also come to very similar results. Like Mead, they both started off from the
obvious everyday living experience in our everyday world. "Under the heading of
"the commonsense world" [... ] Schutz found the a priori conditions of possibility
in one's biographical situation, in one's available stock of knowledge, and the co-
ordinates of the social matrix of "my" situation based on the place which my body
occupies in "my actual here". The intersubjective element in my situation implies a
"there" as well as a "here"' (Dagenais, 1972, pp. 97-98), similar to the `me' of
Mead.

Both the symbolic interactionist as well as the phenomenological approach
have become an important source for geographic action theory, which departs not
from the environment as objectified, but from the social world as lived by human
beings in their actions and projects. In the framework of continental human
geography it is Benno Werlen (1993) who systematized such an action-theoretic
approach, building on the insights of Alfred Schutz and Anthony Giddens.
Wolfgang Zierhofer developed this perspective further towards a language
pragmatic action-theoretic perspective (Zierhofer, 2002).

According to this action-theoretic approach human being and doing, including
being and acting in space, cannot be conceptualized as `behaviour' along
behaviour(al)istic lines of thought. In an action-theoretic framework human spatial
action can only adequately be described and understood taking into account the
intentionality, reflexivity and embeddedness in normative structures and value
systems of human action, as well as its symbolic, affective and emotional
components. By contrast to the stimulus-response-conception in the course of the
behaviour(al)ist tradition, in which the human being is seen as an automaton, only
reacting to external impulses or conditions according to an innate or learned
programme, the action-theoretic approach starts from the primacy of subjective,
group and culture specific sense-making and goal formulation, which allow
individual and collective actors, within certain limits, to reproduce, vary and
produce their own actions and action settings (Weichhart, 1986, p. 85, see also
Figure 10.2).
According to this approach it is not sufficient to analyse the objectified spatial conditions and mechanisms of human behaviour as they show themselves in forms of spatial patterns and configurations and in our cognitive representations of them. Rather than investigating space and actors as such, the action-theoretic approach emphasizes human actions and practices as the geographic object of study. ‘Actions’ are to be understood as any form of human activity with which the actor seeks a specific goal and which to the actor seems to make some ‘sense’. These actions can be overt or mental and also include the deliberate refraining from or toleration of certain activities.

Every action has to be interpreted in the context of the social circumstances under which it takes place. This frames the reflection on and planning of future actions. Not every goal is admissible or feasible in a specific social context. The margin of variation is dependent on existing power relations and the potential for changing them. The implementation of the action plan is also largely dependent on the material spatial infrastructure and technology, which can be used as means to reach one’s objectives. Through the subjective perception of intended and unintended consequences as sanction or incentive, the actor learns about the scope of her actions and is assimilated into the relevant environment. The rationality of
actions is highly subjective and understanding spatial action is based on a careful re-construction of the actor's own leading line of argumentation.

The action-theoretic approach, as described here in all its brevity, builds on the insight that people live in an interpreted world of subjectively and collectively constituted meanings and that meaningful relations with the environment determine who we are. Action-theoretic approaches all strongly emphasize the ability of each interpreting human being in interaction with the environment to come up with new interpretations, or to change or reproduce meanings. Furthermore, limiting or enabling conditions for action first have to be interpreted as such before they are allowed to have any influence. Of course this does not mean that one is free of the effects of one's actions and that the actor is always successful. But, according to the action-theoretic approach, even failure or success is to be seen as a subjective interpretation with substantial degrees of freedom in the way we judge the outcome of our actions.

The action-theoretic approach assumes that from the subjective standpoint human beings and human actions are well assimilated in a network of meaning and sense in our life-world and that this subjective world of meaningful action can be successfully and authentically re-constructed in order to understand spatial action. This theory therefore is based on the idea of a harmonious, self-evident life-world and only in certain problematic situations might new courses of action have to be taken to restore the environmental adequacy of one's spatial actions. This approach indeed is a valuable new perspective in addition to behaviour(al)ism as it now also anticipates the real decision power of the actor both in choosing certain courses of spatial action as well as in interpreting the action setting. It also theorizes the intentional, social and dynamic aspects of these interpretations and actions. This is a first step in de-bordering the self, in freeing it from its containment in an individual existence in confrontation with the objectified environment. The self is to be located in the shared social world ('Mitwelt') of inter-actions. However, as we shall see below, this representation of the self might still be too simple and too idealistic (see section on the hybridity of human being). For example, the very idea that we can talk about clearly identifiable meanings and accordingly determined identities or selves, is challenged by the post-structural tradition to which I now turn.

**Post-structuralism**

French post-structuralist philosophy problematizes the notion of the individual or the subject as an agent of her own actions. In post-structuralist philosophy this notion of the individual subject is also a subjected individual. It was for example Michel Foucault, who argued in his earlier work (1979) that the human sciences have produced individuals who, far from being free, have become constituted in various ways so that they are subjected or dominated through what he calls 'bio-power' (Foucault, 1980). However, in his later writings, in an attempt to answer critics who saw a fatalistic form of determinism in his work on the constitution of the self, he amends his analysis to include how we can ourselves constitute the self (Foucault, 1988, 1990). Conscious of the fact that post-structuralism itself is a highly diverse and fragmented intellectual movement, in this section I will confine
myself to a discussion of the post-structuralist model of man in the work of Foucault, as it probably shows at least some of the most relevant lines of thought and also unveils some of the dilemmas involved.

Foucault analytically distinguishes two main types of technology that human beings use to understand and control themselves and their actions. The first is called `technologies of domination' (the ways in which individuals are transformed by others) and the second `technologies of the self (the ways in which individuals transform themselves). Technologies of domination are concerned with defining and controlling individuals and their conduct, through the exercise of power towards certain ends. Technologies of the self, on the other hand, permit individuals `to effect certain operations on their own bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being' (Foucault, 1982, p. 18), so that they are able to re-construct and transform themselves.

Foucault tries to show that in the Western world within the framework of the Enlightenment project, we have produced and disseminated various discourses and associated practices, which, whilst professing truth to their aim, in fact mask their true function, which is not the will-to-knowledge but rather Nietzsche's will-to-power. In particular Foucault talks about the discourses of the human sciences, which he refers to as `humanism'. The theoretical arguments put forward in the previous sections of this chapter are in his view seen as part of these discourses and are as such not only to be judged on their validity or `truth-value', but also on their dependence on a socio-historical context (episteme) of which they are a part.

Foucault then tries to describe how these discourses developed a specific `normal' and `normative' or `true' model of man, and as a mean and consequence excluded any deviant forms of human being. They thus `produce' as objects `normalized' as well as `deviant' selves and insert corresponding concepts into the relevant discourses. These `new' forms of `governance' of the self have in Western European societies, in the view of Foucault, been obscured and forgotten or have become part of the unreflexive habitual. As an extension of the usual legal forms of state power, Foucault identified the continuous and forceful domination exercised within society at a capillary level by each and every member of that society. Its legitimation is normally derived from `knowledge', or `meaning' produced by experts in the appropriate disciplines. Therefore hidden behind the claim of `truth', they determine what is politically correct. Power is thus closely related to knowledge, and `knowledge is power'. These technologies of domination classify and objectify individuals, and in so far as these objective classifications are adopted and accepted by individuals, so their selves are also constructed.

On the other hand, the subject is also expected to be able to distance herself from these constructions and tell another `truth' about herself. Foucault acknowledges that just as power is everywhere, it is indissociable from contestation and struggle: `[...] as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance' (Foucault, 1988, p. 123). Subjectivity is thus no longer characterized only as a reified construct of power. But in contrast to earlier traditions in the philosophy of consciousness, the task is, in Foucault's view, not to discover some kind of essential secret inner being but rather to continually produce oneself in relation to existing discourses and interactions with the environment. We are still situated within power relations, but the main difference is that Foucault sees that individuals also have the power to define their own
identity, to master their body and desires, and to forge a practice of freedom through techniques of the self. What Foucault now suggests, therefore, is a dialectic between an active and creative agent and a constraining social field where freedom is achieved to the extent that one can overcome socially imposed limitations and attain self-mastery and stylized existence' (Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 65).

What is essential to Foucault's view of the self is that he decentres the possibility and power to act (and therefore rather prefers the term 'practice' over 'action') to the immanent workings of power mechanisms including the normalizing process of subjectification. On the one hand Foucault declares the death of the subject, but not on the basis of objectified causal processes, as was the case with behaviour(al)ism, but on the basis of the performance and exercise of power. On the other hand he leaves some room for the subject, although only marginally and from the margin. Subjects are free to regulate their own behaviours, though not in all possible ways of choosing. As such there is only limited room for manoeuvre. The emphasis is upon the closing down of possibilities, not on their proliferation. As a consequence, the outcome of individual actions is to a large degree indeterminate. Personal interpretations, representations and imaginations of action settings, action objectives and results of action are destabilized, contaminated and disturbed by other meanings. An action-theoretic reconstruction seems literally 'sense-less'. Rather, de-construction seems to be the key to understanding the complexities of the frames of reference of the human subject. From this position it is also difficult to imagine a sociality and communication in which the meaning of (spatial) action is actively created. Along with subjectivity, inter-subjectivity to a large degree also seems to be lost.

We are left at best with a very ambivalent assertion of the death - and (marginal) life - of the subject. In this situation one can of course ask oneself if it is not exactly this ambivalence which could direct us to some hybrid 'essence' of human existence. In the final section of this contribution I will refer to a conceptualization of human being, which in this sense could indeed fill the gap.

The Hybridity of Human Being

The philosophical anthropological work of Helmuth Plessner (2003, IV, pp. 360-425) suggests a hybrid conceptualization of the self. In his view, in contrast to the centric life of the animal, humans live eccentrically, quasi 'outside itself', from where the subject can look over her own shoulder to reflect on her own centra being in the world (Plessner, 2003, IV, pp. 360). By means of this typical eccentric positionality, the human being is able to negate her worldly being and be able to do something about herself. Because human beings can position themselves beyond their own corporeal existence and can see themselves amidst all other objects, the direct relation between incoming stimuli and the outgoing response is interrupted. The subject can refuse, resist, destroy, change, make, create, construct itself and the world around it. In the ability to say no (or yes) lies the necessity of making choices and the recognition of the freedom of will along with the awareness of the contingency and ambivalence of these decisions. At this point it is easy to see the resemblance of Plessner's eccentric positionality with d
Debordering Subjectivity

Meadean ‘I’ and the Foucauldian ‘technologies of the self’ but also of Plessner’s centric being with the behaviour(al)ist model of man. For Plessner, the human being is both structured as centred and eccentric. In both, however, human beings will never fully succeed and will never find a peaceful home in the same way an animal can find his niche and respective mode of living. Humans must therefore restlessly keep going, to continue their actions.

The relation between human eccentric beings and their environment is actively mediated by human corporeal interactions, their specific positionality in time and space, and their nodal position in the web of discursive practices. The unavoidable inscription of meaning into our (inter-)actions in relation to our action settings prescribe and describe the roles we play, but not necessarily our selves. Our daily social interactions in space and time are like masks behind which human beings are always partly hidden and hiding. This mediatedness enables human beings to objectify and generalize themselves and the environment. Through this mask we create a distance with respect to ourselves and to the environment. We see the masks we wear and see the world through the eyes of our mask. But we realize that this is not necessarily us or the world we see, but only what the mask pretends us to be or lets us see of the world. Without the consciousness of this mediatedness the cognitive consciousness of the world around us would present itself as an (illusory) unmediated, direct and evident objectivity comparable to behaviouralist passive perceptions. The behavioural conceptualisation of the self and the behavioural analysis of human activities only captures human existence and action from the perspective of its central positionality located in time and space. From this position we have some sort of limited subjectivity, in the sense that we actively occupy space, and take position or stand in time and space. But from the perspective of this direct, unquestioned immediacy no consciousness of that same subjectivity is assumed. And, indeed, post-structuralism also from its view puts the emphasis mainly on the intricate system of functions, roles and discourses, which externally inscribe meaning onto people and their actions. The subjective power to position oneself outside these nodes of inscribed meanings almost disappears under the cover of the intricacies of power, and the bordered body becomes a subject to power. It is, however, precisely the mediatedness of our relationship with the environment, according to Plessner, which makes it possible to distance oneself from any inscribed meaning, to experience the contingency of any positioning and to resist it.

Thus the bordered body is not just an interface but also a face, an instrument of human expressivity. Human being and human life are necessarily (inter-)active and mediated expressions of one-self, of one’s identity as a human-being and of symbolic meaning. The individual does not become submerged in external inscriptions of meaning but expresses her individuality precisely by performing her role. This expressiveness is a significant gesture in itself. This is the perspective which is mainly developed by the action-theoretic approach. It emphasizes the ability and processes in which meanings are socially performed and constructed and in which human action becomes meaningful and makes sense. But because of the mediatedness of our actions and expressions they, on the other hand, will never be successful. First of all because the means to express ourselves are limited by the discourses in which we are situated. But also because from our eccentric positionality there is no essential identity, meaning or objective to be expressed. It
is from this eccentric positionality that we precisely experience the contingency of each kind of essential meaning. However, in Plessner's view, this does not mean that we are dis-empowered by this fact. Rather, the idea of this contingency will initiate new actions, linking former ones to future ones and as such create an ever-continuing search for authentic meaning.

Because of this eccentric positionality, every human being experiences her 'constitutive rootlessness', which impels her to transcend the achieved and thus to keep searching for an unreachable 'home', a position of unambiguous fixation, a place in this world and a clear identity for the self and the world around it. The eccentric positionality leads to a positioning in a counterfactual utopian home, a kind of 'smooth place' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 383) or 'non-place' (Auge, 1995, pp. 75ff.) or maybe also in a counterfactual ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1984). From there we experience the traces of the 'other' excluded from our own factual being, doing and saying. This detachment, which is constitutive of our personhood, is also the power of imagining ourselves in the place of any other person, indeed of any other living thing. Where there is one person, Plessner says, there is every person. This also means that there is no such thing as an essential and authentic human being. Plessner rather describes the human being as *a homo absconditus* (Plessner, 2003, VIII, pp. 353-366).

In this context one can say that in the behaviour(al)ist view the human being is completely located in the central factuality of daily life, and functions as an animal functions. No instance of reflection, or eccentric positionality, is attributed to the human being. Science can then try to find the correct theoretical construct to model this fixed human nature or causality of the man-environment relation. The action-theoretic approach assumes an active subject and tries to re-construct the reasons for action. It also recognizes the ideal-typical and dynamic character of these reconstructions. At the same time, however, as Plessner attempts to show, in a certain way humans always fail to make sense of their actions, their intentions are ambiguously mediated expressions, which can only partially make sense. This ambiguity and contingency cannot be reduced to the circumstantial deviation from the ideal-type, to the dynamic character of these positionings, to multiple-identities or to pragmatic abstractions from irrelevances as in the Schutzean, action-theoretic tradition (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). Rather, according to Plessner, these ideal-types are ambiguous themselves. This means that a re-construction of sense is inherently unsuccessful. Action theorists thus seem to forget or underestimate the instability and ambiguity of meaning and identity in their re-constructions. This is also the point where post-structuralism can complement the classical action-theoretic approach. Every reason, every draft of sense has to be de-constructed, to make the instability of interpretations and meanings of action and action situations intelligible. Moreover, post-structuralism is better able to explain the persistence and factuality of networks of meaning as they are constituted by power relations and therefore also why factual actions can only in a very limited way 'make sense'. On the other hand, post-structuralist theory fails to fully grasp the ability of human beings to use the mediatedness of their (inter-)actions to create meaning and sense.

In the view of Plessner, the self is de-bordered since it has no fixed positionality. The self is always both a central and an eccentric being. It cannot ever be captured, positioned, categorized, identified in one way or the other. It is always both and we can only track down its performative spatiality through
Debordering Subjectivity

simultaneous construction, re-construction and de-construction. It is also clear that the subject is not centred or de-centred, but eccentred, and therefore positioned in a 'borderless space'.

Thus, we see that what in the first instance may appear as different and exclusive theoretical positions could be mutually complementary after all, allowing from this standpoint a conceptualization of the spatiality of human action in a more diverse and rich way. In the near future, it will be our task to develop such an enriched view of the spatiality of human being and human action - possibly on the basis of the anthropological insights of Helmut Plessner - and thus come to a more comprehensive theory of spatial action and spatial practice.

Notes

1. It can be shown that even the methodological individualism of economics implicitly assumes such a model (Ulrich, 1997, pp. 187-191).
2. A recent study conducted by Robert G. Dunn (1998) also proves the topicality of his approach for current debates about post-modernity.
3. For this brief description of Mead's argument I gratefully draw on the clear and short summary in Skidmore (1975, pp 143-154).
4. See also his contribution to this volume.
5. See also A. Uexkiil and Kriszat (1980) and Zijderveld (2000, chapter 2).
6. At this point it is interesting to note that Jurgen Habermas as a typical representative of the action-theoretic approach and defendant of the project of modernity would totally agree with his arch-rival's post-structuralist critics, that the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness - of subject-centred reason - is exhausted. Jurgen Habermas, as well as those geographers inspired by his language pragmatics, such as Wolfgang Zierhofer and myself, suggest that the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject be replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action.
7. For more details on the seminal work of Plessner see also: www.kun.nl/socgeo/plessner and Emste (2002); see for English review Grene (1966, 1968) and Honneth and Joas (1980).
8. See for example Plessner's description of the 'Mitwelt' (2003, IV, pp. 373-382).
9. This partly also reiterates the view of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who stated in his Phenomenology of Perception (1945, pp. 136 and 157) that intentional actions always and inseparably involve both corporeal intentionality and the intentionality of the mind.
10. This is specifically maintained in Plessner's basic anthropological laws: (a) The law of natural artificiality, (b) the law of mediated directness, and (c) the law of the utopian placedness (Plessner, 2003, IV, pp. 283-425 and more specifically p. 399).
11. Deleuze and Guattari describe 'smooth space' as a nomad space providing room for vagabondage through simultaneously occurring as a place - in this place. It is a place that is not just here, in a pinpointed spot of space, but in a 'non-limited locality'. As such it belongs neither to physical reality nor to the mind. 'Nomad space is "exterior" without being extended, and "pure" without being imaginary' (Casey, 1997, p. 304).
12. 'The indeterminable hidden man'.
References


Casey, E.S. (1997), *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, University of California Press, Berkeley.


Debordering Subjectivity


Chapter II

Friedrich Ratzel's Spatial Turn

Identities of Disciplinary Space and its Borders Between the Anthropo- and Political Geography of Germany and the United States

Wolfgang Natter

‘One cannot know geography without knowing its history. That is a unique fact about this science. In other sciences, it is possible to know their histories; in geography it is essential’ (Ratzel, 1901, p. 1).

Introduction

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) has entered ‘the annals of geography’ as one of the founding figures of modern academic geography. Not including book reviews, Ratzel's oeuvre amounts to over 1200 published papers and books, behind which also stand copious unpublished archival materials (see Bibliography, Ratzel, 1906). Relatively little of this work continues to be read or be taken note of by contemporary geographers not specifically interested in disciplinary history, and with respect to those who do not read German, the relative dearth of available translations has further limited the possibilities of engaging the spaces of Ratzel's geography or the ongoing evolution and deepening of his spatial imaginary (Natter, 2003b). The present essay, part of a larger project, seeks to address some elements of this lacuna. The essay presupposes arguments made in greater depth elsewhere that the body of Ratzel's work has largely been displaced into a corpus that inadequately reflects on the dynamic, possibilist dimensions of his thought, which has led to a one-sided categorization of its orientation as environmental deterministic. Further, it notes that Ratzel's selective engagement with the Tagespolitik of his lifetime is well documented in his various writings (e.g. affirmation of the German state as created following 1871, his advocacy for a time on behalf of the Colonial Society and later for the Navy League) and has not escaped the attention of German and disciplinary historians (Smith, 1991; Schultz 1980, 2000; Natter 2004b). Yet it also notes that few geographers have attempted
to grasp the significance of Ratzel's epistemological attempts to conceptualize a complex and unitary theory of space and to see the various subdisciplinary and substantive outcomes of that effort (cultural geography, human geography, political geography, transportation geography, biogeography) as an often breathtaking exploration of the varied geographic dimensions of a dynamic theory of space (Natter, 2004b).

Viewed from the perspective of geography and the history of spatial thought, Ratzel's work is concerned with the bordering of space in multiple ways. The present essay will emphasize Ratzel's geography as itself a border phenomenon with reference to the social, natural and human sciences, and additionally, how this phenomenon shapes the dynamic concept of 'the border' which he developed. Both moments, I will argue, prove central to his effort to recast the borders of the discipline of geography with respect both to other cognate disciplines and to the various subdisciplinary fields which he conceptualized as elements of a unitary science of space.

In presenting some aspects of this geography here, I will give particular attention to the trans-disciplinary and trans-national border crossings that inspired Ratzel's authorship of two of his best known projects, i.e. the development of an Anthropogeography (Volume 1, 1882) and a Political Geography (1897), will demonstrate the reciprocal relations between them and argue the importance of Ratzel's travels in and abiding study of the Americas for his conceptualizations of global-regional developments and the mutually constituting realms of physical and human geography. With reference to the contemporaneous emplacement of geography within the universe of knowledge, the essay further examines Ratzel's justification for the pursuit of both political and human geography in distinction to competing efforts by political scientists, historians, and sociologists. The final section will consider the role and character of 'the border' throughout this period of his work and will examine how Ratzel applied a developing border concept to human and physical geography. I conclude that section with a brief discussion of its application to one of geography's thorniest problems, a geographical understanding of race and ethnicity.

**Ratzel Loses his Microscope and Becomes a Geographer**

The writings which resulted from Ratzel's pursuit serve to document what I have labeled somewhat coyly Ratzel's spatial turn. But indeed, it was no less a turn for Ratzel to become one of the founding figures of modern academic geography, and above all else the revitalizer of the tradition of human geography and a variety of subfields within it, than it has been a turn, over the past two decades, for the development of spatial concerns to blossom again in a range of cultural and social sciences. It bears emphasis that this founder of modern human geography was by training a man of the natural sciences and in a context in which the answer to the question of how 'space matters' in understanding human development was anything but certain. A century following his death, these demarcations provide useful points of reflection regarding the 'spatial turn' in the cultural and social sciences, as well as about the further development of the 'New' Cultural Geography (Natter, 2003c).
Friedrich Ratzel's Spatial Turn

Ratzel's formal education included study of geology and paleontology in Karlsruhe and zoological, palaeontological, geological and mineralogical studies in Heidelberg. His dissertation, written in 1868 under Heinrich Pagenstecher's supervision, was titled a "Contribution to the Anatomical and Systematic Knowledge of Oligochaeta" (i.e. worms). Following its conclusion, Ratzel heard further lectures, including ones by Ernst Haeckel in Jena, went to Berlin to meet Adolf Bastian, founder of the Museum fur Völkerkunde and the Anthropological Society in Berlin, before writing a first independent book, Being and Development in the Organic World (Buttmann, 1977). This background doubtless affected his attempt to demarcate the parameters of human geography and its subfields such as cultural and political geography. As it developed thereafter, Ratzel's work reveals a complex and not easily collapsible effort to establish epistemological, conceptual and substantive relationships between physical, cultural, biogeographical and political space in which the matrix humans-environment-space would give unity to the discipline's pursuits. The deepening of that general project entailed for him a broad ranging exploration of morphology, geology, and variously, aspects of anthropology, linguistics, zoology, history, statistics, political science, philosophy, psychology, literature and aesthetics. The unusually varied range of contact moments Ratzel sought in deepening an understanding of the spatiality of geography stands in marked contrast to much of the narrowing of disciplinary developments that ensued in the decades after his death.

The beginnings of Ratzel's spatial turn can be dated to an event: While pursuing postdoctoral study in Montpellier, France, his microscope was stolen at the train station. Without the microscope, he could not even think of continuing his work on sea worms, a work planned as a continuation of the dissertation he had written on land-based worms. As reported by various commentators to whom he told the story (e.g. Curt Hassert, his later student in Leipzig and friend), Ratzel's precarious finances led him to seek replacement for his instrument by penning 'Travel Letters from the Mediterranean' to the Kölnerische Zeitung (Hassert, 1905). Thus began what Ratzel would characterize as the most important transition in his life. Taking exit from the laboratory as he knew it from his studies in Karlsruhe and Heidelberg, Ratzel substituted the relatively enclosed and controlled space of the laboratory for the variegated fields of the organic and inorganic world which he began to graph as topography of intersections between humans, organic and inorganic nature. In terms of institutional space, the transition would ultimately recast the borders and elements of geography, most notably in Ratzel's re-insertion of the geography of humans (i.e. Anthropogeography) within a general geography and the further emplacement of geography within the universe of knowledge. In terms of physical space, the transition began by way of writing travel reports from Southern France, Lower Italy, and Sicily, at first mostly with a zoological focus, and after the war of 1870-71 with further reports from the Mediterranean region and then, between 1873 and 1875, with reports from North and South America which document an ever widening substantive focus.

In his travel reports, Ratzel built upon the study and classification of objects, or sets of them, as his formal education had stressed. Ratzel had learned to identify and associate biotic elements, to note their interdependence and to think about the processes of their differentiation. In 'the laboratory' that opened itself up to him by way of travel and observation in the new world, however, Ratzel started reflecting
upon reciprocal relationships between the non-human and human world as they occurred in and between space. In part inspired by his recent friendship with Moritz Wagner, Ratzel began to pursue two thoughts in detail: people and their ideas changed by their dispersal, and secondly, history might be thought of as encapsulating the sum of movements, both with reference to physical and human geography. Thus, migration appeared to be the key to such developments whether with respect to human or other organic life (see also, Hunter, 1983; Sauer, 1971). In his reports written between 1873 and 1875 from North America, Mexico and Cuba, space in its multiple dimensions started becoming co-equal with species as his organizing principle of observation (Ratzel, 1876, 187811969).

Ratzel in America

In these two years of fieldwork, Ratzel developed an abiding interest in developments in the Americas, particularly ones in the United States. In a section of an autobiographical work written near the end of his life titled Briefe eines Zurückgekehrten, [Letters of a Returnee], Ratzel’s fictional narrator reflects on the uncanny effects of this spatial optic. Above all in the realm of night and dreams, ‘in which all distances are erased’, the narrative I of these letters locates himself in a mental space marked by the recurring pairing and intersection of the here and the there: The Hudson and Rhine rivers, the White Mountains and the Black Forest, the Rockies and the Alps, the Congress and the Reichstag, the president and the Kaiser, the Scharlach oak and the stone oak, the Catawaba grape and the Riesling, the beer of Milwaukee and of Munich: My reflection, writes the narrator, ‘is marked by a thinking in pairs, which ever places phenomena side by side, compares them, and causes them to criss-cross’ (Ratzel, 1905, 393). While he never again traveled to the Americas after 1875, or indeed outside of Europe, he built upon his field notes with a voracious reading of books, newspapers and statistical surveys, the pursuit of correspondence with individual scholars, the fostering of student exchange in Leipzig, and so forth. Measured in terms of published work, his interest in America resulted in about 100 articles, 100 book reviews, and several major books. In addition to the previously mentioned travelogues on North America and Mexico published shortly after his return, they included a first volume of a work on North America in 1878 titled Physical Geography and National Character, a second volume published in 1880 titled Cultural Geography, to which we shall turn shortly, and then an extensively revised two-volume set published in the early 1890s on The Political Geography of the United States of America, with volume one centered on the conditions of physical geography and volume two on political, cultural and economic geography (Ratzel, 1878, 1880, 1893). Except for a translation of the 1876 study, none of these books are accessible to geographers who do not read German, a fact that is evident in the work’s reception history in the English-speaking world.

This is not the place to discuss all the things Ratzel found in America and how it impacted his other work (Natter, 2003b). What must be mentioned, however, are his interests in the phenomenon of rapid urbanization, the residential patterns and architectures it brought forth, the extensive development of transportation networks and their explosive effect on population movement and clustering, social patterns
of immigration, gender, ethnicity and race relations, the impacts of technology more broadly on agriculture and industry, the scope and impact of newspapers, and because of all these, the lessening of the city-countryside divide (Ratzel, 1876; Stehlin, 1988). Equally pronounced is his analysis of the impact of morpho-geography on the location of human patterns of settlement and cultural development. Notable as well is his attention to the phenomenon of abandoned ruins and the wasteful deployment of resources he found being expended in the 1870s. The rapid consolidation of populations concentrated around a given location and its resources was shockingly completely reversible in short order given the presumptive appeal of newer locations and resources. Towns sprang up with the construction of railroads, had expectation of growth and permanence and were abandoned as the rails pushed further (Ratzel, 1876; Sauer, 1971). In protean form, Ratzel had identified at least part of the dynamic of uneven development and what David Harvey has described as the spatial fix (Harvey, 2001).

A few years removed from his travels, Ratzel wrote his *Cultural Geography* (of the United States). Still without a regular academic appointment when he wrote it, he insisted that the sub-disciplinary pursuit of cultural geography would require leaving behind the all too ideographic methods of contemporaneous regional geographers. Identifying general characteristics across scale effecting the emplacement of the particular regional object was to become paramount. Further, cultural geography was to be pursued with the aim of identifying a totality in which ‘every side of cultural life in North America’ was considered (Ratzel, 1880). Pursuing ‘every side’ of cultural geography entailed understanding human culture as connected to physical geography (about which Ratzel stressed its historical depth, thus emphasizing its temporal mutability), population geography, economic and transportation geography, the geography of states and communities, religion and the church, the geography of education and mental life, and, finally, the geography of society, understood as the plane of interaction created by its members between all of the above dimensions of mental and physical space. With these particular emphases, Ratzel had sketched a model on the basis of his U.S. travels which the next century’s worth of cultural geography would pursue, or alternatively, narrow (Natter, 2003c).

**Other Outcomes of Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn**

Five additional points merit observation with respect to the works mentioned here regarding Ratzel’s spatial turn. First, the books of 1876, 1878, and 1880, particularly the volume on cultural geography, importantly pre-articulate the formulation of the 1882 *Anthropogeography*, a book to which we will turn shortly. Second, the revised volume of 1893 on the *Political Geography of North America*, with its stress on location, center-periphery relations and the productive role of the border similarly importantly pre-figured the more general *Political Geography* of 1897, while both these political geographies were explained by Ratzel as being a localized testing of the general principles of *Anthropogeography*. As Ratzel himself characterized this mutual interdependence of his 1897 *Political Geography* and the final edition of his *Anthropogeography*, published in 1899: ‘I wanted to test the validity of my anthropogeographical principles by applying
of immigration, gender, ethnicity and race relations, the impacts of technology more broadly on agriculture and industry, the scope and impact of newspapers, and because of all these, the lessening of the city-countryside divide (Ratzel, 1876; Stehlin, 1988). Equally pronounced is his analysis of the impact of morpho-geography on the location of human patterns of settlement and cultural development. Notable as well is his attention to the phenomenon of abandoned ruins and the wasteful deployment of resources he found being expended in the 1870s. The rapid consolidation of populations concentrated around a given location and its resources was shockingly completely reversible in short order given the presumptive appeal of newer locations and resources. Towns sprang up with the construction of railroads, had expectation of growth and permanence and were abandoned as the rails pushed further (Ratzel, 1876; Sauer, 1971). In protean form, Ratzel had identified at least part of the dynamic of uneven development and what David Harvey has described as the spatial fix (Harvey, 2001).

A few years removed from his travels, Ratzel wrote his Cultural Geography (of the United States). Still without a regular academic appointment when he wrote it, he insisted that the sub-disciplinary pursuit of cultural geography would require leaving behind the all too ideographic methods of contemporaneous regional geographers. Identifying general characteristics across scale effecting the emplacement of the particular regional object was to become paramount. Further, cultural geography was to be pursued with the aim of identifying a totality in which ‘every side of cultural life in North America’ was considered (Ratzel, 1880). Pursuing ‘every side’ of cultural geography entailed understanding human culture as connected to physical geography (about which Ratzel stressed its historical depth, thus emphasizing its temporal mutability), population geography, economic and transportation geography, the geography of states and communities, religion and the church, the geography of education and mental life, and, finally, the geography of society, understood as the plane of interaction created by its members between all of the above dimensions of mental and physical space. With these particular emphases, Ratzel had sketched a model on the basis of his U.S. travels which the next century’s worth of cultural geography would pursue, or alternatively, narrow (Natter, 2003c).

Other Outcomes of Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn

Five additional points merit observation with respect to the works mentioned here regarding Ratzel's spatial turn. First, the books of 1876, 1878, and 1880, particularly the volume on cultural geography, importantly pre-articulate the formulation of the 1882 Anthropogeography, a book to which we will turn shortly. Second, the revised volume of 1893 on the Political Geography of North America, with its stress on location, center-periphery relations and the productive role of the border similarly importantly pre-figured the more general Political Geography of 1897, while both these political geographies were explained by Ratzel as being a localized testing of the general principles of Anthropogeography. As Ratzel himself characterized this mutual interdependence of his 1897 Political Geography and the final edition of his Anthropogeography, published in 1899: ‘I wanted to test the validity of my anthropogeographical principles by applying
them to political geography’. In turn, the 1899 edition of the Anthropogeography ‘profited from a sharper depiction of such concepts as Position (Lage), the thorough treatment of the Border, and the laws affecting the spatial development of peoples and states. As a consequence, the present volume of the Anthropogeography has become a new book because the Political Geography preceded it’ (Ratzel, 1899, preface).

Third, once he began his university career in Munich in 1880 and continuing into his Leipzig years, Ratzel regularly offered courses on transportation and commerce geography, objects of study he had come to identify as being central to the recasting of both physical and social space. The tenets of transportation and commerce geography which he came to develop found their way into numerous published works (e.g. Political Geography). Together with his lectures and the work of his students, they crystallize the parameters of a new sub-disciplinary field in relation to a global-regional understanding of space (Natter, 2004b). Fourth, it will probably not be a surprise to hear that in his academic pursuits, Ratzel remained keenly interested in the study of travel literature from various places and times, and even more broadly in the question of how to represent nature in both scientific and bellettristic literature. He guided several dissertations and offered recurring lecture courses on these topics, and himself wrote numerous essays and books on the topic of description and depiction in accounts of nature (see especially Ratzel, 1904). Notably, he offered numerous analyses of literary authors whom he held up as exemplary models of how to study and represent nature, indeed thought of artistic representation as a form of science related to what geographers do, and gave considerable thought more broadly to the question of representation in various media, in which he made use of both these literary sources and his own experiences (see Bibliography, Ratzel, 1906). Ratzel’s abiding interest in aesthetics, both as content and epistemology, stands in marked contrast to the work of succeeding traditions of geography, perhaps until the 1980s, for whom efforts to make geography ‘more scientific’ and autonomous largely entailed a strict delimitation of questions of representation (Jones and Natter, 1999).

Finally, Ratzel ceased being a zoologist and became a geographer during his travels in the Americas. As Karl Lamprecht put it - he of universal history fame and with whom Ratzel worked collegially in Leipzig - Ratzel’s mature period began with his 1878/80 compendium on North America (Lamprecht, 1904). Or as Kurt Hassert, himself a fellow pioneer of transportation and commerce geography, additionally noted, the 1880 volume’s concerns with location, periphery and reciprocal spatial relations definitively mark the evolution of a natural scientist into a geographer (Hassert, 1905). Not only do both these judgments seem fair, I think it also fair to say that the dual optics of a ceaseless thinking together of the nebeneinander, the side by side, along with burgeoning attention to the nacheinander of phenomena, modeled in his observations of the Americas, is constitutive of the science of space Ratzel attempted to develop in the next decades.
The Place of Ratzel's Anthropogeography in Human and General Geography

Some of the most interesting and suggestive geographical writings before and just after 1900 about the dynamics of space and the spatial character of borders stem from this eye. This almost must seem an unlikely assessment given what most current disciplinary history tells and does not tell us about that (notable exceptions regarding Ratzel in English language works are Dickenson, 1969; Sauer, 1971; Hunter, 1983; Mercier, 1996). This section will therefore dwell on Ratzel's current emplacement in the disciplinary history of the English-speaking world, and as a counter to it, to offer a reading of his anthropogeographical volumes (1882-1899) with reference to their contemporaneous reception.

Friedrich Ratzel had subtitled *Anthropogeography Part I* 'Characteristics of Geography's Application to History'. The book drew considerable interest and public praise for its then 38-year old author. 'Path breaking', 'novel', 'astonishing interdisciplinary breadth', 'an inexhaustible and fecund resource', 'finally a book that enables anthropogeography to proceed with its own program, rather than being mixed in with and dependent on other fields of sciences', were some of the words of praise that found their way into reviews that appeared in both the scholarly and more popular press. We will revisit those reviews in greater detail below. In an institutional sense, Ratzel's efforts to define the scope and methods of his anthropogeography secured a new vista of investigation for the relatively young discipline of autonomous academic geography, one, moreover, in which human geography would become firmly entrenched as a major co-equal focus of disciplinary endeavor (Anonymous, 1899).

Following the 1882 appearance of *Anthropogeography Part I*, Ratzel continued to refine his thinking on its behalf during the next 20 years of his life. Part 2 of *Anthropogeography* appeared in 1891, with the indicative subtitle: 'The Geographical Distribution of Mankind', and a substantially revised version of Part 1, to which I have already alluded, came out in 1899. The first chapter of the 1882 edition of *Anthropogeography*, moreover, already contained treatments of subject matters which would later become the focus of full length independent books, including Ratzel's 1904 *On the Depiction and Description of Nature*, the 1900 *Earth and Life*, which laid out a plan for biogeographical study, the multi-volume *Anthropology* (1885-1889), which further deepened the ties between human geography and anthropology, and lastly, the posthumous *Time and Space, Viewed Geographically*, which appeared in 1907. The very first chapter of the 1882 edition of the *Anthropogeography*, in other words, is devoted to a disciplinary demarcation of his science within the universe of knowledge and in relation to adjoining fields, which now, its author proposed, would need to make room for a much expanded appreciation of space necessitated by the proposed pursuit of a geographical consideration of humans.

Ratzel himself was keenly aware of the enabling limits that confronted him and the contemporaneous state of the discipline, and a thesis I wish to offer is that this situation ought to make a difference today in how one reads Ratzel's ongoing definition of geography's aims and methods. At times explicitly, at other times implicitly, Ratzel's mature writing demonstrates an effort to overcome the Kantian distinction between history (as narration) and geography (as spatial ordering) and between geography (as the outer world of objective material conditions) and
anthropology (as the inner world of subjectivities). Yet in the disciplinary histories of geography, particularly in the English-speaking world, little of this expansive experiment to develop a broad based synthetic understanding of space has remained part of the geographical tradition. Instead, turn of the century geography is said to evidence an antinomy that contrasts Ratzel’s founding efforts in the discipline with those of his French colleague Vidal de la Blache, despite Vidal’s own deep appreciation of Ratzel's contribution to geographic thought (Vidal 1898, 1903, 1904, Mercier no date).

Vidal’s ‘possibilism’ has been set up in this account against Ratzel’s ‘environmental determinism’. Determinism here entails many elements, but principally describes a relationship between nature, mankind and culture, in which the causal arrow unequivocally points from the former to the latter two. Further, in the context of much contemporary social theoretically inspired geography, such a deterministic orientation would be identified as a well spring of essentialism. The characteristics of essence have generally been stabilized in timeless eternal forms, and since at least the early modern period, including in such social containers as nation and race. In geography, both essentialism and environmental determinism have underscored an equation, deeply etched in the schools of regional geography that developed with Hettner before the first World War and continued through the work of Hartshorne and others until the 1970s and beyond, that might be characterized thusly: Certain places = certain identities (Natter and Jones, 1997).

To be sure, a reading of numerous Enlightenment figures who wrote about geography, e.g. Buffon, Linee, Kant, and Hegel, seem no less enamored of the equation, or at all shy in identifying the presumptively necessary geographical conditions (by degrees of longitude and latitude no less) for the ideal development of universal reason and humanity (Natter, 2004a). Foregrounding the very real ‘possibilism’ at work in Ratzel’s diffusionism points us to other ambivalences, fractures and tensions between this presumptive corpus and the body of the work to be found in the 1200 publications mentioned at the outset, not least with respect to the roles of the border and of movement in this geography.

**Anthropo- and Political Geography as a Justification of Geography**

Ratzel repeatedly introduces his major works by first offering a justification of how they present a new ‘way of seeing’, subdiscipline or a new methodology (e.g. discussion regarding his Cultural Geography above). With respect to the (re-)introduction of humans to the aims of geography, Ratzel begins not with a justification for adding a ‘supplement’ to an already constituted field, but by asking how exactly does geography distinguish itself from other sciences. ‘What is geography in relation to the world of science? Is geography really nothing more than a cluster of branches that have been thrown together for practical reasons, branches that really belong to other disciplinary trees? Is geography an autonomous discipline?” (Ratzel, 1882, p. 16). While such neighboring disciplines as history or anthropology allowed a certain role for geography, as an auxiliary science [Hilfswissenschaft] to supplement certain gaps left unaddressed by these established disciplines, Ratzel from the outset sought to inverse the arrow, by refuting the assertion that because other sciences had already laid claim to objects in these
fields of interest, these had already been adequately demarcated. In opposition to these tendencies, he modestly proclaims a near total privilege for a geographic perspective to investigate the world: "And this perspective is given by the compilation of the earth's surface and the life that belongs to it as a whole unified by manifold reciprocal relations" (p. 17). Thus, even if various phenomena that fall within this definition were also claimed by the likes of historians, anthropologists or geologists, Ratzel would counter-claim: "The object addressed by a discipline does not in itself determine its borders, but rather the point of view conferred upon the object" (p. 17).

Similarly, Ratzel's Political Geography of 1897 likewise opens with a justification of the endeavor as a whole in relationship to the aims of cognate disciplines. In this instance, it is the sociologists, political scientists and to some extent the historians who appear as geography's neighbors. But, in asking about politics, political science (Staatswissenschaft) had shown no inclination to think geographically, apart from asking geographers to provide them with better maps or statistics (Ratzel, 1897, p. iii). More generally, Ratzel offered, sociologists, political scientists and historians often seemed to analyze the state and its politics, as if the state simply hovered in the air (p. iv). In, so to speak, grounding an understanding of the state, political geography would not shy away from contact with the investigations offered by sociology, political science and history, but "geography itself will need to shape the material, because the matter at hand demands a genuine geographical point of view; an authentic political geography can only operate according to a geographical predisposition, methodology and its goals" (p. iv). In the case of political geography, this geographical core is given by recognition of the necessary connection between the state and the ground (Boden).

Let me expand on these remarks by suggesting what Ratzel had accomplished with his Anthropogeography (which as I have suggested throughout bleeds into his Political Geography). There are at least five points that merit mention, points which also to various degrees are echoed in the review literature that followed the appearance of the second edition of Volume 1, in 1899.

First, Ratzel had established a framework that put humans back into the systematic pursuit of a general geography. Now, of his immediate contemporaries, Kirchoff, Richthofen, and Peschel, the latter two of whom were Ratzel's direct predecessors in Leipzig, had given some attention to 'the human factor', as had Karl Ritter before that. But 19th century developments after Ritter, including the directions pursued by Richthofen and Peschel, had led to a foregrounding of physical geography as the preferred object of geographical analysis. Within this inner-disciplinary development, Ratzel's innovation was to have developed a perspective for researching the reciprocal historical-geographical development of humans and their social, cultural and political emplacements in relation to the earth's surface. As Petermann's Mitteilungen judged the situation with the book's re-issue in 1899, "This book makes definitely clear, that the days in which Geography was inclined to position itself completely on the side of the natural sciences, or indeed to become a branch of geology, are over" (Anonymous, 1900).

Second, Ratzel had demonstrated, also to the satisfaction of many non-geographers, that 'every manifestation of human culture, such as transportation, commerce, the state, the origins and movements of peoples, had a geographic side, which could be represented in words and on maps' (Vieikandt, 1899). A major
achievement of Ratzel's *Anthropogeography*, reported various readers, was its portrayal of the reciprocal character of the relations between nature and humanity. Premised on the recognition that the entire history of humanity was developed on the earth and with the earth, Ratzel had demonstrated that humankind's history 'is not merely a passive being there [Zugegensein], but rather a living, suffering, progressing and aging with the earth'. In describing the movement of peoples, and their dependence on the earth, Ratzel has shown 'how the earth, with its manifold differences, restrains, enables, slows down, speeds up, divides and unites these movements' (Heiland, 1900).

Third, he had thoughtfully linked time and space in the analysis of human development. Hereafter, as, for example, Karl Lamprecht and Hans Helmolt noted in various publications, it would be impossible to undertake the research of history without the inclusion of a geographical dimension (e.g. Helmolt, 1899; Lamprecht, 1903). At the same time, as Ratzel himself inveighed, geography would also need to supplement its enterprise on the basis of a historical understanding.

Fourth, as argued by Ratzel, the pursuit of human geography and history (Universal History or any of its other forms), truly needed to be worldwide in scope. Such history could not be content with the analysis of Europe and the Mediterranean world, an understanding pursued by Ranke and his followers, following a misguided path of German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel) which had authorized 'a geographic absurdity'. As Ratzel had already stated in the 1882 edition of *Anthropogeography*: 'The unique, scientific perspective, with which geography views the world, is the interconnectedness of the earth's surface and the life that belongs on it as a totality connected in multiple, reciprocal relationships' (Ratzel, 1882, p. 17). As another reviewer noted in making the same point: Ratzel makes clear that an authentic history of mankind can only be on the basis of developments globally; in South America, Africa, and so forth' (Kolnische Zeitung, 22/9/1899). Reviewers praised and alternatively criticized Ratzel's attempt to inductively draw general laws from the endless mass of individual observations and synthetic comparisons. Nearly everyone, however, made a point of emphasizing that the value of the whole of Ratzel's anthropogeography did not rest or fail on the success of this or that synthetic comparison. Nearly all noted with understanding why Ratzel's method required the need to thoroughly know any given time-place to fulfill the aspirations of this comparative general geography. This, it seems to me, is the aspect of Ratzel's analytic most frequently lost sight of by subsequent readers of this or that essay or book who mistake his detailed chronicling of the physical and anthropogeographic features of any given place or region for mere descriptive geography.

Fifth, Ratzel's system provided a means of understanding technology as an instance of cultural developments and as a response to man's relationship with his environment. Technology is a means to overcome human dependence on the caprice of extant nature (e.g. the railroad in Russia). This did not mean, however, that time had overcome space, or some such principle; mankind's connection to the earth and the routing of its various grounds remained primary regardless of any particular instantiation of what Marx independently called second nature.
A Dispute of the Faculties: Anthropogeography versus Social Morphology

For Emile Durkheim, who had taken notice of Ratzel's publications, had written reviews of them, and had invited Ratzel to publish in his journal, the key contributions of Ratzel were to have heightened awareness of the 'geographical factor', and to have lifted geography from its isolation from the world of science (Durkheim, 1897/8, 1898/9). But instead of affirming Ratzel's call to widen the scope of geographic investigation, Durkheim stressed the role that other disciplines ought to play in addressing them, work in which sociology was to be eminent among these disciplines. The earth could not explain mankind, Durkheim ultimately rebuffed what he presumed Ratzel was arguing, but mankind had to explain the earth. This would be the task of Durkheimian sociology and of his L'année sociologique. Integrating geographical factors into sociology, thus Durkheim, was therefore the appropriate tact to take (see Section G of the journal, which in its categorical ordering refers to 'social morphology'). By contrast, Ratzel never ceased in his mature work to insist that *der Boden*, translated alternatively, as earth or ground, was the irreducible foundation of geographic knowledge and upon it could be articulated the triad of relations between humans, the environment, and space.

Let me dwell for a moment on what Durkheim may have missed about the social and political dimensions of Ratzel's use of the terms *Boden* in relationship to the earth. The earth and its various grounds for Ratzel was a multi-tiered horizon of geographical and historical relationships and phenomena. With respect to humans, *der Boden*, the ground, was in one sense a physical surface of the earth on which one might, for example, walk, while on another, the ground of human beings, ever evolving, characterized various paths and networks of, for example, transportation, commerce, and other modalities fostering or inhibiting movement. While the circumference and mass of the earth might remain more or less the same, the general concept of *Boden* could be shown historically and geographically to have taken multiple forms, each with their own effects in constituting assemblages of human beings and their relations to the environment. Importantly, the grounds in question might be studied thoroughly via the principle of *neben*einander, the side by side, for in Ratzel these forms of ground also simultaneously embody the principle of a *nacheinander*. With their evolution, the identity of peoples were effected by movements enabled and inhibited, while the Earth and its environment was also transformed, even while seemingly remaining relatively constant over time. Ratzel was indeed attempting to use the earth to explain humanity, as per Durkheim, but it was an attempt to forge a dynamic spatio-temporal matrix that effectively crossed the wires of time and space in explaining human development.

All these points, I would like to conclude this part of the paper by saying; suggest a very different project than that of a presumptive environmental determinist, the label with which Ratzel's efforts have largely been rendered in most post second World War disciplinary histories of geography in the English-speaking world.
In important ways, which I thematize elsewhere, Ratzel's mature work addressed the flows of global space as they were reconstituting a heightened phase of time-space compression in his lifetime. Among other things, both in his theorization of space and identity, he reflected on the contemporaneous tendencies of extant regional and national borders to be overrun by the tendency towards what he labeled *Grossraumformen* [large orders of space] and the acceleration of hybrid identities. Commerce and transportation are two of the motors of this development for Ratzel, hence his abiding interest in developing the subdisciplines of transportation and economic geography. The resolutions of the proclivity toward large orders of spaces, might, he averred in writings of the 1890s and until his death in 1904, be resolved by economic co-operations or by state reformations (wars also being one such means), depending upon the region in question. The ceaseless movement of peoples, elevated to the condition of universality by the history of mankind, resulted in a constant hybridization of both peoples and cultures, as well as that of the environments within which they interact. As a result: 'Even if some groups stay in relative isolation over periods of time overall, mankind changes daily' (Ratzel, 1900).

This may seem a surprising characterization of a thinker whom most disciplinary history tells us sought to explain regionalization in his political geography on the basis of extant nature, theories of natural borders, and the primary existential divide between land and sea powers. What makes my doing so possible, however, is a palpable ambivalence running throughout his mature work between his recognition, on the one hand, of the essentially dislocating effects of space, particularly notable in the period of late 19th century globalization and its dense space-time compression, and on the other hand, his efforts nonetheless to provide some sort of ground for a territorially defined state, specifically in the form of post-1871 Germany (see Ratzel, 1898).

Borders play a crucial role in this topography, and as I noted earlier, they, along with the categories of space, periphery and location, already organize the political and cultural geographies he wrote about the United States. Ratzel sharply differentiates his understanding of borders from one that considers them as being simply the end of one side and the beginning of the other, without transition: 'All drawing of borders,' he writes in *Political Geography*, 'is symbolical. Modern borders are no longer geographical realities' (Ratzel, 1897, p. 448). Further, the apparently blank border is in fact itself the expression of a movement (p. 450). In actuality, 'the most variable phenomena are seen to coalesce at the border, as effect and expression of the movement on the earth's surfaces' (Ratzel, 1896, p. 59). Ratzel therefore objects to the representation of borders in the form of a drawing of lines to demarcate them, because of the lines' inherent tendency to abstract, simplify and obfuscate the dynamic nature of the border. The drawing of a border, both in nature and in the lives of peoples, is only scientifically justified when rendered with a self-understanding of its status as being the capturing of a moment and movement between transitions (Ratzel, 1896, p. 59), an *Augenblick*. Where 'the abstraction of the line creates the illusion of a clean separation of areas, we in fact see the unique space of a border-edge *[Grenzsaum]* before us, which has developed between any two territories' (Ratzel, 1896, p. 76). Even borders of
political space, which can seemingly be sharply drawn by diplomacy, are in interaction with lines of demarcation which can never be as sharply drawn due to their intertwining with overlapping areas of differences in languages, ethnicity, culture, and religion, not to mention certain borders in nature, all of which react back upon the political border.

In nature, as exemplified in geological study, phenomena demonstrate the general tendency to assume in-between forms, such that the border in any particular case appears as a border-edge (Ratzel, 1896, p. 54). A border-edge [Grenzsaum] is a manifestation of present and historical movement, such areas are documented throughout the biosphere. Both within and without, for reasons of politics, culture and nature, border territories are dynamic, formative of the border territory itself, while as a periphery they react back on the centers which meet at the border. The `essence' of the border, consequently, is that it is always ready to be transformed and it, in turn, effects the centers which in manifold and important ways are constituted by it (Ratzel, 1896, p. 58). Already given for tellurological reasons, the transformability of the borders of states and peoples is equally posited. One must renounce a notion of absolute borders, Ratzel insists in various writings (Ratzel, 1897, p. 453): The border-edge is the reality; the border-line, merely an abstraction of it (Ratzel, 1897, p. 448).

Within contemporary critical social and political geography, one can find a comparable analytic articulated in the notion of the constitutive outside’s relationship to centers and peripheries along with the identities they explicitly cannot contain and an interest in rethinking the various dynamics at play in constituting borders of various kinds. Briefly the constitutive outside suggests the improbability of a sharp drawing of borders, stresses the reciprocal character of processes on either side of porously construed borders, and reflects on how any given identity or center is in fact constituted by its others (Natter and Jones, 1997). What makes Ratzel’s refusal to draw absolute borders of further interest, moreover, is a parallel train of thought which applies the content of the concept border across the full scale of natural and cultural phenomena. That is, every phenomenon appears to have or produce border edges, whether it be areal phenomena bordered by the sky, continents by oceans, countries, races and cultures by others of the same, centers by peripheries, etc. In various historical and imaginable phases of development, any given particularity apparently submerged at the border might under another imaginable scale-in-becoming come to constitute a new center for the arrangement of elements.

Everything and everyplace is in some important sense a potential border, the tendency of which is to foster an admixture of elements, or in the case of human culture, hybridity. Restless movement, as the signature of mankind, has created a culture in which people of the most different origins meet and are transformed, making highly suspect claims for any essential equation between race and region. Even when certain cultures stay ‘in place’ over longer periods of time, at the borders, there still occurs contact and mixing with other groups (Ratzel, 1906, p. 465) whether these others be called peoples, or nations or races. In Ratzel’s mature work, when the concept of race is addressed, it is simultaneously critiqued for being at best an inexact category. Race, it appears to Ratzel, cannot be definitively anchored by language, by physical attributes, by character disposition, or demonstrated evidence of origins. At best, the concept thus registers a phase of
broader global contact between cultures, the moment when the concept of peoples [Voelker] is no longer adequate to measure degrees of separation between cultures, just as before that the identity marker peoples had supplanted the separation of humans into stems [Stamme]. What is true of races is equally so for the notion of ‘peoples’. As little as ‘race’ is uniform, so too peoples, which likewise are purported to be completely uniform, ‘show the ‘tears’ [Risse] of the bordering of previous admixtures of humanity [Mischungsbestandteile’] (Ratzel, 1906, p. 474).

Contrary to those such as Gobineau or Chamberlin who argued for the purity of a purported German race, Ratzel insisted that the above applied especially to the past and present inhabitants of Germany. In his lecture notes, notably those devoted to the topic of Germany, Ratzel even more pointedly makes fun of those who indulge in the proclivity of paying homage to presumed (Aryan) ancestors, ‘although often enough not a drop of blood of the presumed ancestor flows in his veins. In Germany, we often find people whose faces are beautified Irish or Russian features, exclaiming themselves to be the children of the blond ancient Germans, or Slavic West Prussians or Silesians who honor the accounts of Tacitus and apply his reports about the Germans to themselves as much as do the half or fully Celtic Pfalzzer or Badenser’. Nor was this situation to be lamented: ‘It is an entirely erroneous opinion to believe that a people is stronger in every regard, the more uniform it is. In fact, exactly in those peoples who have achieved the most, multiple races and nationalities are at work together in achieving political and all the more, economic success’ (Ratzel, 1906).

In his final years, Ratzel began giving attention to the idea of the establishment of a European customs union. This was one possible incarnation of the tendency toward Grossraumformen which he postulated was the spirit of the contemporary age. Precisely because of the appropriation but also neglect of aspects of Ratzel’s work articulated by Carl Schmidt and various geopoliticians associated with the Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik in the 1930s and ‘40s, Ratzel’s formulation must be carefully distinguished from the notion of Groj3raum Schmidt and Haushofer developed. The customs union Ratzel proposed would be developed on the basis of extant sovereign states that would associate voluntarily with retention of their sovereignty. Further, that sovereignty would not be defined in ethnic terms; ethnic Germans who lived elsewhere, for example, were simply citizens of those other states (Natter, 2003a).

I conclude with a passage from the Letters- of a Returnee, one of Ratzel’s final writings, to which I alluded earlier. ‘My old eyes’, says the text’s narrator, ‘which have become accustomed to American dimensions, can no longer see the purported contrasts between peoples in Europe as being that significant. I have seen so many apparent differences between peoples come to be erased, that I can’t believe in the unending perpetuation of these differences. When one has seen the power that the spatial diffusion of political ideas, and the economic developments that follow, exercise on the sensibilities of human beings, one is inclined to have larger expectations for European possibilities. There is no bigger question for European politics than finding a form of cooperation between its peoples and states, which hitherto have largely insisted on their differences, rather than their similarities, and sadly, too many leaders living in the Germany that Bismarck forged have numbered among the most vociferous in this regard. Finding this common ground may be a lengthy process but a necessary one’ (Ratzel, 1905).
References

Anonymous (1899), Deutsche Literaturzeitung, issue 40.
Anonymous (1900), Petermann's Mitteilungen, issue 10.
Heiland, R. (1900), Pedagogische Blätter.
Hennolt, H. (1899), Weltgeschichte. Volume I, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig and Wien
Ratzel, F. (1869), Sein and Werden der organismischen Welt, Leipzig.
Ratzel, F. (1876), Städtle und Culturbilder aus Nordamerika, Brockhaus, Leipzig.


Ratzel, F. (1882 [1899]), *Anthropogeographie*, Bd 1, J. Engelhorn, Stuttgart.


Ratzel, F. (1893), *Die Politische Geographie Nordamerikas*, Oldenbourg, Munich.


Ratzel, F. (1897), *Politische Geographie*, Oldenburg, Munich.


Ratzel, F. (1900/1906), *Einige Aufgaben einer politischen Ethnographie*, Zeitschrift fuer Sozialwissenschaft, III Jahrgang, Heft 1, 1900. Also in Ratzel 1906.


Ratzel, F. (1904), *Ueber Naturschilderung*, Munich.


Ratzel Papers (no date), *Box on Politische Geographie*, Institut fuer Laenderkunde, Leipzig.


PART IV

RE-IMAGINING BOUNDED ROUTES
AND DISCOURSES
Chapter 12

The Poetry of Boundaries

Reflections from the Portuguese-Spanish Borderlands

James D. Sidaway

‘Talking not long ago with one of my friends - there was a time when we used to call them "informants" - of the changes brought about at his village on the Portuguese-Spanish border by the so-called "Europe Without Frontiers" (or at least without internal frontiers) he thought for a moment and then he replied, carefully and repeating his words: “You may remove the door but the doorframe remains... you may remove the door, but the doorframe remains”’ (Kavanagh, 2000, p. 47).

‘Here we have the first inkling of a possibility of linking borders away from the ebb and flow, advance and retreat that are the direct result of battles lost and run conquests, occupations and negotiated concessions and withdrawals. Not least of the possibilities is the understanding of lines as active; of flight, of crossings, of the ability to carry us away’ (Rogoff, 2000, p. 116).

Introduction

Reflecting life and journeys along the Portuguese-Spanish borderlands, this is a chapter of detours and departures. It is a collection of fragments of the border - thoughts and reflections on the boundary stones and rivers, the maps and marks that serve and signify this frontier. My aim (t)here is to think around, through and ‘against’ borders. Following Barker (1998, p. 120) therefore:

‘To think against is to analyse the level of a surface, not to get closer to or further from the truth or objective reality but to reveal other surfaces and points of contact.’
The chapter is in part a semiotic analysis, in the broad sense that Elam (1980, p. 1) describes as:

"Semiotics can best be defined as a science dedicated to the study of the production of meaning in society. As such it is equally concerned with processes of signification and with those of communication, i.e. the means whereby meanings are both generated and exchanged. Its objects are thus at once the different sign-systems and codes at work in society and the actual messages and texts produced thereby. The breadth of the enterprise is such that it cannot be considered simply as a "discipline", while it is too multifaceted and heterogeneous to be reduced to a "method"."

However, in so much as this chapter is informed by a `method', this rests not only upon the collection and critical scrutiny of published narratives about this border or discussions with those who live along it, but also upon a series of journeys and walks through its landscapes - in particular across the section of the border between the Portuguese Alentejo and Spain's Andalucia that also intersects the rolling hills of the Sierra Morena. In drawing upon these journeys (during which the border stones that appear here in the figures were photographed), I have been inspired by Cloke and Jones's (2001, p. 663) rendering of place and landscape through an exploration of micro-places, ecological and cultural resonances and networks of social and material relations. They explore the dialectic between:

``...the continuing tendency towards framing landscapes as the vista from a fixed point... [which] has the effect of putting the viewer at a fixed point - outside, or on the edge of, the landscape with a single static orientation frozen in time [contrasted with]... a perspective which is about being in the landscape, about moving through it, in all the (perhaps) repeating yet various circumstances of everyday life. Being in, and moving through, landscape is different to gazing upon it from a point which always seemingly puts you at the
The Poetry of Boundaries

edge of it, or even outside of it. The landscape surrounds you, it will often be unreadable from any one position, and your orientation may be constantly or frequently, even habitually, shifting. It is about fleeting intimate details that your senses can pick up from being in a landscape.'

Some inspiration here also comes from Yi-Fu Tuan (1989, p. 240):

`...cultural-geographers-cum-storytellers stand only a little above their material and move only a little below the surfaces of reality in the hope of not losing sight of such surfaces, where nearly all human joys and sorrows unfold.'

However, the starting point of these detours is to reiterate that amongst other things, a border may be read as a semiotic system, a system of images and imaginations. As Anssi Paasi (1999, p. 669) stresses, boundaries are:

`...institutions and symbols that are produced and reproduced in social practices and discourses.'

It is in the context of such approaches and understandings that the paper begins with descriptions and maps of this border between Spain and Portugal. The paper then (re)traverses the line between Portugal and Spain, in order to explore border poetics and politics in the contexts of wider European integration. Whilst I have elsewhere attended more systematically to the geopolitics of Iberian cross-border co-operation projects (Sidaway, 2000 and 2001), this chapter unfolds as a series of forays into border poetics. These begin at the border, with maps and boundary stones and the semiotic (and political) system of which these - and the Portuguese and Spanish states - are components and effects. The chapter then considers how the border and the lives around it are reconfigured within the discourses and practices of European integration.

Maps and Marks

`Boundary stones are not the boundary itself. They are not coeval with it, only its visible symbols' (Kristof, 1959, p. 272).

Narrating his journeys in Portugal, the British poet and travel writer Paul Hyland (1996, p. 153) describes a venture into Spain across this border. As the culmination of his detour in the borderlands he explains that:

`Before crossing the bridge to the old [Portuguese-Spanish] frontier I planned my own pilgrimage, a short one to the Hermitage of Nuestra Senora de los Hilos. Hilos means "threads". I planned to gather up loose ones there... When I found it near dusk, the hermitage comprised a sturdy church... Three men and a dog sat in the..."
porch. It all dated back to the *Reconquista* from the Moors, but had been rebuilt in 1768 when a new image was installed. The light within was rare, the virgin backlit by a lustrous golden rerdos. Always in Iberia the shock of contrast, disconnection, contradiction between outside and inside, _foravdentro._ Outside, a sign read "de los Hitos". The name on my Michelin map was a figment of the cartographer's imagination. The men laughed. "Not hitos," one thracked his thigh with a switch, "but hitos. No loose threads at all, but a line drawn taut for *Nuestra Senora de los Hitos,* Our Lady of the Boundary Stones."

The toponomy and meaning of the Michelin map (Sheet 444 Central Spain, 16th edition, 1998) is indeed misleading in just the way that Hyland notes. Somehow the hill-top sanctuary known as *Nuestra Senora de los Hitos* has become, on the map, *de los Hilos.* Michelin® are not alone. Sancha Soria (1995) describes how further south in the Sierra de Huelva on the Spanish side of the border between Andalucia and the Alentejo, a range of maps, including ones produced by the Spanish Army Geographical Service, the Spanish National Geographic Institute and the Spanish Institute of the Environment differ between each other in the naming of hills and how all depart from local naming practices. These disparities between the cartographic representations and those attached locally to places are stark reminders that maps are another system of representation; foregrounding certain objects and leaving out others, (mis)Naming them and establishing hierarchies of judgement as to what is represented and by what words and other symbols."

"Yet all these maps chose to represent the border between Portugal and Spain. In many of the Spanish maps, beyond the border (marked by a line of crosses) is blank space; marked only by grid lines and bold letters spelling-out 'PORTUGAL'. Whether Portugal is blank or not, what makes this border real and worthy of cartographic designation is that the representation on the map coincides with other systems of representation in which the border is narrated, cited and reiterated. Firstly, where the border is not marked by rivers (which it is for about 60 per cent of its course) - some of which have become reservoirs - it is designated on the ground by boundary markers (known in Spanish as hitos or as marcas in Portuguese) (see Figures 12.1 and 12.2). Either side are different states, themselves complex systems of representation? And the border is also demarcated in a series of Treaties which (with one notable exception of a small disputed area outside our focus area here) are recognized and ratified by the two states. Although throughout its length there is little or no significant environmental variation either side of the border, different languages more or less coincide with the border and with them go different national imaginaries. Some mixing and local dialects complicate this, but the broad coincidence and overlapping of a set of systems of representation (cartographic, legal, linguistic, etc.) make this border seem real and tangible, seemingly worthy of the line of black crosses and yellow line that winds across the Michelin maps of Iberia."

Moreover, this border, like all others, is variable along its length and through time. It stays in the same places (leaving aside minor variations in the courses of those streams and rivers whose deepest point marks the border), but since the
systems of representation that reproduce it are dynamic, its many meanings and its identity change. As Wilson and Donnan (1998, p. 12) note, all borders are:

`...complex and multi-dimensional cultural phenomena, variously articulated and interpreted across space and time. This suggests that a priori assumptions about the nature of "the border" are likely to founder when confronted with empirical data; far from being a self-evident, analytical given which can be applied regardless of context, the "border" must be interrogated for its subtle and sometimes not so subtle shifts in meaning and form according to setting.'

In parallel terms, Douglas (1998, p. 88) demonstrates:

`that even when borders remain relatively static, as has been the case with the French-Spanish border (arguably the most stable in western Europe), the borderlands themselves are in a constant state of flux... Thus, how, as opposed to where, north meets south is subject to constant negotiation.'

With this in mind, the Portuguese-Spanish border is read symptomatically (and as an example) here; but in ways that I hope will be suggestive for other students of borderlines. What lends such a project some credibility is that this (the longest of internal EU borders) is usually regarded as being the oldest stable frontier (surpassing even the claims made on behalf of the French-Spanish border), not only in Europe, but in the world. Spanish and particularly Portuguese historiography traces the origins of the border to Treaties of the 13th century. In other words, part of its representation is an ancient demarcation. In particular, the antiquity of this border and its transhistorical presence through the centuries is a key reference point in narratives of Portugal's history (Sidaway, 2001). The stable borderline is a totem of Portuguese nationalism, a sign of sovereignty.

In what has become something of a classic account of Human Territoriality, Robert Sack (1984) noted how the anchoring of society to place in the nation-state became one of the clearest expressions of `mythical-magical' consciousness of place in the 20th century. And amongst all the characteristics of nation-statehood are numerous concentrated sites of mythical-magical performance - monuments and tombs, museums and mountains. Borders are amongst them. More often seen depicted on maps than they are crossed on the ground, borders have a special place in marking the known and essential limits to the nation-state. Borders are frequently inscribed within narratives of statehood; from maps to history books to popular notions of us-and-them, self and other. Borders are the very substance of nation-statehood.

In contrast, the European Union as an imagined community lacks such sites. Blue flags on official buildings and signs alongside infrastructure projects indicating part-funding by the EU are hardly substitutes for war memorials, national monuments and state borders (Shore, 2000). The European Union is therefore a project of becoming 'an ever closer union' (in the terms of the Treaty of Rome) in part via the fostering of connection and flows.' This future-orientated project includes the re-working (the 're-placing'
of borders between EU members. These borders now enter new texts: those of Brussels. They are scripted as key sites of the integration project. As a special component of what James Scott (2000, p. 104) terms the “visionary cartography” that emerges from the European Commission, borders are to be transcended. Borders are thereby subject to special “community initiatives” which envisage them as pivotal spaces of integration. Moreover, places designated as rural, marginal or underdeveloped (the Portuguese-Spanish border-area prominent amongst them) are subsumed into the European Union’s vision of territorial harmonization and development (Richardson, 2000).

Since the simultaneous adhesion of Portugal and Spain to the European Union in 1986, the Portuguese-Spanish border has therefore become the subject of EU-funded regional development funding. Together with the wider EU project of harmonization and integration, this has transformed its identities and meanings of the border. This is an issue to which the chapter will return in its conclusions - in the meantime however, another border (and theoretical) detour is in order.

Living on / Border Lines

“The study of narratives and discourse is central to an understanding of all types of boundaries, particularly state boundaries. These narratives range from foreign policy discourses, geographical texts and literature (including maps), to the many dimensions of formal and informal socialization which affect the creation of sociospatial identities, especially the notions of “us” and the “Other”, exclusive and inclusive spaces and territories” (Newman and Paasi, 1998, p. 201).

What are the consequences of reading boundaries, along with the authors of the above citation, as discourses? It has already been pointed out that, like others, what gives the Portuguese-Spanish border presence is its reproduction through a complex system of representations. The prevalence of what political geography has called “relict borders” across the lands of the Algarve and Andalucia might also complicate matters (marked by the many towns that carry the designation de la frontera recalling the mobile frontier of medieval reconquest at the expense of Arab-Berber states), as would the existence of new and old divisions internal to the Portuguese and Spanish states. The latter in particular has, as part of its transition and reinscription since the end of Franco’s dictatorship in 1975, become a quasi-federal entity (in official parlance an Estado de Las Autonomias; a State of Autonomies), divided into a series of autonomous communities, with their own assemblies, executive agencies, flags and statutes. So to the north of Andalucia is now an intra-state border with the neighbouring autonomous community of Extremadura. Hence, what Romero Valiente (1990) characterized as a ‘disarticulated and dependent’ space of the border between Andalucia and Extremadura has found its relative peripherality reinforced by what Arroyo-Lopez and Machado-Santiago (1987, p. 341) termed a ‘frontier effect’, whereby boundaries between Spain’s Autonomias produce their own:
The Poetry of Boundaries


The Portuguese regions lack the formal constitutional powers of those in Spain, but do form a significant part of the sense of Portugal’s “unity in diversity” and are duly indicated by prominent signs along main roads and on maps. Commenting on the resulting combination of Iberian frontiers, the anthropologist Luis Uriarte (1994, p. 43, my italics) notes that:

‘One may simultaneously have one foot in Spain and another in Portugal. One can sit down, as I have had the opportunity to do so, on borderpost no. 695 where ecumenically multiple demarcations converge: Spain and Portugal; Caceres and Badajoz provinces; Portoalegre district; Valencia de Alcantara, San Vicente and La Codosera municipal boundaries. In this border-post, one may dwell and rest your backside simultaneously and respectfully between two nation-states, two provinces, a district and three municipal limits. An excess of frontiers for one backside.’

But there is no need to travel with Luis all the way to hito 695 to become aware of ‘excess’ in terms of the frontier. A surplus of complexity is present anywhere when the complexities of representation of this (or any other) interstate boundary are fully taken into account. Although the border is easy to identify on a map and not too hard to find on the ground for those who persevere (it would fail if not), it is hard to say where the representation of the border is, where it begins and ends and where are its limits? We might start at the thousands of hitos (some are duplicated, divided into A, B, C and so on to mark particularly complex border convolutions) and/or the streams and riverbeds that mark around 40 per cent of it. Often encrusted with that strange hybrid plant of lichen (a plant formed out of symbiotic relations between alga and fungi) these hitos form a winding line, but vegetation and topography mean that they are often hidden from each other. And what of the spaces between the hitos or between them and the rivers? What course does the supposed straight line between them follow, given the complex topography? Indeed, exactly how long is the border? Even allowing for a short undemarcated stretch some two hundred kilometres north of the area of focus of this paper which complicates measurement, different accounts offer considerably different lengths. In fact, no two accounts offer exactly the same figure. The lesson from other topographic measurements is that along the ground, as the scale of measurement becomes finer so does the length of that being measured (Bird, 1956). This is what creates such complications to the (what at first might appear as quite simple) question of the length of such a border.

Fintan O’Toole (1997, p. 4) therefore comments how:

‘As it happens modem geometry has given a new sanction to this kind of subjective mapping. In his Fractal Geometry of Nature, the mathematician Beniot Mandelbrot asks the apparently simple question “How long is the coast of Britain?” The coast is obviously not smooth and irregular. It goes in and out in bays and estuaries and
promontories and capes. If you measure it at one hundred miles to an inch, all
these irregularities appear. But if you measure it at twenty miles to an inch, new
bays open up on the coastlines of promontories and new promontories jut out
from the sides of bays. When you measure these as well, the coastline gets longer.
At a mile to an inch it is even longer ... and so on, until you crawl around on your
hands and knees measuring the bumps on the side of each rock that makes up the
coast. The more accurately you measure it, the more uncertain it becomes. What
matters, in the end, is your point of view. Mandlebrot compares the length of the
border between Spain and Portugal in a Portuguese and a Spanish atlas. In the
former it is 20 per cent longer than in the latter, not because the territory is
disputed, but because surveyors used a larger scale, and thus measured fewer
squiggles.‘

in a related sense, we might note that the border exists not only as a system of signs
(rivers, hitos, road signs and so on) inscribed on the text(ure) of the landscape, but
simultaneously in the texts, signed, sealed and ratified which declare and demarcate
it. Before the border could be marked on the ground, it had to be agreed between
Lisbon and Madrid. Joint teams of military surveyors were despatched, but it took
years to mark and agree the border. The northern half was agreed in 1864 and the
southern section in 1926, the contracts for the hitos were drawn up and they were
put in place. But well into the 20th century, a few parts of the border remained
undemarcated. These were either disputed or of shared (condominium or common)
status, with access regulated by feudal ‘usufruct’ rules. Today, with the exception
of the short disputed section that is mentioned above, the border is ‘signed and
sealed’ in agreed legal treaties. But (t)here too, in the state archives, things become
very complex. These texts have no fixed end. They speak and act in the name of
other representations, notably those of the state, the government or the king. Or
they cite earlier texts (of which there is no end) and then refer back to that which
they define (the border). Which comes first, where exactly is the border? The
answer is that one cannot limit the demarcation of the border either to the text of an
agreement or the marks and features that supplement or are appropriated to it on the
ground. Amidst all these signs and wonders, it is impossible to decide exactly what
comes first (analogous to the relationships between the ‘main’ text and the
footnotes/references and images of hitos here in this chapter). The border derives a
significant part of its identity precisely from such undecidability; from the
combinations and cross-references of authority, texts and symbols in different
places. Consider a case from another European border, where this combination is
intensely evident:

The most standard nationalist/republican response to the Border [between the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland] is that it has cut the city off from its
natural hinterland of Donegal and has thereby damaged both places. But it is even
more important to recognise that the Border reproduces itself in every area within
the North. It is and always has been a sectarian border; it embraces a fertile progeny
of internal borders, all of which enhance the unnatural, defensive atmosphere of the
State. These are not flexible or porous borders; they are not indicators of a
community’s autonomy. They are prison walls. Their function is to immure
communities and, with that, to fossilise the political situation in its original form. Since the Troubles [the political and sectarian violence] began, the existence of these borders has been signalled in every conceivable way by flags, murals, graffiti, painted kerbstones... Derry is a border town with internal borders that make themselves manifest even in the slash mark between the names Derry/Londonderry; in the sectarian housing estates; in the old walled architecture of the town and in the competing histories of its development... There is nothing “natural” about borders; they are all created to assert power and control. The most unfortunate aspect of the Border's history is that, to survive, it has forever to insist on its presence. It never therefore became naturalised. If it could have been forgotten about, it would have been more secure. But it can never be ignored. So it will remain assertive, creating division within the territory it was designed to consolidate’ (Campbell, 1999, p. 29).

The Irish border is comparatively recent, amongst those carved out of decaying European empires in the aftermath of the 1914-1918 World War. Its contested status has given it a special character and the project of a boundary treaty (and with this a formal and full demarcation) fell foul of the deteriorating relations and mutual antipathy between the two states in Ireland (Kennedy, 2000). However, whilst Ireland is an extreme case, the endless and uncontainable replication of ‘the Border’ is symptomatic of how modern borders operate. Consider another case, rendered from the same decaying empire:

‘Partition. For a long time, and certainly all the time that we were children, it was a word we heard every now and again said by some adult in conversation, sometimes in anger, sometimes bitterly, but mostly with sorrow, voice trailing off, a resigned shake of the head, a despairing flutter of the hands. All recollections were punctuated with “before Partition” or “after Partition”, marking the chronology of our family history... How do we know Partition except through the many ways in which it is transmitted to us, in its many representations: political, social, historical, testimonial, literary, documentary, even communal. We know it though national and family mythologies, through collective and individual memory. Partition, almost uniquely, is one event in our recent history in which familial recall and its encoding are a significant factor in any general reconstruction of it. In a sense, it is the collective memory of thousands of displaced families on both sides of the border that have imbued a rather innocuous word - partition - with its dreadful meaning: a people violently displaced, a country divided. Partition: a metaphor for irreparable loss’ (Menon and Bhasin, 1998)."

There were Cold War partitions too: Korea, Germany, Europe and Vietnam But those that predate the Cold War, India and Ireland amongst them (and some since, such as Cyprus), reproduce logics of difference that are tied up with colonialism (Kumar, 1997). Yet, despite their apparent abnormality, such special cases also betray the ways that borders are reproduced elsewhere and are thereby never simply either a line on a map or on the ground.
All this complexity and undecidability calls for another line of analysis, even for the relatively peaceful Portuguese border, to whose trace we now return. What has long been proper to border identity is that it is simultaneously *liminal* and *regulated*. On the one hand, the border is an edge; a set of peripheral places. These have something of the characteristic of what Robert Shields (1991) describes as *Places on the Margins*. Indeed, most of the Portuguese-Spanish border is very sparsely populated and relatively underdeveloped in material terms. Low intensity agriculture, mineral, energy (via hydroelectricity) and water extraction, all reinforce the sense of an area of socio-economic marginality. The border provinces and districts of Spain and Portugal have the lowest average per capita incomes of any in Spain and Portugal and amongst the lowest in the entire EU. Historically neither country has attached priority to transport connections with its neighbour. Indeed at the start of the 1990s, the entire section of the border between Andalucia and Portugal had only one official road border-crossing point, at Rosal de la Frontera, and a few years earlier this had been closed at night-time. No railway linked the two countries along this stretch of the border, and the river Guadiana which formed the course of the Andaluz-Portugal border for around its last 30 kilometres or so was without any bridge until 1991. The opening paragraph to the first joint Portuguese-Spanish study on *Transfrontier Territorial Articulation* (conducted with EU funding by the respective territorial planning authorities with jurisdiction in Andalucia, Algarve and Alentejo) notes how:

> `The frontier space between Andalucia and the contiguous Portuguese regions (Algarve and Alentejo) has historically represented a barrier between two neighbouring territories, which besides being a frontier in the European sense, are separated by a veritable wall. The existence of a natural barrier (the Guadiana and Chanza rivers) in part of the frontier line, is not sufficient explanation for this fact, given that valleys in Europe have represented more a means of communication and integration than a separation between its two banks' (Junta de Andalucia, 1995, p. 11).

Yet the border has not only been a liminal or marginal space. It has also been highly regulated, not only through its demarcations on the ground and in the treaties, but as a place that has been subject to patrol by police and customs. The border is characterized by a series of border posts, observation posts and patrol tracks and roads. In common with many other European boundaries, these border-markers were reinforced through the 20th century. Anxiety about the ’integrity’ of the borders and accompanying efforts to demarcate, survey, patrol and police - in short, to regulate - borders forms part of the moment when, as Lofgren (1999, p. 2) explains:

> ‘...modern (and centralizing) nation-making shifted the energy [of inscribing statehood] to the periphery where the state, its power, its cultural capital, its routines, rules and ideas were materialized and challenged.’
However, the identity of the border changes as the balance and forms of liminality/regulation shift. It is in this context that, for a contemporary west European border like this one, the project of the European Union intervenes. Today, therefore, the frontier posts are abandoned. The patrols are gone. Moreover, the border becomes caught in a wider space of networks and possibility (referred to earlier) that is the EU. Indeed the European project as envisioned by the Commission seeks to overcome the peripherality of border (and other marginal areas) through a series of cross-border interventions.

A key means of this is EU regional policy, offering capital investments, usually in terms of transport infrastructure for marginal regions. In the terms of the EU, such strategies are about ‘cohesion’. At the same time, the EU seeks in its terms *harmonisation* of European space, through the removal of barriers to mobility, including borders. A new European scale is envisaged with new effects. In the 1990s this combined cohesion and harmonization has been expressed in a ‘single market’ and the removal of customs and passport control at the borders between most EU members. However such a process is not without contradictions, since it also means the disintegration of the space hitherto configured by the identity of the border. A detailed anthropological study of *Frontiers, Territories and Collective Identities* (Valcuende del Rio, 1998) provides a densely narrated account of the history of the Portuguese-Spanish frontier as a resource for local inhabitants. Although focused on a particular locale on this border, its findings about the border as a resource are echoed in studies from elsewhere along the Portuguese-Spanish border (Garcia, 1997; Hernandez Leon and Castano Madrijal, 1996). This is shown to have had two aspects. Firstly, until the European Union's 1992 'single market' eliminated the significant tariff differences, smuggling and contraband provided income and a way of life for many along the border. Particularly in the rural areas, smuggling became *a genre de vie* in which liminality and regulation were reinscribed as a local resource. However, this capacity has been eroded in the context of the ‘integrating’, ‘harmonizing’ European space into which Portugal and Spain were formally incorporated from the mid-1980s.

The second aspect of the frontier as a resource was legal commerce, notably the sales of goods and services to cross-border travellers, including those who came to the border (in view of the same exchange-rate and tariff differentials that drove smuggling) to shop, to purchase or consume something that was cheaper ‘on the other side’. This significant aspect of the frontier *genre de vie* has also undergone recent transformation and relative decline as border controls and currency differentials disappeared at the same time as new (frequently EU-funded) bridges and roads have speeded flow and increasingly removed the border as an essential stopping point.
Conclusions

This chapter has sought to develop theoretical reflections on how borders operate within complex systems of meaning. In the more specific terms of the Portuguese-Spanish border, the chapter has also noted how the harmonization associated with the EU is predicated on a certain local disintegration of ways of life based on the Portuguese-Spanish border as a space of liminality and regulation. The `production' of a new European scale is, in this case, also the `decomposition' of another one. How then does this relate to the issue of borders as semiotic systems? Amongst the detours of the paper has been a concern to trace how in Rogoff's (2000, p. 114) words, the:

`...minute gesture of the border stone alerts us to the imaginary power of borders as a concept.'

In the European Union, we have come to hear much about the project of a Europe without frontiers. But the borders endure, incorporated and cited now in European discourses of integration. As this paper has argued, a certain visualization (or, if you prefer, a 'perspective') of borders as that which must be overcome is at the heart of the European project. This is not so much the end of borders as their radical reinscription as something to be transcended, as spaces of European integration. Hence, to adapt the argument of Jens Bartelson (1998, p. 322):

`Only when this perspective [of transcending borders] itself has long been forgotten, will we be totally entitled but not the least tempted to speak of the end of the state [boundary].'

In other words, the reference to and the meanings of the border are re-inscribed inside another project, another set of discourses and powers, another vision. It is
(t)here in such inscriptions and actions that Europe is remade, the old marks of its borders are rearranged into new networks and systems of meaning.

Or, in the more poetic terms of the border villager cited by William Kavanagh (2000, p. 47) in the extract with which this chapter opened:

`...but the doorframe remains...'

Acknowledgements

This chapter is a shortened and adapted version of “Signifying boundaries: detours around the Portuguese-Spanish (Algarve/Alentejo-Andalucia) borderlands” that was published 2001 in Geopolitics, vol. 7, 1, 139-164. I am grateful to the editors of B/ordering Space for advice on how it could be shortened and revised for publication here. Most of these revisions were made in July 2003, whilst I was a visitor to the National Centre for Research on Europe of the University of Canterbury at Christchurch, New Zealand, whose hospitality and support is gratefully acknowledged. Further amendments were made whilst I was a visiting fellow at the National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis at the National University of Ireland - Maynooth, in May 2004. I would also like to acknowledge the support of an EU Training and Mobility of Researchers (Marie Curie) Fellowship held at the Department of Human Geography of the University of Seville in 1998-99, which enabled wider research on EU-funded cross-border co-operation and changing boundary practices between the two Iberian states.

Notes

1 A point made in Harley (1988 and 1989), and more widely in ‘critical geopolitics' analysing the writing of words (O Tuathail, 1996). For a review of cartographies of power that works with Harley, but also points out his narrow reading of ‘deconstruction', see Carib (2000).

2 For example, the 1:25'000 topographic maps produced by the Spanish National Geographical Institute.

3 On the state as a system of representation, see Bartelson (1998); Constantinou (1996); Dillon and Everard (1992); Mitchell (1991) and Weber (1995). On statehood/sovereignty as it is recited in social sciences, see Agnew (1994).

4 For critical reflections of the EU as a project of connections and mobility, see Barry (1993 and 1996) and Sparke (1998). For a reading of the poetics and politics of connection within an EU funded cross-border (INTERREG) project, see Hebbert (2000) and Jönsson, Tagil and Tömgvist (2000).

5 Sparke (2000) signifies a similar concept with the term ‘anticipatory geographies'.

6 The classic account is Hartshorne (1936). His account of relict boundaries is one of a series of interpretations of frontiers that appeared in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers between the 1930s and the 1960s, e.g: Kristof (1959); Jones (1959); Minghi (1963). All drew on prior British, French and German traditions of political geography, geopolitics and international law. These papers are briefly reviewed in Newman and Paasi (1998).
The literature on the ‘reconquest’ and medieval Iberian frontiers is utterly vast, since it forms a centre-piece of both Portuguese and Spanish historiography. Rather than enter this here, it seems more appropriate to cite from a short article that appeared in the Andalucía edition of the Spanish daily *El País*, whose author expressed his indigence at the proposal by the authorities of his native town of Jerez de la Frontera (famed for Sherry production) to drop ‘de la Frontera’ from the official name of the town: ‘I can’t make sense of it [No me lo explico]. How could they cross out [corregir] a tradition by the process of annulling it in the stroke of a pen? One recalls that the towns of lower Andalucía [Andalucía la Baja] that call themselves “of the Frontier” - Jerez, Arcos, Castellar, Vejer, Conil, Chiclana... have been protagonists through centuries of living together [convivencia] - or the collision - of Muslim and Christian civilisations. All these localities are also found in the memorable scenes of the so called frontier romances, those fascinating epic poems of love and war... Although I admit that it is a matter of a symbol or of a poetic emblem lodged in the regional memory, it is not acceptable for Jerez to erase from its archives that which history has documented, that is to say, doing without the evocation of a frontier fixed in medieval maps and conserved in the collective imagination... What is going on is that I am not resigned to lose my native frontier, including amongst other things because I feel more a person of the frontier than of Jerez [sentirme mas fronterizo que jerezano].’ (Caballero Bonald, 1999, p. 2).

This unity and singularity of Portugal is a prominent theme in Portuguese geography, notably the works of Orlando de Ribiero inspired by a similar genre (evident in Vidal de La Blache) in French geography. Proposals to introduce a regional system of government in Portugal were put to a referendum in November 1998. They failed to attract the necessary majority and were shelved. Portugal therefore remains amongst the most centralized of European states. The backdrop to the proposals, their failure and the way that inter-regional rivalries appeared stronger than demands for devolution is analysed in Gallagher (1999). For historical perspective, see Nogueira da Silva (1998).

This undemarcated sector, near to the town known in Spain as Olivenza, constitutes a gap through which many confusions and dissonances have passed, notably an ongoing Portuguese irredentist movement (Sidaway, 2001). Such places, along with enclaves and exclaves, are places where an excess of border signification/representation overflows. Europe has several of these places, indeed there are even ‘enclaves within exclaves, for example at the Belgium-Netherlands border around Baarle (Robinson, 1959).

For a contextual analysis of the range of political debates about the Irish border, see Howe (2000).

For other critical works on the aftermaths of Partition, see Chaturvedi (2000); Tan and Kudaisya (2000).

An 1877 plan for the construction of a Lisbon-Huelva-Seville railway still gathers dust in the archives of the Portuguese Ministry of Public Works.

On the EU as the production of a new scale of reference and actions, see: Swyngedouw (1994). See also the material cited in note 4. There is also a fast growing literature on the EU as an articulation of different scales (multiple levels) of governance. For an overview, see Jordan (2000).
References


Garcia, E. M. (1997), Estudio sobre el Contrabando de Posguerra en Olivenza y su.4rea de Influencia, Gabinete de Iniciativas Transfronterizas, M{ö}rída.


Chapter 13

Bor(der)ing Stories

Spaces of Absence
along the Dutch-German Border

Anke StAiver

'[T]he fascinating presence of absences whose traces were everywhere' (de Certeau, 1984, p. 21).

Imagine that you are left on your own in an 'infinite space' which has neither any kind of 'landmarks', nor borders, horizons or 'ends'. In what direction would you start walking?

For now, I will leave this idea circulating somewhere in the back of your mind, reduce it to the simple statement 'there is no such thing as infinite space' and will draw the attention to a situation where infiniteness, or rather 'borderlessness' is proposed. Of course, not a 'real' borderlessness - for, as we all know, 'wherever there are people, there are borders'. But yet, the European Union proposes borderlessness, by pulling down the internal borders between its member states.

One of those internal borders is the one between Germany and the Netherlands: a border that is 536 km long and 0 cm high. But for most of the people who live in the Dutch-German borderland, it is not the border's total length that is of any significance, but its level. Level, however, is not meant in terms of 'height', rather in the sense of 'experiencing' the border as obstacle - an obstacle that is at work within processes of socio-cultural relations and within the popular imagination. This level is related to perceptions of the border, its cognitive and affective meanings, which shape people's lives and forms of socio-spatial identification and can be circumscribed as the 'border in people's minds'. For, in spite of progressing European integration and the formal removal of the EU's internal borders, the barriers in people's minds persist to act as thresholds in people's everyday practices. These thresholds refer to imaginative borders that let everyday practices of borderlanders 'end' at the border and demarcate the 'bordered spheres' of people's lives.

Since popular imaginations are understood as a powerful resource for people's everyday practices, this contribution focuses on popular culture and everyday life, on studying narratives and images as a way to engage with people's lives and everyday practices along and across the Dutch-German border. Against this background, I will concentrate mainly on Michel de Certeau's concept of everyday
practices since it gives particular attention to the interplay of popular representations and everyday practices. De Certeau has studied popular culture in order to investigate the ways in which people `practise' everyday life. And although he has concentrated on much more mundane practices and representations than I will do here, I still consider it promising to `transfer' his ideas to the borderland in order to examine the (non-)crossings of the Dutch-German border and its `level'.

The first section briefly addresses people's (non-)crossings of the Dutch-German border. Then, theoretical reflections on `the everyday' and `everyday practices' are shortly reviewed in order to approach this as routines of non-border-crossings later on. Subsequently, `popular culture' is introduced, pointing towards the relevance of stories and images for the study of (nationalized) everyday life. This is complemented and illustrated by empirical examples dealing with the consumption and interpretation of popular representations of Dutch-German relations, which are finally tied back to `spaces of absence' at the Dutch-German border.

Absent Borders?

Speaking of `bordered spheres' of people's lives at the Dutch-German border, it needs to be emphasized that although everyday practices tend to `stop' at the border, this is not to say that borderlanders do not cross it at all. People from both the Dutch and the German side cross it for special occasions such as festivals, weekend trips and holidays, but also for `fun shopping' or good bargains (Van der Velde, 2000). And since the official opening of the border in 1993, the borderline has changed its qualities, diminished its impacts and border-crossings increasingly have been taken for granted. But despite this opening, formal obstacles to border-crossings (e.g. different languages, unfamiliar ways of doing things, poor cross-border transportation links) continue to exist. Moreover, and more decisively for the following, the border stays in people's everyday minds and lives: The willingness of young Dutch and Germans to cross the border in their everyday activities is perceived as very limited (Janssen, Spille and Baerveldt, 1996; de Bois-Reymond, 1998; see also Renckstorf and Bergmans, 1996). The border remains a barrier expressed by, for example, a low level of cross-border labour mobility, sports and other leisure-time activities (Janssen, 2000; Striiver, 2002b). This impression is reinforced by the existence of an extensive literature on the desired and long overdue improvement of Dutch-German relations (see, for example, Groenewold, 1997; Linthout, 2000; Moldenhauer and Vis, 2001; Muller and Wielenga, 1995) and even `instruction manuals' on how to understand, treat and get along with the respective other in day-to-day life (Muller, 1998; Schiirings, 2003; Slotboom, 2001).

Summarized very briefly, during and after German occupation of the Netherlands in the Second World War (1940-1945), the relations between people along the Dutch-German border had reached an all time low, i.e. the war resulted in a sharp demarcation of the Dutch and the Germans and a very hesitant revival of cross-border contacts. As a result, relations are now still characterized by Dutch distrust (because of wartime occupation) and German indifference (since the
Netherlands is perceived as a small country, merely one out of nine bordering neighbours). These descriptions are the result of Groenewold's (1997) analysis of hundreds of narratives of Dutch-German encounters, which also hint at the interplay of narratives and everyday life. Further below, I will turn to the ways narratives `make' everyday practices, but first, I will focus on the `problem' that everyday life remains mostly unseen.

The (Invisible) Everyday

Everyday life is never easy to register and is often understood as a form of unconsciousness. That is to say, although the everyday encompasses `everything', it remains invisible and very vague. Making it visible seems unmanageable. Everyday life is thus both absent and present, it reveals `the fascinating presence of absences whose traces were everywhere' (de Certeau, 1984, p. 21).

Henri Lefebvre was one of the first social theorists who concentrated on this invisible everyday life in its details against a (post-)structuralist background. His motivation was to investigate the banality of `everydayness' and his concept of `the everyday' is thus very much linked to ordinary and repetitive life. Lefebvre has described the `everyday' as the most universal and the most unique condition, the most obvious and the most hidden. He has defined everyday life `by "what is left over" after all distinct, superior, specialized structured activities have been singled out by analysis' (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 97). Everyday life is thus `simply' lived experience. It suggests the banal on the one hand and routine and insistent repetition on the other. Lefebvre was also very sensitive to the idea that what is familiar is real - but not necessarily known and that `people in general do not know their own lives very well' (ibid., p. 94).

Everyday Practices

Beyond this rather broad reflection, Michel de Certeau was particularly concerned about ordinary people's everyday practices and their logics. For him, everyday life is related to repeated active movements in space that are called `operations' and he attempted to recognize similar modes of practice while staying sensitive to the specificity of `operations'. In order to investigate the ways people operate, de Certeau (1984, 1997) has studied everyday culture. According to this conception, the everyday is characterized by creativity, by `makings' - that do not rely simply on individuals' wills, actions or reflections, but on (various) cultures. De Certeau thus refuses to take the individual, his/her consciousness and identity as sites for meaning in everyday life, but looks at everyday practices as something unconscious in the sense that it is neither fully controllable, nor open to direct observation:

"In reality, a rationalized, expansionist, centralized, spectacular and clamorous production is confronted by an entirely different kind of production, called "consumption" and characterized by its ruses (...), its clandestine nature, its
With respect to subjects and their identities, de Certeau follows French poststructuralist thought and does not rely on a conception of a rational, autonomous subject. And in general, he is less concerned about social actors’ intentions than fascinated by the underlying ‘operational logic’ of practices. De Certeau shares an understanding with Bourdieu that practices are ways of thinking and doing. In addition, Bourdieu argues that practices are generated and regulated by people’s *habitus*. Bourdieu claims that people have a practical sense, an acquired system of preferences, of cognitive structures, which orients their perceptions and practices. *Practices*, in Bourdieu’s sense, refer to all kinds of activities in everyday life. They refer neither to objective rules only, nor simply to subjective decisions or intentional consciousness. They are generated by the habitus as ‘mediator’ between objective structures and subjective constructions (Bourdieu, 1998). The practices produced by the habitus tend to reproduce the objective structures of which they are the outcome and that is why practices are influenced by the past. But since the habitus is also influenced by subjective constructions, practices are not determined, but ‘regulated improvisations’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). Yet, the habitus produces commonsense and the relationship between common and subjective habitus is one in which an agent expresses a *subjective* system of *common* schemes of perception, thought and action.

When viewing the habitus as provider of commonsense and organizer of everyday practices, it is still vital to outline the role of narratives and images in the geographies of daily lives. This interplay of popular representations and banal, but national everyday life is therefore subsequently introduced first in rather abstract, conceptual terms and then ‘transferred’ to the concrete borderland - in order to elucidate people’s consumption of representations and unconscious routine practices, both within national(-ized) contexts.

**Everyday Popular Culture**

There are many possible ways to investigate the relations between popular culture and everyday life (for an overview see, for example, Berger, 1997; Gardiner, 2000; Highmore, 2002a, 2002b; Miller and McHoul, 1998). Yet, most of them draw in one way or another on (post-)structuralism and semiotics, which argue that the only way to understand the world is through its representations in language. De Certeau’s approach is based on his studies of popular culture, in which he found out that the circulation of representations does not reveal much about their perception, the use (consumption) and opinion of their readers (users). Therefore, he suggests to investigate the ‘difference or similarity between the production of the image and the secondary production hidden in the process of its utilization’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. xiii). Users, or consumers, carry out operations of their own, and their products are marked by their clandestine character and quasi-invisibility. Consumers produce through their signifying practices, but their ‘traces’ remain mostly unrecognized.
Because our societies are characterized by an enormous growth of vision, reading (an image or a text) seems to be the most appropriate starting point for de Certeau to study everyday practices. Following him, reading is a silent production, in which a ‘different world (the reader’s) slips into the author’s place’ (ibid., p. xxi). This changes the text into another person’s property and that is why reading is anything but passive. One of his points of departure is the assumption that images are fictions given to the eye that organize people’s everyday life. More broadly, it could be said that people articulate their social, historical and spatial identities by exchanging familiar representations. De Certeau reflects on this relation between representations and practices (especially on the latter as interpretations of the former). This ‘silent production’ of reading is de Certeau’s version of ‘reader-reception-theory’, according to which readers have their own interpretations of a text and might make something different from it than what the author might have intended. Meanings thus vary according to their use, but at the same time the reception of signs remains most of the time unknown (de Certeau, 1997; see also Barthes, 1973; Hall, 1997; Moores, 1993; Rose, 2001). Studying representations and practices and following de Certeau and many others (see, for example, Berger, 1997; Finnegan, 1997; Somers, 1994), stories are understood as decorating the everyday and organize practices. Yet, stories do not express or tell practices, but make the subject (matter) that is spoken about.

Michel de Certeau’s overall understanding of popular culture was summarized as ‘collective ways or manners of thinking and doing’ that are ‘marked by a heterogeneity of practice affectively producing habitable space’ (Conley, 1997, p. 151). It is thus obvious that culture needs to be understood as a set of practices - not things - and that these practices are inextricably linked to space. But in order to exist, popular culture also ‘has to be a largely unconscious affair’ (Eagleton, 2000, p. 113). How to research this ‘unconscious affair’, especially since popular cultures take place in the everyday, which is present, but remains mostly invisible?

Returning to the idea that popular culture produces habitable space, de Certeau has also described how people familiarize themselves with a territory through spatial movement, by recurrent ‘wanderings on the same paths’. He has outlined that ‘operations’ are ‘practices that invent and organize spaces’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. 107). He explicitly emphasizes that space is part of everyday practice - and that stories produce ‘geographies of actions’. These stories and geographies organize movements in space, they structure spaces as a creative act, including the (with)drawing and (non-)crossing of borders.

Summarizing Lefebvre and de Certeau concerning people’s familiar, but unconscious and invisible routine practices and everyday spaces with respect to the borderland, a third unconscious and invisible dimension of ‘important unknowns’ emerges here: Apart from everyday life on the one hand and the unconscious consumption of popular culture on the other, the nation remains a sustained and influential frame of reference that is mostly not reflected upon. Following Tim Edensor, the nation remains a dominant spatial framework for people, which is demarcated by borders that separate from other nations. And although ‘the most common spatial experience is that in everyday life, where familiar space forms a backdrop to daily tasks and where routine movements are unreflexively carried out’, ‘national space constitutes both practical and symbolic imaginary geographies’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 54, p. 67). Moreover, Edensor also emphasizes
that the experiences of spaces and the consumption of spatial representations are part of these geographies. This also applies to Europe, where nation-states seem to be weakened by supra-national organizations such as the EU - and where the member-states have changed, but not lost their general impact: 'at a practical and imaginary level, national geographies continue to predominate over other forms of spatial entity' (ibid., p. 39). Relationships between the national space and everyday places are thus multiple and refer to different scales of spatialization, which (together) constitute a cognitive-affective sense of belonging and both a habitual and habitable space. In the borderland, those two dominant spatial frameworks obviously overlap, i.e. the bordered national space merges in people's local everyday space of routine practices.

The presupposition of a national frame of reference that shapes people's lives and practices is called 'banal nationalism', a (form of) national identity that is taken for granted, neither overtly asserted nor irrelevant. According to Billig (1995) and despite postmodern discourses on nation-states being in decline, nation-states continue to exist and are daily reproduced in a banal way, through everyday beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices. What is more, banal nationalism comprises commonsense, i.e. ways of thinking and doing things. Billig also argues that banal nationalism does not rest on consciously seen national signs, but on unnoticed symbols such as coins, stamps, flags, car stickers, etc.' This form of nationalism is reproduced in routine everyday practices and also transported by mass media (e.g. the nation's territorial shape as background image for TV news). This also means that people do not consciously decide whether to reproduce their nation in daily life or not. For Billig, national identity and banal nationalism are embedded in popular culture and in everyday assumptions about belonging that flood the media, but are not reflected upon. Edensor (2002) also emphasizes that national identity is experienced through and embedded in both popular culture and unreflexive routine practices, i.e. through ordinary aspects of daily life.

Identification is thus not necessarily a self-conscious process, it is rather something 'unthought known' - which yet affects experiences and spatial practices. At the same time, spatial identities and practices are also articulated in and formed through popular representations, regularly consumed in mass media, which play dominant roles in people's lives (Berger, 1997; Hall, 1997; Highmore, 2002a; Stevenson 2002). Moreover, mass media are circulators of stereotypes. And since national stereotypes are linked to the collective memory of a society and form part of a commonsense, they are difficult to transform and sustain in people's minds - with powerful social implications. The collective memory of a society results, among other things, in a national(-ized) us/them demarcation - in this case, both Dutch and German national identities are constructed through and against the neighbour, i.e. processes of identification depend on bordering processes. In what ways stories, stereotypes and practices influence identification and bordering processes on the one hand and organize spaces and spatial movements along the Dutch-German border on the other, is addressed in the following sections.'
Visible 'Culture'

For understanding popular narratives and images as resources of everyday life in general and as reproducers of banal nationalism and national stereotypes in particular, there are numerous representations in Germany about ‘the Dutch’ and vice versa about ‘the Germans’ in the Netherlands. They are present on TV or radio, in ads, documentations and cartoons, in newspapers, on the Internet, etc. and they construct commonsense and common feelings of belonging, including demarcation from the Other. Many of these stories still rely in one way or another on a past that is dominated by German occupation during the second World War and thus also refer to Dutch-German socio-psychological relations that are described as sensitive and difficult. What I have introduced as ‘routines of non-border-crossings’ relies on the consumption of representations and results in borders in people’s minds. These borders are (re)produced by narratives and images and (re)produce imaginative spatialities.

In illustrating this, I will now present some empirical material, which underpins the relations between popular culture and nationally bordered everyday life. The material consists of interpretations of and reactions to two museum exhibitions dealing with the relations between Germany and the Netherlands over the past 50 years: the two nations, their relations, their respective peoples - ‘the Germans’ and ‘the Dutch’ - and their ‘attributes of Germanness and Dutchness’. These exhibitions comprise numerous popular representations of Dutch-German relations and invite to investigate their consumption.

Displaying the relations between Germany and the Netherlands since the end of the Second World War, these two exhibitions present in various images and narratives ‘stories’ of Dutch-German encounters, related to themes such as holidays, politics, economics, culture, cross-border co-operation and wartime remembrances. The types of exhibit range from photographs and advertisements to official documents and films, but also include ‘typical German and Dutch attributes’, personified in the severe German TV detective Derrick, and Frau Antje, a friendly, smiling ‘typical’ Dutch woman (advertising cheese in Germany). On the whole, the exhibitions are organized around six popular icons that were also used to advertise the exhibitions (on flyers, billboards, Internet, etc.). These are a (Dutch) advertisement for holidays in Germany, a (German) cartoon of Frau Antje not advertising cheese any longer, but smoking hashish and carrying a beer can with wilted tulips; a (Dutch) postcard of which more then 1.2 million copies were sent to the German chancellor in 1993, saying ‘I am angry’ - angry about German xenophobia, two advertisements for Dutch dairy products in Germany (one of Frau Antje and the other ‘playing’ with football as an ongoing theme) and last but not least a (Dutch) poster originating in the liberation from the Germans in 1945.

In my view, the displayed objects of Dutch-German contacts as well as the exhibitions themselves rely very much on stereotypes and cliches. Germans are associated with being fat, drunk, loud and xenophobic and the Dutch are reduced to the inhabitants of a small country that serves as a popular holiday destination and supplier of agricultural products (for more details, see Striiver, 2002a). These exhibitions are sites where national and cultural narratives are told, heard and seen. They appear as depicting reality, telling the visitors what is ‘German’ and what is ‘Dutch’ - and what are their relations to each other - while they are actually
constructing ‘reality’. Obviously, exhibitions cannot be representative of these nations and their relations - for they are much too extensive and varied. Yet, the exhibitions’ curators claim in the accompanying catalogues that ‘the exhibitions aim to provide information about the respective neighbour, to describe the Dutch-German relationship and to find out to what extent (public) opinion corresponds with reality’ (Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000, pp. 10-13; see also Rosgen and Baruch, 2001). But the presented stereotypes do not tell ‘the truth’ about Dutch-German relations - although they are real - for these relations are very much shaped by stereotypes.

In general, museums are institutions, which produce knowledge and a particular version of ‘truth’. Museum exhibitions shift attention to particular objects - and ignore others - and they order visible and invisible elements. Therefore, museums are never neutral exhibition spaces, but are based on cultural assumptions and rely on decisions what to display - and in which way. All exhibits establish visibilities (including invisibilities), stereotypes and the ability to know, to verify and to ignore. In their display, museums connect the practices of collecting, ordering and classifying with those of seeing, receiving and interpreting - and although both kinds of practices are mostly understood as neutral, ‘natural’ or logical, they are biased and varied, yet rely on a ‘cultural commonsense’. But apart from these interwoven ‘technologies’ of display and interpretation, museums are also places where practices and identities get shaped. Museums’ influences on their visitors, however, are not often researched (Bennett, 1995; Karp and Lavine, 1991; Sherman and Rogoff, 1994).

Applying (post-)structural theories such as (social) semiotics and arguing that ‘true’ meanings do not exist includes acknowledging that an exhibit has not only one, or one ‘proper’ meaning, but many. For there is no causal or coherent ‘effect’ on museum goers, ‘only’ interpretation. This is to say that visitors make an exhibit’s meaning(s) and that these interpretative activities can change its meaning(s) (Moores, 1993; Rose, 2001; Stevenson, 2002). However, the meanings made by audiences such as museum visitors are not accidental, but contextual - for
viewing practices in museums are embedded in socio-cultural practices. The ways what is seen and what remains unseen - including whether people identify with what they see or not - rely on the production and interpretation of (cultural) meanings, on making sense of national and cultural narratives.

In order to get insights about the interpretations given to the exhibits by museum visitors, I have collected all comments on the exhibitions left in the museums' visitors books as a form of `contingent stocktaking'. In what follows, I will present illustrative examples of these comments on Dutch-German relations. In analysing them, I have avoided the risk of interviews, to put words, themes and opinions in people's mouths - for people have not written their comments for me as a researcher. On the other hand, it is impossible to know whether comments need to be taken seriously (especially really harsh or funny ones). That means I can neither guess the visitors' personal motivations, assumptions and contexts and what has prompted them to write a particular comment, nor whether the exhibits might have put a smile on museum goers' faces, etc. - and it is impossible to check with them.

First of all, a range of comments were found that can be summarized as describing Dutch-German relations in a `positive' way - most of them were actually related to Dutch-German marriages, but also to visiting and living in the neighbouring country (e.g. `Holland, we love you!'

`I've been living here for 10 years now and I like it very much')
But more remarkable were dealing with the (still) uneasy relations, such as `Unfortunately, there still exist many reservations and prejudices in people's minds';
`[remarkable and sometimes shocking how there can be so much lack of understanding'; or `[it seems people are reluctant to let go of the borderline in their heads' Similar expressions can be found in the following: `I may be nuts, but I hate the "Krauts" guts"' and `the relation between the two people could be better if the 80 million people [the Germans] would not look down on their small neighbour'."
And, for the 'other side': `When will it be possible to visit the Netherlands with German car registration numbers and return undamaged?'

On a more personal level, someone stated `it remains difficult!. I have been living in Holland for three years now and I'm still often confronted with anti-German sentiments. What can I do? I was born 30 years after the war!! It's important that the atrocities are not forgotten. But can people not be considered as individuals? As a person I'm no worse than a Dutchman who thinks he should act arrogantly towards Germans.'

Finally, there are also comments that reflect on the neighbours' ambivalent relationship: `The Germans and the Dutch are simply different',
but also `the Dutch and the Germans are too similar to get along with each other'.
The Netherlands and Germany should work more closely together and thereby strengthen each other."
Moreover, `as people often say, the relationship between the two countries is like that between brother and sister: you can neither live with nor without them.' And `although we want to believe otherwise, the Dutch are in principle not much different from the Germans. The young generation in Germany cherishes the same dreams, ideals and wishes as all other Europeans. If we don't forget and forgive, we will never live entirely in freedom.'
Again, a more personal comment: `As a young Dutchman I don't recognize my home country in this exhibition. I didn't experience the war. Surely Dutch culture is more than merely hate and war? The more pleasant outcomes of the Dutch-German relations
are for example rock festivals and other modern events. Then you notice that the differences between the Dutch and the Germans are not as large as assumed." "The Germans have a sense of humour, the Dutch are good merchants. We're there if both sides show respect for each other and no longer hold onto their prejudices. Both countries know how to play football."

This last remark refers to one of the most prominent current themes between Germany and the Netherlands, the football matches between the Dutch and the German national teams and related fan cultures. And football also played an important role in both the exhibitions and the visitors' comments, even though it tends to be reduced to stereotypes. As mentioned earlier, in all, many exhibits rely on and refer to stereotypes - which was also recognized and criticized by the visitors: "I have a totally different perception of Germans now: I now merely see them as sausage-eating, beer-guzzling people. But it's a bit crowded here. There's not much room for so many fat Germans."

However, "despite the many cliches, the exhibition is worthwhile visiting' and '[a]n excellent way to help improve the relationship between the two countries" for 'it is interesting to see how many "ties" there are between the Netherlands and Germany."

On the other hand, visitors also commented that 'the exhibition presents too much little about the problems' and 'confirms what we all know already: nothing new is shown. What's daily life like over there?' And on top of that, it was criticized that 'the emphasis is too much on the past (war) and too little on the future'."

Before I will comment on these comments, a second illustration of the perception and distribution of these two exhibitions' meanings is summarized - one that is based on the reproduction and transportation of Dutch-German stereotypes and 'banal nationalisms' in magazines and newspapers. Altogether, 180 reports about the two exhibitions were collected, but here, I will take only the 145 articles found in printed newspapers into consideration. Concentrating on the headlines of these reports, about one third of them (54) were rather 'neutral' in their message, i.e. merely announcing the exhibitions (e.g. 'Exposition about the Netherlands - Germany relations'). Of the remaining 91 headlines, 38 were employing well-known Dutch-German stereotypes as a way to refer to the exhibitions (e.g. 'Germans are fat and Dutch are jerks'; 'Tulips, cheese and caravans', 'Sausage and beer' with a noticeable accumulation of 'Frau Antje', cheese (symbolising 'the Dutch'), sandcastles (symbolising German holidaymakers on the Dutch coast), caravans (symbolising Dutch holidaymakers in Germany), Rudi Carell (a Dutch show master on German TV) and, last but not least, Dutch and German national football teams. Just as many headlines (39) referred to the ambivalence that characterizes the Dutch-German relationship (e.g. 'Love and a bit of hatred'; 'Marriage of convenience between Derrick and Frau Antje'; 'Good neighbours - until the next football match') whereas four headlines were plainly negative about the respective neighbour (e.g. 'Holland, that's the Other'; 'Germans are still "bad"'). Finally, ten reports have headings that point out the (re-)production of stereotypes and cliches within the exhibitions (e.g. 'Loaded with cliches'); 'Exhibition presents Dutch and German prejudices'.

Although the two exhibitions were supposed to 'cross out' mutual prejudices, reviewing the exhibitions, the visitors books and the headlines of newspaper reports on the exhibitions, it turns out that not much has changed in the prejudiced
commonsense of either country. And this comes as no surprise, since exhibitions also rely on a commonsense and focus on selected themes and particular ways of presentation, i.e. they are not neutral, but partial. They rely on and reproduce both stereotypes and commonsense and influence people's identities and practices. And concentrating on what people actually make of what they see, it turns out that people are sensitive and critical of the ambivalent Dutch-German relationship and the reproduction of stereotypes. As individual museum goers and consumers of stereotypes presented there, they might laugh or get annoyed about them. But at the same time, these stereotypes are also part of their social commonsense.

However, focusing particularly on this commonsense on the one hand and on routine practices on the other, Bourdieu's concept of habitus, providing people with a commonsense of how to practise everyday life, appears appealing since not crossing the border is not a calculated act, but relies on both routine and the consumption of popular culture. Since commonsense is not determining, it produces practices as 'regulated improvisations'. Routines of non-border-crossings therefore include occasional crossings and refer to spaces of absence, which are not empty.

Spaces of Absence

This contribution has addressed the notion of 'presence of absence' in at least three dimensions. First of all, there is the 'original' meaning, going back to de Certeau's quote on the invisibility of everyday life, revealing the 'fascinating presence of absences whose traces were everywhere'. Secondly, it can be applied to the border between Germany and the Netherlands, as this is a border that is supposed to be gone. But since the border remains present in popular culture and people's everyday lives, a presence of absence is also the bedrock for spaces of absence. This idea relies on bordered practices and thus on 'absent' border-crossings, i.e. on routines of non-border-crossings along the Dutch-German border.

Starting with the assumed absent border by returning to the introductory reflection on 'infinite and borderless space' and the statement 'there is no such thing as borderlessness', it is first of all clear that people simply need borders and other 'landmarks' to orient themselves. Apparently, they do not need (or see) the border(-line) as such. But the Dutch-German border can be found in numerous and widespread stories and images on the neighbours' relations - as well as on the respective nations - that are linked to common ways of thinking that influence people's everyday lives. In general, the border has not disappeared. It keeps its functions in dividing two nations with different languages, norms and habits, etc., on the one hand and it also remains effective in terms of (lacking) cross-border infrastructure with respect to transportation, communication and so on. However, despite these 'formal obstacles' which obviously also influence people's practices, the focus here is on imaginative borders - including imaginations of Germanness and Dutchness - and the difficulties to overcome them and change daily routines.

Everyday life is banal, but continual - and since everyday practices are characterized mainly by routines, they do not suddenly change only because a border is formally removed. An open border thus results neither automatically in open minds, nor in suddenly changed everyday practices and spaces. That is to say
that even along `boring' (open) borders, life remains bordered. Border-crossing remains the crossing of a border, an experience of perceiving differences. Linking the unconscious, yet bordered practices with `banal nationalism' as something people are also not consciously aware of, the `banal boring' details of everyday routines turn out to be nationalized and nationally bordered and reproduced through `unseen' national symbols.

Along the Dutch-German border, bordered practices are related to two prevailing spatial frameworks, which apparently overlap: The national framework of everyday life and imaginary geographies, made of popular and often stereotyped representations organizing practices. When considering de Certeau's `signifying practices as spatial practices that produce geographies of actions', as organizing routine, but unconscious movements in space, practices here mainly `take place' along the border - not across it. Following de Certeau, stories and images are a `fiction given to the eye' that organize people's everyday life. And although representations are not decisive, but can be interpreted differently, they yet articulate people's identities and `make' practices as interpretations of representations: Consuming representations influences practices and people's (unconscious) spatial movements. In this sense, stereotyped representations tend to (re)produce `geographies of actions' and bordered practices.

Employing the empirical illustrations outlined above it is obvious that both Dutch and German national identities are constructed through and against the respective neighbour, and that popular national stereotypes are hard to change. In general, Dutch-German relations continue to be full of stereotypes that feed into patterns of scepticism and indifference - and that have a certain consistency because of recurrent themes such as postwar distrust, xenophobia, the countries' size difference, etc. It is a love-hate relationship that does not hint at unpleasant wartime memories only, but also at the fact that the two neighbours are very similar. Yet, being very similar often also results in an urge to emphasize differences - which also makes it difficult to let the (imagined) borderline go. But the difficult Dutch-German relationship is not only reproduced in popular representations, which are unreflexively consumed in the everyday, but also in their institutionalized reproduction, e.g. in museums. The representations in the exhibitions, on the other hand, were not chosen out of the blue, but depending on a commonsense. Even though stereotypes are very dominant and feed into people's lives, their interpretations are not linear or invariable. In reflecting on stereotyped representations consciously, people also laugh about them and are critical of them, i.e. the meanings given to them might differ - as the museum goers' reactions have shown. But although stereotypes do not determine people in their practices (as the habitus is the subjective variation of a commonsense), they are still influential - and hard to overcome as part of collective social memory.

What was introduced as the border's `level' at the beginning of this chapter refers to imaginative borders, to the experience of the border through popular imagination and as part of broader socio-cultural relations between Germany and the Netherlands. This `level' also influences the daily practices of people in the Dutch-German borderland, namely in such a way that they tend to `end' at the border. Everyday life along the Dutch-German border thus remains a `fascinating presence of absences' whose traces can be found in popular culture on the one hand and in spaces of absence, in routines of non-border-crossings on the other. But
these routines are not necessarily oppositional to the EU’s objective of borderless movements: Cross-border spaces of absence are not automatically counter-spaces - they are spaces of boring and bordered everyday practices.

Notes

1 Edensor (2002) goes even further and stresses the impact of familiar features such as phone-booths, post-boxes, roadscapes, architecture, etc. in constructing the feeling of being home in a rather unreflexive manner. This difference between signs and symbols can be explained by Barthes (1973) as the distinction between two levels of signification: a first one of a sign’s literal meanings and a second one of wider and symbolic meanings. Familiar everyday things such as coins and stamps, but also the built environment thus have a ‘second’ symbolic meaning. Beyond being matters of payment, dispatch or accommodation, they are symbols that signify the nation unreflexively.

2 In Germany, the exhibition was called ‘Deutschland - Niederlande: Heiter bis wolkeig’ (‘Germany - The Netherlands: Fair to cloudy’) and presented in Bonn (Haus der Geschichte, 22.11.00 - 16.04.01). In the Netherlands, it was called ‘Zimmer Frei: Nederland - Duitsland na 1945’ (‘Rooms to let: The Netherlands - Germany after 1945’) and was shown in Amsterdam (Rijksmuseum, 26.05.01 - 16.09.01).

3 This protest was initiated by a radio station as reaction to the murder of five Turkish women in Solingen whose home was set on fire.

4 These central themes and images can still be viewed on the museum’s website: http://www.rijksmuseum.nl/nl/tentoonstellingen/zimmerfreieextra_tentoonstelling.htm

5 Comment from Amsterdam, originally left in German (referred to as ‘Amsterdam/German’ below).

6 Comment from Bonn, originally left in Dutch (referred to as ‘Bonn/Dutch’ below).

7 Apart from football, the national stereotypes that appeared most often in the museums’ visitors books were ‘tulips, caravan, cheese, drugs and beach’ for the Netherlands and ‘sausages, beer and detective Derrick’ for Germany.

8 Comment on Amsterdam exhibition.

9 Comment on Amsterdam exhibition.

10 Both comments on Bonn exhibition.

11 Comment on Amsterdam exhibition.

12 All three comments on Bonn exhibition.
References

Chapter 14

`Rostigraben'
A Discourse on National Identity in Switzerland

Wolfgang Zierhofer

Introduction

For almost a century ideological differences between the French- and the German-speaking populations in Switzerland (Figure 14.1) are themselves a theme of public political communication. Since the 1970s this discourse is framed by the metaphor of the *Rostigraben* (roasted potato gap). During the 1990s this term was used in an almost inflationary way, particularly in the aftermath of a series of important national plebiscites. Switzerland had to adapt to a changing international context and to redefine its national identity. Although more recent plebiscites are not really suitable to raise concerns about national cohesion, in public discourse the question of whether a Rostigraben separates the minds of eastern and western Switzerland is already established as a standard for interpreting voting results.

It is not without problems to translate this expression into proper English, nor is there a standard translation into French or Italian. *Rosti* is a profane meal: roughly rasped potatoes, roasted in a pan until they form a golden-brown cake. My dictionary translates *Graben* as ditch, trench or moat. Considering that it refers primarily to a mental difference, I prefer instead to translate it as gap. For the Swiss this expression provokes Swiss-German connotations and is widely used to mark a cultural distinction within the country. But why is a metaphor that indicates cultural distinctions used so frequently to represent political differences? What is its secret `sex-appeal'? And what are the consequences of framing political debates in such terms?

By expressing a gap, the Rostigraben not only refers to two conflicting sides, but also to an imagined third difference, which is of course the unity of Switzerland as a nation and as a state. We are all familiar with the fact that nations are represented by certain meals: the French as `frogs', the Germans as `krauts'. Murcott (1996) elaborates that, from a cultural anthropology point of view, food and eating form the biological and social center of the reproduction of communities. Meals are therefore ideal symbols for cultural distinction. Because the function of metaphors is to circumscribe other notions, for instance in order to avoid naming them directly or to reduce their complexity, one could regard the
Figure 14.1 Typical Representation of the 'Distribution of Languages', Measured by the Residence of Native Speakers in Switzerland, and Early Medieval Areas of Germanic Tribes

disintegration of Switzerland also as the taboo that lends the Rostigraben its life. The notion provides an imagination for what nobody dares to express plainly: the contingent character of the Swiss nation, the fragile unity of the state, the arbitrary constitution of Swiss identity, the alienation between the French-speaking and the German-speaking parts of Switzerland.

Seen from this point of view, the ritual of debating the existence of the Rostigraben contributes to the reproduction and renewal of Swiss national identity. We encounter the phenomenon of a playful camouflage of issues, which at other times and places has led to secession and civil war. The Rostigraben discourse locates itself at the intersection of identity politics and geopolitics. In order to understand such communicative strategies, some knowledge about the cultural and political constitution of Switzerland is essential. Jost. (1994) argues that Swiss historiography should avoid methodological voluntarisms by not focusing on internal processes exclusively, for they are quite often stimulated by rivalries among strong European powers. Following his suggestion, I will try to elaborate a long-term interpretation of national identity politics in a European context.

A first section of this paper is devoted to the historical formation of the regional distribution of languages in contemporary Switzerland, which was the result of the migration of whole populations during late Roman and early medieval times. All subsequent geopolitical turnovers of territory in contemporary Switzerland and its neighboring regions did not alter the map of languages. Section two reports on the formation of the Swiss nation-state in a European
context and on its related identity policies. These two historically oriented sections provide key information on the socio-linguistic and geopolitical conditions, which represent the backdrop for those discourses on national coherence that are the topic of this chapter. Section three discusses a variety of (academic) interpretations of the Röstigraben and their mutual relations, without offering their complete integration. Section four turns to the consequences of the kind of identity politics that are involved in Röstigraben discourse and concludes with a critical discussion of their ethical implications.

Languages on the Move

In the following two sections my historical account draws primarily on four sources (Buchi, 2001; Fahmi, 2002; Felder et. al., 1998; Im Hof, 2001), which represent what is generally accepted in contemporary Swiss historiography, and for the sake of readability I will not refer to them in detail.

Decisive for the contemporary distribution of languages was a process that started with the conquest of the area of contemporary Switzerland by the Romans in 58 BC. For a few centuries Switzerland was sometimes a buffer zone against Germanic tribes in the north, sometimes even a safe and prosperous hinterland. During that period Roman and Celtic cultures mixed, and a Gallo-Romanic idiom emerged in central and western Switzerland, with a Romanic idiom in the east.

Around 400 AD the Romans gave way to Germanic pressure and retreated to the south of the Alps. In 440 AD the Burgundies, a German tribe, settled in Savoy and soon extended their influence to parts of western Switzerland. While the Gallo-Romanic language survived the integration of Burgundy into the Frank Empire in the 6th century, the conquest of large parts of German territory by the Franks was followed by a slow immigration of Alemannic settlers into the northern part of Switzerland, which absorbed the Gallo-Romanic population up to the boundaries of the Burgundies. From the 9th century on the language border between Romanic and Alemannic idioms stabilized, although a large zone remained bilingual.

However, this language border did not yet separate French and German as we know them today, but a Franco-Provencal idiom from Alemannic dialects. From the 16th century onwards, the elites adopted standard French, and by the end of the 19th century the local dialects were practically extinct. Although standard German became an official language as well, it could not replace the Alemannic dialects as spoken language.

By the 6th century, the Langobards, entered eastern and southern Switzerland as well as northern Italy and adopted roman idioms. While the Italian part kept its distribution south of the Alps, the Romansh north of the Alps continuously lost territory to German. Today, Romansh-speaking persons are usually bilingual (EDI, 1989, p. 9).

The four contemporary ‘national’ languages in Switzerland (Figure 14.1) are the result first of Roman and German in-migrations, different forms of adaptation, and in early modernity, the import of foreign standard-languages. For a century or more internal migration and immigration again considerably changed the linguistic landscape of Switzerland. By the beginning of the 21st century almost 20 percent
of the Swiss population is comprised of foreigners, most of whom do not speak one of the Swiss national languages as their native language.

The Formation of Switzerland and Swiss Self-Identity

In a nutshell, up to World War II Switzerland remained largely a zone in-between large and frequently conflicting European powers. The main orientation of conflicts, however, turned from a north-south axis in Roman times to an east-west axis in later periods. Since the beginning of its self-constitution by the end of the 13th century, Switzerland was an area between the French and the German-Austrian empires, and therefore a contested zone. But instead of determining the spatial distribution of languages as in Roman and early post-Roman times, post-Carolingian geopolitical changes continued to stimulate various identity policies, which I propose to regard as the context of the Röstigraben discourse.

From the Early Confederation to the Swiss Nation-state

Narratives of the formation of the Swiss nation-state begin usually with the end of the 13th century when the territories (now known as cantons) of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden established an alliance in order to increase their autonomy from the Habsburg dynasty. This first little confederation was able to impose its ambitions in a series of battles. Moreover, throughout the 14th and particularly the 15th century the confederation expanded westward and southwards, for a short period even considerably beyond the boundaries of contemporary Switzerland. By the beginning of the 16th century, the borders between the French, the Italian, the Romansh and the German populations had become politically rather insignificant boundaries in the interior of the Swiss confederation. Although the confederation was generally acknowledged as a state-like entity, we must not conceive of it as a territorial state in the modern sense. Rather, it was a complex, multi-layered construction of asymmetric dependencies and unequal status of member cantons. Many internal conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, between aristocrats, bourgeois and farmers as well as between urban and rural forces, fill the chapters of Swiss histories from the 16th century until the end of the 18th century. But they did not alter the distribution of languages or the shape of the confederation by and large. Rather, because of the need to balance the bonds within the confederation as well as with external powers, each crisis contributed to the cohesion of the confederation and strengthened its autonomy. The Westphalian peace treaties (1648) included the formal recognition of Switzerland as an autonomous territorial unit and the legal separation from the German Empire.

Infused with the spirit of Enlightenment, the Helvetic Republic, established in 1798, for the first time granted all cantons of the Swiss confederation equal political status and acknowledged Italian, French and German as official languages. But a counter-revolution provoked the occupation of Switzerland by French troops from 1799 to 1804. In the following years of political restoration Switzerland was a rather calm country. A key event was the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in which Switzerland was obliged to military neutrality, this later becoming a major factor determining its geopolitical security (Suter, 1998, p. 160) and a pillar of its
identity. Towards the middle of the 19th century the liberal movement gained strong momentum in Switzerland. Its republican orientation and interest in upscaling political and economic spatial orders was decisive for the transformation of the Swiss confederation into the Swiss federal state. The constitution of 1848 re-established the equal status of all cantons and defined Switzerland again as a multilingual state (Chiffele 2000, p. 20). Right from the beginning, a subtle balance of regional interests also accompanied Swiss politics. Moreover, the constitution of 1848 opened the way for the homogenization of law, money and units of measurement among cantons and led to the abolition of internal borders and tolls. In political, administrative and economic terms the establishment of the Swiss nation-state involved a geographical quantum leap of scale, which was not immediately matched by the development of a national identity.

In Between European Nationalistic Rivalries

Many little incidents, but above all diverging sympathies during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), challenged the Swiss elite to develop a national identity that was deliberately based upon linguistic pluralism rather than cultural homogeneity. While this served of course as a legitimate foil against the annexationist ambitions of neighboring nations, it also provided an interpretative scheme for internal consensus and dissent. Notwithstanding such identity policy, in the last decades of the 19th century, when nationalism and French-German rivalry reached their high tide, in Switzerland also ‘the language question’ became an issue. Rapid modernization and industrialization, increasing inter-regional migration and an internationalization of the economy were the foil to articulate fears of Germanization in western Switzerland, and, conversely, of an advance of French in the east. But the rise of a movement in Germany that strove for the integration of Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands into a larger Germany, was observed with concern in all parts of Switzerland.

When in the summer of 1914 European nations followed one after the other into war, Switzerland chose its national holiday, 1 August, to declare its neutrality. The population of Switzerland, however, was not at all neutral, but sympathized with its various neighboring countries. Verbal battles in the mass media and manifestations threatened peace within the country. But the public efforts of patriotic organizations and well-known individuals succeeded to calm the situation again. It was probably the combination of the ideology of ‘nation of will’ and military neutrality that saved the state from secession at that time. From then on the political gap between western and eastern Switzerland entered historiography and collective identity. Intellectuals began to represent linguistic pluralism as the core of Swiss national identity (Altermatt, 1995, p. 45).

In the 1930s Hitler's program of Heim ins Reich (coming home into the Empire) was perceived as an immediate threat against the Swiss nation-state and its democratic political system. For all major political powers geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual national defense) became the imperative of the moment. The legal upgrading of Romansh to the fourth national language in 1938 by a referendum that achieved an overwhelming result, would demonstrate the multilingual nature of Swiss national identity to its neighbor in the north. While World War I drove Switzerland to the edge of secession, World War II forged a
strong Swiss national identity and drove the relations between the Germans and the Swiss-Germans to their historical low point - with long lasting after-effects, particularly for the self-identity of the Swiss-Germans.

European Integration and Globalization

The first decades after World War II did not bring any noteworthy changes with respect to the language discourse within Switzerland. However, the successes of the new social movements during the 1970s and the increasing popularity of opinion polls intensified political communication and fostered the awareness of regional differences within Switzerland. According to Buchi (2001, p. 258) it was also in the 1970s when the metaphor of Rostigraben started to appear in the public discourse; its origin is unknown, however.

From the 1980s onward, Buchi (2001, p. 262) notes a growing self-consciousness on the part of the francophone minority. This prepared the soil for a crisis that was to come with the reorganization of Swiss international relations, particularly in respect of European integration and the United Nations. A referendum for joining the UN in 1986 failed in all cantons and did not provide reasons to interpret it in terms of a gap in the political landscape. However, the referendum of 1992 on joining the European Market was rejected by a small majority, but with a drastic regional bias: with the exception of the canton Basel City all German-speaking cantons rejected the bill, whereas all francophone cantons accepted it. Regarding its political consequences, the referendum on the European Market has been the most significant in Swiss history (Zbinden, 1994, p. 40). After this referendum a series of others, which also touched on language issues, followed. Very often the petty bourgeois triumphed over open-minded Switzerland, and German-speaking cantons over French-speaking ones. The dissatisfaction of francophone Switzerland gave vent to numerous polemics in the mass media. An east-west gradient of economic prosperity and projects like the rescaling of the Geneva Airport or English as first foreign language at the basic schools in Zurich, fanned the flames.

During the 1990s the voting results again and again revealed a gap between a pro-European and solidarity oriented francophone west against an environmentalist and economically liberal Alemannic east of Switzerland. Whether a plebiscite achieved only a slim majority or minority in certain cantons, whether socio-economic differences were as important as regional ones, did not matter so much: the Rostigraben hovered like a memorial over Switzerland. After a long time of smug silence, the decision on the European Market had brought back the task of defining a Swiss national identity within a changing international context. However, a very good result of joining the United Nations in March 2002 and several other plebiscites without Rostigraben in the last few years calmed the situation again - who knows for how long?

Transformations of the Linguistic Landscape

In order to summarize the emergence of the nexus between linguistic and political structures, which is the background for understanding the Rostigraben, I would like to distinguish three phases:
In the first phase, which is determined by movements of Roman and Germanic populations as well as early medieval politics, the distribution of Romanic and Alemannic idioms on the territory of contemporary Switzerland was shaped.

The second phase, lasting from about the 10th century to the 19th century brought basically two changes. On the one hand, external influences and internal differentiation transformed the early idioms into dialects of French, Italian, German and Romansh and their corresponding standard languages. With the exception of the slow but steady expansion of Swiss-German at the expense of Romansh, the spatial distribution of spoken languages was not significantly altered. On the other hand a variety of factors, such as the slow and complicated formation of Switzerland, the unequal position of cantons within this process, the self-identity of the Swiss as a multilingual and militarily neutral nation, and the amities of different parts of the population to their neighbor countries, transformed the political status of languages from a practical factor to be taken into account in communication into prime symbols of national coherence.

A third phase, marked by intra- and international migration as well as English as popular lingua franca, added a new and complicated layer to the linguistic landscape on top of the Roman and Germanic sediments. Participating in the 'global age' (Albrow, 1996) Switzerland has to define a new geopolitical position and national identity, somewhere in-between independence and European integration, global headquarter economy and protectionism, NATO and military neutrality, local traditions and international migration, autonomy and home base of international organizations, and so forth.

**Approaches to the Rostigraben**

After reconstructing the emergence of a multilingual Switzerland in a European context, I would like to turn now from a predominantly historical perspective to a discussion of explanations of the Rostigraben that are offered within Swiss political and academic debate. To begin with, it is necessary to shed more light on the mode of construction of the Rostigraben. Therefore my first point is a reflection on the practices of representation that make the Rostigraben available as a public discourse. The following three arguments portray essential dimensions of those problems that are often regarded as the causes of east-west tensions in Switzerland, which subsequently led to political differences, thus the Rostigraben. These are the geopolitical history of Switzerland, transformations of scale within the spatial organization of modern society, and - since a materialist account must not miss - regional socio-economic inequalities within Switzerland. Politics is always about different interests and opinions. So, why can some of them become a threat to the political system itself? With an attempt to answer this intriguing question, I shall conclude this section.

*On the discursive constitution and representation of the Rostigraben:* Direct democracy offers Swiss citizens the opportunity to vote several times per year on various issues at the levels of community, canton and the federal state. Political communication is supported by a lively mass media. On a routine basis, journalists, in cooperation with political scientists, provide analyses of plebiscites on the cantonal and national level. It has thus become standard to interpret voting
behavior in regional terms. Without direct democracy and its specialized monitoring in the mass media, a Rostigraben discourse would be inconceivable. However, both, the political system and media reporting also imply some tricky issues for interpretation, which have to do with what I would like to call the majority fallacy.

It is a constitutive factor of democracy that the formulation of bills tends to get support from a bit more than half the voters. Political parties try to achieve as much as possible in respect of their interests, and by consequence, large majorities are a sign of political possibilities that are not exploited to the limit. Therefore, from the point of view of the individual voter, democratic systems tend to produce ‘small majorities’ of winners, but ‘large minorities’ of losers. For national plebiscites in Switzerland, since not only a majority of citizens, but also a majority of cantons is required, the media tend to represent the results in maps that show the votes aggregated on the cantonal level. This has two optical effects: first, even little majorities may be represented by large sections of Switzerland’s surface, and secondly, a systematic regional gradient will lead to a borderline splitting the country into a pro and a contra-side.

The monitoring of political communication and mass media reporting tend to aggregate, homogenize and territorialize the population into many cantonal containers and into two sub-national camps. Other dimensions of political differences, such as class, age, gender, urbanity or dominant economic sectors are comparably underexposed, and chances to understand the causes of dissent are missed. Moreover, if conglomerations of administrative territories are interpreted as linguistic or cultural communities; political discourse is squeezed into sub-national ethnic categories, resulting in the essentialization of political dissent. Such practices of political representation imply an erosion of the standards of political rationality as they have been established since the Enlightenment and which formally and normatively constitute late-modern political spheres.

Rostigraben and geopolitical context: From a historical point of view, however, the link between linguistic communities within the Swiss population and conflicting political attitudes, particularly on the level of international relations in the broadest sense, gets some support. Zbinden (1994, p. 44), for instance, interprets the attitudes toward the European Market and the European Union in terms of the historical affinities to and experiences with France and Germany respectively. In the same line of argument, for Racine (1994, p. 158) the result of the referendum on joining the European Market is an expression of the xenophobic fear that Switzerland might lose the status of an exceptional case, an idea that was fixed particularly through the patriotic discourses of the World War II period. But when dealing with Swiss foreign policy by the end of the 20th century, we have to be careful with such historical interpretations, for it is not clear to what degree and in what ways historical constellations are inscribed in people's memories and able to guide the behavior of the population.

Struggles about scales of spatial integration: A second historical approach sets out from structural changes in modern societies. Like Biichi (2001, pp. 279-287) other commentators also see links between the Rostigraben and socio-economic changes on an international level, such as European integration and neoliberal globalization. In this respect Guzzi (1994, p. 145) proposes to interpret the Rostigraben in terms of republican affinities. Already before the formation of the
nation-state, western Switzerland has shown a pro-republican attitude, whereas the German- and Italian-speaking parts took more conservative positions. According to Guzzi the 'borders' revealed by the referendum on the European Market resemble very much those separating republican friendly from resisting communities at the end of the 18th century. The most interesting aspect of his argument in our context, however, is that these attitudes could be seen as expressions of differently conceived spatial orders; while liberal and republican forces represented the rather cosmopolitan interests of trade, banking and industry, the conservatives stood for ties to the local and regional economy, as they are favorable for farming. In the end the liberals prevailed and induced an up-scaling of Switzerland.

A similar process of up-scaling is involved in European integration and in neoliberal attempts to further open and homogenize global markets. Also Siegenthaler (1994, p. 127) parallels recent debates with the insecurities in the years before the creation of the Swiss nation-state in 1848, partly caused by a mismatch of small-scale politics and an increasingly larger scale economy. In many ways, spatial structures are also distributive schemes, and their change - whether homogenization or fragmentation - will likely produce losers and winners. No doubt, during the 1990s Switzerland had to decide upon its way to go along with an accelerated up-shift of scales particularly in Europe but also world wide. In this respect farmers, small retailers and environmentalists nowadays take the conservative position. In 1992, for instance, not only the right-wing populists but also greens and left-wing social democrats rejected the bill on the European Market. At least for the time being, bilateral contracts with the European Union, membership in many international organizations and headquarters of global corporations are Switzerland's instruments to keep pace with international integration.

Regional, socio-economic disparities: If we could look through materialistic glasses and focus on socio-economic factors, the Rostigraben might appear as a rather insignificant epiphenomenon. Racine (1994, p. 160) for instance, reminds us that in the vote on the European Market many Swiss-German cities had pro-majorities and that a strong urban-rural divide determined the results. In addition, the differences between lowland and mountain regions and between the wealthier and poorer regions of Switzerland were noteworthy. The latter correlate highly with the relative weight of economic sectors. Services and industries, thus the urban sectors, would profit from market integration, but the Swiss agricultural sector would suffer from strong competition. If we consider that Swiss-German cities also achieved pro-majorities, it was not primarily a divide between western and eastern Switzerland on the issue of the European Market, but a marked socio-economic polarization within Alemannic Switzerland that led to surprisingly high rates of 'no'. However, a certain economic domination of eastern Switzerland, particularly Zurich, over the rest of the country and related socio-economic disparities also contribute to the awareness of a Rostigraben. So, from a socio-economic point of view, the Rostigraben reflects a double center-periphery gradient between the urban and the rural, as well as between eastern and western Switzerland.

Federalism, imagined community and political egalitarianism: Every state, every nation is marked by manifold social and economic differences. Most of them are articulated within politics, and there are always winners and losers. Usually these circumstances do not put the unity of the state into question, but the
Rostigraben discourse does. The question can be posed thus: why should political dissent become an issue of Swiss national coherence at all?

Obviously, some implicit expectations regarding the representation of different parts of Switzerland are not met. These expectations could have their roots on the one hand in the transformation of the asymmetric structure of the pre-Helvetic Swiss confederation into an egalitarian federation in 1798 and again in 1848, and on the other hand in the subsequent self-definition of Switzerland as a pluralistic ‘nation of will’. This transformation not only required defining the status of national languages, it also meant that balancing political interests within Switzerland was no longer just an outcome of Realpolitik or a mirror of pure power-distribution, but a matter of normative claims. If the nation understands itself as an egalitarian nation of will, it assumes not only a common understanding, but moreover an implicit social contract between different sections of the population. In contrast to the self-definitions of many other European nations by the end of the 19th century, for the Swiss there was no illusion of cultural unity available. A nation of will had to prove its uninterrupted willingness to reproduce the community. This, however, is incommensurable with a long-lasting systematic dissent of regionally defined parts of the population. By contrast, permanent dissent and conflict between social strata, classes, religious groups or other non-territorial social categories will not so quickly endanger the framework of a nation.

Conclusion: The Ethics of Representing Languages

As we have seen, the Rostigraben is a mass-media discourse that charges political interests with a territorial group identity through which it creates sub-state ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983). By applying a distinction that refers to language and related cultural traits, political will is transformed into an imperative of the ‘clan’, so to speak. We might speak of ethnically defined nations on an ‘intra-national’ level - a formulation that highlights the threat of secession to the nation-state. Taking Guzzi’s approach a step further, we could interpret the codification of political communication in terms of the Rostigraben as a backlash from comparably universalistic republican traditions - which are the basis of the Swiss federal constitution - into particularistic, ethnic and quasi-tribal rationalities. The gap would then not only implicitly refer to a clash of conceived spatial orders, as Guzzi and Siegenthaler would have it, but also to differences of conceived social orders and conceived social contracts.

Rather than framing political dissent a priori in spatial or regional terms, a republican or even cosmopolitical alternative for the global age might imply articulating conflicts primarily in terms of social categories, which as a consequence may reveal an uneven spatial or regional distribution. An adequate representation of conflicts is the necessary precondition for any attempt to achieve agreements and compromises among conflicting camps by argumentation. Metaphors like the Rostigraben and similar territorial categories may turn complex issues into apparently simple, binary structures, but by the same token they invite the misrepresentation of political conflicts. Unless the distribution of resources, chances and risks is per se organized along linguistic dimensions - which in
Switzerland is generally not the case - no generic link exists between languages and political conflicts.

However, representing the social dimension in terms of linguistic territories is quite common - not only in Switzerland. The legal category of `national languages' defines the right to use certain languages in specific official functions on certain territories. From an administrative point of view this makes sense, at least as long as administrations are themselves related to territorial containers, like communes, cantons or states. From a geographical and from an ethical perspective, however, this is problematic. Since, in the end, the mobile human being is the carrier of language(s), the political or legal fixation of language-territories and the idea of language borders are unrealistic, as Leimgruber (1995, p. 45) points out. Linguistic territories are neither sharply delimited, nor homogeneous, nor necessarily stable. Rather, both spoken and native languages present themselves in Switzerland as a dynamic and multilayered feature of culture, particularly if we take into account that many individuals apply several languages and dialects in different contexts, such as home, school, contact with authorities, public life and workplace. What is mapped or statistically captured can at best be a deliberate selection - but at worst a thoughtless, reductionist representation of communicative practices.

The Rostigraben is thus a metaphor that fits into a world that is organized primarily by applying cultural-territorial categories, as in the second of the three phases, which I distinguished at the end of section 2. But this notion is not adequate for discursive `boundary work' in an increasingly functionally differentiated and globalized world. If we take into account that in contemporary Switzerland many non-national languages are regularly spoken by considerable segments of the population, the issue of their legal status comes to the fore. Why should they not demand similar linguistic rights?

When under the Helvetic Republic of 1798 relations among the Swiss cantons shifted from that of legal and political inequality to that of equality, the status of languages had also to be settled. When cosmopolitical debates today (e.g. Beck, 2002, Derrida, 2001) pick up issues like rights of asylum or of political rights for long-term inhabitants with foreign nationality, the demand to settle the legal status of new languages is probably not far away. For sure, developing non-essentialist and non-particularistic language policies would also have far reaching implications for the national identity - and it would not be a trivial task, for it means to define the `polis' in the global age (Kramsch and Zierhofer 2003). From the point of view of a non-particularistic, thus humanitarian or cosmopolitical ethics, typical immigration countries, like Switzerland, would have to find a mode of legally acknowledging linguistic sections of their population without referring to tradition and territorial codes.

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Siebo Janssen and Heinrich Leuthold for providing me valuable information.
References


Chapter 15

On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari

Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones III

Introduction

Perhaps the most influential aspect of postmodernism's introduction into geography in the late 1980s was an interdisciplinary engagement with the humanities, particularly with American literary theory, British cultural studies, and French poststructuralism. Out of these interactions a growing cadre of geographers came to reject their traditional model of mimetic representation and the certainties it insured. In its place they came to highlight the indeterminacy of meaning and the inescapably social entanglements of discourse within systems of power/knowledge. These insights led to an emphasis on the textual character of space and everyday life over the brute force of underlying social structures, particularly the capitalist political economy.

It was no simple task to incorporate new theories that privileged the contingencies of epistemology over the ground truth of ontology into a field that had largely been materialist in both subject matter and methodological orientation. The stakes behind this shift became more pronounced following the publication of David Harvey's (1989) classic analysis of postmodernism. Following a materialist critique of new theories of representation, Harvey showed how post-Fordist economic restructuring and its attendant 'space time compression' could account for the cultural formations and epistemological uncertainties of postmodernism. In spite of his criticisms, over the next decade numerous books and articles continued to explore the representational aspects of social space under the general impetus of the cultural/linguistic turn (Benko and Strohmayer, 1997; Deutsche, 1991; Doel, 1999; Duncan and Ley, 1993; Harley, 1989; Keith and Pile, 1993; Olsson, 1991; O Tuathail, 1996). Such works led some, such as Richard Peet (1998), to conclude with a variety of critics in other fields that the postmodern/poststructuralist movement was at base idealist and relativistic. By the end of the 1990s, some would claim that the division between materialist analyses and those focusing on representation and discourse constituted one of the primary theoretical cleavages in geography (Jones and Natter, 1999).

A relatively recent response to these congealed positions is found in the geographic literature addressing the work of French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Doel, 1999; Bonta and Protevi forthcoming). These two theorists offer what might be best described as a 'post-structuralist historical-libidinal materialism' (Protevi, 2001, p. 199), so named because their ontology rejects the verticality of structuralist thought but retains an emphasis on the 'real' productive
effects of flows and interruptions. Marcus Doel a leading interpreter of Deleuze and Guattari in geography, counters the idealist critique thusly:

`Contrary to popular opinion, we have no special (some would say `unnatural') interest in language. We are not besotted with texts, writing, signs, images, and such like. We do not believe that since reality is only accessible to us through language, then reality itself must be lost to us in language: that all we have are signs of things, rather than the things themselves; that having been emancipated from their bondage to an elite band of actually-existing real-world referents (such as people, places, events, and objects), signs will at last be free to float in the void, enjoying untroubled and halcyon days` (forthcoming, p. 2, emphasis in original).

Instead, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, he asserts the materiality of everything:

`As fanatical materialists, we are struck by everything - nothing will be set aside from the play of force; nothing will be spirited away onto a higher plane or exorcized into a nether-world .... It is true that we take up signs, words, images, quantities, figures, maps, photographs, money, hypertext, gardening advice, lipstick traces, the exquisite corpse, and so on and so forth - but we take them up as force: as strikes and counter-strikes; as blows and counter-blows` (forthcoming, p. 10; emphasis in original).

From our perspective, Deleuze and Guattari’s work bears directly on the theoretical status of borders - parts of ‘everything’ that are both signs and lines: ‘constraining enclosures’ produced by border words (e.g., woman, straight, white: see Kirby, 1996, p. 13) and stubbornly ‘real’ boundaries that ‘refuse to melt in the heat of a post-modern world’ (Valins, 2003, p. 160). This paper is thus an effort to rethink the border outside of the ideational/material preoccupations, a rethinking that should be welcome in the interdisciplinary field of ‘border studies’ (e.g., Arreola, 2002; Fox, 1999; Hicks, 1991; Jay, 1998; Johnson and Michaelson, 1997; Saldivar, 1997; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Welchman, 1996). For, on the one hand, there are those theorists who draw on Derrida, Butler, Foucault, and Bhabha, among others, in stressing the theoretical, abstract, metaphoric, and discursive aspects of social and spatial categorization. For example, John Welchman, in affirming Ernesto Laclau’s theory of the border, asserts that:

`No longer a mere threshold or instrument of demarcation, the border is a crucial zone through which contemporary (political, social, cultural) formations negotiate with received knowledge and reconstitute the “horizon” of discursive identity` (Welchman, 1996, pp. 177-178).

While, on the other hand, there are those who remind us not to neglect the material effects of specific borders, such as the fence separating the U.S. and Mexico:

`I am not critical of the philosophical formulations of such postmodern theorists ... I am saying that the level of abstraction that seems to be the nature of such formulations sometimes distances the reader from the lived reality of the U.S.-Mexican border. As we negotiate the intellectual twists and turns of..."
such musings it is easy to forget the border on which millions of people live and the border that is traversed daily - both legally and illegally - by thousands of women and men' (Tatum, 2000, pp. 96-97).

A premise of this paper is that border researchers should address these sorts of divisions with theories that are both open to new ways of thinking about socio-spatial demarcations and sufficiently capable of addressing the violence of everyday life on the border. As Neil Smith and Cindi Katz note regarding spatial concepts more generally: ‘if a new spatialized politics is to be both coherent and effective, it will be necessary to comprehend the interconnectedness of material and metaphoric [i.e., ideational] space’ (1993, p. 68). Our discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's border theory goes directly to the mediations called for by Smith and Katz. We begin by discussing Deleuze and Guattari's dismissal of metaphor - the conveyor belt par excellence of representation - placing it in relation to their productive materialism of 'becoming'. We then theorize the becoming-border through their concept of (de)territorialization. A brief empirical discussion concludes the main body of the paper. In it we describe the deterritorializing activism of La Resistencia, an anti-border group with offices throughout the U.S. southwest.

The Limits of Metaphor: Becoming as Materiality

The collaborative works of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and *What is Philosophy?* (1994), are replete with the language of borders (for introductions to their work, see Boundas and Olkowski, 1994; Delanda, 2002; Hardt, 1993; Massumi, 1992; Patton, 2000). In these and other works, border terms are accompanied by references to a host of other geographic concepts, such as plateaus and milieus, zones and landscapes, latitudes and longitudes, and tracings and mappings. So infused is their writing with the language of space that at one point they invent the term 'geophilosophy' to announce their investment in geography (see Bonta and Protevi, forthcoming). Yet, as we noted at the outset, when critics and theoreticians turn to the concept of borders as an apparatus for articulating various lines of difference and subjectivity in social and cultural studies (e.g., Anzaldúa, 1999; Kirby, 1996; Welchman, 1996), the term may slide into metaphoric usage. According to Smith and Katz, this maneuver can introduce absolutist and Euclidean versions of spatial thinking that may de-materialize and therefore de-politicize social space, as if borders did their work solely within the nether-land of abstract neutrality (1993, also Tatum, 2000).

As thinkers who invoke the language of borders to understand all manner of topics, Deleuze and Guattari risk inviting similar accusations. Take, for example, their popular concept, 'lines of flight', a phrase that signals an escape from an institutionalized apparatus of capture. The term has been invoked as an experimental resistance to the 'order words' of linguistic systems that limit alternative conceptualizations - just the sort of spatialization that might hover over material borderlands. For us, however, Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual spaces - and their political leverage - are anchored in a resolutely materialist understanding of spatiality.
Key to overcoming the division between metaphor and materiality in Deleuze and Guattari's work is their explicit rejection of the former term. They maintain that metaphor belongs to an idealist realm of relation that, like the evolutionary natural sciences, uses strategies of 'series and structure' to produce degrees of resemblance and difference between a set of terms: 'In the first case, I have resemblances that differ from one another in a single series, and between series. In the second case, I have differences that resemble each other within a single structure, and between structures' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 234). In both instances we find the organization of a closed system that assembles terms and relations according to likenesses, imagining for itself a prior, transcendental Ideal form to which all other terms speak (also Derrida, 1972). Locking these terms into a form of progressive development, each following from the previous in an arboreal series of increasingly different likenesses, produces a hierarchical model that uses the supposed unity of the first term in the series, the Ideal subject or object, as a grounds for producing the individual (individuated) unities of subsequent subjects/objects, each of which differ in varying degrees of perfection, but find their wholeness through a hierarchy of likenesses:

'either in the form of a chain of beings perpetually imitating one another, progressively and regressively, and tending toward the divine higher term they all imitate by graduated resemblances, as the model for and principle behind the series; or in the form of a mirror imitation with nothing left to imitate because it itself is the model everything imitates, this time by ordered difference' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 234-35).

If the border metaphor is problematic for dealing with moments of heterogeneity because it tends to presuppose and fall back upon a unified transcendental identity on either of its sides, where, so to speak, do we begin? Deleuze and Guattari's response is that we start with the fragmented pieces as they are already assembled, 'in the middle', as Doel often says (1999, p. 164). For Deleuze and Guattari, the pieces, whatever and wherever they may be, produce a whole that is immanent to the multiplicities that constitute an assemblage. This whole appears and disappears with the transformation of the multiplicities. Such a whole points not to Identity or essence, but is rather a temporary stabilization, a contingent consistency of the parts within the space upon and with which they assemble.

In their discussion of Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari celebrate the abandonment of metaphor in favor of metamorphoses, actual transformations-out-of that they call becomings:

'Kafka deliberately kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation. Metamorphosis is the contrary to metaphor. There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the world. The thing and the other things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following their line of escape. It is no longer a question of a resemblance .... Instead, it is now a question of a becoming that includes the maximum of differences as a difference of intensity, the crossing of a barrier, a raising or a falling, a bending or an erecting, an accent on the word' (1986, p. 22, emphases added).
Kafka's metamorphic becomings create new possibilities, new actions, and new affects that take lines of flight from the structuring that overcodes the collected parts (what Deleuze and Guattari call 'Bodies without Organs') and produces them as organisms. Such organisms parade as transcendental, as if they precede the assemblage while organizing its serial similarities into categories that elide difference: Oedipalized infant, productive worker, illegal immigrant, capitalist state, nation, and so on. To metamorphose or become is, by contrast, to have a productive relationship to the multiplicities of difference, to rediscover 'what a body can do' (Deleuze 1986, p. 39), something that is often forgotten when thought is organized according to series, structures, and systems. Taking a line of flight from these organizing processes and the instituted bodies they cohere (Massumi, 1992) requires us to retest bodies at molecular levels and to create new strategies for making connections, affecting, and being affected. As such, becoming is never a matter of imitating some other organism, but is rather a metamorphosing out of organization.

The processes just described are determinedly material. Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, even concepts are material and productive, forms of and vehicles for becomings (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). For, by invoking questions, concepts constantly transform our engagement with the world (Olkowski, 1999, p. 91), creating lines of flight for new assemblages. The lengthy compendium of generated and borrowed concepts in the work of Deleuze and Guattari is not word play, but one part of a larger project that rejects the structured categories handed down through the history of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics, ethics). These systems have only served to keep materiality at a distance, held in abeyance through a language that has us looking for the world in all the wrong places. And this explains the political value of spatial terminologies for Deleuze and Guattari, for their efforts to unhinge calcified language regimes is aimed at remapping the terrain of thought so as to welcome in a host of new becomings.

(De)territoriality and the Many Sides of the Border

The above suggests that the concept and process of bordering - a key aspect in Deleuze and Guattari's ontology - can be understood as an event of becoming. As dispersed events of productivity, bordering generates, transverses, and potentially opposes all structures of organization. Bordering describes a vast array of affective and transformative material processes in which social and spatial orders and disorders are constantly reworked.

Consider first how bordering produces an escape from institutionalization. It does so by producing affects that operate outside of the influence of extant organized assemblages. Such lines of escape are productive of new bodies that are capable of any number of new affects. Bordering, passing the limit of stable organization or exhausted connections, is an intense bifurcation that sends bodies into flight and, subsequently, increases their singularities through a process of heterogenesis, 'an active, immanent singularization of subjectivity, as opposed to a transcendent, universalizing and reductionist homogenization. Heterogeneity is an expression of desire, of a becoming that is always in the process of adapting, transforming and modifying itself in relation to its environment' (Pindar and
Sutton, in Guattari, 2000, p. 99, n. 49). The bordering event thus does not sit inertly between sets of ideational categories (Ideas, Subject, and Nature), but rather is active at the event-limit of multiplicities constituted by the affects exchanged between subjectivity and milieu. To deterritorialize an organized body means to make it into a body without organs (BWO), a body that is reawakened to its numerous affective capacities rather than divided up into functions and categories. The body becomes a multiplicity of possible new connections, affects, etc., with other bodies and, more broadly, with the Earth itself.

Thus, although O’ Tuathail (2000) criticizes the invocation of the term ‘deterritorialization’ because of its apparent reference to a borderless world that lacks any sense of spatial distinctiveness or complexity, it is important to note that Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term does not in any way imply that the deterritorialized body is losing its real spatial complexity. Rather, deterritorialization and the heterogenesis it produces are processes that bring forth socio-spatial complexity that was disguised by the functional and categorical divisions of institutionalization. In this use of the concept, then, deterritorialization facilitates new, inventive forms of bordering.

Although accessing lines of flight and creating new bodies helps in the escape from the ‘resentment and bad conscience’ that tend to accompany the instituted body (Marks, 1998, p. 31), Deleuze and Guattari caution that there are always forces of stratification attempting to capture the BwO in order to re-organize and re-absorb (reterritorialize) it into a serial order of like bodies. These are mechanisms of capture and containment [...] that induct the outside into a system of interiority. That system consists in a grid of identities abstracted from actually existing bodies and transposed onto another dimension: from the here and now into the great beyond (Massumi, 1992, p. 111). Deterritorialized bodies are always (at risk of) falling back under the influence of organization, falling from the continual present, actualized through continuous becomings, into an elsewhere of transcendent identity structures.

We can ground this dual-sided disordering and ordering by reference to the worldwide expansion of capital under globalization. If the process of bordering is concerned with the passage of multiplicities through or across their saturated condition in order to create new assemblages and creative possibilities, capital is content to always be present at the limit of those transformations. ‘[C]apitalism is continually reterritorializing with one hand what it is deterritorializing with the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 259). The political potential of any deterritorialized smooth space is therefore always at risk of a capitalist overcoding of social relations and the creation of new hierarchies of labor and production. Thus it is with the neoliberal alliance between capitalism and the state apparatus: all numbers of smooth flows have been territorialized and institutionalized (legally and otherwise) through regimes such as NAFTA on the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican borders.

But this is only one side of becoming-border. Global capital also works by deterritorializing networks and flows across national borders. Building upon the conclusions and political-economic forecasts of Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri have suggested that, given the ‘global expansion of the U.S. constitutional project’- a project ‘constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an
unbounded terrain’ - ‘a border place no longer exists’ (2001, pp. 182-83). The resulting smooth space, while potentially a site of resistance against State striation, is overtaken by capital as a site for connecting several networks of control at once:

‘From the economic point of view, the wage regime is replaced, as a function of regulation, by a flexible and global monetary system; normative command is replaced by the procedures of command and police; and the exercise of domination is formed through communicative networks. This is how exploitation and domination constitute a non-place on the imperial terrain’ (Hardt and Negri 2001, p. 211).

In response to capital’s malleable operations, Hardt and Negri reject any return to striated state spaces. Instead, they call for a new global citizenship in which:

‘The movements of the multitude designate new spaces, and its journeys establish new residences. Autonomous movement is what defines the place proper to the multitude. Increasingly less will passports and legal documents be able to regulate our movements across borders. A new geography is established by the multitude as the productive flows of bodies define new rivers and ports’ (2001, p. 397).

The borderless space of the multitude affirms its autonomy, finally, through a ‘widespread, transversal territorial reappropriation’ (2001, p. 398). It is just such new appropriations that are the focus of the anti-immigration law group, La Resistencia, to which we now turn.

Todos Somos Regales: La Resistencia in the Southwest U.S.

La Resistencia is an organization dedicated to fighting the criminalization of immigrants by the U.S. Border Patrol (La Migra) and by police and vigilantes who enforce control over the U.S.-Mexican border. Founded in 1987, the organization has continuously planned and participated in demonstrations and information dissemination activities aimed at disrupting the physical violence, imprisonment, and deportation experienced by immigrants. Rejecting the order word, ‘illegal’, La Resistencia grounds its opposition in the guarantee that ‘All persons have a right to work’ (La Resistencia, 2003). This right, which is held to supersede any government dictate, is asserted to protect workers and their families from any sanction as they move across the border. In asking readers to judge their commitment to the organization’s goals, the La Resistencia website poses the following questions:

Do you believe that:
• People are driven from their homeland and come to the U.S. to survive?
• All people have a right to survive regardless of legal status?
• Being an immigrant is not a crime? Human life is more important than laws?
La Resistencia's Blue Triangle
Deleuze and Guattari's Bodies without Organs (BwO) take flight from the instituting processes that would organize them as, say, 'illegal'. By appropriating the term selfreferentially, La Resistencia aims to deterritorialize 'illegal' and evacuate its organizing potential. Shirt courtesy of La Resistencia

- People with legal status have the responsibility to defy and resist unjust laws, struggle alongside our brothers and sisters who have been deemed illegal, and protect them? (La Resistencia, 2003).

As part of its activism, the organization opposed California's Proposition 187, an anti-immigrant law that attempted to deny illegally-designated immigrants access to health care, housing, and education, and which `would force people working in education, health care and social services to become “junior Migra agents” or risk losing their jobs and their licenses to work, and possibly jail time’ (GA Resistencia, 2003; Mains, 2000). In response to Proposition 187 and its national counterpart, Federal 187, La Resistencia has engaged in a multipronged strategy of resistance to 'unmap the borders in the world' (van Houtum and Struver, 2002, p. 23) organizing and demonstrating against border blockades and INS detention centers, confronting and exposing acts of violence on the part of La Migra, providing sanctuary for the persecuted, encouraging anti-discriminatory hiring practices on the part of employers, and defying laws that disallow immigrants access to health care and education (La Resistencia, 2003). Members of La Resistencia are recognizable by the blue triangles adorning their clothing and by their banners reading, 'Todos Somos Ilegales/We Are All Illegals'. The blue triangle is appropriated from its use in Nazi Germany, where it identified 'stateless people'. La Resistencia distributes the emblem as a sign of solidarity with 'illegal aliens', the complex body of people categorized through contemporary constructions of Statehood and personhood (Figure 15.1). 'Todos Somos Ilegales/We Are All Illegals' is aimed at disrupting State territorializations of subjectivity (Figure 15.2). Inasmuch as 'illegal' serves as an ontological legitimation for violence committed by both vigilantes and the State (from murder to laws such as Federal 187), refrains of "Todos Somos Ilegales' flattens or smooths the border by delegitimizing exclusivist nationalisms. This border-disordering phrase is simultaneously ordering, encompassing all bodies living within it and offering a new transcendent body, a new 'We', that no longer identifies with the State.
La Resistencia’s website demonstrates an acute understanding of the spatial territorialization and deterritorializations noted in the previous section. In response to the increasingly militarized and striated social space encountered by migrants, La Resistencia explains:

‘The recent anti-terrorist law, the new welfare law, the group of legislation known as “Federal 187”, plans to make “English Only” the law of the land, the millions of dollars spent to militarize the U.S./Mexico border...these moves work to drive immigrants further underground, to set the stage for more raids and round-ups, jailings and beating [sic], deportations and warfare at the border, and to create an anti-immigrant climate which creates a class of “illegals” against whom no crime is unthinkable’ (La Resistencia, 2003).

As Spener and Staudt (1998) note (also Mains, 2000), while these territorializations work against immigrants, other borderings serve the interest of capital. At the present time we have ‘a border open to capital but closed to workers’: the arrival of NAFTA and the accompanying clampdown on the border [through Operation Blockade] were quite explicable: before free trade, U.S. capitalists did not have unfettered access to cheap Mexican workers. It was necessary, therefore, to ‘import’ Mexican workers into the United States. Now, with the Mexican state opening its territory to unfettered foreign investment, U.S. capital had a greater interest in keeping Mexican workers in Mexico, which constituted something of a low-wage labor reserve for manufacturing. In fact, at the,

Figure 15.2 Todos Somos Regales (We Are all Illegal).
This image is from a 1997 march of 20,000 on the town of Watsonville, California, where immigrants mainly work in large strawberry fields. Photo courtesy of Monica Praba Pilar (www.prabapilar.com).
time of the blockade, some cynics speculated that the Border Patrol was actually in cahoots with the operators of maquiladoras in Ciudad Juarez, who complained that they had a shortage of assembly workers at the going rate of pay (Spener and Staudt, 1998: 235-36).

The duplicity of this capital-state alliance is subject to a stinging critique by La Resistencia:

`It is extreme hypocrisy for the government to state that people may not cross borders to survive. U.S. corporations send investments anywhere they want. The U.S. sends armies all over the world to bomb and kill people and sponsor death squad governments. All these create the very conditions that make survival impossible' (La Resistencia, 2003).

None of the above is to suggest that the border is somehow exhaustively organized according to a neoliberal capital-state alliance. For example, Patricia Price’s discussion of the ‘aesthetics of Aztlan’ deconstructs the supposed binary solidity of the southwestern border of the U.S., suggesting that it is instead a fragmented, ‘spatial schizophrenia’ (2000, p. 104) where signs constantly disrupt the nationalized order of things. As with the slogans of La Resistencia, Price explains that the presence of tattoos and murals inscribed upon bodies and walls invoking the imagined geography of Aztlan and its attendant counter-nationalizing discourse rupture the apparent stability of spatial identity instituted throughout the border region. The solidity of the border as an ordering and organizational principle of identity is disrupted through minor deterritorializations of bodies and spaces that are transformed to signal associations with other people who nevertheless occupy the same territory (`We are all illegals`). When understood as an event that deterritorializes the body, such forms of sign-based resistance can produce a disruptive affect, or what Deleuze calls ‘a shock to thought’ (1989, p. 156), upon their witnesses. Price cites a San Diego resident who exemplifies the disorientation inherent in such shocks:

There are a whole lot of portions of Los Angeles city ...if you didn't know where you're at you'd swear you're in Tijuana. You cannot tell the difference. You cannot tell the difference. The barrio that exists in Tijuana looks exactly the same as the one in Los Angeles. As an American, I'm offended by that' (Price, 2000, pp. 103-4; emphasis in original).

Price suggests that such utterances are the result of ‘anxieties at being lost or overrun’ (2000, p. 104) on the part of members of the homogeneous majority. We see an additional complexity that operates in such moments of spatial disorientation. Note that the speaker's account of the spatial similarities between areas in Los Angeles and Tijuana (captured entirely through his own gazing practices) is fraught with invocations of transcendent spatial identity categories that he cannot seem to map onto his experience of space. No doubt, these order words, ‘Los Angeles’, ‘Tijuana’, function as a first step in his thought, one that precedes the experience of the space itself. Such a problem is compounded by the speaker's intense investment in his own (categorical, organizational) spatial identity (`American' no less). The invocation of transcendental organizing names has some
effect on the way that space is organized in thought, but it is at the cost of ignoring the particularities of space. In the present instance, such particularities are exactly those that disrupt the difference posited by the category of the border, a category in which the speaker remains invested in order to stave off the sense that he is himself an alien in a territory that he has misunderstood.

What the San Diegan is missing in his interactions with space, a finding that is at the heart of La Resistencia’s oppositional strategies, is recognition of the various becomings that unfold through the interactions of bodies and space. His deployment of order words that attempt to reterritorialize the Earth in spite of itself speak to that micro-fascist desire for the transcendental that offers an ideational security blanket in the face of the world’s immanent uncertainty. The dichotomy that he invokes between spatial transformations and his own national identity is an attempt to solidify and prioritize the border and the logic of spatial organization that should proceed from it. We witness here a necessary component to the striation of space; namely, the ordering of thought in a manner that takes itself to be prior to the materiality of space and its becomings, and that reads inconsistencies between thought and space as problems surfacing in the realm of the gap (c.f. above: ‘looking for the world in all the wrong places’). This procedure speaks to the development of discourses of immigrant ‘invasion’, where national ‘natives’ panic at the discovery that flows of bodies in search of work, education, medical care, etc., seem to disregard ordering strategies in favor of care of the self and the community. La Resistencia’s revolutionary cry, ‘Todos Somos Ilegales’, reverses this ordering, deterritorializing ‘native’ and setting the border off on a new line of flight.

Conclusion

The concept of borders developed in this paper is strikingly different from a conception that understands them to be stable, permanently situated objects. On the contrary, ‘at the limit, all that counts is the constantly shifting borderline’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 367, italics added). The movement of the borderline that marks the horizon of the multiplicity is perhaps more akin to the borderlands that are said to surround state borders as sites of intensive marginality and creativity. As such, the smooth spaces generated by assemblages (e.g., La Resistencia) that resist both the striating forces of the state and the smooth reterritorializations of capital are not metaphorically like borderlands, but are themselves borderlands constituted by the bordering activity of becoming. In this sense, borderlands can appear and disappear at any point within striated space (and not simply along the State border). As Anzaldua notes, ‘when I capitalize Borderlands, it means that it’s not the actual Southwest or the Canada-U.S. border, but that it’s an emotional Borderlands which can be found anywhere where there are different kinds of people coming together and occupying the same space or where there are spaces that are sort of hemmed in by these larger groups of people’ (1994-95, p. 77).

Assemblages such as La Resistencia take their lines of flight from what they are bordering against: striations, organizations, institutions that want to close the escape hatches and fold these fleeing aberrations back into the order of things. The
group’s strategy seems to speak to the solution proposed by Deleuze and Guattari: ‘it is by leaving the plan(e) of capital, and never ceasing to leave it, that a mass becomes increasingly revolutionary and destroys the dominant equilibrium of the denumerable sets’ (1987, p. 472). If capital has indeed erased international borders, leaving the plan(e) of capital requires something that Massumi has encouraged from the outset: that you cavy your borderings with you. The erasure of national borders (which is itself always an imperfect concept and an incomplete project: see Paasi, 2003; Yeung, 1998) would not mean the end of borders. Following Johnson and Michaelson, we can ‘trouble the place of the border’ (1997, p. 31) in order to see it distributed across various diverse spaces, and not simply constituted by capital or state striations, but as emerging from the assemblages of bodies becoming-other upon it. La Resistencia’s ‘transversal territorial reappropriation’ (Hardt and Negri, 2001) embraces the perpetual end point proposed by Massumi: ‘To achieve the goal that has no end means ceasing to seem to be what you are [‘legal’] in order to become what you cannot be: supermolecular forever. The goal is a limit approached, never reached’ (1992, p. 106, emphasis in original). The practice of reappropriation of space by the multitude, the minor (Katz, 1996), manifests becomings-other by assembling in and with space, by bordering against the surrounding smooth spaces of capital. But even the term ‘reappropriation’ may be problematic: becomings can never really re-appropriate, they cannot return ownership, capture, or repossess a space. Rather, these moments of becoming merely reawaken what was always there: the ever-existing capacity for mutual transformativity and inter-affectivity.

References

On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari


index

actions, analysis of, 161
action-centred perspective, 49
action setting, 161
action theory, 159
Agamben, 8
analysis of everyday regionalizations, 47
analysis of museum exhibitions, 214
Anderson, 19
astronaut household, 67

banal nationalism, 212
behaviour(al)ism, 156, 162
bio-power, 163
body, 142
without organs, 240
b/ordering, 3
b/ordering turn, 4
border, 33, 236, 242, 243, 244
as obstacle, 207
between Portugal and Spain, 192
demarcation of, 196
in people's minds, 207
metaphor, 238,
narratives, 190
poetics, 191
region, 244
studies, 236
bordered body, 165
bordered practices, 218
border-edge, 10, 183
bordering, 239, 246
practices, 7
processes, 47
borderlands, 10, 39
borderless world, 1, 5, 18, 24, 25, 36, 61
borderline communities, 8, 109
border-making, 70
boundary, 22, 33, 35, 37
drawing practices, 18
stones, 191
studies, 17, 27
Bourdieu, P., 210
British Columbia, 114

business immigrants, 63, 69

Camp David, 128
capitalism, 240, 243, 246
circulating knowledge, 149
citizenship, 70
city, 41
colonialism, 110
concept of borders, 245
conceptions of space, 6
conditio humana, 9
constitutions of space, 54
cross-border planning, 7
cyclonic model of international economy, 111

De Certeau M., 10, 209
de-bordered self, 167
decision-making, 157
Deleuze, G., 11, 235, 237
democratic representation, 80
designer regions, 87
determinism, 157, 178, 181
de-territorialization, 11, 24, 35, 237, 240
discourse analysis, 194
disembedding, 56
disintegration, 200
Durkheim, E., 181
Dutch-German border, 208, 217
relations, 215
eccentric positionality, 165
economic borders, 8
encounters, 146, 149
entrepreneurs, 65
essence of borders, 12
ethnic community, 65
EU regional policy, 77, 80, 84
Europe without frontiers, 10, 200
European integration, 199
European Union as an imagined community, 193
Euroregio Salzburg, 103, 104
| every day, life, 209 | 250 | B/ordering Space |
| practice, 10 | 03 | La Resistencia, 241 |
| practices, 209 | 11, 233 | language border, 11, 233 |
| regionalizations, 6 | 228, 233 | language regions, 228, 233 |
| fatal confusion, 49 | 50, 52, 209 | Lefebvre, H., 50, 52, 209 |
| Foucault, M., 163 | | majority fallacy, 230 |
| gated community, 43 | man-environment relationship, 159 | |
| geography as an auxiliary science, 178 | Mead, G. H., 159 | |
| globalization, 5, 24, 35, 61, 240 | metanationalism, 21 | |
| of capital, 36 | metropolis, 40, 146 | |
| of culture, 37 | migrants, 6, 12, 61, 241 | |
| of life-worlds, 56 | migrant strategies, 71 | |
| glocalization, 93 | migration | |
| governance, 78, 80 | illegal activities, 70 | |
| Grossraum, 184 | motives, 64 | |
| Guattari, F., 11, 235, 237 | policy, 62 | |
| Hardt, M., 240 | models of man, 156 | |
| homo absconditus, 166 | nation, 22, 26, 232 | |
| homo economicus, 71, 157 | national | |
| homo sacer, 8, 130, 131, 133 | identity, 11, 223, 224 | |
| human geography, 9 | imaginations, 211 | |
| competing paradigms in, 98 | stereotypes, 212 | |
| hybridity, 39 | necropolitics, 123 | |
| identification, 212 | Negri, A., 240 | |
| identity, 23 | non-border-crossings, 11 | |
| formation, 20 | Oslo accords, 127 | |
| policies, 226 | | |
| ideology, 22 | Paasi, A., 82 | Palestine, 8, 123 |
| illegal | | partition, 197 |
| aliens, 242 | | peripheral areas, 8 |
| settlements, 128 | | philosophical anthropology, 9 |
| imaginative borders, 218 | | places on the margins, 198 |
| immigration policy, 71 | | planning, 7 |
| information dissemination, 149 | | doctrine, 100, 103 |
| Innis, H., 8, 109 | | paradigms, 97, 100 |
| intifada, 126, 129 | | theory, 99 |
| invisible geographies, 143 | Plessner, H., 9, 164 | |
| Irish border, 196 | pluralism of scientific approaches, 97 | |
| Israel, 8 | | political representation, 229 |
| Janus-face of borders, 12 | | popular culture, 210 |
| Jewish state, project of, 124 | | postmetropolis, 6, 40 |
| Kafka, F., 238 | | postmetropolitan transition, 41, 43 |
| knowledge/power, 163 | power topology, 8, 124 | |
Index

quality triangle, 82
race, 184
Ratzel, F. 9, 171
Anthropogeography, 175
biography, 173
borders, 182
method, 180
Political Geography, 175
spatial turn, 172, 175
region, 7, 41, 77, 87
and capacities 79
and system of spatial planning, 94
transnational, 95
regional
boundaries and spatial bias of staples, 113
competitiveness, 78
identity, 81
parliament, 105
regionalism, 38
regionalization, 55, 77, 93
and boundaries, 85
European agenda, 83
phases of, 85
representation, 2
of borders, 182
re-scaling, 19, 28
Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, 125
retirement migration, 69
return migration, 68
RSStigraben, 223, 228
routines of non-border-crossings, 213
Salzburg, 95, 98, 101, 102
Schutz, A., 160
self, 159, 164
single industry towns, 110
situated
knowledge, 145
practice, 9, 34, 142
Six Day War, 125
smooth space, 241
social morphology, 181
sovereignty, 25
space, 48, 50, 51
as frame of reference, 51, 52
misunderstandings in the conception of, 51
of Absence, 217
of exception, 8, 124, 131
of flows, 25
of transgression, 34
space-time bias, concept of, 112
spatial
fix, 88
integration, 230
turn, 4, 155
splintering urbanism, 42
staple commodities, 109
staples
and post-Fordism, 118
and regulation, 116
and space-time bias, 112, 113
theory, 110
state, 17, 21, 26
strategic actions of immigrants, 66, 71, 72
stress-free borderland, 26
structuralism, 158
surveillance, 129, 131
sustainability, 81
Switzerland, 223
taboo, 224
technologies of domination, 163
of the self, 163
territorial
container, 2
reappropriation, 241
trap, 21
territorialization, 11, 19, 20, 28, 34, 56
terrorism, 123
time and space, torsions of, 132
topological imaginary of splintered
Palestine, 133
UN resolutions 242 and 338, 127
urbanization, 41
world-binding, 55
zone of indistinction, 132