WINDOW ON THE NETHERLANDS

ELASTIC MIGRATION: THE CASE OF DUTCH SHORT-DISTANCE TRANSMIGRANTS IN BELGIAN AND GERMAN BORDERLANDS

HENK VAN HOUTUM & RUBEN GIELIS

Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Department of Human Geography, Faculty of Policy Sciences, University of Nijmegen PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, the Netherlands E-mails: H.van.Houtum@bw.kun.nl

ABSTRACT

Along the Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German border a new and interesting kind of transmigration is developing, that is migration over only a few kilometres across the border. The main characteristic of these Dutch short-distance transmigrants is that they have their houses in Belgium/Germany, but their social and working life still takes place in the Netherlands. Their transmigration is hence very elastic. This elasticity invokes the interesting question: what kind of (trans)national identity these Dutch are displaying and to what extent the Dutch desire to be and/or are socially provoked to be integrated in the neighbouring Belgian/German society. These cross-border spaces in which the short-distance migrants have their residences could very well be interesting micro-scale laboratories of the future of the nation-state in the European Union.

Key words: Transnationalism, short-distance transmigrants, borderlands, national identity, integration, elastic migration

INTRODUCTION

Along the Belgian and German border, just outside the Netherlands, an interesting socio-spatial phenomenon is taking place that could best be described as elastic migration. By this we mean to describe the resilient bond migrants can have with their country of origin, resulting in frequent visits and/or strong identification with the nation of origin. Hence, the elastic is created by the interaction between on the one hand centrifugal forces, that is the moving house to another country and on the other hand of centripetal forces, that is the maintaining of an active and/or affective bond with the country of origin. The elastic migrants who we wish to focus on here is the case of Dutch nationals who are living abroad but only a few kilometres away from the Dutch border. Of the Dutch that migrate out of the Netherlands, the largest category is now taken up by those who migrate to Germany or Belgium, and for the most part this concerns a migration just across the border (Graef & Mulder 2003). These Dutch migrants still dominantly ‘use’ the Dutch society in terms of school and/or work and most of them still have a strong Dutch national identity. In this paper, we will embed the phenomenon of elastic migration in the wider academic debate of transnational migration, map the most important settlements of the Dutch along the Belgian and German border and ask ourselves what possible consequences this kind of migration will have on the national identity of the transmigrants as well as on their integration in the receiving local villages of the neighbouring Belgian and German (nation-)state. In short, what is the future of the elastic in the elastic migration of Dutch to the borderlands of the neighbouring countries Germany and Belgium?
SHORT VERSUS LONG-DISTANCE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

The phenomenon of Dutch ‘borderlanders’ can be embedded in the academic debate around transnational migrants or transmigrants. In this debate transmigrants are usually understood as international migrants who create and maintain economic, political, social and/or cultural bonds with their country of origin (Basch et al. 1996; Glick-Schiller et al. 1997; Portes et al. 1999; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). Transmigration is then dominantly seen as a migration over long distances, where the transmigrants usually stay in contact with their motherland by means of telecommunication (such as television, telephone, e-mail and the Internet) and/or an occasional visit. The short-distance transmigration has not received considerable academic attention so far. There is a wide-ranging international debate on long-distance migration of for example Asians to the United States or the transmigration of people from developing countries to Western countries (Szanton-Blanc et al. 1995; Smith 2001). And the phenomenon of cross-border commuting, that is living in your homeland, but working in the neighbouring country, has received considerable attention as well. But the in-between and relatively new category of living in a neighbouring country, while at the same time working, has not received thorough academic attention yet. To the best of our knowledge only a few academic papers have dealt with this phenomenon, for instance on the short-distance transnational migration of Americans and Canadians across the US-Canadian border and Americans across the US-Mexican border, Spaniards and Portuguese on the Spanish-Portuguese border (e.g. Sidaway 2001), Dutch to the Belgian borderlands (e.g. Van der Haegen 1997) and Dutch just across the German border (e.g. Strüver 2005). By contrast, the media have picked up on this issue quite extensively. A large number of (local) media have reported on this issue, often labelling it as an important and sensitive phenomenon. It is seen as sensitive mostly because of the assumed lack of integration of the transmigrants in the neighbouring society and the feeling of being overwhelmed by strangers. Focusing on the Dutch-German border for instance, the integration of the Dutch has been described as problematic (TC-Tubantia 2004; TC-Tubantia 2004a). Some articles report that Dutch exiles are arising on the edges of the German and Belgian border places. Other articles address the problems the migration causes for the Dutch government, for example in their local house-building policy (TC-Tubantia 2004b). Others focus on the sending of the children of the migrants to schools in the Netherlands (NRC Handelsblad 2003; De Gelderlander 2003) and on the refusal of many Dutch transmigrants in German border to learn the German language (van Oosten 2005). Building on the public interest the phenomenon already received along the Dutch border, we feel it is important to better understand the motivations for emigrating just across the border, the (future of the) force of attraction the homeland can have on Dutch emigrants and the possible future of their elastic dwelling in two countries at the same time. For, as can be expected because of the short distance, in the case of a transmigration just across the border the frequency of the corporeal contact is often very high. The short-distance transmigrants not only stay in contact with their country of origin by telecommunication means, but also cross the state border (almost) everyday in a corporeal sense (Van Houtum 2002). In addition, it can be expected that in the case of short distance transmigrants the identification with the nation of origin is still very high. And yet, their emigration is real. They do not live in their homeland anymore, they have moved house and thereby a central part of their habitat. Hence, we believe that this intense elasticity on this micro-scale of a border region could provide valuable insights for the wider study of transmigration.

DUTCH TERRITORIAL CLUSTERS ACROSS THE BORDER

Let us look in more detail at what is taking place in these borderlands of the Netherlands. For a long time the migration of Dutch to Belgian/German borderlands concerned mainly labour migration and consisted only of a few thousand persons altogether. The largest part of those who worked abroad commuted across the border but kept on living in their homeland (Van Houtum & Van der Velde 2004). Since the
opening of the borders of the European Union with the Schengen Treaty of 1985 however, there has been a substantial increase of the flow of Dutch actually moving house to the borderlands of Belgium and Germany. An important impetus for this was the opening of the border through the Schengen agreement, which made the migration to Belgium or Germany much easier. The opening of the border together with the more attractive financial climate in Belgium and Germany are the most important reasons for the increase of Dutch transmigrants just across the border. In Belgium there was and is an attractive fiscal climate compared to the Dutch tax system and in Germany the house prices, land prices, house taxes and car taxes were and still are lower than in the Netherlands. Hence, what binds both directions of short-distance migrations is that the motivation of their migration is first and foremost cost-driven and that the active and affective bond with the Netherlands remains very strong.

The most important difference between the Dutch migrants in the German borderlands and those in the Belgian borderlands, is that the latter come from all parts of the Netherlands, mainly attracted by the attractive fiscal climate in Belgium, while the former dominantly come from the nearby Dutch border-region, mostly attracted by the cheaper house and land prices in the direct surroundings of larger Dutch cities. The migrants on the Belgian border – because they do not necessarily come from the directly bordering region – generally have a weaker bond with the directly bordering region and have more activities on the Belgian side of the border than those in the German borderlands. For instance, the Dutch in the Belgian borderlands often send their children to Belgian schools while the Dutch in the German borderlands in general send their children to Dutch schools. On the Dutch-German border the migration started somewhat later than the migration to the Belgian borderlands. Although the Dutch-German border controls were removed in 1985 as well, this development did not immediately affect the cross-border practices of the Dutch in the Dutch-German borderland. One reason for this difference could be the different language in Germany, whereas in Belgium Dutch is also spoken. A second reason for this relatively passive behaviour until the end of the 1990s could be the strained Dutch-German relations which were to a large extent the result of the Second World War and which have resulted in an antagonistic image and representation of Germans by the Dutch for several decades (see e.g. Becher 1996; Van Houtum and Van Dam 2002; Sars 2004). The Germans functioned as the symbolic constitutive Other for the Dutch nation for several decades after the Second World War. Yet, what we have seen since the end of the 1990s, but especially after 9/11, the day of the attack on the World Trade Center in the United States, is that in the Netherlands as an effect of these attacks, the emphasis on the Germans as the symbolic Other for the Dutch nation has been radically replaced by the antagonistic representation of the Muslim immigrant. The current Dutch neoconservative politics, in its claim to create a strong national identity and cohesion, is increasingly using the non-integrated and/or fundamental Muslim as the constitutive symbolic Other. The rivalry with the Germans seems to have withered away. Of course, if the Netherlands play against Germany in the next World Cup in Germany the antagonism might come back, but we expect that the sharp antagonism as we have seen before has diminished. In the backdrop of this more friendly climate between Germany and the Netherlands, what was also of great importance in softening the (mental) border between the Netherlands and Germany was purely financial stimulus. At the end of the 1990s, due to housing shortages in the Netherlands there was an extreme rise of Dutch housing and land prices, the prices became almost twice as high as the German prices (Westhof 2003; Schipper 2005). In 2003, an average detached house in the Netherlands cost approximately 342,000 euro, while in Germany the prices were on average between 175,000 euro and 200,000 euro. In addition, when one buys a house in Germany one receives a so-called Eigenheimzulage (own house benefit), a benefit that does not exist in the Netherlands (Kuiipers 2002; Schipper 2005). On top of that there are other financial benefits when moving to Germany. Not only are the local municipality taxes in Germany much lower than in the Netherlands, but the car taxes and road taxes are also lower. Perhaps the most important benefit since 2001 was the revision of the Dutch tax system in that year. Since then Dutch migrants are
allowed to keep receiving a reduction of mortgage interest in the Netherlands if they keep their jobs in the Netherlands and keep on paying their taxes in the Netherlands (Graef & Mulder 2003).

The Belgian and German borderlands are now among the most significant migration destinations for the Dutch. In 2003 a total of 50,840 Dutch were living in the Belgian borderlands and 32,873 Dutch in the German borderlands (Graef & Mulder 2003; see Table 1).

Most Dutch migrants are clustered together in Belgian/German agglomerations that are located close to larger Dutch border cities (see Figure 1). In other words, the agglomerations across the border could be seen as satellites of the larger cities in the Netherlands. Examples of these cross-border satellite-agglomerations in Belgium are Essen (nearby Roosendaal), Meerle (nearby Breda), Poppel and Turnhout (nearby Tilburg) and Lommel (nearby Eindhoven). Along the Dutch-German border the migrants are dominantly concentrated in border areas such as Bunde (nearby Winschoten), Bad Bentheim and Gronau (nearby Enschede), Kranenburg and Kleve (nearby Nijmegen) and Sittard (nearby Sittard). In general one can say, the closer to the state border a village or town is located, the more Dutch are living in that place. For example, in the German border village Kranenburg 18.2 per cent of the population is Dutch while in Kleve, 10 kilometres further to the east, ‘only’ 4.3 per cent of the population is Dutch (Huijgen & Reijmer 2005).

In jest or not, as it is hard to judge at the outset, some Dutch wish to emphasise that they are different. They manifestly mark off their property with flags, symbols or small plates and some Germans, possibly as a reaction to this, make clear that they are German also through the use of flags or symbols.

### Table 1. Number of migrants in Belgian and German borderlands (2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of migrants</th>
<th>Migrants is the borderland</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch in Belgium</td>
<td>96,643</td>
<td>50,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch in Germany</td>
<td>114,489</td>
<td>32,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>211,132</td>
<td>83,713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Netherlandisation of Foreign Territory**

Especially on the Dutch-German border, the increase of Dutch people moving to Germany has created difficulties in urban planning on both sides of the border. In some Dutch border regions local planners underestimated the migration to Germany, which resulted in a planning of too many new houses in the Dutch border region. As a result of this, and in the attempt to cope with the migration of their inhabitants across the border, some Dutch municipalities have expressed a desire to build new housing areas across the Dutch-German border. On the German side of the border, the German villagers more and more face a fiercer competition in the local housing market. Because of the migration of so many Dutch, the demand for houses has become greater than the supply, which is beginning to result in a shortage of (affordable) houses for the German villagers. In addition, the large demand for houses and sites by Dutch border migrants has resulted in a rise of housing and land prices. So, besides the shortage of houses for sale, the high house prices and land prices are also causing difficulties for German villagers in buying or building houses in what they see as their village. Because of this development, some municipalities in German villages on the Dutch-German border have started to make a discriminative distinction between land prices for the own local population and for the Dutch. It is an illustration of the fact that the mayors of the German border villages are increasingly situating themselves in a balancing act. On the one hand, they wish to please the local population, leading for instance to cheaper land prices for the own population, but on the other hand because of the ageing and decreasing size of the
own population, they wholeheartedly welcome the Dutch as new inhabitants in their towns.

Their houses may be on the other side of the border, but the social life of the Dutch short-distance migrants still dominantly takes place in the Netherlands. Hence, the dominant pattern is that the Dutch migrants live in Belgium/Germany for financial reasons, shop for their daily groceries in Belgium/Germany because of convenience and the lower prices in the supermarket, but still work in the Netherlands, visit their family in the Netherlands, go for recreation to the Netherlands, and send their children to schools on the Dutch side of the border. Especially on the Dutch-German border the Dutch children who live in Germany using Dutch

Figure 1. Large Dutch clusters across the Dutch-German and Dutch-Belgian border.
schools causes a specific border-problem. The German schools are faced with an abundance of places for children and the Dutch schools are confronted with a shortage of places for children. Another consequence is that most of these young Dutch children predominantly do not have German friends and hardly integrate into local German society. They see themselves and are seen still as outsiders to local German society. To increase child places at their schools and to stimulate the integration of Dutch children in German society, the primary school of the German border village Kranenburg recently announced that they plan to appoint a Dutch teacher next year (<www.nu.nl>). By means of developing bilingual education, the administration of the school hopes that Dutch border migrants will send their children to the local school instead of a Dutch school on the other side of the border. The ‘Netherlandisation’ of foreign territory in terms of education and housing is becoming even more pronounced through the increased hiring of Dutch construction firms and plumbers, Dutch maternity care advising pregnant women in the Dutch territorial communities in the Belgian and German borderlands. The result of the many local border-crossings of the Dutch is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could be seen as the withering away of the mental and corporeal division caused by the national Dutch-Belgium/Dutch-German border. On the other hand, these same border-crossings could also be seen as activities which emphasise the Dutch-Belgian/Dutch-German border, for it is almost an entirely Dutch injection of people and services in German and Belgian space.

THE FUTURE OF ELASTIC MIGRATION

The elastic kind of migration that is emerging in the Belgian/German borderlands is increasingly questioning the modernist assumption of state and nation equality. It is this still largely taken for granted assumption of similitude between integration in a state and integration in a nation that becomes problematic in understanding, let alone tolerating the existence of various identities in a state, so significant for our era. For, it can be argued that there is a difference between respecting/adopting the formal rules and laws created by the Belgian/German state or municipal authority and respecting/adopting the customs, rituals and conventions of the Belgian/German people in the border places. The first issue that needs to be explored further in future research on the elastic migration of Dutch migrants concerns the degree of integration in the German/Belgian state. How is the flexible citizenship, in terms of moving house just across the border, while maintaining Dutch nationality, interpreted and dealt with by the German/Belgian state and municipality. In this context, it is an open question as to whether the Dutch transmigrants in the longer run are interpreted by the German/Belgian state as international parasites only profiting from lower prices and taxes or as new citizens and welcome additions in the struggle against the ageing of the Belgian/German border villages.

The second issue to investigate further then is the degree of integration in the nation. How much integration is needed for a state to exist, in other words, how much nation is needed for a state? At present, one can, broadly speaking, discern three groups of scholars in this debate on the future of the nation-state (Tambini 2001; Balibar 2004). The first group of academics continues to defend the nation-state. These largely liberal nationalistic academics find that the nation (still) is and should be an absolute requirement for citizenship (e.g. Miller 1992). A second group of academics believes it is necessary to think beyond the concept of the nation-state. They posit that there are other ways to create a bond with the state in an increasingly multicultural society (Soysal 1994; Tambini 2001). Examples of this postnational thinking are Schnapper’s plea for a community of citizens: civic nation (Schnapper 1994) and Habermas’ plea for a non-national patriotism: constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1992, 1994). And finally, there are those who plea for an international, cosmopolitan state, a worldwide single community in which identities of all kinds can flourish and are heard (e.g. Nussbaum 1994; Cheah & Robbins 1998; Jones 1999; Vertovec et al. 2002). The question then is which state/nation model is likely to develop in the borderlands of Belgium/Germany. A core issue in answering this question will be the extent these immigrants are allowed to preserve their national identities. What is for instance expected from the Dutch teacher in Kranenburg? Does
REFERENCES

1. There has been and still is a relatively small amount of migrants coming yearly from Germany and Belgium to the Netherlands. The largest amount of migration traffic is however from the Netherlands to Belgium and Germany, especially after 1985.

2. The increase of the number of Dutch ‘fiscal migrants’ in the Belgian borderlands with more than 10,000 between 1981 (before the introduction of the Schengen Treaty) and 1996 (after the introduction of the Schengen Treaty), illustrates the importance of this Treaty for the short distance transmigration of the Dutch (Van der Haegen 1997).

3. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this paper the figures for 2004 and 2005 were not available.


Newspaper articles

De Gelderlander (2003), Samenwerken met Regio Kleef: Tweetaligheid Voorwaarde. 19 May.


NRC Handelsblad (2003), Grensgevechten. 15 November.


TE-Tubantia (2004c), Integreren in Duitsland is Moeilijk. 20 October.